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 During the eighteenth century, a wave of thought inundated the Spanish empire, 
introducing new knowledge in the natural sciences, religion, and philosophy, and importantly, 
questioning the very modes of perceiving and ascertaining this knowledge.  This period of 
epistemic rupture in Spain and her colonies, commonly referred to as the Enlightenment, not 
only presented new ways of knowing, but inspired impassioned debates among leading 
intellectuals about the epistemology and philosophy that continued throughout the century.  The 
previous scholarly literature has largely dismissed Spain’s intellectual activity in the eighteenth-
century, arguing that its predominantly conservative and Catholic culture stifled innovation and 
relegated it to a peripheral and derivative position in the broader European Enlightenment.  Only 
recently have scholars given serious attention to the conception of a widespread “Catholic 
Enlightenment.”  This dissertation places the intellectual and religious activity of the eighteenth-
century Spanish empire within this Catholic Enlightenment, specifically examining the ways in 
which religious intellectuals mediated and contested Enlightenment thought.  It particularly 
highlights the works of Counter-Enlightenment thinkers who engaged eighteenth-century 
philosophy but ultimately rejected it. 
 This dissertation examines the leading theological, philosophical, and scientific writings 
of religious intellectuals, university professors, natural philosophers, and physicians in 
eighteenth-century Spain, New Spain, and Peru, additionally considering personal letters, 
Inquisitorial evidence, and writing from the popular press of the period.  In so doing, it assesses 
the way in which such writings contended for an epistemology which would satisfy both the new 
philosophies and sciences as well as the Catholic faith; showing how eighteenth-century 
Spaniards defined the relationship between these fields and how they conceived of the 
disciplines of knowledge. 
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Ultimately, this dissertation argues that the work of Catholic Enlightenment and Counter-
Enlightenment individuals in Spain was less radical than the philosophies adopted by French or 
British counterparts.  The Spanish Enlightenment experience was the result of a deliberate, 
thoughtful, and careful negotiation between ancients and moderns and an attempt to conciliate 
new methods of knowledge into the existing Scholastic framework which had been held in the 
Spanish empire for centuries, rather than accepting a complete epistemological rupture.  It 
demonstrates the role of conservative intellectuals in contesting epistemological hegemony in the 
mid-eighteenth century by proposing alternative, and at times, mutually exclusive, systems for 
understanding and pursuing truth.  It similarly shows how these epistemological debates 
impacted the way that Spaniards conceived of the relationship between science and religion.  
This, in turn, impacts the way in which historians understand both the way that Spain related to 
the European community, especially France, during the eighteenth century, as well as the way 
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Encountering the Spanish Enlightenments 
“For my part, I am persuaded, that the torpid infidelity of ignorance prevails more in Spain than 
the active infidelity of science in either England or France...such is the general neglect of 
education that the principal ministers find it difficult to procure proper men to fill the common 
offices.” 
-Joseph Townsend, A Journey Through Spain in the Years 1786 and 1787 (1791)1 
 “…It is enough to note,” commented Benito Jerónimo Feijóo (1676-1764), “that 
Theology and Philosophy have their limits well distinguished, and that no Spaniard disregards 
the fact that revealed doctrine has the right of superiority over human discourse, [a right] which 
all the natural sciences lack.”2  In this pronouncement, this priest and amateur natural 
philosopher of eighteenth-century Spain responded to concerns of his contemporaries that the 
new discourse of knowledge provided by Enlightenment thinkers posed a direct challenge to the 
Catholic faith in Spain.  Feijóo saw the fields of Theology and Philosophy (meaning natural 
philosophy, or science) as distinct and hierarchical – yet at other times spoke of science and 
religion as partners in the quest for knowledge and understanding.  How did Spanish intellectuals 
like Feijóo confront the crisis of knowledge that historians commonly call “the Enlightenment?”  
What was considered true knowledge in eighteenth-century Spain, and what ways of justifying 
this knowledge existed? 
To answer these questions, this dissertation provides the history of a particular epistemic 
shift that occurred in Spain at the end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth century 
                                                 
1 Joseph Townsend, A journey through Spain in the years 1786 and 1787 with particular attention to the 
agriculture, manufactures, commerce, population, taxes, and revenue of that country; and remarks in passing 
through a part of France (London: C. Dilly, 1797), three volumes, pg. 235, 247. 
2 Benito Jerónimo Feijóo. Cartas eruditas, y curiosas en que, por la mayor parte, se continiúa el deseignio del 
Teatro Crítico Universal, impugnando, o reduciendo a dudosas, varias opiniones comunes, Tomo Segundo (Madrid, 
1745), Carta XVI, “Causas del atraso que se padece en España en orden a las Ciencias Naturales.”(Hereafter CE, 
marked with essay and paragraph numbers, where applicable). “...basta advertir, que la Teología, y la Filosofía 
tienen bien distinguidos sus límites; y que ningún Español ignora, que la doctrina revelada tiene un derecho de 
superioridad sobre el discurso humano, de que carecen todas las Ciencias Naturales…” (CE II.16.§24) 
2 
– one that had repercussions well throughout the end of the century and into the modern period.  
The idea of an ‘epistemic shift’ relates directly to both Michel Foucault’s concept of an episteme 
and Thomas Kuhn’s similarly defined paradigm: that is, the term given to the collection of a 
priori assumptions about knowledge, collected discursive practices, and the existing metaphysics 
which govern the way individuals approach knowledge.3  The following research describes the 
crucible of epistemological debates which exerted the necessary pressure to force an uneasy 
change in the status quo of the study of knowledge throughout the Spanish empire.  By 
examining key works of philosophy, theology, and science, this study demonstrates how these 
changes began in the initial works of early Spanish novatores (early Enlightenment thinkers) at 
the end of the seventeenth-century (1687), were in full debate by the mid-eighteenth century 
(1727-1765), and were still being contested at the time of the restoration of Fernando VII after 
the French occupation of the Iberian Peninsula (1813).  This places Spain squarely and 
coterminously in the midst of the larger European Enlightenment unfolding during the eighteenth 
century. 
At the start of the eighteenth century, new currents of philosophical and scientific thought 
began to upset the intellectual climate of Spain and her colonies.  New anatomical and 
biochemical advances influenced medicinal practice, and a call for the practice of medical 
skepticism and empirical practice destabilized the traditional strains of Galenic and Hippocratic 
thought.  Academic societies and tertulias began to appear across the peninsula.  In the field of 
natural philosophy, Spanish intellectuals now commonly read scientific authors, including 
foreign authors such as Francis Bacon and Isaac Newton.  Along with the impressive corpus of 
new scientific knowledge, however, came those advocating for a new methodological platform – 
                                                 
3 See Michel Foucault, Les mots et les choses: une archéolegie des sciences humaines (Paris : Editions Gallimard, 
1966) ; Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1962). 
3 
one that would not only govern how one conducted studies of the natural world, but how one 
valued different types of knowledge and approached learning in general. 
Sometimes, such concerns were smuggled in as the philosophical underpinnings of new 
works, at other times, they were confronted head-on by the leading philosophers of the day.  The 
repercussions of their findings began to sound across all disciplines; in the study of both physics 
and metaphysics, the implications of scientific advancements provided new perspectives, 
destabilizing the Scholasticism advocated by the Spanish university system and calling for a 
rejection of the monopoly which Aristotelianism held in nearly all areas of inquiry.  These 
changes, commonly referred to collectively as the “New Philosophy” or the “New Science,” 
impacted the sphere of the religious and intellectual thinkers of the Spanish empire throughout 
the eighteenth century.  To some, these changes were welcome and overdue – individuals such as 
Benito Jerónimo Feijóo, Andrés Piquer (1711-1772), and Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos (1744-
1811) often lamented what they viewed as the intellectual backwardness of Spain and criticized 
the reluctance of the university, church, and state to adopt the import of new philosophies.  To 
many others, such as Salvador José Mañer (1676-1751), Fernando Cevallos (1732-1802), or Fray 
Diego José de Cádiz (1743-1801), these changes were not only direct challenges to established 
certainties, but represented calls for radical methodologies that would lead to materialism, 
atheism, and the ultimate ruin of Catholic society. 4  These individuals critiqued the New 
Philosophy as epistemologically insufficient for the sciences and especially for philosophy and 
theology, and called for a return to the traditionally practiced methods of knowledge.  At stake 
                                                 
4 Andrés Piquer was a royal physician and prolific author on medical and philosophical topics; Jovellanos is 
considered the most emblematic writer of eighteenth-century Spanish literature.  The first chapter of this dissertation 
examines both Piquer and Feijóo in detail. Mañer was a public intellectual and critic who worked in Spanish 
journalism during the first half of the eighteenth century; Fernando de Cevallos y Mier and Cádiz were both 
religious (OSH and OFM, respectively) who participated vehemently in the Spanish Counter-Enlightenment.  The 
third chapter discusses all three. 
4 
was not only the acceptance or rejection of the new knowledge itself, but the prioritization of 
different modes of justification, the definition of disciplines of knowledge, and the way in which 
these disciplines interacted with one another (science and religion, for example). 
 
Some Central Questions 
The question is not so much what people thought and believed in the Spanish empire of 
the eighteenth-century, but how they thought and why they believed the way that they did.5  
What constituted truth to the eighteenth-century mind in the Spanish Atlantic?  What was the 
acceptable standard for logic, reason, proof, or evidence?  What were established or putative 
sources of authoritative knowledge?  How were modes of perception ranked, established, 
criticized, or defended?  What was the rule for the application of skepticism or doubt?  What 
intellectual virtues were recognized and exalted at this time?  How was the model set forth in 
eighteenth-century discourse different in these processes from the intellectual traditions before 
them?  Was there something culturally and socially unique to the Spanish intellectual tradition 
that distinguished it from the rest of Europe, and if so, how are these factors explained? 
 These questions are largely metaphysical, epistemological, and axiological in scope.6  
First, they address the metaphysics of the eighteenth-century Spanish empire, concerned with the 
way in which Spanish intellectuals conceived of reality, and particularly interested in how 
Spanish thinkers divided the realms of the natural and the supernatural and the visible and the 
invisible.  Secondly, and most important to this research, this dissertation investigates the 
epistemology of the eighteenth-century Spanish mind, studying how Spaniards thought about the 
                                                 
5 See, for comparison, Steven Shapin’s distinction between “What Was Known?” and “How Was it Known?” in 
Steven Shapin, The Scientific Revolution (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
6 For more thorough definitions of each of these categories, consult David Boersema, Philosophy of Science: Text 
with Readings (New York: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2009), 1-33. 
5 
nature of knowledge and truth.  These include epistemological questions of metaphysics (i.e. 
what evidence exists for the justification of the supernatural?), but more broadly is interested in 
the entire “account of knowledge.”7  That Spaniards conceived of two distinct fields of inquiry – 
science and religion – is clear from the textual record, but how these two fields related to each 
other varied greatly.  Science and religion both contain epistemological claims about what 
constitutes valid and justified sources and forms of knowledge.  At times these epistemological 
claims were relative to a particular standard or field of inquiry, and other times not – at all times, 
science and Religion were either in a state of antagonism, exclusivity, or compatibility.  This 
dissertation is particularly interested in the third relationship, contextualizing what Alvin 
Plantinga has called the “deep concord” of Science and Religion in the intellectual history of the 
eighteenth-century Spanish empire.8  Lastly, this dissertation is often concerned with axiological 
questions, seeking to establish how eighteenth-century Spaniards conceived of value, meaning, 
and importance, particularly as these relate to questions of reality and truth. 
The central assertion of this dissertation is that the religious and intellectual elite of the 
eighteenth-century Spanish empire were not only deeply concerned with the accuracy or 
orthodoxy of their scientific, philosophical, and religious beliefs, but were fundamentally 
attentive to the epistemology that defined this veracity and mandated the correct modes for 
perceiving knowledge and justifying truth.   More simply, learned clerics, natural philosophers, 
university professors, inquisitors, calificadores, and learned sections of the general populace 
                                                 
7 Paul Moser, The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 3.  See also W. Jay 
Wood, Epistemology: Becoming Intellectually Virtuous (Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press Academic, 1998), 
especially chapter one, “The Nature of Epistemology.” 
8 Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), particularly chapter ten, “Deep Concord: Christian Theism and the Deep Roots of Science.” 
6 
were not only concerned with what people were thinking, but how one came to such thoughts, 
articulated a position, and justified beliefs as true. 
The works surveyed in this dissertation demonstrate a spectrum of opinions on the proper 
nature of epistemology.  Some intellectuals who advocated the adoption of new scientific 
knowledge and medical discourse also argued for a complete overhaul of epistemic justification, 
while others sought to mediate between the existing curricula of academic socities and the new 
philosophies.  Still others rejected entirely the idea of introducing such ideas.  All three 
approaches – reform, reconciliation, and rejection – are explained in detail in the following 
dissertation.  It is first necessary, however, to understand how these particular, and in some ways, 
peculiarly Spanish responses correspond to the broader analysis of European intellectual history 
of the eighteenth century, particularly as it relates to the touchstone of studies on the 
Enlightenment.  The following historiographical survey provides a summary of the major 
positions which this dissertation engages; each chapter elaborates more specifically on particular 
applications. 
 
A Brief Historiography of the Enlightenment 
The available scholarly literature pertaining to Enlightenment Studies is vast, varied, and 
has asserted itself as a necessary field which must be addressed by any history of the eighteenth 
century.  By arguing that there were a series of epistemological debates in Spain during the late-
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this dissertation directly studies processes that were labeled 
by contemporaries as enlightening, their practitioners as enlightened (ilustrados), and known by 
modern historiography as part of a proper-noun program called “The Enlightenment.”  Roughly 
7 
summarized, this was the predominantly intellectual, cultural, and social paradigm which was 
characteristic of the eighteenth century and often seen as the beginning of the modern era. 
Most recent historians have been unanimous in their pronouncements that any singular, 
capital-E Enlightenment is an invention of historians of the nineteenth- and twentieth-centuries 
and is less useful than it is categorically problematic.9  Jonathan Israel has argued that historians 
ought to break the Enlightenment into “Enlightenments” – several coterminous, overlapping 
ideological movements, one of which was the Radical Enlightenment, described as “an anti-
theological and ultimately democratic emancipatory project…”10  This was argued by Israel in 
two of his more famous works, Radical Enlightenment and Enlightenment Contested, both of 
which focused on this Radical Enlightenment, which unfortunately continued the misleading 
association of enlightenment ideas with secularism and liberalism.  The equation of 
secularization and the Enlightenment in past historiography has helped to demonstrate the 
insufficiency of the term and the subsequent call for multiple enlightenments.  The historian 
J.G.A. Pocock has described the current historiographical definition of Enlightenment as “the 
growth of a non-theocentric “philosophy” of civil society, with political economy and a history 
of society and l’esprit humain among its outgrowths.”11  This equation of secularism and non-
theocentrism with Enlightenment was cemented in the work of Peter Gay, namely his two-
                                                 
9 Pocock, for example, simply states that, “There is no single or unifiable phenomenon describable as “the 
Enlightenment,” but it is the definite article rather than the noun which is to be avoided.” J.G.A. Pocock, 
“Historiography and Enlightenment: A View of Their History,” Modern Intellectual History 5, no, 01 (April, 2008), 
83. 
10 J. Israel, “Enlightenment!  Which Enlightenment?,” Journal of the History of Ideas 67, No. 3 (July 2006), 524-
545; 528-529.  Charles Taylor also employs the term “Radical Enlightenment” in his work, Sources of the Self.  See 
also J.G.A.  Pocock, “Enthusiasm: the Antiself of Enlightenment,” Huntington Library Quarterly 60, no. 1/2, 
Enthusiasm and Enlightenment in Europe, 1650-1850 (1997), 7-28.  
11 J.G.A. Pocock,  “Historiography and Enlightenment: A View of Their History,” Modern Intellectual History 5, 
Issue 01 (April, 2008), 84. 
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volume survey revealingly titled The Enlightenment: The Rise of Modern Paganism (1966) and 
The Enlightenment: An Interpretation: The Science of Freedom (1969).12 
Most importantly for this investigation, the mutual exclusivity of enlightenment and of 
religion posited by earlier historians must be rejected, and the categorical concept of 
enlightenments broadened to include religious thought and activity by religious individuals.  In 
his essay, “Enlightenment, Religion, and the Enigma of Secularization: A Review Essay,” 
Sheehan presents an incisive historiographical study of recent historical revisionism to the field 
of Enlightenment histories, particularly interested in the problem of secularization as a process 
and with the “return of religion” to the field of inquiry.13 Sheehan rightly demonstrates that many 
recent works have been written debunking the “secularization thesis,” working to highlight the 
prominence of religion in the Enlightenment.14  Scholars have persuasively demonstrated 
religious Enlightenment movements throughout Europe, including Jewish, Protestant, and 
Catholic thinkers, relegating the idea of a purely secular experience of the Enlightenment as 
“threadbare and outmoded.”15 
                                                 
12 See Gay’s work under these titles.  Also see: Christopher Nadon, ed. Enlightenment and Secularism: Essays on 
the Mobilization of Reason (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2013).   
13 Jonathan Sheehan, “Enlightenment, Religion, and the Enigma of Secularization: A Review Essay” American 
Historical Review 180, No. 4 (October 2003), 1061-1080.  Writing on the problem of secularization, Sheehan 
interestingly muses that: “As an analytical category, secularization plagues the efforts to connect the Enlightenment 
and religion, not least because the term is so crucial to the self-imagination of the modern age, which has, from the 
eighteenth century onward, understood itself as surpassing its religious past.” (1071) 
14 See also, Robert Sullivan, “Rethinking Christianity in Enlightened Europe [Review Essay],” Eighteenth-Century 
Studies 34, No. 2, Antiquarians, Connoisseurs, and Collectors (Winter, 2001), 298-309.  Jonathan Sheehan has 
commented on this relationship, noting that “The injection of religion into the Enlightenment, I suggest, is part of a 
revision of the history of secular society that has sent the very category of the Enlightenment – long defined as a 
philosophical program whose anti-religious zeal paved the way for our secular present – into great turmoil.  
Enlightenment and religion, for a variety of reasons, make a difficult marriage.  But these difficulties are productive, 
I argue, for they allow historians to question implicit and explicit understandings of religion and to put pressure on 
the slippery and often misleading notion of secularization.” Sheehan, “Enlightenment, Religion, and the Enigma of 
Secularization: A Review Essay,” 1064. 
15 David Sorkin, “Godless Liberals: The Myth of the Secular Enlightenment,” Religion Dispatches (University of 
Souther California, Annenberg), April 2, 2010, http://religiondispatches.org/godless-liberals-the-myth-of-the-
secular-enlightenment/ (accessed August 11, 2015).  For a brief survey on this subject, see George A. Klaeren “Was 
the Enlightenment Secular? No.” in The Enlightenment: History Documents, and Key Questions, William Burns, ed. 
(Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 2016), 171-176. See also: S.J. Barnett, The Enlightenment and Religion: The Myths of 
9 
Jonathan Sheehan has posited his own definition of the Enlightenment as “a new 
constellation of formal and technical practices and institutions,” stating that: 
Such practices and institutions might include philosophical argument, but would 
encompass such diverse elements as salons, reading circles, erudition, scholarship 
and scholarly techniques, translations, book reviews, academies, new 
communication tools including journals and newspapers, new or revived 
techniques of data organization and storage (dictionaries, encyclopedias, 
taxonomies), and so on.16 
Such a “media reading” of enlightenment texts, according to Sheehan, focuses on structures and 
institutions – networks of discourse – and highlights not what texts meant but how they meant 
and functioned.17 
The endless historiographical posturing and arguments over the extent and limits of the 
Enlightenment or of enlightenments as a category of thought has indicated to some historians an 
inherent instability in the term.  Many scholars have thus abandoned the use of enlightenments 
altogether, describing it as an ‘unreliable’ term.”18  The use of the word by historical persons 
makes engagement with the term unavoidable – the description of lumières, lumi, Aufklärer, 
ilustrados, and esclarecidos of the period connote a definite self-awareness to an ‘enlightening 
process’ in action.  Historians must be careful, however, to delineate what this process entailed, 
as well as defining any terms they use to do so. 
 
                                                 
Modernity (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003); James E. Bradley and Dale K. Van Kley, eds., 
Religion and Politics in Enlightenment Europe (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001); Jonathan Hill, 
Faith in the Age of Reason (Oxford: Lion Hudson Plc., 2004); Ulrich L. Lehner and Michael Printy, eds., A 
Companion to the Catholic Enlightenment in Europe (Leiden: Brill, 2010); Ulrich L. Lehner, “What is Catholic 
Enlightenment?,” History Compass 8/2 (2010), 166-178; John M. Sandberg, “Religion and the Enlightenment(s),” 
History Compass 8/11 (2010), 1291-1298; and David Sorkin, The Religious Enlightenemnt: Protestants, Jews, and 
Catholics from London to Vienna (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
16 Sheehan, “Enigma of Secularization,” 1075-1076.  To see Sheehan’s theory put into practice, see Jonathan 
Sheehan, The Enlightenment Bible: Translation, Scholarship, Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
17 Sheehan, “Enigma of Secularization,” 1077. 
18 See, for example, J.C.D. Clark, English Society 1688-1832: Ideology, Social Structure and Political Practice 
During the Ancien Regime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 9. 
10 
The Broader, European Catholic Enlightenment 
The fracturing of one, monolithic Enlightenment process has therefore allowed, among 
other national enlightenments and contextual movements, the development of the notion of a 
“Catholic Enlightenment” – studies and works specifically devoted to the analysis of the 
intersection of Catholicism and enlightenment thought.  In the major survey of the Catholic 
Enlightenment, A Companion to the Catholic Enlightenment, Ulrich Lehner and Michael Printy 
define the Catholic Enlightenment broadly as 
…a heuristic concept that describes the diverse phenomenon that mainly took hold of 
Catholic intellectuals in the 18th century and early 19th century.  It combines a multitude 
of different strands of thought and a variety of projects that attempted to renew and 
reform Catholicism in the 18th century.  The Catholic Enlightenment was an apologetic 
endeavor defending the essential dogmas of Catholic Christianity against indifferentism, 
agnosticism, and atheism…The Catholic Enlightenment was, therefore, a reform 
movement within the Church that was linked, though in discordant harmony, with the 
Enlightenment reform movement and with interventions by reforming sovereigns…19 
The definition is accurate, but sufficiently broad enough that it offers little specificity or clarity 
in its applicability.  This dissertation focuses on the historiographical discussions about the 
Catholic Enlightenment in Spain, employing Andrea J. Smidt-Sittema’s definition of the Spanish 
Catholic Enlightenment as encompassing “all of the distinctly religiously-motivated and 
uniquely Spanish attempts at bringing science, reason, progress, and greater social utility to 
Catholicism.”20  Like the Enlightenment, the Catholic Enlightenment can be divided into social, 
                                                 
19 Ulrich L. Lehner and Michael Printy, eds., A Companion to the Catholic Enlightenment in Europe (Leiden: Brill, 
2010), 2-3. 
20 Smidt, 411. Smidt-Sittema continues to note that by 1750 in Spain, there existed “multiple strands of the 
enlightenment,” but that “All strands of Enlightenment in Spain were responses to a general sense of crisis coming 
out of the late 17th and early 18th centuries and thus centered on the concept of reform.” Andrea J. Smidt, “Luces por 
la Fe: The Cause of Catholic Enlightenment in 18th-Century Spain,” in A Companion to the Catholic 
Enlightenment, Ulrich L. Lehner and Michael Printy, eds., 411, 414.  Little work on the Catholic Enlightenment has 
been done; that which has is almost always non-Iberian in focus.  See also David Sorkin, “Reclaiming Theology for 
the Enlightenment: The Case of Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten (1706-1757),” Central European History 36, No. 4 
(2003), 503-530; Massimo Mazzotti, “Maria Gaetana Agnesi Mathematics and the Making of the Catholic 
Enlightenment,” Isis 92, No. 4 (Dec., 2001), 657-683; Jeffrey D. Burson, “The Crystallization of Counter-
Enlightenment and Philosophe Identities: Theological Controversy and Catholic Enlightenment in Pre-
Revolutionary France,” Church History 77, No. 4 (Dec., 2008), 955-1002. 
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intellectual, political, and cultural dimensions, among others.  Existing works have brought 
special attention upon the way that the church related to society, especially politically. 
Lehner has elsewhere emphasized that the chief goals of the Catholic Enlightenment, 
across Europe, were “(a) to use the newest achievements of philosophy and science to defend the 
essential dogmas of Catholic Christianity by explaining them in new language, and (b) to 
reconcile Catholicism with modern culture.”21  This description is apt for the Spanish Catholic 
Enlightenment; in the surveyed primary sources of this dissertation, the theme of the defense of 
the faith is a common thread which unites even the most disparate opinions.  Accordingly, this 
dissertation highlights the epistemological aspects of individual authors and works within the 
Spanish empire and situates them within the broader intellectual network of a “Catholic 
Enlightenment” generally considered, which sought to agree upon and promote an 
epistemological hegemony, to the benefit of the faith. 
 
Was there a Spanish Enlightenment?: Spain’s Intellectual Black Legend 
Although Lehner and Printy’s work is a happy exception, many histories of the Catholic 
Enlightenment or of religious intersections with enlightenment processes have been limited 
geographically, chronologically, and topically.  Recent revisions to Enlightenment 
historiography have pushed the focus from France to Britain, the Netherlands, and Germany.22  
Spain, however, remains woefully understudied, especially in English-speaking scholarship.  
                                                 
21 Ulrich L. Lehner, The Catholic Enlightenment: The Forgotten History of a Global Movement (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 7.  Lehner has most recently detailed his approach by examining in particular the German 
Catholic Enlightenment to highlight the importance of theological pluralism, ecumenism, and shifting exegetical 
practices had as defining characteristics of Catholic Enlightenment thought.  See Ulrich L. Lehner, On the Road to 
Vatican II: German Catholic Enlightenment and Reform of the Church (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2016). 
22 Sheehan describes this motion as “….pushing France to the periphery of the discussion.  Indeed, for Pocock, 
Clark, Sorkin, and most other researchers, the French Enlightenment is the great counterexample…more than 
anywhere else, the Enlightenment in France is still understood as fundamentally anticlerical and, in a connected 
way, fundamentally philosophical.” Sheehan, “Enigma of Secularization,” 1069. 
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This historiographical tendency reflect both the deeply rooted assumption of most scholars that 
enlightenment is synonymous with secularization, as well as the modern-day “Intellectual Black 
Legend” of Spain: that the Iberian Peninsula was several intellectual steps behind the rest of 
Europe, particularly hampered by a pugnaciously dogmatic Catholic Church, an incurious 
populace, an inept government, and a paranoid and policing Inquisition.  The stereotype was first 
promulgated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, sometimes by Spaniards but often by 
foreign critics.  The encyclopedist Feijóo, for example, published a lengthy essay in 1745 on the 
subject of “The Causes of Backwardness that are Suffered in Spain among the Natural Sciences,” 
in which he largely blamed university professors, but also pointed a finger at such notions as an 
overzealous nationalism which spurned anything of foreign influence.23 The idea of Spanish 
backwardness gained a national audience when Nicolás Masson de Morvilliers authored an 
article entitled “Espagne” as part of the first volume of Charles Joseph Panckoucke’s 
Encyclopédie méthodique (1782-3), in which he lambasted Spain as an intellectually sterile 
kingdom and an unproductive member of the European community in the eighteenth century.24  
The paper sparked great outrage in Spain and abroad, promoting some to reflect but many more 
to respond with defenses of Spain’s glory.  Still, the damage had largely been done; in academic 
societies across the continent, people asked Masson de Morvilliers’s question, “What does one 
                                                 
23 Feijóo, CE.II.XVI, “Causas del atraso que se padece en España en orden a las Ciencias Naturales.” 
24 Nicolás Masson de Morvilliers, “Espagne,” Encyclopédie méthodique ou par ordre des matières. Géographie 
moderne. Vol. I. (Paris: Pandoucke, 1782), 554-568.  The “Masson affaire” is covered in detail by Herr in Richard 
Herr, The Eighteenth Century Revolution in Spain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), 220-230.  For Juan 
Pablo Forner’s famous response to the article, see Forner, Oracion Apologética por la España y su mérito literario: 
para que sirva de exórnacion al discurso leido por el Abate Denina en la Academia de Ciencias de Berlin, 
Respondiendo a la question qué se debe á España? (Madrid: La Imprenta Real, 1786).  See also Antonio Borrego’s 
anonymously published Cartas de un Español residente en París á su hermano residente en Madrid sobre la 
Oracion Apologética por la España y su mérito literario, de Don Juan Pablo Forner (Madrid: La Imprenta Real, 
1788). 
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owe to Spain?”25  The trope of a backwards Spain lingered through the political, economical, and 
social instability of the nineteenth century, and it is still quite common to encounter Spanish 
scholars who are occupied with accounting for an imagined gap between Spain and Europe in 
culture and learning.26 
Historians have since worked to correct this part of the Black Legend, addressing each 
factor in turn.  New studies show where the Spanish universities of the eighteenth century were 
important sites of deliberation and dissemination of enlightenment thought.27  Works on the 
broader Catholic Enlightenment have shown the efforts of the Church to reconcile the traditional 
with the modern.28  Several historians have brought to light the efficacy and importance of local 
economic and academic tertulias and Sociedades de los Amigos del País.29  The 
historiographical record has elevated Caroline Spain, and particularly Carlos III (r.1759-1788), 
as one of the finest examples of “enlightened despotism.”30  Moreover, scholars have softened 
                                                 
25 The question came from Masson’s work, but became infamous when the Abbe Denina asked it at the Academy of 
Sciences in Berlin.  This event was one of the main targets of Forner’s apologetic work. 
26 The topic of the polemic of Spanish science, in particular is the subject of dozens of works.  See Pedro Sáinz y 
Rodríguez, Las Polémicas sobre la Cultura Española (Madrid, 1919); Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo, La ciencia 
española, 3 Volumes, E. Sánchez Reyes, ed. (Santander: CSIC, 1953); Ernesto y Enrique García Camarero, ed. La 
Polémica de la Ciencia Española (Madrid: Editorial Alianza, 1970); See William Eamon, “’Nuestros males no son 
constitucionales, sino circunstanciales’: The Black Legend and the History of Early Modern Spanish Science,” The 
Colorado Review of Hispanic Studies Vol. 7 (Fall, 2009), 13-30; Victor Navarro Brotòns and William Eamon, eds., 
Más allá de la Leyenda Negra: Espanña y la Revolución Científica (Valencia: Instituto de Historia de la Ciencia y 
Documentación López Piñero, 2007); Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, “Iberian Science in the Renaissance: Ignored How 
Much Longer?” Perspectives on Science Vol. 12, no. 1 (2004); also Ruth MacKay’s summary of the Spanish history 
related to this subject: Ruth MacKay, “Lazy, Improvident People:” Myth and Reality in the Writing of Spanish 
History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006). 
27 George M. Addy, “The Reforms of 1771: First Steps in the Salamancan Enlightenment,” The Hispanic American 
Historical Review 41, No. 3 (Aug., 1961), 339-366. 
28 John Tate Lanning, “The Enlightenment in Relation to the Church,” The Americas 14, No. 4 (Apr., 1958), 489-
496. 
29 See Herr, The Eighteenth Century Revolution in Spain; also Ernesto Ruiz y González de Linares, Las Sociedades 
Económicas de los Amigos del País (Burgos: Publicaciones de la Institución Fernán González del CSIC, 1977); 
Robert J. Shafer, The Economic Societies in the Spanish World (1763-1821) (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
1958).  
30 Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, Carlos III y la España de la Ilustración (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2005); Francisco 
Martí Gilabert, Carlos III y la política religiosa (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, 2004); and chapter four, “Enlightened 
Despotism and the Origen of Contemporary Spain,” in Richard Herr, An Historical Essay on Modern Spain 
(Berkely: University of California Press, 1971). 
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the edge of the Inquisition in the eighteenth century, suggesting that it was largely ineffective for 
the majority of the century.  By examining a plethora of original works by the Spanish 
intellectual elite throughout the eighteenth century, this dissertation likewise suggests that not 
only was Spain, and particularly the Spanish Catholic Church, more than an impotent and 
petulant critic of enlightenment processes, but an active participant in the discussions over new 
epistemologies of the eighteenth century.  This dissertation furthermore demonstrates that this 
was the case from the very beginning, tracing religious and intellectual intersections to the first 
works of the early novatores and their critics at the turn of the century.31 
 
Enlightened Spanish America and Political Reductionism 
If the Black Legend has unfairly partitioned Spain, separated from Europe only by the 
Pyrenees, it has all but pushed the Spanish American Enlightenment into complete obscurity.  
Some historians have noted a late Enlightenment (and therefore Counter-Enlightenment) in 
Mexico, arguing that, for the most part, eighteenth-century Mexico looked exactly like 
seventeenth-century Mexico. 32 To this interpretation, changes did not occur with the Bourbon 
succession in 1700 and 1715 proper, but with the Caroline reforms of the second-half of the 
century, especially under Carlos III.  Scholars Fortes and Lomnitz, for example, have divided the 
                                                 
31 In addition to being limited geographically, most studies of a Catholic Enlightenment are limited to the late-
eighteenth century.  Stanley and Barbara Stein, for example, imply in Apogee of Empire that the Catholic 
Enlightenment as a period coterminous with the second half of the eighteenth-century (though to be fair, their 
interest is limited to the political-economic ramifications of church-state relations under Carlos III).  Indeed, almost 
every work (in both Spanish and English scholarship) that studies the Ilustración is limited to the reigns of Carlos III 
(1759-1788) and Carlos IV (1788-1808).  Conversely, this paper examines Catholic aspects of enlightening from a 
far earlier perspective, demonstrating that such work began at least as early as the 1720s.  See: Stanley J. Stein and 
Barbara H. Stein, Apogee of Empire: Spain and New Spain in the Age of Charles III, 1759-1789 (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 115; Manuel Sellés, José Luis Peset y Antonio Lafuente (compiladores), 
Carlos III y la ciencia de la Ilustración (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1988). 
32 See pg. 695 of Jacques Lafaye, “Literature and Intellectual life in Spanish America,” in the Cambridge History of 
Latin America Volume 2: Colonial Latin America, Leslie Bethell, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1984), 661-704; or for a fine cautionary example, Susan M. Deeds, “Chapter Eleven: The Enlightened Colony,” in A 
Companion to Mexican History and Culture, William H. Beezley, ed., (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 230-250. 
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Mexican Enlightenment into four phases, the earliest of which begins late in 1735 and extends 
only to 1767.33  Alternatively, this dissertation asserts that the Mexican Enlightenment began 
approximately coterminously with the Spanish Catholic Enlightenment at the end of the 
seventeenth century.  In the study of the eighteenth-century Spanish Enlightenment, a dialogue 
emerges between the thinkers centered around two metropoles – Madrid, in the heart of the 
Iberian Peninsula, and across the vast Atlantic, Mexico City.34  Elevated to a proper place at the 
table of the Enlightenment, the intellectuals of the Mexican Enlightenment offer an unheard 
perspective on the way Catholics negotiated between modern philosophy and traditional 
Scholasticism. 
While the Black Legend has caused a general neglect of Spanish American intellectual 
sources, the main challenge facing the history of the Enlightenment in Spanish America, is the 
elision between the Enlightenment and the widespread revolutions of the first part of the 
nineteenth century.  Serious studies of the intellectual context of Spanish America are hard to 
find without a teleological focus on the Mexican War of Independence in 1821, the result being 
that political factors of the Spanish American Enlightenment are overemphasized and questions 
of metaphysics and epistemology are subordinated or reduced to political and social motivations 
                                                 
33 Jacqueline Fortes and Larissa Adler Lomnitz, Becoming A Scientist In Mexico: The Challenge of Creating a 
Scientific in an Underdeveloped Country (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1994).  See also Patrick 
Romanell, Making of the Mexican Mind: A Study in Recent Mexican Thought (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1952), 29. 
34 Mexico City was a thriving city and arguably the jewel of the Spanish empire during the eighteenth century. An 
extensive number of universities were founded or expanded throughout Latin America, including the University of 
San Jerónimo in Havana in 1728, the Real Universidad de San Felipe in Santiago in 1738), the Universidad Católica 
de Santa Rosa in Caracas in 1725, among others.  Even after an epidemic in 1736, Mexico City was larger in 
population than Madrid.  Numerous religious orders were in the town, most prominently the Franciscans and Jesuits 
teaching in this university and Cathedral town.  The Council of the Indies created in 1646 the Tribunales de 
Protomedicato for the regulation of the practice of medicine in Mexico City – comparatively, the protomedicato was 
not established in Havana until 1728. The book trade, while controlled, was at its highest in Lima and in Mexico 
City – added to by the creation of two presses in the middle of the eighteenth century in Mexico City; one at the 
College of San Ildefonso, and the other the Bibliotheca Mexicana of Juan José de Eguiara y Eguren.  See John M. 
Herrick and Paul H. Stuart, Encyclopedia of Social Welfare History in North America (Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications, Inc., 2005). 
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and applications.  To avoid “treat[ing] the enlightenment as a prelude to Spanish American 
independence,” Arthur P. Whitaker called for historians to highlight both the ways in which 
European Enlightenment thought failed to resonate with colonial thinkers, as well as how these 
intellectuals articulated a unique, creole position within the Spanish empire.35  Although political 
studies of the Mexican Enlightenment still dominate the historiography, several substantial 
works have helped to elucidate the important role that Spanish America had, for example, in 
developing medical and scientific studies and promoting changes to the university curricula.36  
This study likewise follows Whitaker’s suggestion, bringing to the forefront of the discussion 
Spanish American contributions to the broader Catholic Enlightenment, showing how these 
contributions constituted new and unique intellectual positions, not merely derivations of 
Spanish and continental thought, and establishing a clear dialogue and exchange of ideas 
between Spain and her colonies across the Atlantic during the eighteenth century. 
 
Rehabilitating the Counter-Enlightenment 
Along with the themes of Enlightenment, and Catholic Enlightenment, this dissertation 
notably grapples with Spain’s role in the Counter-Enlightenment movement. The notion of 
Counter-Enlightenment entered the historiographical scene with the publication of the essay 
“The Counter-Enlightenment,” by Isaiah Berlin in 1973. 37   His notion – that there was a 
                                                 
35 Arthur P. Whitaker, “Changing and Unchanging Interpretations of the Enlightenment in Spanish America,” in The 
Ibero-American Enlightenment, A. Owen Aldridge, ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971), 29. 
36 See especially John Tate Lanning, Academic Culture in the Spanish Colonies (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1940); Lanning, The Royal Protomedicato: The Regulation of the Medical Professions in the Spanish Empire, 
John Jay TePaske, ed. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985); and Lanning, The Eighteenth-Century Enlightenment 
in the University of San Carlos de Guatemala (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956).  See also Arthur P. Whitaker, 
ed., Latin America and the Enlightenment (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1942). 
37 See Ruth Hill, Sceptres and Sciences in the Spains: Four Humanists and the New Philosophy (ca. 1680-1740). 
Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000; Domínguez, Alberto Medina. “Torres vs. Feijoo: “ensayos” y usos del 
escepticismo en el XVIII español,” Hispania 83, No. 4 (Dec., 2000), 745-756; Isaiah Berlin, “The Counter-
Enlightenment;” Robert Wokler, “Isaiah Berlin’s Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment;” J.G.A. Pocock, 
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reactionary movement to Enlightenment thought – was hardly novel, but his own interpretation 
of the shape and scope of such a cohesive body of counter-enlightenment thought, as well as the 
term given to it (gegen-aufklärung) were.  Berlin’s central characterization of the Counter-
Enlightenment was that it was a response to the Enlightenment idea of the underlying existence 
of universal laws which predictably governed both humanity and nature, what Berlin called the 
“central dogma of the entire Enlightenment.”38  Berlin situated the Counter-Enlightenment in the 
works of German Romantics who threw off such Enlightenment progressivism, espousing 
instead an intensely personal relativism and prioritization of emotional, interior knowledge.  He 
particularly noted, for example, the work of Johann Gottfried Herder and Johann Georg Hamann, 
although he also pointed to precursors such as Giambattista Vico and Joseph de Maistre.39 
Berlin’s Counter-Enlightenment fails to adequately cover the notion.  Geographically, it 
was not limited to Germany; chronologically, it existed well-before the nineteenth century; and 
thematically, the Counter-Enlightenment was concerned with far more than universal laws and 
developed more than vague romanticism as a response to the Enlightenment.  Simply put, 
Berlin’s Counter-Enlightenment was not the Counter-Enlightenment experienced in the 
eighteenth-century Spanish empire.  Much of the scholarly literature written after Berlin’s initial 
work on the Enlightenment has devolved into ahistorical and contemporary debates about the 
intellectual and cultural legacy of the Enlightenment, a series of debates which the historian 
                                                 
“Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment, Revolution and Counter-Revolution; A Eurosceptical Enquiry;” Iris 
H.W.  Engstrand, “The Enlightenment in Spain: Influences upon New World Policy,” The Americas 41, No. 4 (Apr., 
1985), 436-444.; and Richard G. Anderson, “Benito Feijoo, Medical Disenchanter of Spain,” Journal of the History 
of Medicine and Allied Sciences 55, No. 1 (January, 2000), 67-79. 
38 Isaiah Berlin, “The Counter-Enlightenment,” Against the Current: Essays in the History of Idea, second edition 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 4. 
39 Isaiah Berlin, and Henry Hardy, ed. Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000). 
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Darrin McMahon aptly describes as “something of an intellectual blood-sport.”40  Studies such as 
Robert E. Norton’s “The Myth of the Counter-Enlightenment” seem perennially concerned with 
the connection between counter-enlightenment thought and modernity.41  The connection is 
troubling for historical studies of the period, as the majority of such works result in a teleological 
imposition of the primary sources.  The heuristic concept of an Enlightenment is extremely 
mutable; change the definition of the Enlightenment, and the definition of Counter-
Enlightenment is accordingly modified. 
McMahon has classified the Counter-Enlightenment as the responsory literature of 
French anti-philosophes of the eighteenth century, including clergy, university professors, 
conservative members of the aristocracy and parlementaires, but he also argues for the existence 
of a ‘low-culture’ Counter-Enlightenment impulse in eighteenth-century France.42  Importantly, 
he emphasizes that these anti-philosophes were well in place at least forty years prior to the 
French Revolution’s outbreak in 1789.  The Revolution did not dictate the need for countering 
literature, but only served as the locus classicus for future writers.  McMahon writes that 
opposition to the Enlightenment was “first and foremost French and first foremost religious.”43  
The voice of the anti-ilustrados of Spain, like the anti-philosophes needs to be revitalized.  Both 
                                                 
40 Darrin M. McMahon, Enemies of the Enlightenment: The French Counter-Enlightenment and the Making of 
Modernity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 12.   
41 Robert E. Norton, “The Myth of the Counter-Enlightenment,” Journal of the History of Ideas 68, No. 4 (Oct., 
2007), 635-658.  See also: Carlos Rodríguez López-Brea, “Don Pedro Iguanzo y Rivero, un Canónigo Anti-
Ilustrado;” Historia Constitucional 14 (2013), 77-91; Reyes Mate and Friedrich Niewöhner, cords.,  La Ilustración 
en España y Alemania (Barcelona: Editorial Anthropos, 1989); Graeme Garrard, “Tilting at Counter-Enlightenment 
Windmills,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 49, No. 1 (Fall, 2015), 77-81; Jeremy L. Caradonna, “There Was No 
Counter-Enlightenment,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 49, No. 1 (Fall 2015), 51-69; James Schmidt, “The Counter-
Enlightenment: Historical Notes on a Concept Historians Should Avoid,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 49, No. 1 (Fall 
2015), 83-86, and Eva Piirimäe, “Berlin, Herder, and the Counter-Enlightenment,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 49, 
No. 1 (Fall 2015), 71-76. 
42 Like McMahon, Graeme Garrard has pushed the counter-enlightenment to mid-century France in his study, 
Graeme Garrard, Rousseau’s Counter Enlightenment: A Republican Critique of the Philosophes (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2003). 
43 McMahon, Enemies, 9. 
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have been curiously absent from the historiographical record, particularly in Anglophonic 
literature.  Part of this may be the result of a penchant among modern scholars for the great 
minds and clean progression of the Enlightenment narrative.  Yet even here it is surprising that 
this topic has not been appropriately researched, given that philosophes and ilustrados such as 
Voltaire, Feijóo, Diderot, and Martín Martínez (1684-1734) were constantly referencing, 
engaging, and refuting these Counter-Enlightenment individuals. 
There are, however, some fundamental differences that set Spain’s Counter-
Enlightenment apart from other movements.  First, while McMahon has argued against the origin 
of the Counter-Enlightenment in German thought, he argues instead for a French nascence.44  
This chapter asserts, however that the Spanish Counter-Enlightenment preceded French, anti-
philosophe publications by at least two decades.  Anti-ilustrados in Spain have widely 
disseminated publications by 1727, with references in those works to even earlier, lost pamphlets 
and essays.  While the sequence is not overly important to this history, the early and rapid 
response to the “New Philosophy” in Spain suggests that Spain, in particular, had the 
institutional and intellectual networks in place needed to organize a coherent response to the 
challenges of the enlightenment. 
Another difference between the French and Spanish Counter-enlightenments, albeit 
related to the temporal sequence, is the degree of popularity with which the intellectual circles in 
each country accepted new philosophical ideas and Enlightenment thought.  In France, 
philosophes dominated the public sphere, the presses, the coffeehouses, salons – even the 
universities and the Academie Française.  In Bourbon Spain, however, popularity was hard 
fought and slowly won for ilustrados – as will be shown in chapter one, early novatores were the 
                                                 
44 McMahon clearly argues that France was “…the first country to generate a self-conscious Counter-Enlightenment 
response…,” Enemies, 10. 
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minority, and had to combat the major medical institutions and universities of their day by 
forming independent academic societies.   Feijóo, as seen in chapter two, frequently lamented 
what he saw as Spain’s unwillingness to adapt to new information.  Individuals such as Diego 
Mateo Zapata (1664-1745) were investigated and imprisoned by the Inquisition, and even the 
eighth volume of Feijóo’s Theatro Crítico was censored.45  Indeed, the consensus of the majority 
of historians is that until the reign of Carlos III, ilustración failed to secure a prominent place in 
the intellectual sphere and public culture. 
This suggests that the counter-enlightenment response in Spain was more secure, faster, 
better supported by academic, religious, and monarchial institutions, and more systematic and 
coherent, creating a richer and deeper dialogue between enlightenment and counter-
enlightenment thought than existed in many other areas and that has been thought to have existed 
in Spain.  Thus, while past histories have spoken of Iberia as “not directly involved (except 
through the papacy) in the great debate between reason and faith,” this chapter argues that Spain 
was a center of this debate – indeed, that perhaps no other nation had such a coherent and rich 
response to the introduction of enlightenment thought.46  In short, the work of anti-ilustrados, so 
often labeled unreceptive, intolerant, and intransigent, is instead one part of an ongoing dialogue 
about faith and reason, between religion and science in Spain.  In the works of these 
traditionalists, one finds concerned Catholics who wished to seriously engage, analytically 
understand, and responsibly critique the introduction of the New Philosophy and the New 
                                                 
45 See “Nos los Inquisidores Apostolicos, Contra La Heretica Pravedad, Y Apostasia, &c….”, Hesburgh.Inq.333.  
Fernando VI intervened on Feijóo’s behalf, banning any criticisms of his work in 1750.  This is stated in 
McClelland, Ideological Hesitancy, 64, also that “Feijoo was honoured by Fernando VI in 1748 with the title of 
Councillor for his ‘profound, specialist learning and most useful words’, as the reporting Gaceta put it.”  Feijóo was, 
more specifically, added to the Real y Supremo Consejo de Castilla in 1748.  
46 Will and Ariel Durant, The Age of Voltaire (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980), vii. 
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Sciences which entered Spain during the time of the novatores (1687-1725) and was proliferated 
through the work of Feijóo and others (1720s-1760s). 
This chapter uses all three terms above – Enlightenments, Catholic Enlightenments, and 
Counter-Enlightenments, to refer to the collective intellectual movements present within Spain 
during the late-seventeenth and eighteenth- centuries.  The reluctant employment of these terms 
recalls J.G.A. Pocock’s pronouncement that historians use “...the word “Enlightenment” in a 
family of ways and talking about a family of phenomena, resembling and related to one another 
in a variety of ways that permit of various generalizations about them…the keyword 
“Enlightenment” is ours to use and should not master us.”47  Once disabused (though remaining 
sentient) of the omnipotent importance and practicality of categories like Enlightenment and 
Counter-Enlightenment, actual textual analysis – the real work of the historian – is free to 
occur.48 
                                                 
47 J.G.A. Pocock, “Historiography and Enlightenment: A View of Their History.” Modern Intellectual History 5, 
Issue 01 (April, 2008), 83. 
48 Martínez lamented that he had to devote hundreds of pages to answering the gauntlet of the Dogmatists before 
moving on to his “real work;” similarly, if this dissertation must engage in the concept of the enlightenment, then the 
reactionary positions to the views and opinions espoused by the novatores will necessarily interact with the concept 
of the “counter-enlightenment,” notably studied by Isaiah Berlin.  See Isaiah Berlin, “The Counter-Enlightenment,” 
in The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays, henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer, eds. (New York: 
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1949). See also Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, 
Herder, Henry Hardy, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Paul Ilie, The Age of Minerva (Vol 1): 
Counter-Rational Reason in the Eighteenth Century: Goya and the Paradigm of Unreason in Western Europe 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995); Joseph Mali, Robert Wokler, Mark Lilla, Roger Hausheer, 
John Robertson, Darrin M. McMahon, Frederick Beiser, Graeme Garrard, Lionel Gossman, John E. Toews and 
Michael Confino, “Isaiah Berlin's Counter-Enlightenment,” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 93, 
No. 5 (2003), i-xi, 1-11, 13-31, 33-71, 73-131, 133-196; Graeme Garrad, Counter-Enlightenments: From the 
Eighteenth Century to the Present (Routledge Studies in Social and Political Thought) (London: Routledge, 2006); 
and B.W. Young, Religion and Enlightenment in Eighteenth-Century England: Theological Debate from Locke to 
Burke (Gloucestershire: Clarendon Press, 1998). In his review essay, Sheehan also comments on the use of the term 
“counter-enlightenment,” writing: “The category of enlightenment itself seems shaky, as if incapable of surviving 
the introduction of religion without some reduction in power.  The recent revival of Isaiah Berlin’s “Counter-
Enlightenment is, I believe, a symptom of these uncertainties.  If the Enlightenment held dear the familiar principles 
of “universality, objectivity, rationality,” Berlin’s largely German Counter-Enlightenment insisted on the 
particularity of truth and the “impotence of reason to demonstrate the existence of anything. ... Newer research has 
reached beyond Germany and made the Counter-Enlightenment a general feature of eighteenth-century Europe.” 
(Sheehan, “Enigma of Secularization,” 1067) 
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Categorizing the Spanish Experience: Radical, Catholic, and Counter- Enlightenments 
This dissertation therefore generalizes three diverging ideological camps within the 
eighteenth-century Spanish empire, labeling them “Radical Enlightenment,” “Catholic 
Enlightenment,” and “Counter-Enlightenment” experiences and maintains these terms 
throughout the work.  The first are described as “”Radical” for two main reasons: first, because 
the term “radical enlightenment” already has a well-established place in the historiographical 
cannon of Enlightenment studies, defined most notably by Jonathan Israel as being 
“….egalitarian, secularist, Spinozist, and anti-colonial...”49  Secondly, this dissertation labels 
these individuals as “radical” because their stance (often stridently held) placed them at the 
fringe of mainstream intellectual society in Spain.  There is no textual evidence that any 
substantial “radical enlightenment” movement ever occurred in eighteenth-century Spain.  The 
occasional cryptic reference in a personal letter or treatise exists that can be read alternatively as 
institutional disenchantment or genuine doubt.  Outliers exist in Inquisition cases, certainly, but 
as these outliers are preserved for historians in a position where they had been revealed, arrested, 
investigated, and often castigated, their position reinforces their abnormality to Spain.  The 
radical position was often influenced directly by French writings, deist, agnostic, or atheist in 
character, antimonarchical, egalitarian, anticlerical and antagonistic to religion (especially 
institutionally), and holding a secularizing view that reason and religion were antithetical to each 
other.  None of the texts examined in this dissertation espouse such a position.  Richard Herr 
notes that “…enlightened Spaniards…were partisans of new ideas concerning scientific progress, 
educational reforms, economic prosperity, and social justice – all of which could be described as 
                                                 
49 Jonathan Israel, “Enlightenment! Which Enlightenment?,” Journal of the History of Ideas 67, No. 3 (July 2006), 
523.  Ulrich L. Lehner also uses Spinozism as a central component of Enlightenment thought. 
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luces – but one would have had to search hard among their growing numbers to uncover the 
inevitable few who questioned their Catholic faith.”50  Years of research for this dissertation has 
yet to “uncover the inevitable few” who belong to this position. 
There is little doubt that some of the authors to whom the term “Catholic Enlightenment” 
is ascribed considered themselves to be simply theists or deists, and that some held positions of 
agnosticism or atheism.  Those that did so, however, did so clandestinely – understandably so, 
since holding any religious position other than Catholicism was a punishable crime, and 
throughout the eighteenth-century, the Holy Office of the Inquisition continued to monitor the 
orthodoxy of Spaniards.  What this means however, is that the radical position can only be seen 
by teasing out implications and assumptions in the works of major intellectual figures.  Although 
speculating the ‘Catholicity’ of these ilustrados might offer new perspectives on their works, it is 
a question that no historian can answer, and it is therefore idle conjecture to speculate in this 
manner in an academic work.  This research judges only the textual record that these individuals 
have left behind and takes these texts largely at their face value.  I follow as my methodology the 
theories of the historian of ideas Quentin Skinner, who argued that religious and intellectual 
historians must adopt the linguistic sensitivity and epistemological method of approaching “the 
past with a willingness to listen.”51 This is “more or less synonymous with understanding 
religious people on their own terms, or with reconstructing the ways in which they viewed 
themselves and their world, or with depicting them in a manner in which they would have 
                                                 
50 Herr, Eighteenth Century Revolution, 84. 
51 Brad S. Gregory, “Can We ‘See Things Their Way’? Should We Try?,” in Alistar Chapman, John Coffey, and 
Brad S. Gregory, eds., Seeing Things Their Way: Intellectual History and the Return of Religion (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 25. 
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recognized themselves.”52In doing so, the evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of labeling these 
works and their authors as Catholics of varying degrees of orthodoxy. 
Thus, the experience of the enlightenment across the Spanish empire was largely that of a 
question of compatibility between religion and the new philosophies, in varying gradations; it is 
these varying gradations which are the principal focus of this dissertation.   These gradations take 
the form of the remaining two concepts.  First, I examine a “Catholic Enlightenment,” whose 
constituents argued for the harmony between Catholic thought and ideas such as scientific 
empiricism, the partitioning of the church-state relationship (“Spanish Regalism”), a renewed 
emphasis on reason and natural theology in religion, the promotion of vernacular publications, 
various reform movements, both within the Church and in Spanish society, among other ideas.  
Secondly, I assess a “Counter-Enlightenment,” whose proponents argued against the introduction 
and adoption of such ideas, reasserting the traditional religio-intellectual diet of neo-
Scholasticism or “second Scholasticism” in its place.  The historian Mauricio Beuchot has 
viewed the overall enlightenment experience of Mexico as a spectrum of Catholic responses.  In 
his Filosofía y Ciencia en el México Dieciochesco, Beuchot argued that “…We find Scholastics 
that did not enter the debate with modernity… Scholastics who rejected modernity…. 
Scholastics that attempted to integrate modernity… Eclectics who preferred the modern but did 
not attack tradition… and Moderns who fought against Scholasticism….”53  In all of these 
debates, as Beuchot rightly notes, the central question was “the assimilation of the modern 
against the traditional current which was Scholasticism.”54  This summation agrees with 
                                                 
52 Gregory, “Can We ‘See Things Their’ Way?,” 25.  See also the work of Alan Charles Kors, who unites anti-
religion (atheism) and intellectual history convincingly during his study of French philosophes of the eighteenth 
century.  Alan Charles Kors, D’Holbach’s Coterie: An Enlightenment in Paris (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1976). 
53 Mauricio Beuchot, Filosofía y Ciencia en el México Dieciochesco (Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 
México, 1996), 7. 
54 Mauricio Beuchot, Filosofía y Ciencia en el México Dieciochesco, 7. 
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Lehner’s assertion that all Catholic Enlighteners wished “to reconcile Catholicism with modern 
culture.”55 
Lehner, who argues that “all [Catholic Enlighteners] agreed that Aristotelian 
scholasticism could no longer serve as the universal foundation for theology,” likewise affirms 
Beuchot’s particular emphasis on Scholasticism as the shibboleth of Counter-Enlightenment 
thinkers.56  Recognizing that Spanish Catholic intellectuals responded differently to the 
Enlightenment, this dissertation employs the three central categories of Radical, Catholic, and 
Counter-Enlightenments to broadly describe the main intellectual camps of the eighteenth-
century Spanish empire, breaking each into more specific descriptions within each chapter.  The 
tripartite categorization followed by this dissertation encompasses this spectrum that Beuchot 
noticed in eighteenth-century Mexican thought, as well as those noted by other scholars of 
Catholic and Counter-Enlightenment cultures (see Figure 1).  It is particularly resonant with the 
“radical, moderate, and counter-enlightenment” framework which Jonathan Israel has used and 
which has been described by Jeffrey D. Burson.57 
  
                                                 
55 Lehner, The Catholic Enlightenment, 7. 
56 The truth of this claim is reviewed in the third chapter of this dissertation.  Lehner, The Catholic Enlightenment, 7. 
57 Jeffrey D. Burson, “The Crystallization of Counter-Enlightenment and Philosophe Identities: Theological 
Controversy and Catholic Enlightenment in Pre-Revolutionary France,” Church History 77, No. 4 (Dec., 2008), 956. 
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Figure 1. “Three Enlightenment Frameworks: Catholic, Counter, and Radical” 
Klaeren Terminology Other Historiographical Terms58 Examples 
Radical Enlightenment: 
antagonistic to theism, influenced 
by French philosophes, argued for 
the incompatibility of faith and 
the new philosophies  
“Radical Enlightenment” (Israel), “the 
inevitable few who questioned their 
Catholic faith…” (Herr) 
No known significant 
examples. 
Catholic Enlightenment: a wide 
spectrum of thinkers who viewed 
the New Philosophy as 
compatible with the existing 
religious traditions; thinkers who 
sought to incorporate isolated 
elements of enlightenment 
thought without disrupting the 
epistemological status quo 
“Moderns who fought against 
Scholasticism” (Beuchot), “Sensualists” 
(Bejarano) 
Those Catholics who interacted “in at 
least a somewhat positive way with the 
overall European Enlightenment 
Process.” (Lehner) 
Andrés Piquer, Discurso 
sobre la aplicación de la 
filosofia a los asuntos de 
religión (1778, second 
edition); Diego Mateo 
Zapata, Ocaso de las 
Formas Aristotélicas (1745) 
“Eclectics who preferred the modern but 
did not attack tradition” (Beuchot), 
“Eclectics” (Bejarano), “The Critical 
School” (Bejarano), “Practical 
Philosophers” (Bejarano), 
Martin Martinez, Filosofía 
escéptica…(1730); Benito 
Jerónimo Feijóo, Teatro 
Crítico Universal (1726-
1740) and Cartas eruditas y 
curiosas (1742-1760) 
“Scholastics that attempted to integrate 
modernity” (Beuchot), “Moderate 
Scholastics” (Bejarano)  
Salvador Josef Mañer, 
Crisol Critico… (1734); 
Ignacio de Armesto y 
Ossorio, Theatro Anti-
Critico Universal… (1737) 
Counter-Enlightenment: thinkers 
who argued against the 
introduction of enlightenment 
thought, arguing that its 
philosophical foundations were 
contrary to the Christian, Catholic 
worldview and incorrect, 
maintaining that such ideas had 
problematic applications 
“Scholastics who rejected modernity” 
(Beuchot), “Rigid Scholastics” 
(Bejarano), “Counter-Enlightenment” and 
“Enemies of the Enlightenment” 
(McMahon), “The Conservative 
Opposition,” (Herr), “Reactionary 
Mythology” (Herrero) 
Francisco Ignacio Cigala, 
Cartas al Ilmo. y Rmo. Mro. 
F. Benito Gerónimo Feijóo 
Montenegro (c. 1760); 
Francisco Soto y Marne, 
Reflexiones Critico-
Apologéticas (1749?); 




“Scholastics that did not enter the debate 
with modernity” (Beuchot), “Rigid 
Scholastics” (Bejarano), “Counter-
Enlightenment” and “Enemies of the 
Enlightenment” (McMahon), “The 
Conservative Opposition,” (Herr), 
“Reactionary Mythology” (Herrero) 




                                                 
58 Beuchot, Filosofia y Ciencia en el México Dieciochesco (Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 
1996); Bejarano, Historia de la filosofía en España, hasta el siglo XX (Madrid: Renacimiento, 1929); Herr, The 
Eighteenth Century Revolution in Spain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958); Darrin M. McMahon, 
Enemies of the Enlightenment: The French Counter-Enlightenment and the Making of Modernity (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001); Javier Herrero, Los Orígenes del Pensamiento Reaccionario Español (Madrid: Editorial 
Cuadernos para el Dialogo Edicusa, 1971); Jonathan Israel, “Enlightenment! Which Enlightenment?,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas 67, No. 3 (July 2006); Ulrich L. Lehner, “What is ‘Catholic Enlightenment’?,” History Compass 
8/2 (2010), pg. 166 
27 
Description of Sources 
This dissertation utilizes a variety of written sources from the long eighteenth-century 
across the Spanish Atlantic, primarily printed books and treatises, but occasionally including 
personal letters and manuscripts, Inquisition case summaries and related documents, and 
periodicals.  These represent several different genres and range in subject matter, primarily 
focusing on theology, philosophy, science.  The research for this work was conducted at 
numerous archives and research libraries in the United States, Spain, and Mexico. 
 
Periodicals of the Eighteenth-Century Spanish Empire 
Richard Herr outlines three principal “channels of the Enlightenment” in Spain: the 
Spanish university system, societies and organizations, and the periodical press.59  The 
eighteenth century in Spain, as in other countries, witnessed the flourishing of the popular press.  
In this, Madrid far outstripped all of the other cities as the central source of activity in the 
periodical press.  Perhaps as a result of the centralizing and stimulating reforms of the Bourbon 
monarchs, nearly all of the most significant periodicals were published from the capital and 
disseminated outwards to the rest of the nation, although some notable exceptions existed, 
including the Diario curioso, histórico, erudito, comercial, civil y económico, which ran for at 
least 233 issues in Barcelona between 1772 and 1773, and the first daily paper of Sevilla, the 
Diario Histórico y Político de Sevilla, which was first published on September 1, 1792.  To gage 
the spread of these periodicals, Herr has analyzed the partial subscription lists of several key 
papers – the Espíritu de los mejores diarios, for example, listed 630 subscribers in 1789, 36% of 
which were in Madrid, 53% in other Spanish provinces, and the remaining 11% in the Americas. 
                                                 
59 Herr, Eighteenth Century Revolution, 183.  
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In the colonies, the press similarly grew during the eighteenth century.  In Mexico, one 
could find the Gazeta de México as early as 1728-1739 (145 issues, totaling over 1,153 pages of 
writing), which first appeared as the Gaceta de México in 1722, reappeared as the Mercurio de 
México (1740-1744), and again as the Gazeta de México (1,085 issues between 1784-1809).  In 
addition to this principal publication, there also existed the Diario de México and the early 
Astrolabio Americano.60  The press arrived in the second half of the eighteenth century to 
Havana, a burgeoning city of approximately 171,620 inhabitants in 1774, which ran the Gazeta 
de la Havana (1764-1766, 1782-1783), the Papel periódico de La Havana for at least 34 issues 
between 1790-1804, El Aviso for 149 between 1805-1810.  La Gaceta de Lima, founded in 1715 
and restricted in 1756, was enormously influential in the viceroyalty of Peru, and in Venezuela, 
the Gaceta de Caracas was in circulation by 1808, publishing some 355 issues over the next 
decade.61 
 These periodicals covered a wide range of topics, reporting on recent activities within 
their cities, forecasting meteorological trends, and announcing slave auctions (in Havana), but 
also printing editorial passages, social commentaries, reprinting passages from works, and 
significantly for the dissemination of enlightenment thought, printing bibliographical lists, 
including specific sections devoted to foreign works.62  The Semanario Económico, for example, 
specifically billed itself as: “Composed of practical, curious, and erudite notices; of all the 
Sciences, Arts, and Offices: translated and extracted from the Records of the Sciences of Paris, 
                                                 
60 The statistics and information in this section comes from the unattributed descriptions authored by the 
Hemeroteca Digital’s “Descriptions” section of the catalog, part of the Biblioteca Nacional de España.  For further 
information on the Mexican periodical press as well as catalogs of Mexican authors, see the extensive work of María 
del Carmen Ruiz Castañeda. 
61 See Tamar Herzog, “La Gaceta de Lima (1756-1761): la reestructuración de la realidad y sus funciones,” 
HISTORICA Vol XVI, No. 1 (Junio, 1992), 33-61. 
62 See Paul-J. Guinard, La presse espagnole de 1737 à 1791: Formation et signification d’un genre (Paris : Centre 
de Recherches hispaniques, 1973). 
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of those of Trevoux; and of many other famous French, English, Italian, and German books.”63  
The titles are often vaguely all-encompassing and frequently imprecise – for example, the 
Sunday, July 2, 1786 edition of the Diario Curioso, Erudito, Económico y Comercial, which 
begins with a cover story on medicine, and is followed by a report on ecclesiastical vacancies 
and changes in positions in the Madrid community.64  Herr has claimed that journals and 
periodicals offered recourse to the Spanish book market which was predominantly concerned 
with religious topics. 65  Many of the periodicals, however, likewise published essays and 
editorials that discussed religious and philosophical subjects.  
 
Treatises, Books, and Published Works 
A small portion of the primary sources are personal letters, unpublished manuscripts, or 
other documents – occasional broadsheets, but most often cedulas, royal, papal, conciliar, or 
Inqusitiorial pronouncements.66  Of this category, the personal letters are worth particular notice, 
as they offer an occasional, unguarded perspective of the authors of the great intellectual works 
of the Spanish Enlightenment.67  The majority of the primary sources, however, that this 
dissertation utilizes were printed books and treatises published between 1687 and 1813.  The 
book trade in Spain was a teeming market of works in all areas of inquiry.  This was amplified 
                                                 
63 Semanario Economico, Jueves 11 de Abril de 1765.  Hemeroteca Digital de la Biblioteca Nacional de España. 
64 Diario Curioso, Erudito, Económico y Comercial, Domingo 2 de Julio de 1786. Hemeroteca Digital de la 
Biblioteca Nacional. 
65 Herr, Eighteenth Century Revolution, 194. 
66 For example, Fray Francisco Soto y Marne, “Advertencia contra las publicaciones de Feijoo,” (1750/1), 
AHN.Clero.387.Num.32.65. 
67 Antonio Mestre argues that for this reason, the letter has become of prime importance to the historian of the 
enlightenment.  Antonio Mestre Sanchis, “La Carta, Fuente de Conocimiento Histórico,” Revista de Historia 
Moderna 18 (2000), 13-26.  See, for example, Benito Jerónimo Feijóo, “Carta del Rmo. P.M. Fr. Benito Geronimo 
Feijoo, Maestro General de la Religion de San Benito, Abad del Colegio de San Vicente de Oviedo, &c. escrita á 
Don Gregorio Mayáns i Ciscár, del Gremio, i Claustro de la Universidad de Valencia, i su Cathedratico del Codigo 
de Justiniano: cuya Respuesta va adjunta,” (Valencia, 1731), BNE 2/50700(5); also “Cartas interceptads por el 
gobierno a sacerdotes navarros, que se escribian con un exjesuita,” (Esteban de Mendiburu, 1770), AESIA, Estante 
1, Caja 6, No. 7.1, Leg 8.1. 
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especially in the second half of the eighteenth-century, when, under the supervision of Carlos III 
and the bequest of the Conde de Campomanes, the Real Compañía de Impresores y Libreros 
(Royal Company of Printers and Booksellers) was established, July 24, 1763.  The company 
formed a cooperative association of printers which shared mutual responsibilities and resources; 
the result was a doubling in the number of presses in Madrid.68  Many of the works printed 
during this time – hundreds of works – were devoted explicitly to the themes addressed by this 
dissertation: epistemology, theories of knowledge, and philosophies of science and religion. 
To place these publications in a broader context, Herr has analyzed the Biblioteca 
periódica anual para utilidad de los libreros y literatos, a near-exhaustive list of the publications 
made each year by the Imprenta Real from 1784-1791.  For the year 1784-1785, in which 
approximately 460 publications were listed, he found that approximately one-third of the 
publications were religious in subject, nine percent on medicine, seven percent on the sciences, 
and two percent on philosophical subjects.  Tomás Mantecón likewise has suggested that, while 
the overall percentage of printed books covering religious subjects decreased and those focused 
on “philosophy, history, grammar, and science” grew during the period during 1741-1800 from 
the previous 150 years, the balance was still overwhelmingly religious (49%) over philosophy 
(13%).69  These numbers are fungible, however, as genres which Herr classifies outside these 
areas, such as funeral orations or popular histories, were often used to address religious, 
philosophical, or political topics – for example Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos’s (1744-1811) 
Elogio de Carlos III, leído en la Real Sociedad Económica de Madrid el día 8 de Noviembre de 
                                                 
68 See chapter one, “The Madrid Book Trade Mid-Eighteenth Century” in Diana M. Thomas, Royal Company of 
Printers & Booksellers of Spain: 1763-1794 (Troy, NY: Whitson Publishing Company, 1984).  See also: John 
Dowling’s review of this work, South Atlantic Review Vol. 50, No. 2 (May, 1985), 118-120. 
69 See references made by Adrien Maggiolo in Tomás A. Mantecón, España en Tiempos de Ilustración: Los 
Desafíos del Siglo XVIII (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, S.A., 2013), 236.  Mantecón, citing Ofelia Rey Castelao, 
estimates 69% religious and 9% philosophical from 1601-1740. 
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1788 – in name an eulogy of the monarch, but in practice both a praise of his policies and a 
platform for further policy reforms.70  In addition, many of the existing bibliographic essays and 
publication records of the eighteenth-century fail to account for reissuing publications, multiple 
editions, and series or multi-volume works, and entirely fail to report some works.  In short, the 
Spanish Atlantic did not lack for reading material in the eighteenth century; this dissertation 
analyzes only a handful of some of the more prominent works as an attempt to offer a more 
generalized view of the intellectual history for the period. 
 
The Index of Prohibited Books, Foreign Works, and the Porous Spanish Atlantic 
In the past, historians have cited the dreaded Index Librorum Prohibitorum – the index of 
prohibited books issued by the Holy See, and doubled in the Spanish empire by a separate, 
additional index specifically for the Spanish kingdom (“pro universis Hispaniarum”).71  As part 
of the Spanish intellectual Black Legend, many were quick to denounce the policing and 
regulating work of the Inquisition, particularly in the form of the indices.  Critics asserted that 
the index was responsible for occluding the light of foreign philosophes and thinkers, preventing 
the publication of forward-thinking Spaniards, and keeping the Spanish public in a state of 
retarded, impeded, and antiquated thinking.  Henry Charles Lea, for example, argued that 
“censorship of the press was not the least effective function of arresting the development of the 
                                                 
70 Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, “Elogio de Carlos III, leído en la Real Sociedad Económica de Madrid el día 8 de 
noviembre de 1788,” a point which is made by Herr himself (57).  Similarly, tt is quite common to see in the 
literature of this period hybridized titles: “philosophical-theological,” or “moral-medical,” as in Salvador Josef 
Mañer, Crisol Critico, Theologico, Historico, Politico, Physico, y Mathematico, en que se quilatan las Materias del 
Theatro Critico, que ha Pretendido Defender la Demonstracion Critica del M.R.P.Fr. Martin Sarmiento, 
Benedictino, Parte Segunda (Madrid: En la Imprenta de Bernardo Peralta, Calle de la Paz, 1734). 
71 See, for example, the 1747 Spanish Index: Consilio Supremi Senatus Inquisitionis Generalis, Index Librorum 
Prohibitorum, ac expurgandorum novissimus.  Pro universis hispaniarum regnis serenissimi Ferdinandi Vi. Regis 
Catholici, hac ultima editione (Madrid: Ex Calcographia Emmanuelis Fernandez, 1747), two volumes. 
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Spanish intellect.”72  Even Spanish contemporaries levied similar blame; Feijóo, for example, 
complained about the “tepid zeal of the Ministers of the Holy Tribunal,” and the partisan 
histories of Antonio Puigblanch and Juan Antonio Llorente are replete with condemnations for 
what they considered was the ignorance which the index and the Holy Office caused.73 
Emphasizing the role of the book trade also leaves historians with a lopsided 
interpretation that all Enlightenment thought in Spanish America during the Eighteenth-Century 
was foreign-fueled.  Although this dissertation is primarily concerned with the organic, Hispanic 
literature rather than the importation of foreign ideas into the Spanish world, it is worth pointing 
out that the index is an insufficient means of exploring both the success of Spanish authors and 
the penetration of foreign thought into the Spanish intellectual world of the eighteenth century 
for several reasons.  First, academics could apply for and receive licenses granted by the Holy 
Office for the purpose of acquiring and reading otherwise prohibited works, provided that they 
were deemed responsible enough to read such works and had a clear reason for doing so.74  
Feijóo, for example, was a recipient of such a license.  Gerard Delpy has documented hundreds 
of foreign (mostly French) sources cited by Feijóo, including Bayle, Malebranche, Spinoza, 
Descartes, Musschenbroeck, Bacon, and Locke, among others.75  Generally, for those who could 
                                                 
72 Henry Charles Lea, A History of the Inquisition in Spain (London, 1907), 480. 
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74 Patricia Manning, Voicing Dissent in Seventeenth-Century Spain: Inquisition, Social Criticism and Theology in 
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siglo XVIII (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 2002), 130.  Malebranche was particularly important to the 
Spanish debates; see the work as well as accompanying notes of translation into Spanish from RANM.Malebranche, 
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afford to purchase such books – especially the aristocracy - they were clearly accessible.76  Once 
purchased by a licensed buyer, these works did not always stay in one place, as Patricia Manning 
has demonstrated, books acquired in this manner often strayed from their original readers into 
other personal libraries, “undermining” the work of the indices.77 
Secondly, it is clear simply by reading the works of Spanish intellectuals that they had a 
clear understanding of foreign works and were regularly reading them.  Herr notes that “there 
were ways to circumvent the censors.  An obvious one was to go across the Pyrenees.”78  Indeed, 
some Spaniards had notable instances of personal contact with philosophes – the Conde de 
Aranda (1719-1798), president of the Consejo de Castilla and secretary of state for Carlos IV (r. 
1788-1808) met Voltaire, Diderot, and d’Alembert during his travels, and the Duque de Alba 
(1733-1770) was so taken with Rousseau during his tenure as the royal ambassador to France 
(1746-1749) that he requested that his complete works be sent to him in Spain.79  In addition to 
Feijóo, the personal libraries of such influential individuals as Teodoro Ardemans (1661-1726), 
Padre Enrique Flórez de Setién y Huidobro (OSA) (1702-1773), Padre José Francisco de Isla de 
la Torre y Rojo (SJ) (1703-1781), the Marqués de Dos Aguas, Padre Martín Sarmiento (OSB) 
(1695-1772), the Conde del Águila (Miguel de Espinosa y Maldonado de Saavedra), Pedro 
Rodríguez de Campomanes (1723-1802), Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos (1744-1811), Pablo 
Antonio José de Olavide y Jáuregui (1725-1803), and Juan Sempere y Guarinos (1754-1830), as 
well as communal libraries of sociedades have been cataloged and studied, all evincing a wide 
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selection of Spanish and foreign works of the eighteenth-century.80  Historical studies of 
individual authors have been conducted and have demonstrated that many foreign writers found 
a welcome audience in Spain.81 
The officials of the Spanish Inquisition struggled, increasingly ineffectively, against the 
black market of forbidden works, often vainly admonishing warnings: “…It is understood that 
many books have entered into these kingdoms clandestinely that have and preach bad 
doctrines…,” stated one announcement published in Sevilla.82  The Holy Office threatened 
“under the pain of Excommunication and a fine of fifty ducats for the expenses of the Holy 
Office, that similar sheets, packages, and boxes should not be allowed to arrive from outside of 
these kingdoms unless they should be first searched and examined by the ministers named for 
this purpose.”83  But such works continued to arrive, and neither the threat of damning anathema, 
nor the hefty fine of fifty ducats was enough to effectively stopper the influx. 
This was especially true in the frontier or areas further away from metropoles.  Richard 
Greenleaf notes, for example, that “Because of the shortage of commissaries in New Mexico and 
Texas, and the long distances between their headquarters, curtailing smuggling was an almost 
impossible task.  Many frontier libraries in New Mexico and Louisiana had books and pamphlets 
prohibited by the Inquisition, works of philosophy, theology, history, and politics.”84  Thus it is 
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not easy to assume a direct correlation between ownership and dissemination of these books and 
the spread of Enlightenment ideas; or inversely, the control of such works and the effectiveness 
of the counter-Enlightenment.85  Eleanor B. Adams and Keith W. Algier echo this conclusion, 
stating that “Scholarly research and publication of the twentieth century have refuted beyond 
doubt the traditional misconception that censorship insulate residents of Spain’s overseas empire 
from new trends in European thought.  The literate element of the population was comparatively 
small, to be sure, but this was equally true in the Old World.  Those who could – and wished – to 
read were able to carry their books and ideas to the farthest frontiers.”86  Among the Consejo de 
Castilla in the heart of Madrid, or amid the far-flung missions of Durango, Mexico, Spanish 
readers participated in the broader “European spirit” of the Enlightenment by reading the most 
recent publications.87 
 Thirdly, and moreover, the prohibition of one work of an author did not necessarily entail 
the banning of all of the writer’s other publications.  While all of the works of Rousseau were 
prohibited by the Spanish Index in 1764, for example, Condillac’s works were judged piecemeal 
– his La logique ou les premiers developments de l’art de penser (1781) was freely translated 
and imported, while his the latter volumes of his Cours d’etudes pour l’instruction du Prince de 
Parme (1767-1773, 13 volumes) were banned – although not until after the first volumes had 
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already been admitted and distributed throughout the peninsula.88  Even Voltaire, one of the most 
disagreeably impious philosophes to the censors of Spain, had publications reach the Spanish 
public.  The proliferation of bibliographic essays further spread awareness of new works – both 
Spanish and foreign – many of the most cutting-edge Enlightenment publications are described 
by the jurist and political theorist Juan Sempere y Guarinos (1754-1830), who published his 
Ensayo de una biblioteca Española de los mejores escritores del reinado de Carlos III (“Essay 
of a Spanish Library of the Best Writers of the Kingdom of Carlos III”), in six volumes in 
Madrid from 1785-1789.89  Additionally, new periodicals such as El Semanario Político and 
Cristóbal Cladera’s Espíritu de los mejores diarios literarios que se publican en Europa 
regularly published news and advertisements for the latest works of the time. 
 Ultimately, however, the Index is insufficient and offers an imbalanced perspective of 
Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment activity in Spain because of the emphasis it places on 
the foreign importation of thought into the Spanish world.  This reinforces the erroneous view 
that has long dominated Enlightenment studies of Spain: that the Spanish empire, closed off to 
the liberalizing work of France and Britain, was late to come to the intellectual supper table, 
gleaning only the scraps of what it could receive from the philosophes across the border.  As will 
be shown in this dissertation, Spain had herself a vibrant and engaged intellectual community 
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which participated concomitantly in the broader European Enlightenment project, and which in 
many ways contained unique elements – particularly in an articulated counter-Enlightenment 
stream of thought. 
 
Inquisition Cases 
 The final category of primary sources, found primarily in the second chapter of this 
dissertation, includes Inquisition cases – both more replete trial transcripts (procesos) and the 
partial testimony in the relaciones de causas, or summarized notes of a trial which supply an 
overview of the accused (reo), the charges, and the proceedings of the investigation, including 
evidence, witnesses, and the pronounced sentence.90  Much has been written on the genre of 
Inquisition cases and the need for careful historiographical tact when interpreting trials.91 
My own approach to these cases has been to view them as supplemental to the 
conversations of what Euan Cameron calls the “theological academy” or the intellectual elite of 
eighteenth-century Spain.92  In this regard, my aim has been to show the grounded reality of an 
otherwise abstract, epistemological concept by examining cases which involve claims of the 
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supernatural (miracles, exorcisms, visions, witchcraft, etc.).  These cases, which forcibly bring 
into contact the metaphysical and physical, are particularly helpful for glimpsing the unwitting, 
epistemic mentality of the inquisitors and the accused.  My methodological approach to such 
cases has been largly informed by Carlo Ginzburg’s work, especially his article, “The Inqusitior 
as Anthropologist.”  In his article, Ginzburg highlights the historian’s need to be aware of a 
dialogue occurring in case files between the Inquisitor and the accused, a dialogue that reveals 
simultaneously the anthropological categories being espoused and imposed by the authorities and 
the quotidian beliefs and practices of those being investigated. 
In Inquisition cases, as in all of the genres of literature that this dissertation examines, 
there are clear limitations in evidence.  The evidence that does exist was almost exclusively 
written by theologians, jurists, scientists, and the intellectual elite.  These works, however, offer 
only a ‘top-down’ perspective of classifying ideas and interpreting them through the lens of a 
mostly-orthodox religious ideology.  Epistemological beliefs were held without being explicitly 
expressed even by the most academic individuals; the occurence of such a self-referential 
conception among the lay, popular, and folk presented in Inquisition cases is non-existent.93  
Ginzburg notes that even in Inquisitorial literature, where there is at least some record of a 
popular voice (via the defendant), this voice is distorted – influenced by the pressure of power in 
the trial setting, by the notarial choices of the secretary, and by the “contamination of 
interpretation.”94  In a particularly condemning sentence on the difficulty of understanding these 
popular beliefs, Ginzburg writes, “What is revealed here is a more embarrassing fact: the 
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existence of a close continuity between our own comparative mythology and the interpretations 
of inquisitors.  They were translating – or, rather, transposing – beliefs fundamentally foreign to 
them into another, more unambiguous code.”95  There exists, therefore, a constant tension 
between the study of the academic construction of an episteme, of the methods of definition and 
dissemination, and of the discussion of such epistemologies, as opposed to the actual held beliefs 
of the time (the “reality”). 
Yet the existence of such a reality is a necessary given, and the cases of the Inquistion, 
added to extensive readings of the published works of the Spanish ‘republic of letters’ is the most 
legitimate means of uncovering and understanding these beliefs.  Total skepticism and 
inaccessibility, according to these historians, is mostly the result of an ‘intellectual 
disenchantment’ of the late-twentieth century.  Moreover, Ginzburg states that the historian can 
escape the “web of categories used by those remote anthropologists” by analyzing the dialogic 
structure of inquisition cases.96  In such records, he argues, there exist rare opportunities where 
contradictions, misunderstandings, or conflicts of meaning occur.  These clashes of definition 
expose gaps between two different ways of understanding the supernatural cosmos of early 
modern Europe – one belonging to the Inquisitor, the other to the defendant.  By highlighting this 
“real dialogue,” Ginzburg asserts that historians can successfully tease out of the inquisitorial 
record an idea, belief, or practice held by the popular culture.97 
This dissertation also reevaluates, indirectly, the role of the Holy Office of the Inquisition 
in the Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment across the Spanish Atlantic.  It is important to 
note that these abstract and intellectual debates had a very realized dimension to them.  The 
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polemical arguments dominated the printed sector of society, to be sure.  Indeed, the fears of 
many anti-ilustrados about the reception and misuses of information reaffirms the fact that these 
Catholic Enlightenment vs. Counter-Enlightenment debates were filtered throughout all levels of 
society.  This is especially the case with Inqusition investigations that necessarily brought into 
question the boundaries of supernatural and natural. Cast in the light of the context of a trial, the 
questions about epistemic justification and modes of perception become not only immediately 
clear in sharp relief, but also understandable via concrete examples.  The oft-overlooked third 
side of the epistemic triangle – magic – is here considered as an alternative way of knowing (one 
that both religion and science, each in its way, clamored to denounce).  Michael Bailey, a 
historian of late-medieval and early modern witchcraft and magic, has noted that “magic has 
often been linked to other expansive systems for understanding, interacting with, and influencing 
the whole of creation, namely, religion and science.”98 
In 1966, the historian Richard Greenleaf noted the political role of the Inquisition in 
enforcing regalist policies directed from the Bourbon crown, a task which was noticeably more 
difficult given the porosity of the Spanish colonies and borderlands than in peninsular regulation.  
Greenleaf’s studies of the Inquisition, particularly in the eighteenth-century emphasized the role 
that regalist policies played in dictating Inquisitorial activities.  He described in detail the 
conflict for jurisdictional authority between the tribunals of the Holy Office and civil authorities 
– particularly regional governors and the viceroy that manifested itself in criminal and 
inquisition investigations of persons of office (often without any substantial evidence).99  
Greenleaf went so far, in fact, as to call the Mexican Inquisition a “political instrument” during 
the second half of the eighteenth century.  Nor, as Greenleaf noted, was this new.  He argued that 
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this was the modus operandi of the crown and the inquisition for centuries in Mexico, writing 
that “The use of the Inquisition by the later eighteenth-century Bourbon kings in Spain as an 
instrument of regalism was not a departure from tradition.”100 
There is no denying that there is a strong and evident connection between Enlightenment 
thought, Bourbon reforms and policies, and the political sphere that developed the “creole 
patriotism” that would erupt in the nationalist movements of the nineteenth-century. Admirable 
research in this area includes, for example, David Brading’s work on “creole patriotism,” 
Jacques Lafaye’s notion of “creole triumphalism,” or Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra’s ideas of a 
“creole epistemology” in the histories of the eighteenth century.101  However, the testimony of 
the Inquisition has led to the problem that the vast historiography of Enlightenment thought has 
too often become nothing more than political reductionism.  The political considerations of the 
eighteenth century are an essential component for understanding the enlightened Spanish empire, 
but by no means sufficient for doing so.  There is need to move beyond this one-dimensional 
interpretation of the Inquisition - and indeed, often extended to movements such as freemasonry, 
or even to the broader institution of the church.  It is too simple a story to sublimate all religio-
intellectual activity under the motives of politics or the economy, and one that is so incomplete 
that it misleads students of the period.  
For these reasons, the documentary record of the Inquisition in eighteenth-century New 
Spain may not be the most useful source for reconstructing an accurate account of the 
enlightenment nor of the counter-enlightenment in Spanish America.  Still, these cases can 
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escape their relegation to the regalist realm and add to our understanding of the deeper 
intellectual and religious debates of the century. To do so, this dissertation moves beyond a 
statistical or quantified treatment of the records of the Inquisition and an increased emphasis on 
deep, textual analysis.  Particular attention is paid to the language used to discuss heresy, 
heterodoxy, and the supernatural.  The employment of protomédicos and other medical 
professionals in the tribunals could yield, for example, immense historical evidence to help us to 
understand the way that medicine and science worked with theology to produce a system of 
discernment and to create an evaluatory standard or hierarchy of evidence. 
Thus, a new understanding of evidence and standards of justification in early modern 
New Spain can be gained by assessing the examples of Inquisition trials for superstition, alleged 
witchcraft, and false possessions, as well as independent clerical and scientific investigations into 
cases of reported miracles or possessions.  As intersections of the supernatural and natural, they 
acted as sites of metaphysical contestation for the explanatory powers of both science and 
religion in the eighteenth-century.  
 
Some Limits of the Dissertation 
It should be clearly expressed that the scope of this dissertation is limited to the 
philosophical debates over knowledge held between science and religion in the Spanish Catholic- 
and Counter-Enlightenment, and does not include an analysis of objections made to 
Enlightenment thought on political, economic, or social grounds.  These are, it is understood, all 
fundamentally connected to each other, and at times, the language of each seeps into the other, 
but the expressly political objections made to the enlightenment have been avoided.  This was 
initially made as an attempt to avoid the popular area of counter-revolutionary thought after the 
43 
outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789 – it became necessary, however, to clearly reject the 
political reductionism which has governed previous interpretations of eighteenth-century Spanish 
thought.  This means disentangling particular topics such as Jansenism, regalism, reformism, and 
Freemasonry from their relegation to exclusively political definitions, and rehabilitating them to 
a far more complex and nuanced status as terms which expressed philosophic postures and 
attitudes which directed political, economic, and social activities.  That they had political 
applications is doubtlessly sure; likewise sure is that there already exist several admirable 
monographs which have covered these applications, particularly in the Hispanophonic scholarly 
literature.102  The analysis of this dissertation therefore does not investigate these topics, and 
instead limits itself to the questions of the history of the philosophy of science and religion 
during the Spanish Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment. 
Additionally, this study is not necessarily representative of a popular spirit of the 
Enlightenment in Spain.  This dissertation is a study of texts produced within the Spanish empire 
during the long eighteenth century and relies upon written records to gage reactions and ideas.  
To begin with, the vast majority of the Spanish population during this time was illiterate, and is 
therefore inadequately represented by textual studies.  Some rough estimates have suggested that 
around one quarter of the Spanish population could sign their own name in 1786. 103 Though it is 
difficult to extrapolate literacy records from the early modern period, Antonio Viñao Frago has 
estimated that by 1841, shortly after the period examined in this study, 75.7% of the population 
                                                 
102 See, for example, Gabriel B. Paquette, Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform in Spain and its Empire, 1759-
1808 (Houndsmills, Palgrave MacMillan, 2008); the previously mentioned work of Brading, Cañizares-Esguerra, 
Lafaye; additionally Scott Eastman, Preaching Spanish Nationalism across the Hispanic Atlantic (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2012). 
103 See references made by Adrien Maggiolo in Tomás A. Mantecón, España en Tiempos de Ilustración: Los 
Desafíos del Siglo XVIII (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, S.A., 2013), 229. 
44 
of Spain was illiterate, with only 9.7% of the population able to write.104  These numbers are 
even more condemning for women, 90.8% of whom in 1841 were illiterate, and 2.2% of whom 
had the ability to both read and write.105  While some scholars believe that these estimates may 
actually have fallen from a higher rate of literacy during the Spanish Enlightenment from 1770-
1790, they yet remain strongly suggestive that the expressed ideas in the examined works of this 
dissertation reflect the upper academic echelon of Hispanic society during the period. 
This is particularly true when the primary sources in question are published, non-
periodical works.  Members of the clergy, individuals associated with academic institutions, or 
by professionals associated with various sociedades or positions in the government wrote nearly 
all of the works mentioned in this dissertation.  The same elitism follows in the periodical press; 
Herr bleakly estimates that less than one percent of the Spanish population (approximately 
10,000,000 by the 1780s) participated in periodical subscriptions.106  In much of Spain and in 
Spanish America, historians have convincingly demonstrated that it was the clergy and nobility 
who had the time, necessary knowledge, contacts, and resources to read and understand 
Enlightenment works, disseminating these ideas further by responding to these publications.107  
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The result is a study which primarily examines the vanguard of intellectual discussions in 
eighteenth-century Spain.   
There is, however, some reason to suggest that such discussions effectively “trickled 
down” to a wider audience.  The periodical press was particularly effective at spreading 
information beyond the traditional classes of clergy and titled nobility.  Herr has suggested that 
the “overwhelming majority of the names on the [subscription] lists belonged to members of 
neither [clergy nor titled nobility] but to commoners or to untitled hidalgos…members of the 
royal government…military officers…doctors, lawyers, and professors…very likely many of 
them were well-to-do commoners without official positions – shopkeepers, merchants, 
entrepreneurs, professional men, and the like…”108  These subscription lists, moreover, do not 
reflect the number of hearers of such papers.  Additionally, works that intentionally popularized 
the subjects of this study proliferated during the eighteenth century.  While the complexity of a 
work such as Diego Mateo Zapata’s Ocaso de las Formas Aristotélicas (Twilight of the 
Aristotelian Forms) may not have been accessible to the average literate Spaniard, later works 
such as Andrés Piquer’s Discurso sobre la aplicación de la filosofía a los asuntos de religión 
para la juventud española (Discourse on the Application of Philosophy to the Facts of Religion 
for the Spanish Youth) deliberately marketed themselves for a more general reader.109  In the 
dedicatory letter to the Duque de Osuna which prefaces Ramón Campos’s Sistema de Lógica 
(1791), for example, the author writes “He is the wiser who has the better System of Logic…this 
System…without departing from simplicity, attempts to briefly decipher the occult and 
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complicated paths of knowledge.”110  Deciphering and translating complex material into popular, 
digestible knowledge was part of the regular task of a Catholic Enlightener.  The encyclopedic 
genre, which included the wildly successful and reprinted works of Benito Jerónimo Feijóo, also 
aimed for broad appeal.  Indeed, if the number of complaints levied by academics against the 
misconstruations of the vulgo (populace) are at all indicative, it seems clear that some measure 
(however mistakenly understood) of “academically elite” works was regularly reaching a 
significant swathe of the population. 
 
The Significance of Understanding Enlightenment Epistemology 
There are several ways in which the methodology of the new sciences proposed by the 
novatores and promoted by Catholic Enlighteners constituted direct breaks with the existing 
platform of Aristotelian science – that is to say, the practice of science largely influenced by 
Aristotelian physics and Scholastic philosophy and theology, which, before the eighteenth 
century, was the only position held in the universities of the Spanish empire.  Moreover, these 
breaks with the Aristotelian system necessarily extended beyond the field of ‘applied’ science, a 
fact which counter-enlightenment thinkers were quick to point out.  In the area of general 
epistemology and philosophy, these epistemic ruptures included: an elimination of teleology and 
final cause from the study of the physical sciences (excepting, perhaps, biology and anatomy), a 
removal of questions of ontology, a transition from qualitative analysis to quantitative analysis, a 
redistricting of the natural, supernatural, and preternatural realms of causality, the creation of 
                                                 
110 Ramón Campos, Sistema de Lógica (Madrid: En la Imprenta de la Viuda de Ibarra, 1791), A2a-b. 
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disciplines of knowledge and new rules for how these disciplines interacted with one another, 
and a reprioritization of the modes of perception and corresponding new hermeneutic.111 
There are several existing works which are excellent reference points for understanding 
the eighteenth-century as it transpired in Spain.  Chief among them are Richard Herr’s The 
Eighteenth Century Revolution in Spain (1958) and Jean Saraillh’s L’Espagne éclairée de la 
deuxième moitié du XVIIIe siècle (1954).  Herr’s work provides a general overview of the 
Spanish enlightenment, particularly emphasizing economic and policy reforms instituted by 
Carlos III and with an entire half of the book devoted to the impact of the French Revolution and 
the growth of liberalism during the reign of Carlos IV.  Saraillh’s book, which emphasizes the 
enlightened mentality more than Herr’s, is an extensive reference work which encompasses the 
entirety of the century.  Though slightly dated and amended by later histories, these works are 
essential for understanding the Spanish eighteenth-century; yet this dissertation departs from 
them in several key ways.  Four differences in approach and scope, in particular, distinguish my 
research from the admirable work conducted by Herr, Saraillh, and others: 1) a closer textual 
analysis of eighteenth-century works, with special attention to the language used by eighteenth-
century writers; 2) a serious treatment of Counter-Enlightenment thinkers and their works, 
approaching religious topics as part of the intellectual history of Spain and avoiding political 
reductionism; 3) the use of examples from New Spain and Peru to reconstruct a transatlantic 
dialogue between colonial and peninsular thinkers; and 4) the use of Inquisition cases and 
functional examples of epistemology to show “real life” application of otherwise abstract ideas, 
grounding how the New Philosophy could be realized in concrete ways.  These are presented in a 
roughly chronological order throughout the dissertation, recognizing roughly four stages of the 
                                                 
111 Gaston Bachelard, The Formation of the Scientific Mind : A Contribution to a Psychoanalysis of Objective 
Knowledge, Mary McAllester Jones, trans. (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2002). 
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enlightenment experience in the Hispanic world, each with some overlap: the novator movement 
(1687-1728), Feijóo’s encyclopedic work and the popularization of Enlightenment ideas (1726-
1760), the synthesizing debates and crystallization of philosophy during the ‘High Spanish 
Enlightenment’ (1750-1788), and the late, revolutionary period (1782-1813). 
 
Description of Chapters 
Chapter one “Religion and the New Philosophy of Science in Eighteenth-Century Spain,” 
examines the influence that changes in the philosophy of science and the acquisition of 
knowledge exerted on the work of pre-Enlightenment thinkers of Spain, known as the novatores.  
This chapter explores the religio-intellectual scene of the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth 
centuries (approximately 1687-1728) which existed in Spain and her colonies, specifically 
examining the works of Martín Martínez and his critics as a touchstone for the wider debates of 
the period.  Additionally, this chapter anchors these intellectual-theological discussions by 
providing concrete examples drawn from the records of the Spanish Inquisition during this time, 
as well as seeking anecdotal accounts of popular belief reported in newspapers, gazettes, and 
other works.  By doing so, it will show a preeminent concern with epistemology – that the 
Catholic intellectual elite (manifested in academic scholars, members of the clergy, inquisitors, 
court representatives, etc.) were concerned not only with what ought to be believed, but how it 
ought to be known.  Particularly important to this chapter is the analysis of modes of belief 
(perception, intuition, revelation, etc.), and the methods by which the intellectual contributions of 
the novatores constituted a significant and distinct paradigm or episteme for the early modern 
Spanish empire.112 
                                                 
112 See Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 
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The analysis and application of modes of belief from scientific advancements are 
contextualized in the extensive (and provocative) discourses of Benito Jerónimo Feijóo in 
chapter two, “A Priest Who Ventured Out of his Science.”  Feijóo was perhaps the most widely 
read representative of enlightenment thought during his time; indeed, he was both so effective 
and provocative in his work that after one volume of his works had received censorship from the 
Inquisition, the king later forbade future attacks on his Teatro Crítico Universal.  This chapter 
particularly analyzes two aspects of Feijóo’s “anti-superstition campaign” evidenced in his 
Teatro Crítico Universal and Cartas Eruditas y Curiosas.  First, this chapter examines Feijóo’s 
numerous discourses on the existence and analysis of miracles – a subject which he gained 
renown for as a debunker of superstition and myth.  It therefore suggests that Feijóo must be read 
as man of greater complexity than previously treated, a scientific priest who, while instrumental 
in the advancement of experimental science in eighteenth-century Spain and in the 
modernization of analytical thinking, was fundamentally influenced and guided by Catholic 
theology and religious figures of his day.  His scientific and religious works are therefore 
inextricably interwoven, and must be read as such.  This marriage of science and religion, 
furthermore, are characterized as being the unique product of the Spanish reception of the new 
philosophy of the eighteenth century.  This is similarly seen in the second half of this chapter, 
which surveys Feijóo’s writing on exorcisms in eighteenth century Spain.  By demonstrating that 
Feijóo’s standards of discernment and skepticism towards accounts of exorcisms were largely 
motivated by a desire to distinguish the legitimate boundaries of supernatural and natural for the 
strengthening of Catholicism; moreover, much of his methodology and reasoning is deeply 
rooted in the traditions of the Catholic Church.   
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 Chapter three, “La Verdad Católica, La Falsa Filosofía: the Anti-Teatrista Polemics of 
Salvador Josef Mañer and the Counter-Enlightement Response in the Early-Eighteenth Century,” 
assesses the reactionary position of many Spanish intellectuals to an “enlightenment 
epistemology,” particularly in response to Feijóo’s publications during the mid-eighteenth 
century. This chapter analyzes individuals such as Mañer, Igancio Armesto y Ossorio, and 
Francisco Ignacio Cigala, who reacted against the introduction of enlightenment modes of 
thought, analyzing their reasons for critiquing the New Philosophy and their suggestions for 
alternative epistemologies.  I examine why leading intellectuals argued against a “Catholic 
Enlightenment” of eighteenth-century Spain, what their specific objections were, and how these 
objections were rationalized and seen as legitimate arguments at the time.  This chapter thus 
demonstrates how religious intellectuals contested for epistemological hegemony in the mid-
eighteenth century, proposing alternative, and at times, mutually exclusive, systems for 
understanding and the pursuit of truth. 
 Chapter four, “Each Subject Has Its Method,” surveys the work of Vicente Fernández 
Valcárcel, a Palencian canon at the end of the eighteenth-century who typifies the irenic 
mediation of Catholic enlightenment thought.113  By examining Valcárcel’s efforts to negotiate 
the apparent tensions between science and religion in his work, Desengaños Filósoficos, this 
dissertation also demonstrates how Valcárcel’s epistemology reflects a bridge between the 
progressivism of thinkers such as Martínez and Feijóo and the conservative stance taken by 
intellectuals such as Mañer.  The systematic nature of Valcárcel’s attempts to circumscribe the 
“magisteria” of science and of religion is therefore representative of late-enlightenment thought 
across the Spanish empire. 
                                                 
113 See Ulrich Lehner, On the Road to Vatican II. 
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Ultimately, the translation of traditionalism and reactionary Catholic epistemology 
towards an insular stance against reform, enlightenment philosophy, and foreign influences at the 
end of the eighteenth-century and through the French invasion of the peninsula is presented in 
the fifth and final chapter, “From Ilustrado to Afrancesado: Politicizing Reform, Enlightenment, 
and Jansenism in the Alvarado-Villanueva Debates, 1782-1813.” After the excesses of the 
French Revolution, and particularly subsequent to the Napoleonic invasion of the peninsula, the 
metaphysical and epistemological framework that many Spaniards associated with the 
enlightenment became linked to both French nationality and to the destruction of traditional 
society.  Enlightened “liberalism” and reformism became particularly suspect.  This chapter 
particularly situates the Jansenist debates of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century 
Spanish Catholic Church within broader ecclesiastical efforts to regulate reform and doctrinal 
critique, as well as to maintain epistemological hegemony.  These themes are explored through 
the works of Spanish Jansenists, assessing how Jansenism was classified as a heterodox variety 
of Catholicism, what Jansenists professed in their texts, and how Spanish theologians responded 
and reacted to it.  To do so, this chapter specifically analyzes El Jansenismo, a religious dialogue 
and debate written by Joaquín Lorenzo Villanueva in 1811, as well as a series of editorial letters 
authored by Fray Francisco Alvarado.  This chapter thus considers the contested definitions of 
Spanish Jansenism at the end of the eighteenth century and assesses its relation to Catholic 
reform and Enlightened Catholicism. By doing so, this chapter demonstrates how Spanish 
Jansenism, as a variety of Catholicism, was part of the larger reforming efforts within the 
Spanish Catholic Church during the eighteenth century, and how such reform was the direct 
causal conclusion of  the metaphysical, epistemological, and axiological questions raised earlier 




While conducting research for this dissertation in Spain, I was frequently asked by 
scholars, clergy, and lay persons the subject of my study.  When I answered that I was 
investigating the Spanish enlightenment, the confused response was always a variation of the 
same reply: “pero no existía en España la Ilustración.”  This was said with an assertive finality 
that suggested both the obviousness of this fact and the intimation that my time would be better 
spent searching for something that actually existed.  One of my main aims in this work is to 
correct this common misunderstanding, showing that not only did Spain participate in the 
enlightenment, but that the intellectual production of the Spanish empire during this time 
constituted a rich and distinctive body of thought worthy of study and critical to understanding 
the history of Europe in the eighteenth century. 
The age of enlightenment witnessed sweeping changes in almost every sphere of life 
throughout Europe and across the Atlantic to the colonies of the New World.  “Our indispensable 
century,” the poet Matthew Arnold labeled it, and indeed it was; in Spain, everything from 
political reforms, to economic improvement plans, new agricultural and industrial 
implementations, literature, infrastructure, social justice, natural law and human rights, 
jurisprudence, and, most importantly for this dissertation, advancements in the natural sciences 
which introduced a time of transition and debate for the areas of philosophy, epistemology, and 
theology.  The greatest minds of the century were split between those who argued against the 
introduction of new ideas and those who urged for them to be adopted – and among each camp, 
differences of opinions on how these ideas were useful, beneficial, harmful, or errant differed 
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greatly.  One hundred years afterwards, two of the greatest historians of the period had failed to 
reach a consensus. 
Writing in 1890, Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo, the most prominent historian of ideas in 
Spain during the nineteenth century, member of the Real Academia Española and director of the 
Academia de la Historia, was direct about his opinions on the comparative brilliance of the 
various thinkers of the eighteenth century.  Looking back on the litany of Spanish philosophers 
of the second half of the eighteenth century, most of whom were largely inspired by John Locke, 
he wrote that: 
For the glory of our nation, one should say that the only illustrious expositor here 
was Locke, and that the rest didn’t even reach the point of mediocrity, and that, on 
the other hand, the most illustrious thinkers of the eighteenth century, the 
Cistercian Rodríguez, the Hieronymite Ceballos, the canons Valcárcel and Castro, 
and the important doctor Piquer and his disciple Forner, in whom it seems the 
spirit of Vives was reborn; the Sevillano Pérez y López, emulator of Sabunde, and 
finally, the Jesuit Hervás y Panduro…they maintained immunity to such a 
contagion, they grappled without compromise against the intellectual invasion of 
France, they managed to add to the golden chain of our culture and were fervent 
spiritualists, as opposed to those who denied all the anterior and superior activity 
of the soul to the sensations and searched in sensations and the various 
transformed modes, the root of all knowledge, clumsily applying the analytic 
method.”114 
                                                 
114 Menéndez y Pelayo, HHE, VI.iii.4.pp.516.  Antonio José Rodríguez, OCist (1703-1777), was a physician and 
writer whose works were the Palestra critica-medica en que se trata de introducer la verdadera Medicina…, six 
volumes (Pamplona: J.J. Martínez y Zaragoza, F. Moreno, 1734-1749) and the Nuevo aspecto de Theología Médico-
Moral (1742); Ceballos is a common corruption of Fernando de Cevallos (OSH); Vicente Fernandez Valcárcel 
(1723-1798), autor of Desengaños Filosoficos, Que en Obsequio de la Verdad, de la Religion, y de la Patria 
(Madrid: Don Blas Roman, Impresor de la Real Academia de Derecho Español, 1787); Juan Francisco de Castro 
Fernández (1721-1790), a presbyter, lawyer, and apologist who, like Feijóo, was from Galicia, in nearby Lugo.  He 
was appointed a canon of the city by Carlos III, and later an archdeacon.  In addition to authoring works on law 
(Discursos críticos sobre las Leyes, y sus Interpretes, en que se demuestra la incertidumbre de éstos, y la necesidad 
de un Nuevo y metódico cuerpo de derecho, para la recta administración de justicia (Madrid, 1765,1770, three 
volumes), he also was the president of the Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País de Lugo, which he directed from 
1784-1790. .  (www.filosofia.org/ave/001/a184.htm); Juan Pablo Forner y Segarra (1756-1797), nephew of Piquer 
and Spanish apologist; Antonio Xavier Pérez y López (1736-1792), a faculty member of the University of Sevilla; 
and Lorenzo Hervás y Panduro, SJ (1735-1809). 
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To Menéndez y Pelayo, who admittedly often wrote sympathetically to the conservative position, 
the majority of the most insightful philosophical productions from the siglo de las luces did not 
come from those authors who styled themselves as ilustrados, but rather from those who have 
been consigned by historians to the “losing team” of counter-enlightenment thinkers.  While 
Piquer and Castro Fernández are considered part of the Catholic Enlightenment movement in 
Spain, every other name that Menéndez y Pelayo exalts authored a significant work against the 
new thinking introduced in the eighteenth-century.115 
Not to be outdone in color, Mario Méndez Bejarano, writing shortly after Menédez y 
Pelayo described the eighteenth century from a completely different perspective, writing that: 
Ill winds blew through Spain for philosophy in the eighteenth century, nothing 
more than the ancilla Theologiae that endured this long night of conscience, not 
awoken to hopeful matins until the end of the century.  Not a single original 
thinker until D. Javier Pérez y López, who audaciously translated the Cartesian 
enthymeme from psychology to ontology.  Religious orders continued to ruminate 
scholasticism: the Franciscans in their Scotist variety, the Dominicans in 
Thomistic orthodoxy, and the Ignatians in the Suarist modification.  Some Jesuits 
were tossed into the arms of sensualism, which I fail to comprehend how they 
paired it with Christian doctrine, because the entire system is arranged on the 
senses, which are considered the only source of knowledge, a fatal impulse to 
materialism in psychology and ontology towards atheism.  All the while, the 
Cartesian and Gassendenist surf lapped against the peaks of the Pyrenees and its 
splashes were approved by Feijóo.116 
This dissertation closely examines both of these views, and each of the authors named are 
analyzed in hundreds of publications and manuscripts from the period.  What is 
ultimately sought is not a champion of the eighteenth-century Spanish intellectual sphere, 
                                                 
115 The historiographical jury is out on Castro Fernández; while Sempere y Guarinos agrees with Menéndez y 
Pelayo, writing that “the Author thinks well, and has merit in many of his reflections, and particularly his 
examples….” Mario Méndez Bejarano stated that Castro Fernández was “of little philosophical talent… [his work] 
covered a lot, girded a little, and didn’t offer any novelty in justification of final causes (causas finales)…” See 
Sempere y Guarinos, EBE II.158-159, and Mario Méndez Bejarano, Historia de la filosofía en España hasta el siglo 
XX (Madrid: Renacimiento, 1929), XVI§vii.381. 
116 “Degeneración de la filosofía” in Méndez Bejarano, Historia de la filosofía en España hasta el siglo XX, 
XVI.§i.335-336. 
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but a clear and detailed understanding of how the various philosophies of science and 
religion interacted and contested over the epistemological claim of the Spanish empire, 
and why this particular debate was the defining concern of the leading minds on both 
sides of the Spanish Atlantic for over a century.  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
Religion and the New Philosophy of Science in Eighteenth-Century Spain: 
Martín Martínez’s Medical Skepticism, Empiricism, and the Challenges of Epistemic 
Demarcation, 1687-1730 
 
“It is enough simply to mention the New Philosophy to turn their stomachs…The preoccupation 
reigns in Spain against all new things.  Many say that the title of ‘new” in the doctrines is enough 
to reprove them, because in the area of doctrine, all new things are suspicious…This absurdity 
follows and falls on their heads like a lead weight: in the Sciences and Arts there has never been 
a discovery or invention that was not at some time new.” 
-P.Fr. Benito Jerónimo Feijóo (OSB), “On the Causes of Backwardsness that Spain Suffers”117 
 
“It is certain that in our time it seems that Athens has been transplanted to Spain.  St. Luke says 
in the Acts of the Apostles that the Athenians and Foreigners of that City were completely given 
over to talking and hearing about some new thing…But if you were to ask the various professors 
of the New Philosophies if they have found the truth?  Not a single one would say ‘yes.’” 
-P. Fr. Diego Tello Lasso de la Vega (O. de M.), personal letter to Josef Cevallos118 
  
In 1722, Martín Martínez, a physician practicing in Madrid and president of the Regia 
Sociedad de Medicina de Sevilla (Royal Society of Medicine in Seville), and later professor of 
anatomy and personal physician to the King’s own chamber, published his latest addition to the 
                                                 
117 “Basta nombrar la nueva Filosofía, para conmover a estos el estómago…La segunda causa es la preocupación, 
que reina en España contra toda novedad. Dicen muchos, que basta en las doctrinas el título de nuevas para 
reprobarlas, porque las novedades en punto de doctrina son sospechosas… de ella se sigue un absurdo, que cae a 
plomo sobre sus cabezas. En materia de Ciencias, y Artes no hay descubrimiento, o invención, que no haya sido un 
tiempo nueva.” CE.II.16§3, 6, and 9 (1745). 
118 “Cierto que en nuestro tiempo parece se ha trasladado Athenas a Espana.  Los Athenenses, y Forasteros en 
aquella Ciu.d. dice San Lucas en los Hechos Apostolicos, que estaban totalmente dados a deicr, u oir alguna cosa 
nueva.  Athemenses autem omnes, et al vena hospites, ad nihil aliud sacabant, nesi aut dicere aut audire aliquid novi. 
Detor. 17  Pero si preguntas semos a los Varios Professores de las nuevas Philosophicas, si han hallado la verdad ?  
Ninguno dirá que si.” in Fr. Diego Tello Lasso de la Vega, “Carta de Fr. Diego Tello Gasso de la Vega a Cevallos,” 
(28-Noviembre-1756), in bound manuscript volume BNE_10350, páginas 95-112.  This is part of a collection of 
eighteen personal letters which de la Vega sent to Cevallos between October 1, 1751 and July 19th, 1760.  Lasso de 
la Vega (1686-1763), O. de M., a presentado de numero and chair of the province of Andalucia el Real, was best 
known as the author of two hagiographical works on San Laureano, archbishop of Sevilla (r. 522-539).  He was also 
a consultor for the Sacred Congregation of the Index, and a calificador of the Holy, Supreme, and Universal Office 
of the Roman Inquisition. 
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burgeoning field of medical knowledge and discoveries of the early-eighteenth century in Spain.  
Since the last quarter of the seventeenth century, the Spanish empire had undergone its own 
“Scientific Revolution” experience, and a generation of physicians and natural philosophers had 
published dozens of works discussing the most cutting-edge medical and scientific experiments 
being performed both within the Spanish kingdoms and across the Pyrenees.  Martínez’s 
contribution was a lengthy, two-volume work entitled Medicina Sceptica (Skeptical Medicine), 
and contained, strikingly, not only practical information about the practice of medicine, anatomy, 
and surgery, but a radically clear call for the adoption of skepticism as a philosophy and practice 
within these disciplines.119  Quoting Saint John Chrysostom, Martínez stated the purpose of his 
work in the prologue, asserting that: 
It is very difficult to teach, but it is much more difficult to “unteach,” principally 
when the propagated errors come from our forefathers; because those that are 
already are so accustomed it is so extremely difficult to remove the preconceived 
opinions… So powerful is this persuasion that the false things first learned have 
more strength than the true ones, if they are learned later.120 
Martínez sought to “unteach” not only how people approached the study of the natural world, but 
also to reconceive of the way that the intellectual sphere of eighteenth-century Spain thought 
about the relationship between science and religion and their respective epistemologies.  In his 
work, Martínez thus called for not only new areas of knowledge, but a new way of learning this 
knowledge.  In order for this new way to be learned, old habits of understanding had to be 
                                                 
119 Quotes are taken from the third edition of Martínez’s two-volume Medicina sceptica (ME), which included 
Feijóo’s apology for the work.  See Martín Martínez, Medicina sceptica y cirugia moderna, con un tratado de 
operaciones chirurgicas. [Texto impreso] (1748), tercera impresión añadida con una apología del Rmo. P.M. Fr. 
Benito Feijoo; Biblioteca Nacional de España 2/61446. 
120 Martínez, ME.I.70-71. “Muy dificil es enseñar, pero mucho mas dificil desenseñar, principalmente quando los 
errores vienen propagados desde nuestro ancessores; porque los que assi están yá impuestos, tan difícilmente dexan 
las preconcebidas opiniones, aunque las hallen sólidamente impugnades, como los que tienen hijos adoptivos, a 
quienes han mantenido largo tiempo, los quales, si hubieran sabido al principio que eran hijos supuestos, y 
achacados, ni aun los hubieran admitido.  Tan poderosa es la persuasión, que las cosas falsas aprendidas primero, 
tienen mas fuerza que las verdaderas, si se enseñan después.” Prologo.ii-iii 
58 
‘untaught’ to Spain’s scholars.  What Martínez meant by skepticism (scepticismo), the deeper, 
epistemological consequences of his work, and the numerous debates that broke out across the 
intellectual climate of eighteenth-century Spanish empire all indicate a concern with defining the 
relationship between religion and science, as well as clearly discerning a Catholic epistemology 
with which religious thinkers could search for truth and knowledge. 
This chapter explores the religio-intellectual scene of the early-eighteenth century that 
existed in Spain and her colonies by specifically examining the works of Martín Martínez and his 
critics.  Additionally, this chapter anchors Martínez’s writings in the broader intellectual-
theological discussions of the eighteenth century by providing the context of some of Martínez’s 
critics and supporters.  Martínez’s publications in the 1720s tackled directly the philosophical 
concerns of the new sciences, and the debate in which he became embroiled is representative of 
the widespread conflicts between Counter- and Catholic-Enlighteners that occurred during the 
initial stage of the Spanish Enlightenment (1687-1737).  By doing so, it shows the preeminent 
concern of the Spanish Catholic and Counter-Enlighteners with epistemology – that the Catholic 
intellectual elite (university professors, certain members of the clergy, calificadores, jurists, 
physicians, among others) were concerned not only with what ought to be believed, but how it 
ought to be known.  Ultimately, this chapter demonstrates how, as a result of these concerns, 
Martínez advocated for the adoption of skepticism in natural philosophy, the abandonment of 
Aristotelianism and Galenism, and how he worked to effect an epistemic demarcation between 
theology and science, similar to what Richard Popkin has termed a fideistic skepticism and 
Francisco Sánchez-Blanco has called a “Christian Skeptical Philosophy.”121  Though Martínez 
                                                 
121 Richard Popkin, The History of Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
xxi. Fideism is the epistemological belief that faith and reason are distinct (or, at times, contradictory) modes of 
belief, intended for distinct fields of knowledge.  See, for example Blaise Pascal’s Pensées.  Francisco Sánchez-
Blanco, “Benito Jerónimo Feijoo y Montenegro (1676-1764): Benedictine and Skeptic Enlightener,” in 
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advocated this separation, both the writings of his critics and the record of subsequent 
publications of the period indicate that such an epistemic demarcation was disregarded, 
misunderstood, or seen as fundamentally unstable.  These Counter-Enlightenment writers 
pointed to the insufficiency of skepticism in both natural philosophy and metaphysics, as well as 
to the porosity of Martínez’s proposed disciplinary boundaries. 
 
Defining the Novatores and the “Novator Movement” (1687-1737) 
The study of the particular transition period in the intellectual climate from the 
seventeenth to the eighteenth century, while less-known in English scholarship, has yielded 
numerous and considerable scholarly works on the ‘epoch of the novatores.’  The first significant 
work to attempt such a history was Paul Hazard’s Le Crise de la Conscience Européene.122  
Hazard’s work is encompassing and thorough, describing the channels in which traditional ways 
of knowing and bodies of knowledge were steadily challenged and often successfully replaced 
by religious movements previously considered heterodoxical, by new methods such as 
rationalism, skepticism, or empiricism, by developments in scientific knowledge and natural 
philosophy, by innovative political ideologies, by new fields of study in biblical exegesis, even 
by new understandings of morality, ethics, and human psychology.  Hazard describes this 
process in militant terms, describing a tension between two predominantly mutually exclusive 
factors, writing, 
The champions of Reason and the champions of Religion were, in the words of 
Pierre Bayle, fighting desperately for the possession of men’s souls, confronting 
each other in a contest at which the whole of thoughtful Europe was looking on… 
                                                 
Enlightenment and Catholicism in Europe: A Transnational History, Jeffrey D. Burson and Ulrich L. Lehner, eds. 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014), 309-326. 
122 Paul Hazard, La Crise de la Conscience Européene (Boivin : Paris, 1935).  See also Paul Hazard, The European 
Mind (1680-1715), trans. J. Lewis May (London : Hollis & Carter, 1953). 
60 
The first task was one of demolition.  That well and truly completed, the next 
thing was reconstruction.123 
Hazard therefore necessarily describes the turn of the century as one of epistemic rupture – an 
old system was being replaced, sometimes gradually, other times more precipitously (i.e., with 
medical, scientific, and technological discoveries), by new thoughts. Hazard’s work, while 
pioneering and immensely helpful in understanding a well-synthesized overview of the period 
from 1680 to 1715, is unfortunately limited to France and England, and neglects the spread of 
Enlightenment ideas or parallel movements in other European countries. 
Implicit in Hazard’s analysis is a necessary rupture between reason and religion – a 
religio-intellectual battle that involved European society on multiple levels and in various 
forums, creating a general “crisis of conscience,” or as Hazard labels it elsewhere, a “dubious no-
man’s-land” of transition, a general “quest for truth and happiness.”124  In this quest, Hazard 
argues, “what men craved to know was what they were to believe, and what they were not to 
believe.”125  While this last statement is doubtlessly true, it emphasizes the content and material 
of what was believed by European society to the detriment of the method of its acquisition.  This 
necessarily results in a historiography that is heavy-handed toward epistemic rupture as the 
defining characteristic – most simply, historians have cataloged the beliefs and notions of 
European intellectual elite circa 1687 and again in 1725, have noted wide disparities, and have 
concluded that something dramatic occurred. 
For Spain, the study of this transition period is synonymous with the study of the 
novatores or the “Novator Movement.” First used disparagingly by Francisco Palanco in 1714 to 
describe a group of individuals attacking the established beliefs in theology, philosophy, and 
                                                 
123 Hazard, The European Mind, xv-xvi. 
124 Hazard, The European Mind, 15. 
125 Hazard, The European Mind, 15. 
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science, the term “novatores” (“innovators”) is now applied historically to the roughly 
coterminous collection of individuals who challenged the existing Galenic and Aristotelian 
practices in medicine and natural philosophy in Spain at the end of the seventeenth and 
beginning of the eighteenth centuries.126  They often included physicians, anatomists, surgeons, 
scientists, mathematicians, and armchair enthusiasts of the aforementioned fields, commonly 
advocated for the adoption of iatrochemistry, iatromechanism, vitalism, or atheoretical 
empiricism in medicine and science, and competed against the existing Scholastic institutions to 
legitimize these practices, often resorting to alternative and informal intellectual networks.  They 
have alternatively been considered the first generation of early-enlightenment thought, the group 
responsible for introducing ‘modernity’ to Spain, or Spain’s reaction to and participation in the 
broader European scientific activity of the mid-seventeenth century. 
The era of the novatores in Spanish history is inextricably linked to studies of the 
‘Scientific Revolution,’ and accordingly, the two share similar historiographical trends.127  Two 
such similarities are the blurring of any clear periodization and the fracturing of the idea of a 
unified, coherent movement.  For example, historians have emphasized that the idea of a clean, 
epistemic break or unified paradigm shift that occurred at a discrete moment of ‘Revolution’ 
between the old and the new is simply inaccurate.  “The line dividing the ancients and the 
                                                 
126 Francisco Palanco [alternatively Polanco], Dialogus Physico-Theologicus contra Philosophiae Novatores, sive 
Thomista contra Atomistas. Cursus Philosophici (Madrid: Blasij de Villanueva, 1714). 
127 A review of the available literature on the Scientific Revolution would necessitate another dissertation.  For a 
brief overview, in addition to Thomas Kuhn and Steven Shapin’s work, which serves as a useful introduction to both 
the history and historiography of the Scientific Revolution, see also these trends reflected or noted in:  George 
Basalla, The Rise of Modern Science: External or Internal Factors? (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1968); Herbert 
Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science, Revised Edition (New York: The Free Press, 1957); Lorrain J. Daston 
and Peter Galison, Objectivity (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007); A. Rupert Hall, The Scientific Revolution 1500-
1800: The Formation of the Modern Scientific Attitude (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); Robert A. Hatch, “The 
Scientific Revolution: Paradigm Lost?,” OAH Magazine of History 4, No. 2 (Spring, 1989): 34-39; Pamela H. 
Smith, “Science on the Move: Recent Trends in the History of Early Modern Science,” Renaissance Quarterly 62, 
No. 2 (Summer 2009): 345-375. 
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moderns often tends to blur in complex ways…” writes Mary Lindemann, further arguing that 
many “modern projects” were simply refurbishments of ancient ideas.128  Juan de Cabriada, 
considered by many to be the first of the novatores, for example, described his own subject of 
study as “la nova-antigua medicina” – the “new-old medicine.”129  Many of the novatores 
straddled the line between traditionalism and innovation or who saw many of their particularly 
scientific discoveries as non-contradictory to the metaphysical framework of Aristotelianism.  
Similarly, and more importantly, just as historians have broken the Enlightenment into multiple 
enlightenment experiences and shattered the idea of “any singular and discrete event…any single 
coherent cultural entity” such as a practice of science or the ‘Scientific Revolution,’ scholars 
have recently undermined the idea of a unified and coherent group or movement of novatores 
present at turn-of-the-century Spain.130  
The alternative is to see “a diverse array of cultural practices aimed at understanding, 
explaining, and controlling the natural world,” or more specifically to the novatores, to 
understand that the term is itself a construction of historians, and that the reality was “plural and 
heterogeneous…the result of processes linked to their own rhythms and adjustments and, above 
all, marked by an distinctly local context.”131  This is done, argues historians José Pardo-Tomás 
and Alvar Martínez-Vidal, by paying special attention to the locality of the production of 
scientific knowledge, emphasizing particular cultural practices, institutions, and intellectual 
                                                 
128 Mary Lindemann, Medicine and Society in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
199), 78. 
129 Juan de Cabriada, Carta Filosofica-Medico-Chymica en que se demuestra que de los tiempos, y experiencias se 
han aprendido los Mejores Remedios contra las Enfermedades.  Por la Nova-Antigua Medicina (Madrid: Lucas 
Antonio de Bedmar y Baldivia, 1687), title page.  See also Andrés Piquer’s use of “vetus et nova” in Andrés Piquer, 
Medicina vetus et nova I secundis curis retracta (Mantua: Joachimum Ibarram, 1758). 
130 Steven Shapin, The Scientific Revolution (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 3. 
131 Shapin, 3; José Pardo-Tomás and Alvar Martínez-Vidal, “Medicine and the Spanish Novator Movement,” in Más 
allá de la leyenda Negra: España y la Revolución Científica, William Eamon and Victor Navarro Brotóns, eds., 
341-342. 
63 
networks that influenced the generation, dissemination, and adaptation of scientific ideas and 
practices.  This would include, for example, the role of personal networks between physicians, 
anatomists, apothecarists, surgeons, and academics, academic societies (royal and informal), 
tertulias, the development of hospitals, anatomical theaters, and medical schools, medical 
consultas and juntas, publishers and publishing houses, the dissemination of printed works, 
personal letters, and other means of circulating, adapting, and growing knowledge.132 
It also means avoiding generalizing categories and labels or “troubling anachronistic 
territorial taxonomy.”133  This last issue is particularly pronounced in Spanish and Portuguese 
historiographies, as the founding studies of the novatores and their works was born under the 
influence of the polémica de la ciencia española which formed part of the Spanish Black 
Legend.  Indeed, in the case of Portugal, the term for the early pioneers of the new science is not 
“innovators” but “estrangeirados” – those who have been influenced by foreigners.134  These 
early works, and particularly the contributions of José María López Piñero, emphasized the 
‘home-grown’ nature of the novatores to contradict the previous consignation of Iberia to passive 
receptivity of the “diffusionist narrative.”  It additionally challenged the date of the 
modernization of science in Spain from the 1730s to an entire generation earlier, displacing 
                                                 
132 In this respect, José Pardo-Tomás has led the field of the history of science in Spain.  See, for example, Alvar 
Martínez-Vidal and José Pardo-Tomás, “Anatomical Theaters and the Teaching of Anatomy in Early Modern 
Spain,” Medical History 49 (2005): 251-280; José Pardo Tomás and Alvar Martínez Vidal, “Los Origenes del Teatro 
Anatómico de Madrid (1689-1728),” Ascelpio XLIX-1 (1997): 5-38; José Pardo Tomás and Alvar Martínez Vidal, 
“Las consultas y juntas de médicos como escenarios de controversia científica y práctica médica en la época de los 
novatores (1687-1725),” DYNAMIS. Acta Hisp. Med. Sci.Hist. Illus. 22 (2002): 303-325; for Latin America: 
Antonio Lafuente, “Enlightenment in an Imperial Context: Local Science in the Late-Eighteenth-Century Hispanic 
World,” Osiris Vol. 15 (2000): 155-173; for Portugal: Ana Carneiro, Ana Simoes, and Maria Paula Diogo, 
“Enlightenment Science in Portugal: The Estrangeirados and Their Communication Networks,” Social Studies of 
Science 30, No. 4 (Aug., 2000): 591-619. 
133 PardoTomas and Martínez-Vidal, “Medicine and the Spanish Novator Movement,” 341. 
134 Ana Carneiro, Ana Simoes, and Maria Paula Diogo, “Enlightenment Science in Portugal: The Estrangeirados and 
Their Communication Networks,” Social Studies of Science 30, No. 4 (Aug., 2000): 591-619. 
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Gregorio Marañón’s assertion that Feijóo was the herald of the enlightenment by suggesting in 
his place de Cabriada’s 1687 work, Carta Filosofica-Medico-Chymica.135 
All of this reinforces the fact that to speak about the novatores as a distinct movement of 
card-carrying members is wildly misleading, as is the impulse “to “shoehorn major figures into 
one category or another.”136   Indeed, Pardo-Tomás and Martínez-Vidal suggest that a close 
examination of a particular novator’s thought and polemics, for example, that of Martín 
Martínez, would demonstrate the vast spectrum of opinions being espoused at this time.137 
This chapter follows Pardo-Tomás and Martínez-Vidal’s suggestion, examining the 
arguments over Martínez’s work to show the “multiplicity of standpoints” within the vague and 
encompassing term of “the New Philosophy.”138  In so doing, however, it classifies and 
constructs a taxonomy of terms – not only to satisfy the “historiographical itch to arrange and 
classify,” but to provide students of the period a manageable way to understand how 
Enlighteners and Counter-Enlighteners described their thinking.139  The result is a long and 
confusing lexicography of philosophical, theological, and scientific terms, many of which are 
arcane, some of which are contradictorily employed by different agents, and all of which demand 
further study.  Despite these faults, this approach has one redeeming virtue: it studies the Spanish 
Enlightenment on its own terms, seeking to “see things their way.”140  This method, followed by 
this dissertation, treats the historical texts seriously to understand how eighteenth-century 
intellectuals thought.  Certainly, historians who become agitated with the conflation and 
                                                 
135 See Pardo-Tomás and Martínez-Vidal’s summary in “Medicine and the Spanish Novator Movement.”  Related 
also is the foundational work of Gregorio Marañón and of José María López Piñero. 
136 Mary Lindemann, Medicine and Society in Early Modern Europe, 85. 
137 PardoTomas and Martínez-Vidal, “Medicine and the Spanish Novator Movement,” 356. 
138 PardoTomas and Martínez-Vidal, “Medicine and the Spanish Novator Movement,” 355-356. 
139 PardoTomas and Martínez-Vidal, “Medicine and the Spanish Novator Movement,” 340, 
140 Alister Chapman, John Coffey, and Brad S. Gregory, eds, Seeing Things Their Way: Intellectual History and the 
Return of Religion (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009). 
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proliferation of philosophical terms and schools generated during the late-seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries can take solace in the fact that Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment 
thinkers similarly ridiculed the hyperspecific “-isms” of the time.  “The Systematic [Philosophy] 
has many dividend members,” rattled off Feijóo, “e.g. Pythagoreanism, Platonism, 
Peripateticism, Paracelsianism, or Campanela’s Chemistry, Cartesianism, Gassendism, etc.”141 
 
Assessing the “New Philosophy” of the Novatores 
Novelty thus was the defining trait of the novatores – they proposed the “New 
Philosophy,” composed of new ideas learned from the “New Sciences” as alternatives to the 
Scholastic, Aristotelian, and Galenic status quo in Spain. The widespread use of the term “New 
Philosophy” or occasionally “Modern Philosophy” (more prominently used in Mexico as an 
alternative label, but periodically in Spain as well) supply ample evidence that the conception of 
a group of philosophies characterized by either similarities in their beliefs or, at the very least, 
their recent inventions, held a coherent, semantic meaning, not only in the Hispanophonic world, 
but in examples from England, France, and the Italian peninsula also.142 
Despite an awareness of these varied schools, the historiographical scope has rarely 
moved from what Spaniards thought to how they thought.  One of the few historians to address 
this oversight is Anthony Pagden.  In his article, “The Reception of the ‘New Philosophy’ in 
Eighteenth-Century Spain,” Pagden argues that the work of novatores was largely ineffective, 
and attempts to explain why the challenges posed by la nueva filosofía to the established 
epistemology of “Thomist jusnaturalism” failed to take root in the initial decades of eighteenth-
                                                 
141 Feijóo, Teatro Critico Universal (TCU) II.16§19. 
142 The term “New Philosophy” or “Modern Philosophy” is found in Vicente Fernández Valcárcel, Louis Antoine de 
Caraccioli, Andres Piquer, Benito Jerónimo Feijóo, Claude François Nonnotte, Fernando de Cevallos, Teodoro de 
Almeida, Josefa Amar y Borbón, and Giuseppe Gazola, among others. 
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century Spain.143  Pagden traces the origins of the rise of novatore philosophy to Cartesianism; 
certainly, individuals such as Martínez, Feijóo, and Diego Mateo Zapata were all aware of and 
profoundly influenced by the work of Descartes - but they were equally as influenced by 
numerous others. 144  Moreover, many Catholic Enlightenment intellectuals recognized that 
Descartes had made errors in areas of his thinking.  “Descartes was given a sublime genius,” 
wrote Feijóo, “... [and] overall, although Descartes spoke poorly in some things, he taught 
innumerable Philosophers to speak well.”145  Early-eighteenth century Spanish Catholic 
philosophers had to work to glean the salvageable material from Descartes (Feijóo, for example, 
had difficulty accepting the idea of the cogito) and to separate his philosophies from Gassendian 
atomism, which was seen as fundamentally contradictory to such Catholic doctrine as 
transubstantiation.146  Importantly, Pagden argues that the challenges made to technical or 
scientific knowledge quickly became associated with broader questions of knowledge and 
epistemology, even disturbing what he calls “the cultural hegemony” of the religio-intellectual 
elite.  He writes, 
At one immediate level, these Philosophers challenged the cultural hegemony of 
the traditional academic institutions because their concerns, however cautiously 
pursued, by privileging experience and individual cognition over exegesis, clearly 
constituted a threat to the system of text-based knowledge on which late 
scholasticism relied.147 
Pagden raises many valid questions, and his framework for assessing the failure of novatores as 
an epistemological one – one in which they were unable to displace scholasticism, 
                                                 
143 Anthony Pagden, “The Reception of the ‘New Philosophy’ in Eighteenth-Century Spain,” Journal of the 
Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 51 (1988), 126-140. 
144 Martínez’s Filosofía Escéptica, for example involves a Cartesianist as one of the four principal characters in his 
dialogue. 
145 CE.II.16§17,18 “Fue Descartes dotado de un genio sublime…Con todo, aunque Descartes en algunas cosas 
discurrió mal, enseñó a inumerables Filósofos a discurrir bien.” 
146 Pagden, “New Philosophy,” 130. 
147 Pagden, “New Philosophy,” 128. 
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Aristotelianism, Thomism, and other “older methods of explanation” is useful.148  However, it 
necessarily posits the novatores as outsiders, and at times, has a reductionist, duplicitous 
interpretation where novatore thinkers only attempted reconciliation of ideas as conceits or feints 
to protect their reputation or work from punishment or censorship.  Moreover, it fails ultimately 
in its explanation, because by the end of the eighteenth century, the position formerly occupied 
by novatores was now dominant, whereas the conservative Scholastic principle was seen as 
backwards, recalcitrant, and reactionary. 
Another way of describing the philosophical debate of the eighteenth-century is that of a 
priori and a posteriori knowledge.149  A priori knowledge is that knowledge which requires 
justification independent of experience or empirical observations; this knowledge is produced 
and used, for example, in the field of mathematics, and is present in tautologies as well 
theoretical deductions, logic, and “pure reason.” Because of the heavy reliance upon deduction 
(moving from one or more general premises to reach necessarily true conclusions), those who 
argue from a priori knowledge are often labeled “deductionists;” alternatively, because of the 
use of “pure reason,” such philosophers are also called “rationalists.”  A posteriori knowledge, 
on the other hand, is knowledge which has to be justified by experience and empirical 
observation; such is the knowledge generated in the physical sciences, for example. Because of 
the reliance upon inductive reasoning (gathering repeat premises as evidence for a probable 
                                                 
148 Pagden, “New Philosophy,” 140. 
149 Although Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is most famous for his treatment of these terms, there is no evidence of his 
work being made readily accessible or discussed in Spain during the eighteenth century.  The oldest copy of a 
Spanish translation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason in the collection of the Biblioteca Nacional de España only 
dates back to 1883; Immanuel Kant, Crítica de la razón pura: texto de las dos ediciones. Precedida de la Vida de 
Kant y de la Historia de los oríenes de la filosofía crítica, de Kuno Fischer, translated from German by José del 
Perojo (Madrid: Gaspar, 1883), BNE 5/42132 V.1.  Older copies in French and German are available, as well as 
some earlier Spanish translations of other Works by Kant.The terms apriori and a posteriori, although used by both 
Euclid and Berkeley and doubtless known by the Spanish intelligentsia, do not appear in the literature.  Berkeley is 
similarly absent, except in French translations. 
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truth) and on the empirical senses, philosophers who argue for the primacy of a posteriori 
knowledge are often described as “sensationalists” or “empiricists.”  The Spanish novatores defy 
easy categorization – particularly those who are conscribed to the Spanish Catholic 
Enlightenment.  It is for this reason why many historians have overused the term “eclecticism” to 
characterize the philosophical approach of Spanish ilustrados, a term that will be discussed in 
greater detail at the end of this chapter and in the following chapter.  As much as possible, this 
dissertation uses the words which the historical agents themselves employed (moderate skeptics, 
dogmatists, systematicists, etc.), even if it requires extensive cataloging and explanation. 
 
Martínez’s Medical Skepticism 
Born in Madrid, November 11, 1684, Martín Martínez was one of the most prominent 
physicians and public intellectuals of his time, becoming a key figure in the novator movement.  
After studying medicine at Alcalá de Henares, he held numerous prestigious positions, including 
service as a doctor at the Hospital General de Madrid (1706), a professor of anatomy at that same 
hospital (1728), personal physician to king Felipe V, a protomedico (evaluatory position charged 
with monitoring the standards for the health sciences - medicine, surgery, pharmacy - within 
Spain), and perhaps most importantly, President of the Regia Sociedad de Medicina de Sevilla.150  
                                                 
150 For biographical information on Martín Martínez, see his entry and introduction from the Proyecto Filosofía en 
español (2001), available online at ww.filosofia.org. See also “Pedro Martín Martinez” in Jose Alvarez-Sierra, 
Médicos Madrileños Famosos: Biografía y Bibliografía de Médicos ilustres nacidos en Madrid y su provincia 
(Madrid: Bolaños y Aguilar, 1934), 64-66.  John Christian Laursen writes that “The fact that he never held a chair at 
a university surely helps account for his hostility to the medical faculties of his day.” (Laursen, “Medicine and 
Skepticism: Martín Martínez (1684-1734),” 311, in Gianni Paganini, ed. The Return of Scepticism from Hobbes and 
Descartes to Bayle, (Norwell: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 305-325.)  This is a common charge levied at 
members of the Regia Sociedad de Medicina de Sevilla who see it as fundamentally against the Spanish university 
system.  It should be noted that while it is true that Martínez was never a chair, he was the futura selection (a 
placeholding position until a suitable chair could be found) for the professorship in anatomy at the Hospital General 
in Atocha, Madrid after the death of José de Arboleda in 1728 (see Pardo-Tomás and Martínez-Vidal, “Medicine 
and the Spanish Novator Movement,” 355).  Not only is Laursen’s assumption pure speculation, but this claim 
reduces the arguments of Martínez from substantive comments about learning to jealous ad hominem attacks.  It  
may be just as possible that Martínez’s already full employment record afforded no opportunity for a university 
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Martínez, like the other subjects of this study, found in the medical fields a fertile testing ground 
for his intellectual curiosity and philosophical experimentation.  Anthony Pagden has argued that 
the early-enlightenment thinkers were almost universally doctors, for doctors were the only 
intellectuals during this period who would have been able to secure patrons outside of the closely 
monitored and highly structured Church and the university system; “The Spanish nobility,” 
Pagden argues, “like the nobility everywhere, wished to be cured of its diseases.”151 
Individuals such as Martínez sought to provide new solutions to diseases, and in doing so, 
broadened their questions in scope.  Intellectual fellowships such as the Regia Sociedad enabled 
him to maintain contact with many of the intellectual elite of early eighteenth-century Spain.  
Some, Martínez supported – he was, for example, a close friend of the polymath Benito Jerónimo 
Feijóo, for whom he wrote two apologies defending his work, entitled Carta defensiva, que 
sobre el primer torno del Theatro critic universal and Juicio Final de la Astrología, en defense 
del Teatro Crítico Universal.152  Feijóo, correspondingly praised Martínez, lauding him as the 
“the eagle of the geniuses.”153  Others, Martínez engaged in polemical discussions, most notably 
                                                 
position, or even more likely, that his “hostility to the medical faculties” preceded his abstention from them.  For 
further information on the protomedicato (the council governing the protomedicos of the Spanish empire, designed 
to protect the populace against charlatans and unregulated health practices), see: John Tate Lanning, The Royal 
Protomedicato: The Regulation of the Medical Profession in the Spanish Empire, John Jay TePaske, ed. (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1985); Robin Price, “Spanish medicine in the Golden Age,” Journal of the Royal Society of 
Medicine 72 (November 1979), 864-874; and for a colonial perspective, Emeterio S. Santovenia, El Protomedicato 
de La Habana (Havana: Ministerio de Salubridad y Asistencia Social, 1952). 
151 Pagden, “New Philosophy,” 131. 
152 For further information, see Martín Martínez, Carta defensive que sobre el primer Tomo del Teatro Crítico 
Universal, que dió a luz el Rmo. P. Mro. Fr. Benito Feijoo, le escribió su más ficionado amigo D. Martín Martínez, 
Doctor en Medicina, y Médico Honorario de Familia de S.M. Profesor de Antomía, Examinador del Proto-
Medicato, Socio, y actual Presidente de la Regia Sociedad de Ciencias de Sevilla, &c. (Madrid, Imprenta Real, 
1726); Martín Martínez, Juicio Final de la Astrología, en defensa del Teatro Crítico Universal, dividido en tres 
Discursos (Madrid, Imprenta Real, 1727); both are available digitally through www.filosofia.org. 
153 Alvarez-Sierra, Medicos Madrileños, 65. “el águila de los ingenios.”  Alvarez-Sierra rightly notes that this 
compliment is especially surprising considering Feijóo’s inclination to distrust and dislike physicians and medical 
practitioners. 
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Bernardo López de Araujo y Ascarraga and Juan Martín Lessaca.  He died in Madrid, October 9, 
1734. 
 While Martínez was a prolific writer of medical treatises and works introducing new, 
innovative medical and anatomical knowledge, his work also advocated a distinct 
epistemological platform, one directly informed by his empirically skeptical study of medicine. 
Sadly, much of the previous work on Martínez has remained at a purely content-based level of 
analysis, concerned only with the scientific contributions and reforms of medical education at the 
university level that Martínez achieved.154  Martínez’s magnum opus was the two-volume work, 
Medicina escéptica y cirugía moderna, published in two volumes in 1722 and 1725, with reprints 
of both volumes made in 1727 and 1748. 
Both Martínez’s Medicina Escéptica and his subsequent work, Philosophía Scéptica, 
Extracto de la Physica Antigua y moderna, Recopilada en Dialogos, entre un Aristotélico, 
Cartesiano, Gasendista, y Scéptico, para instrucción de la curiosidad Española (1730, with 
reprints in 1750 and 1768) take the form of dialogues between physicians of various schools of 
thought.155  In the Medicina Escéptica, these are a Galenist, a Chemist, and Hippocratic Skeptic 
(who, Martínez explains in the prologue, represents his own opinions).  In the Philosophia 
Escéptica, these positions shift to an Aristotelian (a Galenist), a Cartesian, a Gassendist, and a 
                                                 
154 See, for example, the information on the life and work of Martín Martínez in Luis S. Granjel, “El pensamiento 
médico de Martín Martínez,” en Archivos Iberoamericanos de Historia de la Medicina, IV:41-78, Madrid 1952; 
Carlos del Valle-Inclán, “El léxico anatómico de Porras y de Martín Martínez,” Archivos Iberoamericanos de 
Historia de la Medicina, IV:141-228, Madrid 1952; Ma Victoria de Aguinaga Manzanos, Martín Martínez: un 
intento de sistematización de la medicina europea en España (Tesis Doctoral, Medicina, Universidad Autónoma de 
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155 Translated, the titles are Skeptical Medicine and Surgery, with a Treatise on Surgical Operations, Volume One, 
Which is Called ‘Tentative,’ (1722), Skeptical Medicine, Volume Two. The First Part Apologema, in favor of 
Skeptical Doctors.  The Second Part Apomathema, against Dogmatist Doctors, in which it all contains the work of 
fevers (1725), and Skeptical Philosophy, Extracted from Ancient and Modern Physics, Recompiled in Dialogues 
between an Aristotelian, a Cartesian, a Gassendist, and a Skeptic, for the instruction of Spanish curiosity (1734). 
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Skeptic.156  Both works are dedicated to advocating and explaining the application of what 
Martínez labeled “skeptical medicine” and “skeptical philosophy.” 
By skepticism (escepticismo), Martínez meant that in the practice of the sciences 
(physicas), one ought to employ a “suspension of belief,” constructing all assertions from 
empirical evidence and immediate observation.  In the study of nature, Martínez asserted, God 
had never given a secure knowledge of the causes of things – only an awareness that these things 
were.  In Philosophia Escéptica, Martínez wrote: 
Physical Philosophy is a Science, or as it is better to say, it is a probable 
awareness of natural effects for [the study of] their causes.  I said probable 
awareness, because God has left us in this world only the certainty and use of 
some truths, but not the scientific comprehension of these; rather that we 
investigate the causes of things, it is easy for us to have probable awareness, but 
impossible [to have] evidence…157 
In a variation of this statement, Martínez writes that not only has God not given humanity the 
causes, or first principles, these may have originally been granted to man, but have been hidden 
in Nature due to the distortion of sin in the Fall.  Martínez describes that: 
…These most obscure shadows Philosophy left for our first Father Adam, from 
where the marring of the first sin affected Nature, and miscarried the beautiful 
light of Science, which his Creator had infused in him, leaving him only by divine 
                                                 
156 The shift in schools of thought may indicate that already, by 1730, Martínez was beginning to question the 
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razones, por las quales las cosas son assi; pero ni aun prudentemente las investiga, ni trabaja para conocerlas, que es 
la pessima ocupación, que dió Dios á los hijos de los hombres, esto es, á los Philosophos.” Martínez, Philosophia 
Escéptica, extracto de la physica antigua, y moderna, recopilada en diálogos, entre un Aristotelico, Cartesiano, 
Gassendista, y Sceptico, para instrucción de la curiosidad Española [hereafter PE], second printing, (Madrid, 
1750), 22-23. 
72 
mercy the light of reason, or first principles, which developed with repeated 
experiences in the dilated course of his live, which in the acquired Science 
constituted a consummate Philosopher, and Master of his posterity.158 
Thus, in approaching the study of the natural world, Martínez insisted that one could not argue 
from the coherence of logical syllogisms alone, but that these had to be rooted, and indeed, ought 
to originate from corresponding empirical evidence.159 
In his article, “Medicine and Skepticism: Martín Martínez (1684-1734),” John Christian 
Laursen analyzes the works of Martínez, particularly the two volumes of his Medicina Scéptica 
(1722 and 1725).  Laursen provides a fairly straightforward narrative through the works, 
emphasizing that the only mode of belief acceptable in the practice of medicine to Martínez was 
direct experience.  Laursen highlights numerous passages throughout both volumes of the 
Medicina Sceptica in which Martínez either praises observation or condemns the application of 
syllogisms.  “Martínez’s bedrock,” he writes, “is experience.”160 Martínez wrote primarily 
against the Galenists and Dogmatists (define), who believed that the combination of logic and 
endeixis (translation) were sufficient for diagnosing illnesses and the study of medicine, and 
many of his arguments for the employment of escepticismo were directly constructed against the 
Galenists. 
 Because these experiences (cosas, probable noticia) could be easily misunderstood, 
misapprehended by the senses, or confusing, Martínez insisted that philosophers who studied 
science did not apprehend verity, but rather verisimilitude.  The conclusions drawn from 
                                                 
158 “Entre estas obscurissimas sombras dexó la Philosophia nuestro primer Padre Adán, desde que el borron de la 
primera culpa afeo la Naturaleza, y malogró la hermosa luz de Ciencia, que le infundió su Criador, quedándole solo 
por piedad divina la luz de la razón, ó primeros principios, que adelantados con repetidas experiencias en el dilatado 
curso de su vida, le constituyeron en la Ciencia adquirida consumado Philosopho, y Maestro de su posteridad.” 
Martínez, PE, 22-23. 
159 Generally speaking, in epistemology, the correspondence of truth determines the truth of astatement based on its 
correspondence, or relation, to the world.  Coherence theory, however, determines the truth of a statement based on 
its relationship to other statements in its own episteme. 
160 Laursen, “Medicine and Skepticism,” 323. 
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repeated experiments formed probability, but not certainty.  Therefore, asserted Martínez, the 
natural philosopher must adopt a state of epoche.  Epoche, borrowed from the Greek skeptics and 
revised by Cartesianism in the seventeenth century, demanded a suspension of belief – a state in 
which the mind doubted both the truth and falsehood of a statement, remaining in an inquisitive, 
undecided state.161  All human knowledge (saber), stated Martínez, “is knowing to doubt, but not 
to decide.  This doctrine is that of the ingenious Skeptics, in whose tranquil Epoché I have found 
a safe port after having long wandered among the inconstant gulfs of the Dogmatists.”162  He 
further explained the epoché as verisimilitude, and contrasted it to the logical posturing of the 
Dogmatists, writing: 
…one must suppose that the verisimilitude is halfway between knowledge (el 
saber) and ignorance, because probability and awareness (noticia) are not 
absolute ignorance, but neither arrive at being a science. The Skeptics confess that 
they have some clear idea about their arts, with which they are not ignorant of that 
which others know, but they know that which the others ignore: it is very contrary 
to those arrogant Dogmatists, who affect that they know that which they do not 
know, and they make us presume that they are ignorant of what they know.163 
Martínez borrowed a medical metaphor to describe this “suspended state of mind” practiced by 
the Skeptics, writing that the epoché functioned as a purgative, removing the humors from the 
body.164 
                                                 
161161 The meaning for the Greek Word skepsis is literally an inquiring or an examination. 
162 “…todo el faber humano es faber dudar, pero no decidir. Ella doctrina es la de los ingenuos Scepticos;en cuya 
tranquila Epoche he encontrado feguro puerto , defpues de aver largamente vagado por los inconftantes golfos de los 
Dogmáticos…” Martín Martínez, Medicina Sceptica, y Cirugia Moderna, con un tratado de operaciones 
chirurgicas, Vol. I, third edition (Madrid:1748), 72 [hereafter ME.I]. 
163 “Parecerá esto en mi hipocresía, ó vanidad; porque (como reparó un Critico) los Scepticos hacen que ignoran lo 
que saben, por afectar, que saben lo que ignoran.  Para satisfacer á esta censura se ha de suponer, que la verisimilitud 
es medio entre el saber, y el ignorar, porque la probabilidad, y la noticia no son absoluta ignorancia, pero ni llegan á 
ser ciencia.  Confiessan los Scepticos, que tienen alguna clara idéa de sus artes, con que no ignoran lo que los demás 
saben, pero saben lo que los demás ignoran: muy al contrario de los arrogantes Dogmaticos, que afectando saber lo 
que ignoran, nos hacen presumir que ignoran lo que saben.” ME.I.72. 
164 “Vaye de otro modo: esta proposición Epoche es un estado suspenso de la mente, es de las reflectentes, porque 
ácia su verdad también ay Epoche; es muy semejante á la otra, Nada se sabe; porque si se sabe algo, es falsa; y si no 
se sabe, a lo menos se sabe que nada se sabe, y assi también es falsa.  La falta de erudición en el Centinela, hace que 
manche papel con tan ridículos argumentillos: él no ha visto mas libros que traten de Scepticos, que aquellos de que 
le hemos dado seña, y contraseña (es verdad que no tiene mas obligación un Centinela) pero si essos los hubiera 
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In her analysis of Martínez’s work, “The False Alarm of ‘Scepticism’,”scholar Ivy 
McClelland has argued that Martínez’s use of “skepticism” (escepticismo) was strictly limited to 
the study of medicine and science, had a unique, technical application in meaning, and was 
misunderstood by the majority of his readers (including many present-day historians).165  
Martínez’s use of the word, McClelland states, directly caused a bitter dispute in which both 
sides were employing vocabulary which their counterparts understood differently.  She writes, 
Its [skepticism’s] use by Martínez in 1722, in the title of his Medicina scéptica, 
meaning medical acknowledgement of medical uncertainties, might have been 
less notoriously provocative and alarming had not Feijoo…imaginatively paraded 
its every possible Baconian application in his own treatises…. Yet neither 
Martínez nor Feijoo was speaking of skepticism in the abstract.166 
Contemporaries clearly linked Martínez’s name with skepticism (and indeed, his two principal 
works) generally misunderstood at that time as a quasi-Cartesian rejection of all knowledge, even 
common sense.  Juan Bernabé’s portrait of Martínez in 1745, for example, featured the médico in 
his study, armed with a quill and the two volumes of his Medicina Escéptica, and a Latin 
epigraph underscoring his skepticism below him declaring “Since learned opinion is, in truth, 
only ignorance, I know nothing, not even the sky above me; I know only that I know nothing at 
all.”167  The confusion and general alarm that occurred in response to Martínez’s use of 
skepticism is understandable.   Martínez situated the academic lineage of the Hippocratic-Skeptic 
clearly in the very first dialogue of the Medicina Escéptica. “The Rational Empiricists,” he 
                                                 
visto bien, hubiera hallado la respuesta graciosa en uno de ellos.  Los Scepticos dicen, que esta proposicon, Nada se 
sabe, es de tal naturaleza, que destruyendo á las demás, se destruye á símisma; y quitando la verdad de las otras, 
también la quita de sí: al modo que los medicamentos purgantes, sacando los humores del cuerpo, se sacan á sí 
mismos.” Martín Martínez, Medicina Sceptica, Tomo Segundo, Vol. II (Madrid, 1748), 36-37 [hereafter ME.II]. 
165 See I.L. McClelland, “The False Alarm of ‘Scepticism’,” in Ideological Hesitancy in Spain 1700-1750 
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1991), 9-57. 
166 McClelland, Ideological Hesitancy, 10-11. 
167 “Cum sit opinio docta quidem ignorantia tantum.  Nil scio, coel solium me, scio, scire nihil.” For the retrato, see 
Juan Bernabé Palomino, Retrato de Martín Martinez [Material gráfico] (1745), Biblioteca Nacional de España 
ER/4006(1). 
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writes, “among those one should speak of Hippocrates, Erasistratus, Celsus, Boyle, Sidenham, 
Capoa, Silvio, and Gassendi.”168  In many other parts of his work, Martínez includes the great 
prince of empirical thinking, Francis Bacon.169  Not only were the majority of these natural 
philosophers heretics, but some had very recently advocated skepticism that was far more radical 
and epistemic than Martínez’s.170 (Gassendi’s atomism, for example, had already become a 
byword for atheist materialism in Spain by the 1720s.) 
To distance himself from such radical interpretations, Martínez attempted to distinguish 
between “prudent skeptics” and more “academic skeptics.”171  Prudent skeptics, according to 
Martínez, did not negate the existence of such patent logical truths as “the whole is greater than 
the parts” or rules of logic (such as the law of non-exclusivity).  Nor did prudent skeptics carry 
the fallibility of the senses to a degree that impaired their ability to observe, record, and examine. 
Similarly, Feijóo, like his friend and colleague Martín Martínez, distinguished between 
gradations of skepticism.  In the first paragraph of his essay, “Esceptismo filosófico,” written 
shortly after the publication of the Medicina Escéptica, Feijóo described skepticism as having a 
great “latitude,” primarily dividing skeptics between “rigid” and “moderate” believers.  “Rigid 
skepticism,” wrote Feijóo, “is an extravagant delirium; moderate [skepticism] is a prudent 
caution.”172  The difference between these, and their corresponding relationship to rationality 
                                                 
168 .“…los Empyricos racionales, entre los quales debéis contar á Hyppocrates, Erasistrato, Celso, Boyle, Sidenham, 
Capoa, Silvio, Gassendo…” ME.I.79.  Laursen distinguishes ancient definitions of medical schools of thought, and 
therefore highlights that in this line of philosophers, Martínez conflates empiricists with skeptics.  This study is not 
concerned if this is a departure from ancient parameters of the schools of thought, rather I only wish to highlight 
how Martínez himself viewed these beliefs (Laursen, “Medicine and Skepticism,” 314). 
169 See the opening quote, “In Phisicis ubi natura opera, non adversaries argumento constringendus est, elabitur 
plane veritas ex minibus propter longé maiorem naturalium operationum, quam verborum subtilitatem. Verulam. 
De Augment. Scient.” PE.frontmatter. 
170 Novatores such as Martínez and Feijóo freely acknowledged that many of their heroes in the philosophy of 
science were heretics.  See, for example, CE.II.16.23, “En Inglaterra reina la Filosofía Newtoniana.  Isaac Newton, 
su Fundador, fue tan Hereje como lo son por lo común los demá habitadores de aquella Isla.” 
171 See ME.I.prólogo 
172 Feijóo, TCU III.13 “Hay tanta latitud en el Escepticismo…El Escepticismo rígido es un delirio extravagante; el 
moderado una cautela prudente.” 
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was, to Feijóo, a matter of to what degree “doubt” or “suspension of assent/belief” was 
extended.173  Rigid skepticism, elsewhere labeled by Feijóo “universal skepticism,” was soundly 
denounced.  “Doubting everything,” he wrote, “is madness.”174  Similarly, he disparaged such 
skeptics, writing that “one shouldn’t consider such as a philosopher, but as a sot, it would be 
inappropriate for one to be able to call such a particular mode of philosophy thus, more just 
reason is owed to call such a particular mode [of thought] delirium.”175  Three years earlier, in 
his apology to the first volume of the Teatro Crítico Universal, Martín Martínez similarly 
described “los rígidos Escépticos.”176  It is not immediately clear if this is a distinction which all 
Counter-Enlightenment authors knew.  Fray Luis de Flandes differentiated between “rigid or 
moderate skeptics,” and disdained them both equally; Araujo y Ascarraga, whether through 
ignorance or as a deliberate, rhetorical strategy, simply wrote against the “Skeptic or Pyrrhonist 
Sect.” 177 
  
                                                 
173 “Esta duda, o suspensión de asenso puede ser más, o menos racional, según la mayor, o menor extensión que se 
le da, y según las materias a que se aplica.” TCU III.13§i.3. 
174 TCU III.13§i.3 “…dudar de todas es locura…” 
175 TCU III.13§iii.8 “…no debe considerarse como Filósofo, sino como fatuo; y este modo particular de filosofar, 
impropiamente se puede llamar tal, debiendo a justa razón llamarse un modo particular de delirar.” 
176 See Martínez, Carta defensive que sobre el primer Tomo del Teatro Crítico Universal, que dió a luz el Rmo. P. 
Mro. Fr. Benito Feijoo, le escribió su más ficionado amgio D. Martín Martínez, Doctor en Medicina, y Médico 
Honoraio de Familia de S.M., Profesor de Anatomía, Examinador del Proto-Medicato, Socio, y actual Presidente de 
la Regia Sociedad de Ciencias de Sevilla, &c. 
177 Fr. Luis de Flandes, El Antiguo Academico, Contra el Moderno Sceptico, o Dudoso, Rigido, o Moderado.  
Defensea de las Ciencias, y especialmente de la Physica Pytagorica, y Medica en el conocimiento, y practica de los 
Medicos Sabios (Madrid: Casa de Mr. Symond, 1743[¿]); Bernardo Lopez de Araujo y Ascarraga, Centinela 
Medico-Aristotelica Contra Scepticos: En la qual se declara ser mas segura, y firme la doctrina que se enseña en 




A portrait of Martín Martínez, drawn by Juan Bernabé 
Palomino (1692-1777) in 1745, which features both volumes of 
the Medicina Escéptica, and whose caption references a more 
rigid philosophical skepticism than Martínez ever advocated.178 
                                                 
178 Palomino, Juan Bernabé. Retrato de Martín Martínez (Madrid: en la Imprenta Real, por Don Miguel Francisco 
Rodriguez, 1745). Biblioteca Nacional de España, ER/4006(1) Published in the Antomia completa del hombre 
(1745), and made digitally availble through the Biblioteca Digital Hispánica. 
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Martínez’s Epistemic Demarcation of Science and Religion 
Very importantly, Martínez limited the application of skepticism and his rule on the 
epoché of evidence and empirical observation as the only acceptable modes of belief by seeking 
to separate science (and the particular practice of medicine) as a distinct field of knowledge from 
theology.  This not only helped to distance himself from the “academic skeptics” who extended 
skepticism to every area of life, but worked to establish distinct epistemological approaches to 
each individual field of inquiry.  Martínez masterfully contrasted Faith and Science, and their 
respective epistemologies, writing that: 
In Medicine, we fight with understandings… God has given us two modes…of 
knowing [dos modos…de conocer]: by reason and by authority; the first we call 
Science, the second Faith.  In the first, one believes by itself (what haughtiness!).  
In the second, one trusts in another (and if this other is infallible, what security!).  
Both are common languages: one is dubious, the other certain.  The first is 
respective; that is we know the truth not as it is, but rather in its relation to our 
preservation and life.  The second is absolute; which we praise as the truths that 
they are.  Of the first, let us use it, and arrange natural instructions, albeit into 
superfluous musings.  Of the second, let us value it, becoming captive to the 
declarations of the Church; and he has less need in this who makes a complete 
sacrifice of his reason, without reserving anything for himself.  Of the eternal and 
necessary truths, we all know: of the human dogmas, nothing; in which we can 
achieve two happinesses, as says the Poet: 
I will always judge that the only Blessed here 
Are those that know all things, or nothing at all.179 
In a rare case of terminological continuity to the present day, Martínez describes two “modes of 
understanding/knowing” (epistemologists today similarly describe various “modes of belief” – 
                                                 
179“Luchemos en la Medicina con los entendimientos, dexemos los Mysterios incomprehensibles, reservados para lo 
intimo de nuestra veneración, y creencia.  Definat elatis quisquam considere rebus; Vincere nostra potest pectora 
sola fides.  Dos modos nos dexó Dios de conocer: por razón, y por autoridad; al primero llamamos Ciencia; al 
segundo Fé.  En el primero, se fia uno á sí mismo (que sobervia!) En el segundo, se confía uno á otro (si este es 
infalible, qué seguridad!)  Ambos son lenguajes comunes: el uno dudoso; el otro cierto.  El primero respectivo; con 
que conocemos la verdad, no como es en sí, sino con relación á nuestra conservación, y vida.  El segundo absoluto; 
con que alcanzamos las verdades como ellas son.  Del primero usémos, arreglándonos á las Instrucciones naturales, 
sin cavilaciones superfluas.  Del segundo valgámonos, cautivándonos a las declaraciones de la Iglesia; y menos 
tendrá que hacer en esto, quien hace total sacrificio de su razón, sin reservar nada para sí.  De las verdades eternas 
necesarias, todo lo sabemos: de los dogmas humanos nada; con que logramos las dos felicidades, que dixo el Poeta. 
Iudice me soli Semper perinde Beati. Sunt, quicumque sciunt omnia, quique nihil.” ME.ii.53 Martínez took the Latin 
phrase at the end of this passage from Owen’s Epigrammata 3.134. 
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i.e. intuition, revelation, authority, reason, empirical observation).  He ascribes authority and 
revelation to Faith, reserving reason (razón) for Science (Ciencia).  In this example, Martínez did 
not mean the pure logic of the Galenic Dogmatists, but as he explained the applied reason that 
involved the “arrange[ment] of natural instructions.”180  It is similarly important to note that 
Martínez ascribed security and greater importance to the knowledge that came from trusting the 
authoritative revelations of divine matters.  He established early in the introduction of his 
Medicina Escéptica that in no way should skepticism interfere with the metaphysical axioms of 
the Catholic Church.  
Just as one speaks about the Mysteries of the Faith, one can also speak well about 
the mysteries of Physics, and Medicine.  One says revealed things which can 
neither be deceived nor deceive us; [the other] speaks the views of this world, 
which can be deceived and deceive us.  The first remained admitted by those 
words of the Introduction: We believe infallibly the revealed truths.  The second 
remained impugned in the entire context of the Work, to which one cannot give 
satisfaction.181 
Science and religion, according to Martínez operated under entirely different epistemic 
assumptions.  The natural world presented experiences without offering any principles or 
explanations of causes; the metaphysical world was revealed in truths for which no empirically 
evidential observations could suffice or were supplied.  Responding to the Aristotelian in his 
Philosophía Escéptica, Martínez wrote: 
…If your intent is to follow Theological studies, cultivate the Philosophy of 
Aristotle, as it is studied in our Schools, not only for the harmony with which that 
Philosophical system goes hand in hand with Theology, but also because as 
                                                 
180 ME.ii.53. 
181 “Chimista: Como no se hable de los Mysterios de la Fé, sino de los mysterios de la Physica, y Medicina, dicen 
muy bien.  Las cosas reveladas las dice, quien ni puede engañarse, ni engañarnos: las opiniones de este mundo las 
dice, quien se engaña, y nos engaña.  Las primeras quedaron admitidas por aquellas palabras de la Introduccion: 
Creemos infaliblemente las verdades reveladas.  Las segundas quedaron impugnadas en todo el contexto de la Obra, 
á que no se ha dado satisfacción…” ME.ii.35 
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Aristotle is founded on abstract ideas, it seems more proportionate to explain 
supernatural things, outside of all materiality…182 
As for science, which examined the material world, Martinez advised the Aristotelian physician 
that: “But if you should want to follow the natural Sciences, it seems that you would find clearer 
and more useful ideas in the corpuscular Philosophies (which are about Geometric principles 
and senses [that] have interpreted nature) that are in your Authors…”183 This epistemic 
demarcation of science and religion is fundamental to understanding Martínez’s work.  The only 
reason he advocated the use of skepticism at all was his belief that it was confined to a limited 
exercise in a distinct field of knowledge.  For this reason, Martínez refrained from making 
excessive references to Scripture or to citations of patristic authors.  He noted that: 
Of the Sacred Scripture I do not cite, but those that are very opportune or 
essential, because I abhor the necessity of mixing the Sacred with the profane, but 
that which is brought in with great discretion, or necessity, because to sprinkle a 
profane paragraph in places with the Sacred, besides being an impertinence, does 
not have more value, than to record the concordances and to read whatever Psalm, 
where for each verse you can easily find yourself a niche [that is, a place which 
conveniently fits your position].  And what thing could be more stupid that to see 
a Physician cite more from Solomon than from Hippocrates?184 
Reinforcing this division, the first sixty-five pages of Martínez’s text are endorsements from 
fellow scholars attesting to both the soundness of his arguments and, particularly in later editions 
of the text, the orthodoxy of his beliefs.  Included is an aprobación (editorial approbation) from 
                                                 
182 “No obstante, señor Aristotelico, si vuestro intento es seguir los estudios Theologicos, cultivad la Philosophia de 
Aristoteles, como se estudia en nuestras Escuelas, no solo por la harmonia, con que mutuamente se dán la mano el 
sistema Philosophico con el Theologico, sino porque como el Aristotelico se funda en idéas abstractas, parece mas 
proporcionado para explicar las cosas sobrenaturales, agenas de toda materialidad…” PE.21 
183 “… pero si quereis seguir las Ciencias naturales, parece que hallareis mas claras, y útiles idéas en los Philsophos 
corpusculares (que sobre principios Geometricos, y sensibles han interpretado la naturaleza) que en vuestros 
Authores...” PE.21  Martínez was referencing the corpuscularianism of Gassendi and Boyle, which advocated the 
position that all matter was composed of smaller bodies (corpuscles). 
184 “De Sacra Escritura no pongo, sino las que son muy oportunas, y essenciales, porque aborrezco la necedad de 
mezclar lo Sagrado con lo profano, sino que venga traído con gran discreción, ó necesidad, porque salpicar un 
párrafo profano de lugares Sacros, demás de la impertinencia, no tiene mas costa, que registrar las concordancias, y 
leer qualquier Psalmo, donde para cada verso con facilidad se encuentra nicho.  Y qué cosa mas zonza, que ver á un 
Medico citar mas a Salomón, que a Hyppocrates?” ME.I.76. 
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Juan de Ayala, retired catedrático of Sacred Theology at the Universidad de Salamanca, a 
licencia del ordinario by Doctor Don Cristóbal Damasio, representative for the Holy Office of 
the Inquisition, a censura of Doctor Don Miguel Marcelino Boix, catedrático of Medicine at the 
Universidad de Alcalá and founder of the Real Academia of Sevilla, and, most famously, an 
apology (aprobación apologetica) from Feijóo.185  In each of these, the authors assure that 
nothing in Martínez’s work, despite the alarming sound of skepticism, was contrary to the 
teachings of the Church.  Father Gaspar Luis de Nabas, for example, reaffirmed what Martínez 
had written, reminding readers that “only God has the keys to that which is hidden in 
nature…”186  Laursen, citing the work of Richard Popkin, has described this as a “fideist use of 
skepticism” – that is to say, the use of a limited skepticism by one who believed that some truths, 
particularly religious truths, could only be guaranteed or granted by faith or revelation.187 
To reaffirm this rigid demarcation between the sciences and theology, Martínez argued 
that the practice of certain fields of knowledge – medicine, anatomy, and surgical expertise, for 
example – should be seen as an epistemologically distinct techne or what Laursen has described 
as a didaskalia technoon, a limited and specific art or area of expertise in which the use of 
skepticism was legitimate, but controlled.188  This is rather different than the shift demonstrated 
                                                 
185 See Aprobacion del Rmo. P.M. Fr. Juan Interian de Ayala, del Real Orden de Nuestra Señora de la Merced, 
Redempcion de Cautivos, del Claustro, y Cathedratico Jubilado de la Universidad de Salamanca, en la Facultad de 
Sagrada Theologia, Predicador, y Theologo de su Magestad, en la Real Junta de la Concepcion, &c. (ME.I.17); 
Licencia del Ordinario (ME.I.21); Censura del Doct. Don Miguel Marcelino Boix, Cathedratico de Medicina en la 
Universidad de Alcalá, Colegial del Infige Trilingues, Socio, y Fundador de la Real Academia de Sevilla, Medico 
Honorario de Camara de su Magestad, &c. (ME.I.22); Aprobacion Apologetica del Scepticismo Medico, escrita por 
el Rmo. P.M. Fr. Benito Geronymo Feyjoo, Benedictino, Cathedratico de Theología en la Universidad de Oviedo, 
&c. (ME.I.24) 
186 Laursen, “Medicine and Skepticism,” 312. 
187 Laursen, “Medicine and Skepticism,” 312; see also Popkin’s brief definition of skepticism and fideism in the 
introduction of his History of Skepticism.  Because Popkin does not extend his study into eighteenth-century Spain, 
and because individuals such as Martínez did not themselves use fideism as a term, this paper generally avoids 
employing fideism as a heuristic device. 
188 Laursen, “Medicine and Skepticism,” 309, citing Sextus Empiricus.  
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in Pamela H. Smith’s The Body of the Artisan: Art and Experience in the Scientific Revolution.189  
In this work, Smith, demonstrative of the majority of current scholars, blurs the line between the 
experiential or praxis of applied knowledge and the broader theoretical knowledge of scientia or 
episteme.190  If medicine is viewed as a techne, its impact on theoretical approaches to scientia 
may be clearly established - the connection between physicians and practitioners of philosophical 
skepticism betrays the reality of the connection between techne and episteme.  Laursen notes, for 
example, that nearly every major skeptic was a physician, from Sextus Empiricus’s ancient 
contributions, to Francisco Sánchez, whose Quod nihil scitur dominated Spanish conversations 
on the topic since its publication in 1581.191  Whereas many historians of science have similarly 
noted that the scope of techne had a direct impact on the evolution of an episteme, and therefore 
reference the contributions of an “artisanal epistemology” that contributed to the Scientific 
Revolution and to the Enlightenment, Martínez clearly argued against such a relationship.192 
 Martínez labeled Science and Medicine, at several points, an “art,” writing about the “art 
of healing” or noting that “The Skeptics confess that they have some clear idea about their 
arts...”193  It is probable that this view of medicine as a craft or a technical skill alarmed many of 
Martínez’s readers, who unlike, Martínez, did not have a background in the study of anatomy, 
which was distinct from the study of medicine.  Michael Burke describes the divide between 
                                                 
189 Pamela H. Smith, The Body of the Artisan: Art and Experience in the Scientific Revolution (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2004). 
190 See also Luis R. Corteguera, “Artisans and the New Science of Politics in Early Modern Europe,” Journal of 
Medieval and Early Modern Studies 43, No. 3 (Fall 2013), 601. 
191 Laursen, “Medicine and Skepticism,” 305. 
192 For “artisanal epistemology” see Smith, The Body of an Artisan, and Corteguera, “Artisans and the New 
Science.” 
193 “No te admire, pues, que yo piense contra las vulgares sentencias, pues prescindiendo de que este es reato preciso 
de la conjetura, la Phiosophia, y Medicina, que en las Escuelas se nos enseña, es tan impertinente para el arte de 
curar…” (ME.I.i) “Do not admire, therefore, that I think against these vulgar sentences, because regardless of 
whether this is bound in precise conjecture, Philosophy and Medicine, which in the schools are taught to us, is as 
impertinent to the art of healing.”; “Confiessan los Scepticos, que tienen alguna clara idéa de sus artes…” “The 
Skeptics might confess that they have some clear idea of their arts…” ME.I.72. Emphasis added. 
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medicina and cirugía, writing that “the physician was a professional, familiar with the classics 
and possessing an academic degree; the surgeon, on the other hand, was an uneducated craftsman 
who worked with his hands.”194  Martínez, as an anatomist, was familiar with surgical procedure, 
and yet was simultaneously a university-educated member of the intellectual and social elite.  He 
was in a perfect position, therefore, to be an avant-garde proponent of the inclusion of surgical 
study and empirical observations of the body for physicians (the entire second half of Medicina 
Escéptica is a surgical treatise, and Martínez’s first work, Noches Anatómicas, contained specific 
anatomical instruction for physicians).  Martínez’s description of medicine as a craft, perhaps 
borrowed from his training in anatomy and surgery, thus helped him to account why there was a 
distinct epistemology for the sciences. 
 To further distinguish the sciences as a closed field, Martínez argued throughout his 
works that the ultimate measure of effectiveness of a scientific practice was less in achieving 
higher grades of verisimilitude than in utility; what mattered to Martínez was not the logical 
coherence of a particular medical theory, but in patients cured and lives saved.  “How many 
times,” he lamented, “do the ill die from petty discourses!”195  The very titles of the 
conversations in his Medicina Escéptica demonstrate the importance of utility.  The first three 
chapters of volume one, for example, include: “the use of Medicine…,” “…it is superfluous for 
the Practical Method to inquire if elements formally remain in a Mixture…,” and “…it is useless 
to dispute the correspondence of the Elements….”196  In his study of surgical reform in Spain, 
                                                 
194 Michael E. Burke, The Royal College of San Carlos: Surgery and Spanish Medical Reform in the Late Eighteenth 
Century (Durham: Duke University Press, 1977), 25.  This was a well-established challenge against surgery and 
anatomy by the time of Martínez; still, it is interesting to note the unique role which anatomy played in bringing the 
about the empirical turn of medical and scientific practice, given that it was once a lesser subject of study. 
195 Martínez’s Apomathema (pg. 129), cited in Laursen, “Medicine and Skepticism,” 322. 
196 “Que para el uso de la Medicina, ni sirve, ni se puede determiner el numero de los Elementos.” 
ME.I.Conversación 1; “Que es superfluo para el Methodo Practico inquirir si los elementos permanecen 
formalmente en el Mixto.” ME.I.Conversación 2; “Que es inútil disputar la correspondencia de los Elementos en el 
Mixto: y moralmente imposible decidirla.” ME.I.Conversación 3 
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Burke emphasizes the growing importance that practical use had in determining validity, 
contrasting this with French philosophes as a uniquely Spanish element.197  Not only did 
Martínez want his work to be useful and to stay as close to the practical curative goal, he also 
desired as part of this utility that his work should be widely read and noticed.  Martínez 
deliberately published his works in Castilian rather than Latin, and he offered a six-part defense 
for doing so.  Among his arguments, Martínez quoted Hippocrates, writing that his work “was 
not only for physicians, but also for those that, not being physicians, need medical 
knowledge.”198  By stressing utility rather than truth as the goal of medicine and science, by 
comparing scientific endeavors, and particularly medicine, to technical crafts, and by direct 
comparison with theological studies, Martínez repeatedly emphasized his conception of 
epistemically distinct areas of science and religion.  In such a conception, Martínez felt secure 
describing the limited application of an empirically based epistemology which he described as 
“medical/philosophical skepticism.”  However, immediately subsequent to the publication of his 
first volume, Martínez had to contend with critics and with alternate views on skepticism and the 
interaction of science and religion.  Ultimately, Martínez’s own epistemic demarcations would 
prove unstable in eighteenth-century Spain.  
                                                 
197 Burke writes that “Unlike many French philosophes, the Spanish ilustrado was immensely practical.  He saw the 
new sciences not as the key to all truth but as concrete tools to improve human life.  Again and again, the Spanish 
innovators used the term “useful knowledge.”…Thus, the Spanish Enlightenment reflected the utilitarian thrust of 
the alter Enlightenment throughout Europe, but it largely ignored the more idealistic concerns with rationalism and 
natural law that also characterized that intellectual movement elsewhere in Europe.” Burke, San Carlos, 5. 
198 ME I.73, “…el qual escrivió Hyppocrates en Griego, no solo para los Medicos, sino para los que no seindo 
Medicos necessitan de Medico…” Martínez is affecting wordplay on the similarity between médico (physician) and 
médico (medical). Throughout this paper, I consistently translate médico as ‘physician’ rather than ‘doctor’ in order 
to avoid any ambiguity; similarly, I translate docto as ‘learned.’  Martínez specifically has in mind, among these 
uneducated, the “ignorantes Curanderos.” ME.I.72.  See also Martínez’s statement that: Por todos estos motivos, no 
solo escriví este Libro en Castellano, sino aun las autoridades communes las interpret en la misma lengua, por no 
exasperar lo corriente del estilo, poniendo las citas al pie de la plana, para los curiosos; no obstante reservo en Latin 
las de Sacra Escritura, ó algun Santo Padre, á quienes por veneración se las debe esta prerrogativa, y tambien 
algunas otras; ó porque es impossible darlas aquella alma, que tienen en su idioma, ó porque en neustra lengua no 
serían tan bien sonantes, ó por la hermosura del mero. ME.I.76. 
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Figure 2: Publications involving the Works and Polemics of M. Martínez, 1716-1811*199 
*Unless otherwise noted, all of the publications were printed in Madrid. 
1716 Martínez, Noches Anatomicas, o Anatomia compendiosa 
1722 Martínez, Medicina sceptica y cirugía moderna, con un tratado de operaciones chirurgicas, Volume I 
1723 Martínez, Discurso físico sobre si las víboras deben reputarse por carne o pescado en el sentido en 
que nuestra madre la Iglesia nos veda las carnes en días de abstinencia 
Martínez, Observatio rara de corde in monstroso infantido ubi obiter et noviter de motu cordis et 
sanguinis agitur 
1724 Lesaca, Colyrio Philosophico Aristhotelico Thomistico 
1725 Martínez, Medicina sceptica, tomo segundo. Primera parte: apologema en favor de los medicos 
scepticos.  Segunda parte: apomathema, contra los médicos dogmáticos, en que se contiene todo el 
acto de fiebres. 
Araujo y Ascarraga, Centinela Medico-Aristotelica Contra Scepticos: en la qual se declara ser mas 
segura, y firme la Doctrina que se enseña en las Universidades Españolas, y los graves 
inconvenientes que se siguen de la Secta Sceptica, o Pyrrhonica 
Martínez, Examen nuevo de cirugía moderna 
1726 Martínez, Carta defensive, que sobre el primer tomo del Theatro crítico universal, que dió a luz el 
Rmo. P. Mro. Fr. Benito Feijoo… 
1727 Martínez, Juicio Final de la Astrología, en defensa del Teatro Crítico Universal, dividido en tres 
Discursos (Reprinted, s.a. in Seville) 
Torres Villarroel, Entierro del Juicio Final, y vivificación de la Astrología, herida con tres Llagas, en 
lo Natural, Moral, y Político; y curada con tres Parches. 
Suarez de Ribera, Escuela Medica Convincente Triumphante, Sceptica Dogmatica, Hija Legitima de 
la Experiencia, y Razon 
1728 Martínez, Carta defensiva, reprinted in Volume II of Feijóo’s Teatro Crítico 
Martínez, Anatomia completa del hombre, con todos los hallazgos, nuevas doctrinas y observaciones 
raras hasta el tiempo presente, y muchas advertencias necesarias para la cirugía según el méthodo 
con que se explica en nuestro theatro de Madrid 
1729 Lesaca, Apologia Escolastica en defensa de la Universidad de Alcala, y demás universidades de 
España, contra la medicina sceptica del doctor Martinez 
Gil Sanz, El Triumpho vindicado de la calumnia, impostura, e ignorancia contra la medicina sceptica 
y sus favtores [sic] 
1730 Martínez, Philosophia Escéptica: extracto de la physica antiqua, y moderna, recopilada en dialogos, 
entre un Aristotelico, Cartesiano, Gasendista, y Sceptico, para instruccion de la curiosidad española 
1743 [est.] Flandes, El Antiguo Academico, contra el modern sceptico, ó dudoso, rigido, ó moderado: 
defensa de las ciencias, y especialmente de la physica pytagorica, y medica en el conocimiento, y 
practica de los médicos sabios 
1745 Second edition of Anatomia completa 
[Posthumous] Zapata, Ocaso de las Forma Aristotelicas que pretendio ilustrar a la luz de la Razon 
1748 Reprinting of the Medicina Sceptica [3rd or 4th ed.?] 
1750 Second edition of Noches Anatomicas 
Reprinting of Philosophia Escéptica 
1764 Third edition of Anatomia Completa 
1768 Third printing of Philosophia Escéptica 
1775 Fourth edition of Anatomia Completa 
1788 Fifth edition of Anatomia Completa  
Reprinting of Examen Nuevo with emendations 
1811 Reprinting of Examen Nuevo with emendations (Valencia) 
                                                 
199 More bibliographical information can be found in DHEE, DHFE, filosofia.org, and A. Dechambre, and eds., 
Dictionnaire Encyclopédique des Sciences Médicales Deuxième Série, Tome Cinquième (Mar-Méd) (Paris : Place 
de L’École-de-Médecine, 1874), 162-163. 
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Critics of Martínez and The Mutability of Escepticismo 
Ivy McClelland is correct in arguing in “The False Alarm of Skepticism,” that there was 
considerable debate as to the appropriate use and scope of the word escéptica within Martínez’s 
work. 200 McClelland convincingly demonstrates, for example, that Father Master Fr. Juan 
Interián de Ayala clearly predicted that the use of escéptica would confuse readers of the work, 
writing in his aprobación, 
…in this book is given the term Skeptic, which to many, I fear, suggests something 
more novel than what meaning the term actually carries; for it signifies nothing 
more than indeterminacy, irresolution, and consideration.  And these qualities, if 
one considers them well, ought to be had in all human science and natural 
philosophy; if not in all, or at least in many parts and speculations [of them].201 
Interián de Ayala argues that Martínez’s use of the word, while problematic, is strictly limited to 
a scientific application, and is therefore orthodox and legitimate.  McClelland blames Martínez’s 
use of skepticism as the unfortunate happenstance of a man who was not as rhetorically skilled as 
Feijóo, Mayans y Siscár, or Jovellanos.  It may rather be, however, that Martínez’s use of the 
term was deliberately aware of the religious and moral implications of employing escéptica, and 
consciously chose a jarring and confusing term.  Indeed, one of  Martínez’s principal critics, 
Bernardo López de Araujo y Ascárraga, wrote in his antithetical work, Centinela medico-
aristotélica contra Scépticos, that Martínez wanted “to enter through the roof…breaking all the 
tiles and causing leaks…”202 McClelland, similarly knowing that “for Spain in particular the 
Word ‘sceptical’ had alarmingly religious connotations,” proceeds somewhat naively by ignoring 
                                                 
200 McClelland, “The False Alarm of ‘Scepticism’,” 11-13. 
201 …en este Libro se le da de Sceptica, que a muchos temo haga mas novedad de la que trae configo el termino, el 
qual nada significa mas, que inderterminada, irresoluta, y considerativa.  Y estas calidades, si se considera bien, las 
debe tener toda humana ciencia, y natural Philosofia; sino en todas, a lo menos en muchas de sus partes, y 
especulaciones. ME.I.17, “Aprobacion del Rmo. P. M. Fr. Juan Interian de Ayala” 
202 Araujo, Centinela, 322. “y á la Dialectica la comparan a la llave de la tal puerta; porque assi como no se puede 
entrar a lo interior de la casa sin llave, que abra la puerta….que acaso se entre por el texado, como el Doctor 
Martinez quiere, rompiendo texas, y hacienda goteras.” 
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the associated ideas and meanings attached to skepticism (almost feigning surprise that 
casticistas and conservative reactionaries could misinterpret what Martínez stated).203  If it was 
indeed Martínez’s motive to create metaphorical “leaks” in the understanding of knowledge, he 
succeeded. 
 Between the publication of Martínez’s first volume of Medicina Escéptica in 1722 and 
the second volume in 1725, numerous Galenists (as well as some non-affiliated intellectuals) 
responded to Martínez’s charge for a new praxis and a new episteme of science.  Most 
significant among these early challenges were two works: Bernardo Araujo’s Centinela Medico-
Aristotélica (Madrid, 1725), and Juan Martín Lesaca’s Apología Escolástica en Defensa de la 
Universidad de Alcalá, y demás universidades de España, contra la medicina scéptica del doctor 
Martínez (Madrid, 1729).204  Araujo, who was a physician of the Reales Hospitales Generales 
(Royal General Hospitals) leveled many charges against Martínez’s use of skepticism and 
Epoché.  First, he argued, Martínez failed to offer a satisfactory definition of either term, 
expounding upon all possible applications.  “Epoché,” Araujo stated, “Is a state of mind in which 
one suspends assent; and neither does one determine nor depreciate some opinion” according to 
the Skeptics.205  Questioning the very sustainability of this premise, Araujo asked about this 
previous statement, 
                                                 
203 McClelland, 12. 
204 Bernardo López de Araujo y Ascárraga, Centinela medico-aristotelica contra scepticos: en la cual se declara ser 
mas segura y firme la doctrina que se enseña en las universidades españolas (Madrid, 1725) [The Medical-
Aristotelian Sentinel Against the Skeptics: In Which it is Declared that That which is taught in the Spanish 
Universities is more Secure and Firm Doctrine] ; Juan Martin Lesaca, Apologia escolastica en defense de la 
Universidad de Alcala, y demás universidades de España, contra la medicina sceptica del doctor Martinez: 
respuesta al discurso de la medicina del Teatro Crítico Universal (Madrid: en la imprenta de Juan de Ariztia, 1729).  
[Scholastic Apology in Defense of the University of Alcalá, and Other Universities of Spain, Against the Skeptical 
Medicine of Doctor Martinez, A Response to the Discourse on Medicine in the Teatro Critico Universal]  Both 
Works are available gratis via Hathi Digital Trust. 
205 Araujo, Centinela, 10. “Es un estado de la mente, en que se suspende el assenso; y ni se determina, ni se 
desprecia opinion alguna…” 
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Is it true, or false?  If you say it is true, then you already have something certain 
and true and consequently give assent to it, because you cannot hold something to 
be true without giving it [your] assent.  If you say this is false, then why do you 
hold on to it?  Ergo, in all ways is Doctor Martínez convicted by his own 
words.206 
Araujo’s confusion over the extent of skepticism, or how the limits of skepticism could be 
imposed was shared by many prominent intellectuals of the time.  Reviewing Martínez’s 
arguments, Lesaca noted that the author explained only a certain amount of his mind, “and the 
rest was confusion.”207  As previously mentioned, many readers (including the less-educate 
“vulgo” for whom Martínez had deliberately written in the vernacular) assumed less analytical 
responses, quickly associating Martínez’s escepticismo with the heretical skepticism of 
Descartes, Locke, Sydenham, Boyle, or Gassendi.  Because Martínez employed philosophical 
terms with an immense historical precedence such as skepsis and epoché, these terms came with 
vast connotations which inherently created confusion and allowed for critics of Martínez to 
either genuinely misinterpret his text, deliberately undermine his work by destabilizing his 
vocabulary, or to issue legitimate concerns about his interpretation of skepticism and its 
dependence on an epistemic demarcation between science and religion.  As Araujo, Lesaca, and 
many others noted, it was difficult to contain skepticism in one field of knowledge from 




                                                 
206 “…Es verdadera, ó falsa?  Si dize, que es verdadera: luego yá ay cosa cierta, y verdadera, y consiguientemente dá 
assenso á ella, porque no se puede tener una cosa por verdadera sin darla assenso.  Si dize que es falsa, para qué la 
trae?  Luego de todos modos es convencido el Doctor Martinez en sus proprias palabras.” Araujo, Centinela, 10.  
Note Araujo’s assumption of knowledge as justified true belief, a classic tenet of epistemology. 
207 “…sigue la mente del author que explica; lo demás fuera confusion.” Lesaca, Apologia escolástica, 47. 
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The Demarcation Crisis of the Spanish Enlightenment 
As McClelland describes it, there was “undeniable justification” that “scepticism in one 
sphere leads to scepticism in others.”208  Both Araujo and Lesaca saw that unless it was better 
explained, Martínez’s partition between science and religion would deteriorate.  They 
particularly critiqued the arbitrariness and vagaries of Martínez’s “prudent skepticism” – which 
truths or principles constituted such obvious knowledge that scientists were allowed to accept 
them?  When was reason and logical deduction legitimately allowed?  How much empirical 
evidence was needed before one could start establishing patterns?  In his efforts to move away 
from the inutility of the inane conversations of the Dogmatists, Martínez often failed to provide a 
systematic philosophy of his science, particularly in the two volumes of Medicina Escéptica.  
Araujo, for example, commented on the essential link between theory and science, decrying 
Martínez’s depreciation of them by stating: 
The cause precedes the effect; the father is the cause of the son; therefore the 
father comes before the son…[Martínez] wants to call these principles precarious, 
or supposed…a thing outside of all reason…. The principles do not demonstrate, 
but rather serve to demonstrate and engender sciences with the light and efficacy 
of understanding.  There is no science without principles; because the 
fundamentals of the sciences are the principles…209 
The assertion that science could only exist upon the foundation of principles was not limited to 
the Galenic school of thought.  Martínez’s hyperbolic description of the hidden secrets of nature 
was a severe deviation from previous works which sought to employ empirical observation to   
                                                 
208 McClelland, 22.  Other historians have described Martínez’s conception as “anti-systematic.” See Alvar Martinez 
Vidal, “Los Supuestos Conceptuales del Pensamiento Medico de Martin Martinez (1684-1734): La Actitud 
Antisistematica,” LLULL 90 (1986), 127-152. 
209 Araujo, Centinela, 51-52. “La causa es primero que su efecto: el padre es causa del hijo; luego el padre es 
primero que el hijo.  Si a estos principios quiere llamarlos precarios, o supuestos….una cosa agena de toda 
razón….Porque los principios no se demuestran, sino que sirven para demonstrar, y engendrar ciencias con la luz, y 
eficacia de el entendimiento.  Ciencia sin principios no ay; porque los fundamentos de las ciencias son los 
principios…” 
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“unlocking” these secrets.210   And for many intellectuals in eighteenth-century Spain, the lack of 
underlying laws negated the whole existence of science; without discoverable order, observation 
was merely the compilation of phenomena without any pattern.  Lesaca espoused that Martínez 
was necessarily inconsistent with his own beliefs.  “Those that follow this course [of epoché], 
those are the true Skeptics,” Lesaca describes, “but neither the Doctor Martínez nor Saint 
Augustine (although Doctor Martínez supposes it) follow this course...”211  Whereas Martínez or 
Feijóo described this merely as the difference between rigid and prudent skepticism, Lesaca 
argues that this difference is arbitrarily positioned unless a justification can be given. 
Whether or not Martínez was earnest and intellectually rigorous in his demarcation, 
others who followed him would not abide by his rigid boundaries.  The very titles of publications 
that followed after Martínez’s death and throughout the eighteenth century demonstrate the close 
connection that the majority of Spanish intellectuals saw between religious and scientific 
topics.212  Even Feijóo, whose aprobación added to the second edition of Martínez’s Medicina 
Escéptica greatly increased the popularity and success of the work, deviated wildly from 
Martínez’s epistemological platform.  Feijóo delighted in applying the knowledge gained from 
the natural sciences towards debunking superstitions, testing miracles, evaluating claims of 
                                                 
210 In this sense, Martínez’s epistemology is radically different from that of Isaac Newton. 
211 Lesaca, Apologia escolastica, 19. 
212 See, for example, Antonio Joseph Rodriguez’s Nuevo Aspecto de Theologia Medico-Moral, y Ambos Derechos, o 
Paradoxas Physico-Theologico Legales (Madrid, Segunda Edición 1763), D. Joaquin Castellot’s Embriologia 
Sagrada, ó Tratado de la Obligacion que tienen los Curas, Confesores, Médicos, Comadres, y otras personas, de 
cooperar á la salvacion de los Niños que aun no han nacido, de los que nacen al parecer muertos, de los abortivos, 
de los monstrous, &c. (Madrid, 1774), Josef Antonio Viader’s Discurso Medico-Moral de la Informacion del Feto 
por el Alma desde su Concepcion; i Adminstracion de su Bautismo. Obra Util a Parrocos, Medicos, Comadrones, i 
Parteras (Gerona, 1785), Andrés Piquer’s Lógica moderna (1747) and Filosofia moral para la juventud española 
(1755), Francisco Palanco o Polanco’s Cursus philosophicus pars tertia continens duos libros de questione 
elementis ac meteoris, unum de coelo, tres de anima et metaphysica (Madrid 1697), and his Dialogus Physico-
Theologicus contra Philosophiae novatores, sive tomista contra atomistas: cursus phiosophici tomus quartus 
(Madrid, 1714), or Diego Mateo Zapata’s Dissertación médico-teológica, que consagra a la serenísima señora 
princesa del Brasil (Madrid, 1733). 
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possession, defining the relationship between the supernatural and natural, and constructing a 
“natural theology” that could speculate about the nature of reality (metaphysics). 
 Over the course of the eighteenth century in Spain, three discernible historical narratives 
emerge as responses to the question of the relationship between science and religion in the 
Spanish Enlightenment.  First, a distinct minority of Spanish intellectuals adopted a position of 
secularization, that is to say, that the explanatory power of religion is diminished as scientific 
methodologies become the dominant epistemic norms and as naturalism grows to encourage 
materialism and atheism.  As institutions that were once “legitimated by religious symbols” 
cease to become so, they become “secularized.”213  This narrative has been traditionally popular 
among sociologists of religion, but has in recent years been sufficiently qualified.  Certainly, in 
the textual record of eighteenth-century Spain, very few works exist that advocate such a 
position.214 
The second description of the relationship between religion and science is the historical 
use of “eclecticism” as a description of the mentality of Catholic enlightenment individuals, a 
historical term used by some of the thinkers in question. 215  Eclecticism was “an attitude which 
[sought] to free itself from sectarian doctrines and to achieve a more objective position above all 
                                                 
213 John H. Evans and Michael S. Evans, “Religion and Science: Beyond the Epistemological Conflict Narrative,” 
Annual Review of Sociology 34 (2008), pp. 87-105. (92). See also Charles Lemert, “Science, Religion and 
Secularization,” The Sociological Quarterly 20, No. 4 (Autumn, 1979), 445-461. 
214 For the original perpetuators of secularization, see James Frazer, The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and 
Religion (1890); Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912); Bronislaw Malinowski, Magic, 
Science and Religion and Other Essays (1948); and Max Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 
(1905).  For challenges to this theory, see: Jeffrey K. Hadden “Toward Desacralizing Secularization Theory,” Social 
Forces 65, No. 3 (1987), 587-611.  For a rebuttal to these challenges, see: Frank J. Lechner, “The Case Against 
Secularization: A Rebuttal,” Social Forces 69, No. 4 (1991), 1103-1119. 
215 Eclecticism is also used to describe the “running compromise between neoclassicism and romanticism” that 
occurred in Spanish literature and aesthetics during the first half of the eighteenth century.  See pg. 108 of Philip W. 
Silver, “Cernuda and Spanish Romanticism: Prolegomena to a Genealogy,” Revista Hispánica Moderna, Año 43, 
No. 1 (Jun., 1990), 107-113.  Interestingly, “eclecticism” or “methodological eclecticism” is still used presently to 
describe research methods which fail to adhere to certain defined “conceptual frameworks.”  See Stephen C. 
Yancher and David D. Williams, “Reconsidering the Compatibility Thesis and Eclecticism: Five Proposed 
Guidelines for Method Use,” Educational Researcher 35, No. 9 (Dec., 2006), 3-12. 
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such groups.”216  Eclectics did this, essentially, by cherry-picking their favorite ideas in various 
philosophical frameworks and amalgamating them into a new system; each eclecticism is 
therefore particular to the eclectic developing it.  Diderot commented in l’Encyclopédie that 
eclectic philosophers “recognize no master,” disregarding authority and tradition, so that “all 
philosophies are analyzed without regard and without partiality.”217  Donald Kelley comments on 
this particularism, noting that “Eclecticism was hardly a school, still less a tradition.”218  Victor 
Cousin further described in 1829 that eclecticism sought to “disengage what is true in each of 
these systems, and thus construct a philosophy superior to all systems.”219  It is interesting to 
note that neither Pagden nor McClelland employ this term (although the term itself entered the 
historiographical scene rather late).220  Scholar Martin Mulsow explains how eclecticism was the 
de facto emergent philosophical position by many intellectuals during the early Enlightenment, 
noting that: 
The programmatic term “eclectic,” indestructible and apparently indispensable in 
the early Enlightenment, was thus over-strained and ambiguous.  Its skeptical 
potential for independence and anti-dogmatism stands against the tendency to take 
historicization, important for selection, as the criteria for determining an 
originally correct truth…. For in a “multi-option society” eclecticism is a virtue 
which is necessary for life.  The early modern period, characterized as it was by a 
confusion of competing ideas brought about by printing, by increasing 
confessionalisation, and by the rapid development and obsolescence of scientific 
theories, gave rise to eclectic thinking…221 
                                                 
216 Martin Mulsow, “Eclecticism or Skepticism? A Problem of the Early Enlightenment,” Journal of the History of 
Ideas 58, No. 3 (Jul., 1997), 456-477; 465. 
217 Diderot et d’Alembert, “Eclectisme,” Encyclopédie, Tome 5, “un home qui ne reconnâit point de maître…,” “et 
de toutes les philosophies qu’il a analysées sans égard et sans partialité…” Accessed through online transcription – 
find a scan of the original article. 
218 Donald R. Kelley, “Eclecticism and the History of Ideas,” Journal of the History of Ideas 62, No. 4 (Oct., 2001), 
577-592; 580. 
219 Kelley, “Eclecticism,” 577. 
220  See Beatriz Helena Domingues, “The role of eclecticism in the introduction of modern philosophy in eighteenth-
century Spain,” Iberoamerican (2001-), Nueva época, Año 8, No. 29 (Marzo de 2008), 41-61. 
221 Martin Mulsow, “Eclecticism or Skepticism?,” 476. 
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Perhaps, then, the all-encompassing and sometimes-contradictory nature of eclecticism is not 
solely a historiographical problem, but is an accurate reflection and record of historical epistemic 
anxiety – what Paul Hazard has labeled the “crisis of conscience” of late-seventeenth and early-
eighteenth-century Europe.  Still, eclecticism rests upon an epistemic assumption about the 
universality of truth – an assumption which itself must be explained and cannot be avoided by 
intellectual historians.  Although the historical use and application of eclecticism makes it an 
attractive term to employ, the definitional instability and the fact that many particular novatores 
did not describe themselves as eclectics makes this term less than favorable.  Martínez, for 
example, never described his own method as eclectic, nor did Araujo or Lesaca. 
Lastly, the larger dissertation to which this chapter belongs argues that a third narrative of 
“Catholic Rationalism” existed in eighteenth-century Spain, especially among the more 
institutional aspects of Spanish Catholicism.  Catholic rationalism is the process by which the 
Spanish Catholic Church, broadly conceived, coopted contemporary intellectual trends (in this 
case, new scientific, empirical, and medical advances) to strengthen the existing epistemological 
structure of Catholicism. Similarly, “medical fideism” signifies the increasing reliance of 
Spanish clergy upon medicine and medical discourse to discern between true and false cases of 
superstition during the late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.222  
The questions that Martínez raised about the relationship between religion and science, 
the employment of skepticism, the idea of distinct epistemologies, and the association of natural 
philosophy with naturalism impacted and is connected with a variety of intellectual 
developments throughout the broader Spanish Enlightenment.  In the trial settings of the 
Inquisition during the eighteenth century, for example, new standards of evidence and evaluation 
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of testimony were considered as an empirical epistemology gained greater authority.  A distinct 
hermeneutical shift occurred in biblical exegesis, as a “historical biblical criticism” became more 
popular over traditional authoritative narratives.  These questions even impact institutional 
reforms, particularly during the second half of the eighteenth century.  The call for disciplinary 
demarcation may also be related to broader questions about the interaction between state and 
academic institutions in Bourbon Spain.  One of Martínez’s main points in Medicina Escéptica is 
to carve out a legitimate forum for scientists and medical practitioners to practice medical 
skepticism, to advocate for a separation of medical practices from direct theological oversight, 
and to provide for a defensible position from which médicos could offer critique of the existing 
status quo.  McClelland has labeled this Martínez’s call for “mental independence.”223   This is 
remarkably similar to Kant’s delineation in the late-eighteenth century of the private and public 
realms of discussion: the private, or specific contextual applications of obedience and practice, 
and the public – a “realm of argument, of free debate, [that] must be separated from the realm of 
obedience.”224  In this sense, Martínez contributed to the notion of the public realm of science in 
the Spanish Enlightenment.  Thus, the particular issue of how Martínez and other ilustrados 
thought about the relationship between science and religion had very real impacts in almost 
every dimension of enlightened thought. 
 
Conclusion 
In his introduction to a documentary study on Galileo’s trial before the Roman 
Inquisition, Thomas Mayer explains that many have avoided an actual examination of the textual 
record, including historians.  He writes of these culpable individuals, noting “They thought they 
                                                 
223 McClelland, Ideological Hesitancy, 11. 
224 Samuel Fleischacker, What is Enlightenment? (New York: Routledge, 2013), 15. 
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could safely ignore [Galileo’s trial] since they knew how it ended and the myth already told them 
what it meant.”225  Too often, this has been the historiographical record of the Spanish 
enlightenment, or more broadly, the story of the relationship between science and religion during 
the age of enlightenment.  The warfare trope of science and religion, particularly infamous in 
Andrew Dickson White’s two-volume History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in 
Christendom, paired with the long-standing association of the Enlightenment with secularization 
has resulted in a historiography dominated by the story of progressive science combating a 
backwards Catholic Spain—a myth that was even perpetuated among nineteenth-century 
Spaniards.226  The example of Martínez, of Araujo, and of Lesaca provide one small case study 
that show that for the eighteenth-century mind in Spain, although the relationship between 
science and religion was debated, it was far from hostile. 
In current research on the theoretical relationship between science and religion, many 
scholars have demonstrated the need to carefully define both individual fields before posing 
questions about the nature of their interaction.  In “Reconceptualizing Religion, Magic, and 
Science,” for example, sociologist Rodney Stark argues that these categories “are so poorly and 
inconsistently defined as to preclude coherent discussion.”227  Stark supplies a systematic 
evaluation of these categories through ten different categories and concludes with his own 
definition of these fields which limits science to the empirical world and grants religion the only 
position of ascribing meaning and morality.  This is a position of demarcation that the historian 
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Brad Gregory has likewise supported; that conflict between the two fields cannot occur because 
science is prohibited from making moral pronouncements.228  Similarly, Alvin Plantinga has 
argued that there exists a “deep concord” between theism and science, and that conflicts that do 
occur are superficial or misinterpretations.229  Spanish ilustrados were likely closer to this 
opinion than the modern scholar, and yet significant concerns about potential conflict are a 
regular feature in the archival record.  The conflict between Martínez and his critics show that 
both sides affirmed the existence of a “deep concord” or fundamental compatibility between 
science and religion, but that the precise way in which this concord would be reconciled was 
subject for debate. 
 Also concerned about the classification of these terms, Ronald L. Numbers has argued 
that the majority of historical surveys of the relationship between Religion and Science have 
concluded in the “warfare thesis” because of a lack of definition.230  These questions of 
definition become even more difficult to answer when attempting to consider what the meaning 
of a word was in a particular historical context.   Nicholas Jardine, for example, has argued that 
“no Renaissance category even remotely corresponds to “the sciences” or “the natural sciences” 
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in our sense of the terms.”231  Peter Harrison more strikingly states that “so inextricably 
connected were the dual concerns of God and nature that it is misleading to attempt to identify 
various kinds of relationships between science and religion in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. “Science” and “Religion”,” argues Harrison, “were not independent entities…to 
identify such connections is to project back in time a set of concerns that are typically those of 
our own age.”232 
 These ahistorical projections become particularly clear when the historian is confronted 
with what appears to be a paradox: how could, for example, Martínez believe in the totality and 
corporate unity of truth from a divine origin, and yet affirm that not all knowledge was created 
equally, indeed, that a specialized and distinct epistemology was needed in science that only 
applied to science?  In such a circumstance the problem most likely lies in the textual analysis of 
the historian.  Cognizant of Harrison’s warnings about imposing an analysis of the relationship 
between science and religion, this chapter yet suggests that in eighteenth-century Spain, contrary 
to Harrison’s assertion, individuals were at least beginning to conceive of the independence of 
science and religion and to hypothesize about the ways that the broader epistemological concerns 
of a philosophy of science and a philosophy of religion interacted.233  
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 Whether the dominant narrative of the relationship between science and religion in 
Enlightenment Spain was one of conflict, concord, or coexistence, or whether a dominant 
narrative even exists, remains to be established.  What seems clear from the evidence at hand is 
that the fideist skepticism and epistemic demarcation proposed by Martínez in his works during 
the early-enlightenment was either rejected or broken by subsequent Spanish thinkers and their 
writings in eighteenth-century Spain.  For the rest, one may have to suspend both doubt and 
assent.  
                                                 
same paragraph the terms “ciencia, y natural Philosofia” and comparatively, “toda humana ciencia, y natural 
Philosofia.” (ME.I.17)  The shared etymologyical origin should, however, remind historians that even Martínez’s 
conception of “natural philosophy” as a science was far from the methodologies of the modern sciences.  Moreover, 
the shared definition in exploring causes and principals helps to explain why there were many points of contestation 
between two alternative systems of explanation. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
“A Priest who ventured out of his Science:” the Disillusioning Work of Padre Feijóo and 
the Catholic Enlightenment, 1726-1760 
 
“Age of transition…of a fight of conflicting interests… 
[and] this new Prometheus, doubting everything except God and his soul… 
A thousand times over you are wise, you who respected the man of conscience 
And without defoliating a belief, guided him by the hand to the temple of science… 
A thousand times over you are wise.  The divine power explains all that has to do with Faith… 
Speak, Feijóo!  Science is the way, but God is the goal.” 
-Emilia Pardo Bazán, “Ode to the Philosopher Feijóo” (1876)234 
 “The professed Design of the Author is to explode vulgar Errors, which he does with a Freedom 
surprising in a Spaniard, and with a Decency peculiar to true Wit and good Sense.  Of his 
universal Learning the Reader will form a judgment, when he considers, that the Subject of this 
Tract was foreign to his own Profession.  It was too interesting to pass unanswered, and dull Men 
had a fine Opportunity for Raillery at a Priest who ventured out of his Science…[he answered 
one] whose Absurdities he diverted himself with.” 
-Introduction to Feijóo’s An Exposition of the Uncertainties in the Practice of Physic (1751)235 
 
In 1729, in the third volume of his Teatro crítico universal, Benito Jerónimo Feijóo 
recounted the story of a miraculous crucifix once housed at the town of Agreda.236  Left for the 
Virgin Mother by a local magistrate in memory of his nephew, the presbyter Don Francisco 
Coronel, the crucifix soon amazed the town when the figurine Christ began to sweat blood at 
various times.  The local congregation was enthralled and visitors flocked to Agreda to witness 
the miracle.  “In fact,” wrote Feijóo, “having crowded many different times to see it, they 
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acknowledged [that] the face [was] somewhat dyed with blood, and although there was no way 
that it could be sweaty [with blood], already the image was to be placed in somber 
[observance].”  Not only were the commoners fascinated with the crucifix, but notables too.  
Feijóo noted that there was a prominent increase in prayers, processions, vows, and almsgiving, 
but he does not end his story with this inspired, albeit misguided, piety.  Feijóo wrote, “Only a 
clerk, a cautious and wise man, suspected some hidden deceit in that which all had judged an 
indubitable prodigy.”  To detect the truth behind the matter, the clerk hid himself in the cell 
where the crucifix was kept.  “There he saw,” detailed Feijóo, “how [an] old woman...came to 
the site and taking blood from [her] nostrils, dyed with it as it pleased her on the face of the 
Image.”  As was later discovered, the woman was a servant of the priest who had discussed “that 
it could result in some usefulness” if it was rumored among the village (pueblo) that the image 
had the miraculous ability to sweat blood.  Feijóo closed the account with the concluding justice 
administered to the falsifiers, that the magistrate, “a man of solid piety, had to give two hundred 
lashes to the old woman, which were so well deserved...”237 
Such accounts of false miracles abound in Feijóo’s works.  Feijóo lamented, “With this 
the common people are led to believe when one talks of miracles in the Catholic Church, it is 
deemed a lie and a falsity.  Thus the obstinacy is augmented, the error wins, and the truth 
suffers.”238  Feijóo constantly sought to curb the insidious effects of feigned miracles by 
exposing the ludicrous nature of superstitious practices and naive beliefs made especially 
refutable by recent advancements in science and learning.  Hailed by many historians as the 
precursor of the Spanish Enlightenment, Feijóo is often interpreted as the beginning of the end of 
Catholic tradition in Spain, the “Spanish Voltaire” who used science and deduction to illuminate 
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the irrational customs of the past.239  Yet to view Feijóo’s contributions to the history of science 
and his reliance on the contemporary intellectual of his trends without contextualizing him fully 
in his historical background is to ignore a fundamental part of his motivation for campaigning 
against superstition in early modern Spain.  The narrative of the bleeding crucifix from the 
village of Agreda is featured in a discurso entitled “Milagros Supuestos” (Alleged Miracles) in 
which Feijóo wrote, “The true miracles are the strongest proof of our Holy Faith, but feigned 
miracles serve as a pretext to the unfaithful to not believe the truth.”240  It is a point Feijóo 
reiterated many times – the true miracles that do exist for the promulgation of Christianity are 
weakened by the spread of superstitious credulity. 
This chapter examines Feijóos discourses on the nature of miracles, and more broadly, 
his writings on overlapping occurrences of the supernatural and natural (demonic possession, 
magic, etc.).  In doing so, it explores how Feijóo’s work serves as an example of the way in 
which the intellectual debates of the eighteenth century played out in a particular setting.  The 
new philosophies of skepticism, Cartesianism, and atomism had, despite Martínez’s attempts to 
limit it, introduced an incipient methodological materialism.  This approach, which discounted 
divine activity and supernatural causality, meant the nonexistence of miracles, witchcraft, angels, 
and demons.  As necessary overlapping sites of the natural and the supernatural, the existence of 
miracles became contested territory for theology, philosophy, and the physical sciences, as 
leading intellectuals in each field rushed to define the “truly” miraculous.  Feijóo’s qualified 
avowal of the continuation of miracles and his cautiously skeptical acceptance and investigation 
into reports of them is symbolic of the via media charted by the Spanish Enlightenment.  This is 
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likewise true for his approach to other occurrences of the supernatural and preternatural, such as 
witchcraft and demonic possession. 
 
Disenchantment: A Useful Term? 
Presently, the historiographical consensus in the study of the intersections of magic, 
science, and religion of the late-medieval and early modern periods has considerably distanced 
itself from “disenchantment theory.”  First espoused by Max Weber in his 1918 lecture, “Science 
as a Vocation,” the entzauberung der welt – disenchantment of the world – was a byproduct of 
modernity, a process of positivist rationalization that gradually eliminated the operations of the 
supernatural and the removal of magic until, at last, it was that there were “no mysterious, 
incalculable powers at work, but rather that one could in principle master everything through 
calculation.”241  Importantly, disenchantment was not necessarily the removal of the 
supernatural, but the removal of mystery.242  This disenchantment was particularly achieved 
through scientific progress, intellectualization, and technology, and resulted in a decline of magic 
and erasure of spirits until “lofty rationalism….dethroned this polytheism.”243  Weber’s thesis of 
disenchantment was popularly revived and brought to scholarly attention in 1971 with the 
publication of Keith Thomas’s seminal work, Religion and the Decline of Magic. In the context 
of late-medieval and early modern England, Thomas viewed magic and supernaturalism as a 
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matter of pre-Reformation against post-Reformation beliefs, and credited the spread of 
Protestantism with the removal of magic from English society.  In the last forty years since 
Thomas’s publication, historians have complicated Weber’s theory of disenchantment with a 
variety of methodological objections and with mixed success. 
Several prominent medievalists have demonstrated, for example, that the medieval 
Catholic Church was both highly rational and part of a longer “trajectory of disenchantment” in 
which elements of rationalization and the decline of magic and superstition occurred in the 
thirteenth through fifteenth centuries.244  Other historians have pointed to the continuation of 
“superstition” and “magic” well through the nineteenth century, stating that if such a process of 
disenchantment occurred, it was a long and gradual process.  Many scholars have likewise 
demonstrated that a prominent concern of the Catholic Church during the Counter Reformation 
was the systematic evaluation, regulation, and elimination of superstition, folklore magic, and 
popular misconceptions of religion – an “antisuperstitious campaign” of the post-Tridentine 
Catholic Church.245   
A further testament to the Catholic regulation of magic and superstition is the wealth of 
Inquisition documents related to the persecution of magic, witchcraft, and superstitious belief.  
As part of the Tridentine Catholic Church’s efforts to extirpate magic, the Inquisition 
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(particularly the Spanish and the Roman Inquisitions) worked vehemently to investigate and 
prosecute practitioners of magic, thus contributing to the notion of Catholic disenchantment.  In 
his article, “Religious Enthusiasm, the Spanish Inquisition, and the Disenchantment of the 
World,” Andrew Keitt has argued that the Catholic Church was especially effective at organizing 
rational, disenchanting clerical instruction, particularly through the activity of the Spanish 
Inquisition.  Rather than the anemic and supernaturally-burdened caricature of reformed 
Catholicism portrayed by Weber, Keitt states that, 
… Spanish ecclesiastical authorities and intellectual elites made a concerted effort 
to scrutinize claims of direct, unmediated divine inspiration more closely, to 
subject prophesies, apparitions, miracles, revelations, and other such examples of 
supposedly supernatural religious phenomena to stricter control and more 
thorough verification…the category of the natural expanded to encompass a wide 
range of purportedly miraculous events, and religious enthusiasm was 
increasingly described in medical terms, or as a psychological disorder, or 
dismissed as deliberate fraud.246 
This seriously undermines Weber’s argument that disenchantment belonged to Protestantism and 
Calvinism alone or particularly.  Rather than a disenchantment which eliminated magic, some 
historians posit the “folklorization of magic” – the relegation of magic to the popular level.247  
This contradicts Weber’s notions that disenchantment would be accompanied by an erasure of 
magic from quotidian culture.  With the definitional instability of these terms, it is 
understandable that Weberian disenchantment has been markedly challenged, with many 
skeptical scholars calling for an abandonment of the term completely.248  At stake are crucial 
questions: how to understand the way in which people negotiated with nature, understood the 
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relationship between reason and religion, articulated the basis of truth, and how all of these 
issues changed over time. 
This chapter questions the applicability of disenchantment by situating it among the work 
of Feijóo to investigate the validity of miracles.  By doing so, it demonstrates Feijóo’s position of 
upholding the validity of divine action while limiting the sphere of legitimate supernatural 
activity from the influence of the new sciences.  This position is considered typical of the 
Spanish Catholic Enlightenment.  The same analysis is then extended, briefly, to Feijóo’s 
discourses on exorcism and demonic possession, and then applied to two cases from the Spanish 
Inquisition during the late-eighteenth century, one of demonic possession and the other of 
supposed witchcraft.  Certainly, the negotiation of Catholic epistemologies evinced in both the 
theological and intellectual treatises of eighteenth-century Spain as well as in the record of 
Inquisition cases challenges disenchantment.  It points to an ecclesiastical modus operandi of 
Catholic rationalism which was regularly disenchanting for centuries while simultaneously 
uncovering an eighteenth-century intellectual climate which was far from decidedly-
disenchanted.  In the texts of Feijóo and other religious intellectuals of ‘enlightened’ Spain, both 
the impulse to advance the probability of natural causality and the desire to reaffirm the realm of 
legitimate supernatural and preternatural activity were present.  In cases of the Inquisition, jurists 
and theologians daily negotiated this tension.   
While this complicates the traditional notion of “disenchantment,” this chapter argues 
that the term remains a useful touchstone for discussing the relation between magic, religion, and 
science. This is doubly true for research on individuals such as Feijóo and other early-eighteenth 
century ilustrados, because they themselves employed the term desengaño (disillusionment) to 
describe the work that they were doing.  Importantly, enlighteners such as Feijóo never 
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conceived of disillusionment or disenchantment as antithetical to Catholicism, a position which 
sets the Hispanic enlightenment experience apart. 
 
Introducing Feijóo 
Benito Jerónimo Feijóo was born October 8, 1676 in Casedemiro, in the province of 
Orense, Galicia.  At the age of twelve, he entered the Benedictine Monastery of San Julián de 
Samos, Galicia, and in 1690 received the Benedictine habit.  After pursuing advanced education, 
in 1709 Feijóo began teaching theology at the Monastery of San Vicente, Oviedo, Asturias.  
From 1710-1721, he held the Theology Chair of Santo Tomás at the University of Oviedo, in 
1724, was granted the Vísperas Chair, and in 1739, granted the Prima Chair of Theology (the 
progression in chairs marked seniority, prestige, and academic prowess).  While he was 
advancing at the university, Feijóo was a prolific writer.  From 1726-1740, he published his most 
famous work, Teatro crítico universal (The Universal Theater of Criticism) in nine volumes.  
Moreover, he became well-known for his contributions to both religious and scientific thought.  
While teaching at the University of Oviedo, he was twice elected the abbot of his monastery, and 
made an honorary member of the Royal Society of Medicine in Sevilla in 1727.  He retired in 
1739 after his appointment to the Prima Chair of Theology due to his steadily failing health, 
dedicating the rest of his life to writing.  It was during this time that he published his second 
major work, Cartas eruditas y curiosas (Intellectual Letters) in five volumes from 1742-1760.  
He died in 1764 at the age of ninety-seven at his home monastery of San Vicente in Oviedo.249 
The Teatro crítico universal, Feijóo’s first work, is a collection of discourses and 
speeches in eight volumes.  The supplemental ninth volume was released in 1740 and largely 
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serves as an apologetic to remarks made against the Teatro crítico universal.  The topics of the 
discourses vary greatly and reflect Feijóo’s diverse breadth of study in philosophy, natural 
sciences, religion and theology, history, and political events of contemporary Spain and Europe.  
This is true for the subjects of Feijóo’s second work, the epistolary collection of Cartas eruditas 
y curiosas.  Feijóo’s works were able to influence both the professional scholar and lay 
academic.  Feijóo wrote in a didactic and explanatory fashion, but uses a conversational tone and 
punctuates many of his letters with humorous witticisms that make his writings more enjoyable 
to read.  Feijóo was also one of the few Spanish authors of the eighteenth century for whom there 
is ample documentary evidence showing his translation and appropriation to other nations.  It is 
clear that his work was being read and studied in the Spanish colonies, for example, but his 
works were also translated and published in London, Paris, and Bavaria. 
Although Feijóo is well-known to Spanish historians, his achievements and works are 
uncommon and scarcely read by English-speaking scholarship.  Additionally, translations of his 
works are practically nonexistent – a few publications of selected discourses and letters from his 
works are available.  Previous secondary sources on Feijóo, whether they be in Spanish or 
English, are almost entirely concentrated on Feijóo’s academic contributions to the fields of 
science.  The selections of Feijóo used form a predictable canon of his more groundbreaking or 
prophetically advanced scientific discourses, for example, “Medicina” (Medicine)250 or 
“Respuesta a algunas Cuestiones sobre los cuatro Elementos” (Response to some questions on 
the four Elements).251  In recent years, the growth of interest in the history of science and the 
history of medicine has increased historians’ awareness of Feijóo, but only in the limited context 
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of his scientific research and experiments.252  One of the most famous works on Feijóo, Gregorio 
Marañón’s Las Ideas Biológicas del Padre Feijóo, is almost exclusively devoted to such ideas.253  
Occasionally, attention is directed towards Feijóo’s more political discourses, for example, “Voz 
del Pueblo” (Voice of the People),254 “Antipatía de Franceses y Españoles” (Hostility between the 
French and the Spanish),255 or “Glorias de España” (The Glories of Spain).256  In such studies, 
the polemics that followed both the Teatro crítico universal and Cartas eruditas y curiosas are of 
paramount importance. 
Feijóo often appears in histories of the Enlightenment as a footnote, citing him as an 
important figure in the introduction of Enlightenment thought to Spain.  Stanley G. Payne, in his 
seminal work A History of Spain and Portugal describes Feijóo as “the precursor of the Spanish 
enlightenment,” his writings as “the turning point that marked the official beginning of the 
Spanish enlightenment,” and even labels him “father of the Spanish enlightenment.”257  
Unsurprisingly, Feijóo’s religious characteristics and contributions are often misinterpreted by 
those who would portray Feijóo as the Father of the Spanish Enlightenment.  I.L. McClelland, in 
her bibliographic study Benito Jerónimo Feijóo, makes the mistake of minimizing Feijóo’s 
religious background and beliefs, arguing that: “there is no indication in his work that his interior 
religious life was very highly developed.”258  However, from the age of twelve until his death 
eighty-five years later, Feijóo had sought to be part of a religious community, although as the 
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eldest son of ten children, the church would not have been the traditional route.  Nearly every 
existent analysis on Feijóo exalts an exclusively scientific reading of his life and works, either 
simply omitting religion from the historical context or worse, advocating a reading of Feijóo that 
stresses that religion and science must be seen as naturally polarized combatants.  Feijóo, priest 
and natural philosopher as he is, is subsequently designated as confused, inconsistent, or bound 
by the rules of the society in which he lived.259 
This chapter analyzes Feijóo’s writings on the supernatural, and specifically the 
miraculous.  In doing so, it attempts to show that Feijóo’s standards of discernment and 
skepticism towards accounts of miracles were largely motivated by a desire to distinguish those 
miracles Feijóo deemed true for the strengthening of Catholicism; moreover, much of his 
methodology and reasoning is deeply rooted in the traditions of the Catholic Church.  It will 
therefore suggest that Feijóo must be read as man of greater complexity than previously treated, 
a scientific priest who, while instrumental in the advancement of experimental science in 18th 
century Spain and in the modernization of analytical thinking, was fundamentally influenced and 
guided by Catholic theology and religious figures of his day.  His scientific and religious works 
are therefore inextricably interwoven, and must be read as such. 
By looking at the life and work of this Benedictine priest-philosopher, a religious man 
well-educated in science and philosophy at the beginning of the eighteenth-century, important 
theoretical implications can be made.  First, Feijóo invites a closer study of the role of reform in 
early modern Catholicism, especially in Spain.  Feijóo’s efforts to eradicate superstition and 
incorporate reason in theological evaluation of miracles are, I have argued, indicative of the 
Catholic Church’s modus operando at his time.  I assert that Feijóo was largely motivated by a 
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sense of Catholic Rationalism – the Catholic Church’s longstanding attempt to incorporate 
contemporary intellectual trends and encourage reason, empiricism, and textual criticism.  This 
supports John W. O’Malley’s arguments for a reform within the Catholic Church that stretched 
from the late medieval period until the French Revolution in 1789; but more importantly, it 
suggests one way to understand the unique, mediated character of the Catholic Enlightenment in 
Spain.260  Feijóo’s approach to the investigation of the supernatural is illustrative of the Catholic 
enlightenment impulse to chart a middle course between tradition and modernity, preserving the 
doctrines of the church and seeking to adopt and adapt new methods of knowledge and 
advancements made in secular knowledge. 
It is easy to understand why many historians have failed to seriously study Feijóo’s 
religious influences or have mischaracterized him as antagonistic to the Catholic Church.  Feijóo 
did not suffer fools gladly and could be especially harsh towards those religious figures who 
insisted on ignorance in the name of “piety.”  He wrote in his letter Causes of Spain’s 
Backwardness on 
the consternation with which all novelty is viewed in Spain.  Many say that in the 
matter of doctrines, the title ‘new’ is grounds enough to condemn them.  New 
doctrines in sacred fields of knowledge are suspicious and all those who rightly 
reproached doctrinal novelties have spoken of this.  But to extend this disdain to 
anything that seems new is to indulge in a stubborn ignorance...this can be 
accepted among common people, and such attitudes can be tolerated among 
idiots, but it is insufferable in learned professors, who must be aware of the 
motives we have in common with other nations, especially with Catholics.261 
Feijóo critiqued religious officials for being stubborn and static, universities for rejecting 
philosophers without reading their work, Spaniards for being suspicious of anything not written 
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by a Spaniard, and the Inquisition (what he calls “the Holy Tribunal”) for being overly zealous in 
their ideological purges.  However, Feijóo’s own reasons for studying and applying new 
philosophies must be explained.  In “Causes of Spain’s Backwardness,” Feijóo not only 
lamented Spain’s reluctance to accept novel ideas, but gave his reasons for doing so: first, that all 
truth is useful.  Feijóo explained that “there is no kind of truth whose perception is not useful to 
the understanding, because all help satisfy one’s natural appetite for knowledge.  This appetite 
came to the understanding from the Author of nature.”262  Secondly, that Feijóo was confident 
that new philosophical ideas cannot harm religion.  He stated that this 
...will not happen because we have plenty of subjects who are skillful and well 
educated in dogma, who can distinguish what is opposed to faith from what is 
not...this remedy is always available to reassure us, even with respect to those 
philosophical opinions that come from countries infected with heresy...to assuage 
all reasonable fears on the second point, it is enough to note that theology and 
philosophy have their limits well marked out, and that no Spaniard is unaware that 
revealed doctrine has superior rights over human discourse, of which all the 
nature sciences are lacking.263 
In this passage, Feijóo, like his friend Martínez, with whom he exchanged defenses for each 
other’s work, indicates borders of circumscribed fields of knowledge, explicitly privileging 
revealed truth over other forms of knowledge.  Feijóo’s vitriolic sarcasm of religious institutions, 
of which there is plenty to be found, and his promotion of scientific discoveries and new 
philosophies can obfuscate the simple fact that Feijóo was a Benedictine monk, a correspondent 
with and active participant in the religious community, well-versed in Biblical, conciliar, papal, 
and theological literature, and a professing believer in Catholic Christianity who wrote 
theological treatises as well as on scientific discoveries.264 
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It is not a matter, therefore, of arguing for natural philosophy or Catholic religious 
tradition as the “true” origins of Feijóo’s skepticism and critical analysis of claims of the 
supernatural and of superstition.  Feijóo’s work is a seamless synthesis of both of these threads 
of thought – one that implies that the abyssal division that some historians have charted between 
science and religion during the Enlightenment is artificially enhanced, a modern concept read 
into past texts.  Feijóo argued that faith is suprarational, containing within it the truths of 
philosophies, and I assert that this is the view which must be considered when assessing the 
history of religion and science during turn-of-the-century Europe – especially in Spain.265  It is 
important to remember that Feijóo was not an outlier, but rather a well-documented 
representation of an epistemological trend which was common to the more progressive edge of 
the Catholic Enlightenment in Spain.  Although Pardo Bazán described Feijóo as a “prophetic 
philosopher,” a lone vox clamantis in the barren, intellectual desert of Spain, the example of the 
novatores before him, the attention and popularity which his works received, and the evidence of 
contemporary thinkers, many of whom wrote to support and defend Feijóo’s works, clearly 
points to the fact that Feijóo was one among many rather than an unheralded harbinger.266  
Feijóo’s work to introduce advancements made in the natural sciences to combat superstition and 
to better understand the boundaries of natural and supernatural are illustrative of the broader 
efforts of Catholic Enlighteners to make their faith understandable and adaptive to the particular 
demands of eighteenth-century, ‘modern’ society.267 
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Figure 4: Portrait of Benito Jerónimo Feijóo y Montenegro 
 
Juan Bernabé Palomino, Retrato de Benito Jerónimo Feijoo (1733[?])268 
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through the BNE, signature 3/33636. 
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Feijóo’s Discernment of Miracles 
Key to understanding Feijóo’s stance against superstitious practices and false claims of 
miracles is his focus on discernimiento (discernment).  Feijóo understood discernment to mean 
the authentication of external realities – spiritual possession, most often, but also spiritually 
inspired prophecy, claims of visions, and the occurrence of supernatural events.  The language of 
discernment that Feijóo used is radically scientific and systematic compared to, for example, that 
of mysticism’s passivity and “no pensar nada” approach of spiritual contemplation.269  
Discernment of Spirits is, discretio spirituum, according to the Bible, a charismata or a gratia 
gratis data - a spiritual gift given by God freely.270  As such, it is a notoriously difficult activity 
to regulate.  As historian John Bossy writes, “The trouble with the Spirit, from the point of view 
of organised Christianity, has always been that it bloweth where it listeth...it was a difficult guest 
in any Church.”271  It is clear that this was a struggle that the Catholic Church long suffered.  
Some have credited the rise of Protestantism as increasing the importance of personal religious 
experience and degrading the role of doctrine in the practice of Christianity.272  Additionally, 
with the rise of religious heterodoxies such as Alumbrados, or Illuminists, and Jansenists, the 
emphasis on such spiritual liberty increased - what one modern theologian labels “the deadly 
enemy of discernment.”273  Recently, historian Moshe Sluhovsky has studied the incongruity of 
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the divine grace of discernment and the Catholic Church’s failed attempts to systematize 
discernment.274 
However, the inherent difficulty that Sluhovsky has demonstrated was less problematic to 
Feijóo in his assessment of miracles and superstition.  The discernment of spirits, especially 
when concerned with visions, prophecies, and possession, operated with and interpreted naturally 
interior events.  That the discernment of spirits was a charismatic grace is therefore 
understandable.  As Gerson wrote in his treatise On Distinguishing True from False Revelations, 
“There is for human beings no general rule or method that can be given always and infallibly to 
distinguish between revelations that are true and those that are false or deceptive.”275  The 
discernment of miracles, however, involved naturally external realities that could be tested by the 
new scientific standards of empiricism and rationalism.  Miracles (milagros) occurred when the 
supernatural (God) interacted in the natural world, defying natural law or contradicting natural 
probabilities.  It is for this reason that Feijóo was able to construct a series of general rules for 
the evaluation of miracles; it is also for this reason that Feijóo conceded that his rules were 
fallible to exceptions. 
The Catholic Church had a tradition of multiple attempts to test and discern spirits and 
the supernatural.  The Bible warned of false prophecies and visions and encouraged the testing of 
such phenomena.276  Catholic theologians worked to define guidelines for discernment.  St. 
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), for example, wrote that four characteristics of miracles must be 
longevity, utility, deification, and the invocation of God’s name with reverence.277    In the 
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fourteenth century, Henry of Langenstein (1325-1397) attempted to categorize spiritual 
influences based on somatic signs; such categorization was common in late medieval and early 
modern assessments of the supernatural – especially possession.278  Feijóo likewise endorsed a 
set of guidelines for evaluating claims of miraculous healing devised by Paulo Zaquias in his 
letter, “Sobre la continuación de Milagros en algunos Santuarios” (On the Continuation of 
Miracles in some Sanctuaries).279  He wrote that in order for a healing to be miraculous, it is 
prudent to establish four facts.280  First, the affliction must be naturally incurable or notoriously 
difficult to recover from.  Secondly, that the disease is not in its final epidemiological stages.  
Thirdly, that the patient who experiences miraculous healing is fully recovered without a trace of 
the former illness.  Lastly, the miraculous healing should be characterized by instant or sudden 
recovery.  If not, wrote Feijóo, the healing could be contested as natural.  Feijóo jested, “How 
many times has health returned without a miracle to the sick whom the doctors had abandoned as 
deplorable!”281  Feijóo continued in his letter to use these rules (reglas) to discredit claims of 
healing from hydrophobia; both men and animals have been known to recover from this disease, 
Feijóo asserted, therefore it was unlikely that such a cure could be counted as a miracle.  The 
definition of miracles here must be stressed – they are supernatural events.  The use of natural 
means, even if orchestrated by God, is not miraculous, merely providential. 
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Take, for example, Feijóo’s constructed classification of miraculous accounts found in 
“Toro de S. Marcos” (The Bull of St. Mark).282  In this discurso, Feijóo analyzed the credibility 
of a renowned and popular tale of the supernatural – that on the Eve of St. Mark in some places 
of the Extremadura, members of certain confraternities had the ability to select a bull from the 
herd, which would immediately eschew its natural ferocity and would dutifully and with full 
gentleness attend Vespers with the people of the village.283  Feijóo began his examination of this 
tale with the following, 
As for the gentleness of the Bull, three inspections can be made of the fact 
according to three different causes that one can consider the influences of it: the 
first – miraculous, the second – superstitious, and the third – natural.  If God, in 
attention to the merits of the Evangelist [St. Mark] and the prayers of his 
devotees, by himself alone, without the interposition of some secondary cause, 
domesticates the fierceness, it is successfully miraculous; if the devil does it by 
virtue of some implicit pact, or explicit with those involved in the deed, it is 
superstitious; or if by some means contained in the sphere of the natural, and 
provided to this effect it is achieved, it is natural.284 
With this tripartite classification, Feijóo clearly defined important distinctions between the terms 
he so often used.  First, that those works considered miraculous must be unaccountable according 
to natural explanations and void of any possible “secondary causes.”  The possible natural 
explanations must therefore be first examined and excluded as a possibility for confirming 
miracles.  Secondly, the source of the supernatural influences must be considered in order to 
define an event as a miracle or a superstition.  Feijóo, in this sense, used superstition to mean 
both false accounts of the miraculous and those supernatural occurrences achieved by unholy 
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means, such as the practicing of witchcraft and magic or the invocation of the powers of the 
Devil.285  With consideration to both definitions of the word, it is noteworthy that Feijóo 
described the Catholic faith as “the irreconcilable enemy of all superstition.”286 
The Catholic Church had, by the time of Feijóo, already been engaged in multiple papal 
and conciliar efforts to establish standards of discernment and definition.  In 1516, the Fifth 
Lateran Church Council promoted episcopal investigation of purported prophecies before 
allowing their dissemination to the laity.  In Session XXV of the Council of Trent, held under 
Pius IV and recorded December 4, 1563, the Council wrote, 
That these things may be the more faithfully observed, the holy council decrees 
that no one is permitted to erect or cause to be erected in any place or church, 
howsoever exempt, any unusual image unless it has been approved by the bishop; 
also that no new miracles be accepted and no relics recognized unless they have 
been investigated and approved by the same bishop, who, as soon as he has 
obtained any knowledge of such matters, shall, after consulting theologians and 
other pious men, act thereon as he shall judge consonant with truth and piety.  But 
if any doubtful or grave abuse is to be eradicated, or if indeed any graver question 
concerning these matters should arise, the bishop, before he settles the 
controversy, shall await the decision of the metropolitan and of the bishops of the 
province in a provincial synod; so, however, that nothing new or anything that has 
not hitherto been in use in the Church, shall be decided upon without having first 
consulted the most holy Roman pontiff.287 
At a meeting held in Malines in 1607, officials similarly concluded that “It is superstitious to 
expect any effect from anything when such an effect cannot be produced by natural causes, by 
divine institution or by the ordination and approval of the Church.”288  Feijóo was well aware of 
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these ecclesiastical trends – moreover, he was in support of them.  He advocated for stricter 
enforcement of these ecclesiastical decrees that mandated the episcopal evaluation of miraculous 
accounts before their promulgation to the public.  Feijóo specifically cited this selection from the 
Council of Trent on the evaluation of miracles in his letter, “Sobre la multitud de milagros” (On 
the Multitude of Miracles).289  Additionally, in “Milagros Supuestos,” (Supposed Miracles) 
Feijóo argued that in cases where the intent was to feign miracles, “as it happens oft times for 
various motives,” the Secular Magistrate should proceed against the author of the lie, remaining 
in its bounds [jurisdiction], with severe penalty.”290  Such was the case of the old servant woman 
responsible for falsifying the blood of the crucifix in the village of Agreda, who, after having 
been discovered in flagrante delicto, was judicially prosecuted and whipped in the public streets 
(las calles públicas).291 
As Feijóo established in “Toro de S. Marcos,” the first step in assessing and discerning 
miracles was to ensure that no possible natural explanation existed for the event.  Educated 
evaluation of sensational accounts was needed in order to establish truth, and Feijóo, among 
others, believed it the duty of the Church to investigate these claims with the assistance of all 
available resources.  In the first half of eighteenth-century Spain, these resources specifically 
included new scientific ideas.  Feijóo clearly relied on the fields of philosophy, medicine, and 
science.  Multiple times, he cites contemporary literature in these fields, indicating that he had an 
awareness of the more recent advancements and work being performed.292  Moreover, he often 
seeks scientific explanations for reported miracles before considering a supernatural 
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explanation.293  When recounting the feigned miracle of the bleeding crucifix of Agreda, for 
example, Feijóo wrote, “...in regards to miracles, the commoner’s piety sees more with the 
imagination than with the eyes...”294  Certainly, Feijóo advocated the use of empiricism to inform 
judgments, and as one of the more prominent scientific minds of Spanish society, informed the 
public through his works about contemporary scientific advancements. 
It is important to note that when Feijóo practiced such empirical investigations, the 
scientific resources he referenced and encouraged others to use were written not only by “other 
pious men,” as the Council of Trent dictated, but even by non-Catholic natural philosophers.  
Feijóo was not alone in this practice; he cites in “Examen de Milagros” (Examination of 
Miracles) that the consultation of non-Catholic, even atheist philosophers, was practiced by the 
pope, Benedict XIV.  He wrote that “this discernment relies on Philosophy,” and that “Our Most 
Holy Father Benedict XIV…never cites theologians without philosophers, and philosophers for 
the larger part that haven’t studied a word of Theology, citing as legitimate authors for this test 
even heretic philosophers.”295 
Benedict XIV (1740-1758), formerly Archbishop Lambertini of Bologna, was known for 
his unconventionally administrative and effective approach to the papacy.296  He oversaw 
numerous reforms within the Catholic Church, including a reduction in feast days and the 
general investigation and repression of popular superstitions.  As pope, he relied on advisors and 
secretaries; it is not entirely surprising, therefore, that Feijóo knows of his consultation of heretic 
philosophers.297  This consultation is significant in that it demonstrates the Catholic Church’s 
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shift in approach to the discernment of truth.  Expressed belief in Christianity was no longer an 
epistemological prerequisite for the discernment of truth in various subjects.  It was, by the 
prevenient grace of God, possible for natural philosophers to speak authoritatively on natural 
truths and for these truths to be then utilized by the Catholic Church.  That Feijóo prefers to cite 
first religious, educated men does not negate the fact that he prefers irreligious educated 
individuals to the unintelligent, albeit ‘pious’, vulgo.  John Locke, of whom Feijóo calls 
“Príncipe de los Metafísicos,” wrote “Reason and judgement must be used in order to measure 
the degree of probability of what we are asked to believe by faith.”298  This increased focus on 
the importance of incorporating knowledge gained from empiricism, reason, and nature into 
Catholicism I label trends of ‘Catholic Rationalism’, using Justo L. González’s description of 
Rationalism as a philosophy “characterized by its interest in the world and by its confidence in 
the powers of reason.”299   
Feijóo used the word filosofía in multiple manners.  Most often, he used filósofos or 
filosofía to refer to philosophy in the broader and common sense, as when he discusses “filósofos 
Materialistas.” or “la filosofía de Descartes.”300  Occasionally, however, Feijóo used filosofía 
defined explicitly as natural philosophy, as when he discussed “el Sistema Filosófico de 
Newton.”301  Context is thus necessary for defining the term every instance that Feijóo used it.  
The natural philosophy use of the word is the most likely definition in this selected quote from 
“Examen de Milagros;” in this letter, Feijóo discussed the benefits that modern advancements in 
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science have granted to those discerning between the spiritually supernatural and the naturally 
unexplained. 
What becomes clear is that Feijóo was not the first to attempt to curb superstition and 
localized traditions of religion – a long litany of Catholic thinkers, both clergy and lay, had done 
so before him.  Contemporary with Feijóo was a large community of the learned who, like 
Feijóo, attempted to discern true miracles.  In his discurso “Toro de S. Marcos,” Feijóo wrote, “I 
have no news of other authors who have touched this question, other than Master Fr. Juan de 
Santo Tomás...Tomás Hurtado...Father Carlos Casnedi of the Society of Jesus...P. Leandro, cited 
by Gobat...”302  Not only did Feijóo painstakingly cite those authors whom he read, but included 
the works and appropriate sections; moreover, Feijóo informed his readers that having discussed 
the case first with the Archbishop of Santiago, he was encouraged to investigate the case by the 
Bishop of Avila. 303  Clearly, Feijóo was not alone in the religious community in his campaign 
against superstition and feigned miracles.  What made Feijóo successful, particularly in the 
evaluation of natural causes, was his familiarity and incorporation of new scientific ideas and a 
strong reliance on natural reason – but here too, context shows that he was not alone in this 
practice.  From his own letters, Feijóo cited other intellectuals who are conducting similar efforts 
and notes on multiple occasions that the recommended course of investigation for and by bishops 
was to employ scientific experts to evaluate the cases.304  The implications of this fact are 
immense.  For many historians, the Catholic Church of the seventeenth century is anemic, 
desperately trying to regain authority in spiritual authentication.305  Moshe Sluhovsky, for 
example, writes that there existed 
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303 TCU VII.8.6. 
304 For example, Paulo Zaquis, the Archbishop of Paris, as well as certain Jesuit colleagues. 
305 Sluhovsky, Believe Not Every Spirit, 180. 
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...a climate in which individual believers sought more interiorized and passive 
routes for interaction with the divine.  By the early decades of the sixteenth 
century, mystical knowledge was often even presented as equal, if not superior to, 
intellectual knowledge, and a theology of love, affection, and passivity 
overshadowed a theology of reason.306 
At the same time, Justo González notes that, “partially as a result of all this [emphasis on state 
and religious toleration], and partially as a result of new scientific discoveries, rationalism took 
hold of Europe.”307  Out of this rationalism, Gonzalez asserts, rose distrust toward dogma, 
doctrine, and traditional Church orthodoxy and the origins of Quietism and interior spiritual 
movements.308  This may be one alternative reaction to the rise of rationalism in Europe, but 
Feijóo is significant because he offers a different perspective.  Through Feijóo’s writings, one 
sees the legacy of the Catholic Church’s incorporation of rationalism into theological 
discernment.  The Catholic Church that Feijóo was part of was dynamic, institutionally unified, 
and more accessible to the reception of ideas than previously caricatured. 
Feijóo once charged, “Let us not wait for the enemy, the Heretics, to discover that which 
is error in the false piety of some Catholics.”  Feijóo encouraged the Church to be as diligently 
self-critical as possible, rather than allowing nonbelievers to “make war on our truths with our 
fictions.”  This, according to Feijóo, was “the way of Erasmus, [that] hidden enemy, more 
ingenious than Luther, [who caused] much suffering to the Church.”309  Feijóo conceded, 
however, Erasmus was at least successful in pointing to many of the superstitions held by 
Catholics.310 
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William A. Christian, Jr., while noting the development of a more critical analysis and 
reception of local apparitions among the Catholic clergy in late-medieval and sixteenth-century 
Spain, omitted any assertion of the roots of this strict receptivity.311  This chapter has asserted 
that the increased skepticism of religious authorities in the discernment of miracles, including 
apparitions, is reflective of larger trends of Catholic Rationalism.  The origins of Catholic 
rationalism, however, remain themselves unclear.  Certainly, Feijóo placed himself as part of a 
longer tradition that extended to Erasmus, even if Erasmus’s methods and conclusions were not 
agreeable to Feijóo.  Similarly, Feijóo saw Catholic Rationalism present in many of his 
contemporaries.  It would seem, however, that many of Feijóo’s advocated methods are direct 
responses to conciliar and papal efforts during the immediately post-Tridentine period. 
Feijóo’s writings are marked by skepticism – so much so that he developed a reputation 
for his critical reception of miracles among his readers and the religious community.  In letter 
forty-three of Cartas eruditas y curiosas, tomo primero, he responded to the charge that “The 
true Miracles are not as few as I imagine and as I assert in my Writings.”312  It is clear that he 
consistently upheld the existence of the miraculous and God’s ability to work supernaturally.  
Feijóo wrote, for example, “The continuation of Miracles, in whichever sanctuary, and outside of 
it, is possible to the Omnipotent, and is a certain possibility.”313  It is also repeated that Feijóo 
considered disbelief in miracles contrary to Christianity and inimical to believers and the Church.  
He wrote that “…trivial incredulity, in the case of miracles, is prejudicial to Religion.”314  
Moreover, he wrote on multiple occasions about the supernatural powers of the Devil and 
                                                 
311 William A Christian, Jr., Apparitions in Late Medieval and Renaissance Spain (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1981), and Local Religion in Sixteenth-Century Spain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1981). 
312 CE, I.43.1.  “los verdaderos Milagros no son tan pocos como yo imagino, u como manifesto en mis Escritos.” 
313 CE, I.31.2 “La continuación de Milagros, es, en cualquier Santuario, y fuera de él, possible a la Omnipotencia, 
siendo la posibilidad cierta…” 
314 CE, II.11.1 “la nimia incredulidad, en orden a milagros, es perjudicial a la Religión.” 
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demons – which, as he had classified, were superstitious magic, not miracles.315  Feijóo even 
wrote concerning the only miracle which he personally witnessed (as a seminary student).316  
Feijóo is dubious, however, of the supposed multitude of miracles, authentic relics, and reports 
of supernatural encounters.  He wrote “For every certain miracle there are six or eight which are 
doubtful and seventy or eighty that are false.”317 
One of the main causes of this skepticism is Feijóo’s skeptical attitude towards the 
veracity of men.  In almost every carta that challenges or analyzes miracles, Feijóo’s distrusted 
the testimonies given by “witnesses” of the supernatural and miraculous.  This distrust is directed 
at both testimonies where Feijóo believed the authors are knowingly falsifying accounts, and 
those whom have been misled by ignorance or thoughtlessness.318 
In the first case, Feijóo devoted much of his writing on miracles to exposing those who 
deliberately report false miracles; this was clearly seen in Feijóo’s tale of the bleeding crucifix of 
Agreda.  Sometimes, according to Feijóo, heretics reported such falsehoods to impugn the 
credibility of the true miracles of the Church.  Feijóo recounted one story of a Dutch heretic who 
acted as a Catholic and feigned miracles.  After he had aroused the suspicion of the locals and 
was subsequently tortured, he confessed that his ‘miracles’ were false. The consequence, Feijóo 
noted, was “[they] were persuaded by this example that all the miracles that are celebrated in the 
Catholic Church are of this ilk.”319  Other times, such false miracles were the results of the greed 
of men who are involved in the trade of religious relics.320  The majority of those whom Feijóo 
confronted, however, were Catholics who falsely testified to witnessing miracles.  Such men, 
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according to Feijóo, often committed such perjury with good intention.  Some, devoted to a 
particular church or saint and wanting to further their glory or fame, lied from devotion.321  
Feijóo alternatively labeled this misguided piety, “bad faith”, or deception “clothed in a 
misleading spirituality.”322  According to Feijóo, such fabrications harm, rather than aid, the 
Church by increasing suspicion and distrust toward the faith when such false miracles are, 
inevitably, found to be lies.  The end, to Feijóo, does not justify the means – lying is a sin, and 
sins cannot be performed in hopes of achieving a moral result.323  Rather, Feijóo encouraged the 
truly pious man to follow the teaching of ecumenical councils on the strict admission standards 
of true miracles, writing, 
…every man imbued with true piety should be interested in what the Holy 
Council of Trent observed.  The Church, ever following the Holy Spirit, always 
knows what is best for the glory of God, the cult of the Saints, the edification of 
the Faithful, the increase of piety, and the strengthening of Religion.324 
Feijóo cited the Council of Trent’s clause demanding the partnership of veritati et pietati (truth 
and piety) in the evaluation of supposed miracles – emphasizing that those who spread false 
miracles in order to encourage faith follow pietati to such an extent that they forsake her sister 
veritati.325 
In the second category of false accounts of witnesses, Feijóo frequently wrote demeaning 
statements on the commoner’s (el vulgo, el bruto) inability to accurately or credibly report 
miracles.326  Feijóo once wrote, “It is the vulgar, properly speaking, that is the land of 
                                                 
321 CE I.31.11. 
322 CE I.43.4,8. “fe mala...revestidos de una espiritualidad engañosa.” 
323 CE I.43.6. 
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chimeras.”327  Furthermore, he stated, “With an extraordinary thing, they attribute it to a 
mysterious cause.”328  The commoner’s lack of education made him particularly susceptible to 
being deceived in miracles, whether by the guile of others or by simple misunderstanding of the 
natural world.  Yet McClelland emphasizes the importance of the word vulgo, noting that it is a 
purposefully offensive word that fundamentally categorizes not by social distinction but by 
mental ability.329  The “common herd” for Feijóo were those who lacked the mental capacity or 
will to engage in discernment and rational thought.  It is for this reason that Feijóo wrote as a 
maxim, “In a question whether some effect is natural or supernatural, do not make an 
appreciation of the opinions of the ignorant; for this subject, only resort to the learned.”330  It is 
also for this reason that Feijóo considered one good and honest man of insight worth more than 
the testimony of a million members of the masses.331  The scholar William A. Christian, Jr. has 
effectively illustrated that the existence of the divide between the vulgo (popular religion) and 
the learned clergy was greatly augmented during the sixteenth century in his work Apparitions in 
Late Medieval and Renaissance Spain.332  By the beginning of the eighteenth century, this 
difference was firmly entrenched – a fact that Feijóo worked to correct by advocating education 
and discretion for both the vulgo and the learned. 
For Feijóo, the existence of true miracles, both in Scripture and in continuance, was a 
fundamental tenet of Catholicism.  For example, Feijóo cited St. Augustine’s De Civitate Dei, in 
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which St. Augustine writes on the continuation of miracles for the furthering of belief in 
Christianity.  Feijóo wrote, “Saint Augustine says, and we should believe thus, that not only were 
miracles made for the belief of the World, there were also more [miracles] after that belief.”333  
Feijóo, like Augustine, condemned those who disbelieved in the existence of true miracles as 
unbelievers.  Similarly, Feijóo once critiqued the writings of Abbot de Comanville, who authored 
a collection on the lives of various saints and martyrs “in four volumes, without reference to any 
miracle, outside of those contained in Sacred Scripture.  Such severe parsimony is not laudable, 
nor can it be useful for the mystical body of the Church.”334  Such avowed rectitude or disbelief 
in miracles was one problematic extreme in approaching the discernment of miracles, although it 
was not this that Feijóo saw as the most widespread.  He wrote, “to give or suspend consent to 
miracles falls into two extremes, both vicious: trivial credulity and perverse incredulity.  Not to 
believe in any miracle outside of those in Sacred Scripture is reprehensible hardness; to believe 
all that the rumor of the commons accredits is too much frivolity.”335  It was the first of these 
two, trivial credulity, that Feijóo saw as a pernicious and pervasive affliction, particularly in the 
commoner. 
Feijóo was aware that the mistaken beliefs of el vulgo were often unintentional or 
innocent.  In “Milagros Supuestos,” he wrote of how false stories of miracles are usually 
conceived and spread amongst the common.  “Not long ago,” wrote Feijóo, “in a certain 
province of Christendom preached a venerable old man of a truly apostolic spirit, but who in life 
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did not say anything special concerning prophecies or miracles.”336  After the death of such 
respected men, according to Feijóo, someone would come to his grave or former church and 
would attribute to him predictions and miracles to “satisfy their neat little piety.”337  In the 
centuries that follow, those who read these attributed accounts would assume they were written 
authoritatively by a contemporary or witness of the said miracles, never imagining that they were 
invented by someone “...for the blind affection professed for that old apostle or to leave his name 
in the world.”338  Feijóo later detailed how such unverified and easily mutable false testimony 
could be absolutely absurd and yet firmly believed in his recollected account of ‘St.’ Ganelon.  
Feijóo described how there existed in France a church dedicated to Ganelon, after a laudatory 
tombstone in the area.  Little did the villagers know that the marker was actually an elaborate 
stone that marked the grave of a loyal dog which had once saved a young child from certain 
death.  The vulgar would have persisted in this foolish error, according to Feijóo, had it not been 
for “...a wise and zealous Bishop, striving, as he should, to investigate the origin of this 
devotion...” and who “at last found the story just recounted on an old paper preserved in the 
archives of the palace...”339  It is important that Feijóo emphasized that it was the responsibility 
of the educated Bishop to seek the truth of miraculous claims and to discern true miracles from 
false claims. 
William A. Christian, Jr. has distinguished between “real” apparition accounts and 
legendary apparition accounts in his study, Apparitions in Late Medieval and Renaissance 
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Spain.340  The former category applies to only those reports which were written by, or more 
commonly, contained recorded testimony of witnesses.  The second category, legendary 
apparition accounts, includes those narratives written using secondary evidence or hearsay tales 
of the supposed miracles.  Feijóo, as demonstrated, clearly preferred those accounts written by 
eyewitnesses – testigo ocular – when available.341  Whether the account was written by a 
contemporary or not, Feijóo insisted that the author be a credible, educated source, writing 
without personal motivation and only after carefully investigating the reported miracle. 
“But the most common origin of these imaginary narratives,” wrote Feijóo, “is the vain 
appreciation that the Writers have for any common rumor.”342  Feijóo attributed the various 
motives of publishers to “disordered love” – whether that love was for the glory of the nation, 
affection to a particular saint, or the desire to write stories that would be well-read, taking 
advantage of the curiosity that was sparked by tales of miracles.  To Feijóo, regardless of the 
motive, the act was odiously reprehensible and merited penalty.343  That the trivial belief in 
miracles had spread “by way of contamination” to the learned was catastrophic.344  Those 
responsible for the discernment and promulgation of truth that would solidify Catholicism, the 
learned, were rather promoting vanities that invited disbelief, encouraged opponents of the 
Church and of Christianity in their attacks, and led wayward the malleable and impressionable 
vulgo.  Feijóo used the well-known metaphor of the body politic to convey the diseased state of 
superstition that reigned in Spain. 
The learned believe what the masses feign, and then the masses believe what the 
learned write: the polluted news makes in the body politic a circulation similar to 
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that formed by vicious humors in the human body, since it is like this – the head, 
which is the throne of reason...the other members for their part communicate in 
condensed form to the head; thus in this vague manners, the vapors of the lowest 
rabble ascend to the learned, that is the head of the civil body, and they curd 
themselves there in writing, which later descends authoritatively to the masses, 
where it is received, as another’s doctrine, the error that was part theirs.345 
Once the falsehood is introduced into the body politic, usually by the vulgo, it becomes a circular 
malignance that is transmitted to the educated.  After the rumor is distilled by the educated into 
writing, the error becomes powerfully authoritative to the lower and uneducated classes.  The 
only remedy, according to Feijóo, is that those with the ability to do so seek to correct these false 
accounts, purging the body politic of the vicious vapors of imagined superstitions. 
Apart from el vulgo, Feijóo marginalized certain groups of people from ever being 
capable of reliable testimony – principally, foreigners and heretics.  When presented with the 
testimony of “those devout Mohammedans [Turks],” Feijóo judges their witness to be 
“fabled.”346 Similarly, Feijóo believes the curative power of the kings of France because of their 
adherence to Catholicism; when he is presented with the stories of the same curative power being 
possessed by the kings of England, he dismisses it as a ‘heretical hoax’ (patraña heretical).  
Inversely, Feijóo appears to have placed more trust in religious figures and authorities, somewhat 
suspending his usual skepticism in such circumstances.  He cited, for example, the Jesuit Padre 
Benito Pereira’s work on demons as authoritative and trustworthy.347  He believed the accounts 
of Venerable Guibert of Nogent, despite the fact that the author was French.348  Feijóo relied on 
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the integrity of an author to evaluate the possible veracity of the miraculous account.  He wrote, 
therefore, that he trusts the authoritative accounts of the Church Fathers such as St. Irenaeus and 
St. Augustine “without the least embarrassment.”349  Such ad hominem deductions are a 
necessary precondition for Feijóo to determine the validity of a statement, but by no means an 
inflexible standard.  Despite utilizing heretic philosophers, it is important to note that because 
Feijóo considered Catholicism the only true religion, only Catholics had the necessary 
disposition to get to the complete fullness of truth when discerning miracles.  Feijóo stated, for 
example, that “The miracles which Plutarch spoke of were parte diabolic illusion, part the 
invention of the vanity of Gentiles.  Thus, the center that he was looking for can only be found 
by those who profess the Catholic Religion.”350  He similarly noted in his discurso “Artes 
divinatorias” (Divinatory Arts) that Catholics may be predisposed to discern truth that God may 
communicate through dreams.351 
Feijóo’s arguments are normally ordered with logical progression – many times, Feijóo 
actually cited axioms of logic from classical and scholastic texts.352 Occasionally, however, 
Feijóo’s religious views dictate an argument, the Christian theology setting parameters of 
validity within which rationalism is allowed to operate.353  Such is the case when Feijóo 
considered the reports of the ability of the kings of France to cure scrofula – a disease that 
noticeably caused the infection and swelling of lymph nodes in the neck.  Since similar reports 
existed concerning this ability in the kings of England, Feijóo deduced that the multitude of 
reports of France did not constitute enough evidence – for they could be as false as the English 
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accounts had to be (the English kings being heretically Anglicans, and therefore barred from 
receiving such miraculous curative powers from God).354  Similarly, Catholic theology informs 
Feijóo’s arguments when considering the ability of the Virgin of Nieva to protect inhabitants 
from lightning, provided pilgrims to her shrine presented a portrait to her.  Such a miracle, Feijóo 
wrote, would only encourage Christians to live without fear during storms – rather than feeling 
compelled to confess their sin for fear of their own possibly imminent deaths.  Feijóo reasoned 
that since God desired confession from his followers, it was highly unlikely that he would 
sanction such a miracle.355 
“I confess,” wrote Feijóo after describing the deceit performed with the crucifix at the 
village of Agreda, “that I cannot tolerate piety as an excuse for lies.  He does not have a well-
founded faith who thinks that divine truths need the assistance of human inventions.”356  William 
A. Christian, Jr. has made the valid and important point that even false miracles can be treated as 
historically significant.357  First, the report of the fabrication uses religious language and myth 
that reveals much about early modern Spanish society.  Secondly, false miracles produced 
significant responses.  Though the crucifix in Agreda failed to actually sweat blood, there was a 
very real reaction noted in the local congregation and throughout the region.  The false miracle 
produced, albeit by illicit means, a rededication of the people and renewed local religious fervor.  
Certainly, Feijóo, historically closer to these accounts, recognized the religious benefits of 
falsified miracles – it is, according to Feijóo, the primary motivation in cases where miracles are 
feigned by members of the Catholic clergy.  However, Feijóo clearly stated that the detrimental 
                                                 
354 CE I.25.7. 
355 CE I.31.13-15. 
356 TCU II.3.15 “Confieso que no puedo tolerar que a expensas de la piedad se haga capa al embuste.  No tiene bien 
asentada la fe quien piensa que las verdades divinas necesitan del socorro de invenciones humanas.” 
357 See Christian’s Apparitions. 
134 
consequences of these falsehoods outweighed any inspired piety.  Feijóo did not consider the 
Catholic faith to be in need of falsified miracles intended to produce piety – Christianity, as he 
viewed it, was replete with true miracles for that very reason.  “The nature of true religion is to 
be confirmed with true miracles, and God has worked so much to this end, more than enough to 
convince the most obstinate incredulity,” Feijóo wrote, adding, “It is completely against God’s 
intention that his truths are qualified with lies.”358   
It is not surprising, therefore, that Feijóo, as a highly educated priest and enthusiast of the 
latest intellectual trends in science and empirical studies, sought to employ his natural 
intelligence and his experience in both theology and natural philosophy to seek to eradicate 
superstition and lies from belief, both of the common (vulgo) and among the learned (doctos).  
While it is likely true that he would not have been as successful nor as widely read had it not 
been for his knowledge of and contributions to the history of science, the religious motivation for 
discernment and the traditions of evaluation and rational discernment found in the Catholic 
Church were fundamental to Feijóo’s understanding of miracles. 
 
The Counterfeit Supernatural and the Categorizing Work of the Spanish Inquisition 
Feijóo was not only concerned with miracles, however, but also with reports of other 
supernatural occurences, including witchcraft, popular healing practices, superstitious traditions 
which had crept into religious observance, and demonic possession and exorcisms.  For the 
Inquisition as well, fakery was a common concern.  Certainly, prior to this time, the Inquisition 
investigated numerous individuals charged with feigning (fingadores, embustadores, 
                                                 
358 TCU II.3.20, 43 “El carácter de la religión verdadera es estar confirmada con milagros verdaderos; y Dios ha 
obrado tantos a este fin, cuantos bastan a convencer la más obstinada incredulidad.” “Es totalmente contra la 
intención de Dios el que sus verdades se califiquen con embustes.” 
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estafadoras, imposturas).  The majority of these cases, as well as scholarly studies, have focused 
on inquiries of “false sanctity.”359  Persons accused of false revelations, raptures, divine 
communion, dreams, or miracles were carefully investigated to determine if these supernatural 
gifts were legitimate, if they were deceiving the undiscerning populace (el vulgo), or if they were 
deceived themselves by the prince of dissimulation, the devil.  These charges comprised, for 
example, the chief threat of iluminismo, and help to explain why it is that in many cases where 
the defendant is accused of being an iluso, alumbrado, or a molinista, the accusations often  
include the more explicit denunciations of being “a hypocrite and a liar.”360  The category of 
feigned possessions has received less attention, but being the mirrored image of false sanctity, it 
had the same dangerous capacity to inspire and to deceive. 
Keitt has investigated cases of false sanctity in the seventeenth century, placing these 
cases in the larger context of the struggle for definition and epistemological authority in early 
modern Spain.361  The seventeenth century, according to his research, was a time of “competing 
models of epistemological legitimacy,” in which “it fell to the Inquisition to distinguish between 
counterfeit sanctity and the genuine article...”362  The majority of these epistemological questions 
thus took the form of what Keitt calls “boundary problems” – that is, the Inquisition, as well as 
the wider sphere of religious intelligentsia, were keen to define the difference between 
                                                 
359 Andrew Keitt, Inventing the Sacred: Imposture, Inquisition, and the Boundaries of the Supernatural in Golden 
Age Spain (Leiden: Brill, 205), especially the introduction, “False Saints and Scandalous Impostors.” 
360 See, for example, Archivo General de la Nacion, Sección de la Inquisición, Vol. 748, Expediente 1, (1712), “El 
Señor Inquisidor Fiscal de este Santo Oficio contra María Mañuela Picazo, española, vecina de México, por 
alumbrada, hipócrita, y embustera.” Accessible at the Center for Southwest Research (University of New Mexico), 
MSS 769 BC, Box 1, Folder 1. 
361 The connection between the “discernment of spirits” and epistemological surety is likewise made in Nancy 
Caciola and Moshe Sluhovsky, “Spiritual Physiologies: The Discernment of Spirits in Medieval and Early Modern 
Europe,” Preternature: Critical and Historical Studies on the Preternatural 1, No. 1 (2012), 1-48, as well as in 
Moshe Sluhovsky, Believe Not Every Spirit : Possession, Mysticism, & Discernment in Early Modern Catholicism 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
362 Keitt, Inventing the Sacred, 2, 8. 
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superstition and legitimate credulity, to delineate the tripartite causality of supernatural, 
preternatural, and natural, and to develop a taxonomy of supernatural gifts and effects that would 
include symptomatic expressions, diagnostic tests, and defined characteristics for analysis.363  In 
this regard, false saints and fake demoniacs were the bane of those attempting to define these 
boundaries, for they represented individuals who – willfully or unwittingly – blurred the lines 
between natural, supernatural, and preternatural.  They were, as Keitt describes them, 
“quintessential borderline entities.”364 
 If the seventeenth century was a time of epistemological uncertainty for Spain, then the 
eighteenth century must be described as one of a complete crisis of doubt and categorical 
instability.  Efforts to demarcate the ruptured boundaries of the supernatural and natural had only 
produced new and unanswered questions.  The rise of yet newer philosophies and 
epistemological systems at the end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth centuries 
(through the work of the Spanish novatores – pre-enlightenment scientists and philosophers)  
created dilemmas for inquisitors and religious intellectuals that had been never before seen – 
particularly in the areas of modes of perception and methods of acquiring knowledge.  Ascendant 
skepticism, empiricism, and materialism vied with the traditional, scholastic, and Tridentine 
understandings of the world.  At the heart of all these epistemological debates, the sticky 
question of understanding the intersection of supernatural and natural persisted in the form of 
feigned possessions. 
Feijóo was among the most famous of Spanish intellectuals to publically confront the 
“boundary problems” presented by superstitious credulity and to take up the mantle of defining 
                                                 
363 See, for example, Campagne; also Staurt Clark, Thinking with Demons: The Idea of Witchcraft in Early Modern 
Europe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). 
364 Keitt, Inventing the Sacred, 9. 
137 
the supernatural and the natural.  Similar to his approach with miracles, by first examining 
Feijóo’s two discourses on feigned possessions, and then comparing these discourses to an actual 
Inquisition record from the end of the eighteenth century, one can see how these theorizations of 
the shadowy border of the natural realm were realized a quarter of a century after Feijóo’s 
publications and following his conjectures. 
 
Feijóo and the Investigation of Demonic Possessions (1739-1750) 
Feijóo, like much of enlightened Spain, problematizes the notion of disenchantment by 
presenting simultaneously two impulses which most scholars view as inherently antithetical.  
Understanding how Feijóo, Martínez, and others reconciled these impulses – between Catholic 
revelation and skeptical expiremntalism – is the key to unlocking the Catholic Enlightenment 
experience in the Spanish empire.  One of the foremost experts on witchcraft and magic in Spain, 
Maria Tausiet, has stated about Feijóo that: 
On the one hand, his critical liberty in reaction against Scholastic dogmatism and 
his experimental methods situate him squarely within the Enlightened current 
which was at that moment flowing in Europe.  On the other hand, his orthodox 
and unshakable Catholicism, which led him to accept revelation as an essential 
part of knowledge, entrenches him deeply within the world of traditions that he 
was attempting to dismantle…365 
She furthermore argues that Feijóo’s ideas represent “a characteristic reflection of a type of 
compromising solution that constantly placed him as a gentleman between two eras.”366  Yet 
Tausiet implicitly places Feijóo as straddling the line between two camps of thought which were 
fundamentally divergent and incompatible, even insinuating that Feijóo’s contributions to 
                                                 
365 María Tausiet, “De la illusion al desencanto: Feijoo y los “falsos posesos” en la españa del siglo XVIII,” Historia 
Social 54 (2006), 4. There is a revised, translated edition of the article available as: María Tuasiet, “From illusion to 
disenchantment: Feijoo versus the ‘falsely possessed’ in eighteenth-century Spain,” trans. by Mary O’Sullivan, in 
Beyond the Witch Trials: Witchcraft and Magic in Enlightenment Europe, Owen Davies and Willem de Blécourt, 
eds. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), pg. 45-60. 
366 Tausiet, “De la illusión, ” 4. 
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“enlightened thought” were subconsciously subverting his “world of traditions.” However, a 
thorough analysis of Feijóo’s work and the application of his work to Inquisition cases rests upon 
taking Feijóo seriously at his own heuristic framework – and Feijóo certainly would not have 
considered himself a thinker who contradicted himself. 
 In addition to numerous discourses addressing false miracles, common superstitions of 
the vulgo (the uneducated or undiscerning), and irrational practices of credulity, Feijóo wrote 
two essays specifically addressing problems that he saw with demonic possessions and 
exorcisms in eighteenth-century Spain.  The first, “Demoniacos,” (Demoniacs), published in 
1739, is a substantial analytical essay of some 37,000 words, in which Feijóo simultaneously 
attacked the popular belief in the widespread occurrence of demonic possessions, while 
maintaining that real possessions occurred and establishing methods for differentiating between 
true demoniacs and fakers.  It is what one historian has labeled “the most representative work of 
the start of the Spanish enlightenment movement.”367  The second work, “Sobre los nuevos 
exorcismos” (On the New Exorcisms), has received practically no scholarly attention, perhaps 
due to its comparative brevity and late publication date of 1750.  This latter essay, however, is 
equally as interesting, for in it Feijóo more directly critiques the practices of contemporary 
exorcists.  In both discourses, Feijóo works to curb the abuses of the vulgo by employing his 
knowledge of both theology and natural philosophy to separate superstition from the genuinely 
preternatural.  In one of the more quotable sections of his work, Feijóo declared that: 
The vulgo (in whose class is included a great multitude of indiscreet Priests) 
almost generally accepts as truly possessed the people who have presented such 
stories.  Men of greater discernment know well that many are fakers...But my 
                                                 
367 Tausiet, “De la ilusión,” 4 
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feeling is that…among five hundred who claim to be possessed, one can actually 
find twenty or thirty that truly are so.368 
The insistence upon the existence of real possessions and of a real devil becomes a refrain which 
sounds throughout Feijóo’s essay.  At some points, Feijóo’s flippant tone towards both the 
“possessed” and their exorcists is extended to the figure of the Devil, though unlike satirists who 
preceded him, Feijóo maintains a clear appreciation for the very real and very horrendous 
persistence of diabolic activity in contemporary eighteenth-century Spain.369  Indeed, Feijóo 
attributes such power and ability to the Devil, that the only limitations which he could conceive 
of were those imposed upon him by the supreme power, God.  With the supposedly “possessed” 
individuals, however, Feijóo’s tone is mocking and harshly disabusing.  In one of the most 
important assertions of the essay, Feijóo notes that, “… in proof, today, the Demonically-
possessed are rare…for the majority, the main part are faked or imagined…370 
To Feijóo, all possessions could be labeled as real, faked, or imagined.371  In the first 
category belonged those individuals whose bodies had been genuinely invaded by a legitimate 
                                                 
368 “El vulgo (en cuya clase comprehendo una gran multitud de Sacerdotes indiscretos) casi generalmente acepta por 
verdaderos Energúmenos cuantos hacen la representación de tales. Los hombres de más advertencia reconocen, que 
son muchos los fingidos; pero quedando en la persuasión de que no son muy pocos los verdaderos. Pero mi sentir es, 
que el número de éstos es tan estrecho, tan limitado, que apenas, por lo común, entre quinientos, que hacen papel de 
Energúmenos, se hallarán veinte, o treinta, que verdaderamente lo sean.” TCU.VIII.6 “Demoniacos,” §5.  Feijóo’s 
use of vulgo aligns with the definition provided in this dissertation; this is made explicit in this quote, in which he 
includes many priests in his designation of the vulgo. 
369 Long before Feijóo, Quevedo jested at exorcists and exorcisms; see Francisco de Quevedo y Villegas. “El 
Alguacil Endemoniado” in Sueños y Discursos de Verdades Descubridoras de Abusos vicios y Engaños en todos los 
oficios y estados del mundo, Felipe C.R. Maldonado, ed. Madrid: Clásicos Castalia), 92-93. 
370 TCU.VIII.6.§.105, “Pero habiendo alegado arriba la experiencia, en prueba de que hoy son rarísimos los 
Energúmenos, hemos menester señalar, qué experiencia es esta. Por lo cual digo lo primero, que la observación 
hecha de haber muchísimas Energúmenas, y rarísimo Energúmeno, funda una fuertísima conjetura de que aquellas, 
por la mayor, y máxima parte son fingidas, o imaginadas: porque, como acabamos de probar, no hay disparidad 
alguna entre uno, y otro sexo para la posesión verdadera; pero la hay grandísima para la fingida, o imaginada.”  It is 
worthwhile to note that Feijóo employed both the masculine energúmenos and feminine energúmenas in his essays.  
The gendered dimension of possession, both divine and diabolic, has been well-noted and studied; for a clear 
example, consult Nancy Caciola, Discerning Spirits: Divine and Demonic Possession in the Middle Ages (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2003).  Following the example of Keitt, however, I argue that the lens of gender and of 
social control and power are “necessary but not sufficient” in explaining the regulation of possession in Spain. Keitt, 
Inventing the Sacred, 6. 
371 This point is admirably proven by María Tausiet – see Tausiet, “De la illusión,” 15.  See also TCU.VIII.6. 
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supernatural entity, a spirit whose existence Feijóo, as a professing Catholic, affirmed and whose 
power afforded him nearly every ability.  Feijóo wrote of the devil that, “if he wishes to be there, 
he will.”372  In the second category were individuals who knowingly pretended to be demonically 
possessed.  Feijóo speculated various motivations for doing so – perhaps for fame, for greed, or 
for social mobility or freedom.  This, according to Feijóo, was why more women faked 
possessions.373  That fakers of possession constituted a direct threat to the order of society and 
the teachings of the church was a clear problem to both Feijóo and to the wider intellectual elite. 
It is the third category of imagined possessions, however, which demonstrates Feijóo’s 
most subtle and brilliant blend of supernatural possibility and naturalistic probability. It included 
those cases where an individual genuinely believed himself, or more probably herself, to be 
possessed, but in which these “possessions” could be attributed to wholly natural causes.  The 
majority of these errors of imagination were due to sickness, mental instability, or the power of 
suggestion.  Importantly, Feijóo blames medical and religious authorities – the so-called popular, 
itinerant “exorcists” of the time – for propagating and furthering these imagined possessions.  He 
notes, for example, that, 
Extraordinary illnesses are hardly ever taken as anything but signs of either 
witchcraft or possession.  In this, the greatest blame generally lies with the 
ignorant doctors; when they see symptoms which they cannot find any description 
of in the few books that they have read, and they cannot determine the cause, nor 
                                                 
372 TCU.VIII.6§80, “Con que, si él quiere estarse, se estará…” 
373 Tausiet, on pg. 17 of her article, points to Feijóo’s commentary on the feminine proclivity to possession in the 
following passage: “Son las mujeres, dicen, más ocasionadas a la ira, al terror, a la tristeza, a la desesperación, y en 
estas pasiones halla cierta especie de atractivo, o llamamiento el Espíritu maligno. Todo esto es hablar al aire; y lo 
que se dice de esta, y de aquella, que con la ocasión de padecer algún gran susto, se les introdujo el Demonio, todo 
es cuento. Para el Demonio no hay otra disposición, que la permisión Divina. Puesta ésta, no hay cuerpo, ni alma, 
los más bien templados del mundo, que le hagan la más leve resistencia.” (TCU.VIII.6.§.101).  She likewise is 
correct in countering that these ideas were in common circulation at that time, and that Feijóo had elsewhere written 
an essay entitled “Defensa de las mujeres” (TCU I.16, 1726).  Though Feijóo has long been thought to be unusually 
in favor of increased liberality of women in early-eighteenth century Spain, recent studies have called this into 
question; see José Pardo Tomás and Àlvar Martínez Vidal, “The Ignorance of Midwives: The Role of Clergymen in 
Spanish Enlightenment Debates on Birth Care,” in Medicine and Religion in Enlightenment Europe, Ole Peter Grell, 
and Andrew Cunningham, eds. (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007), pg. 49-62. 
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the remedy, they throw the blame on the devil, and call for the weapons of the 
Church to aid them.374 
By establishing these three categories of possessions, Feijóo demonstrates how the religio-
intellectual elite of the early-eighteenth century sought to negotiate between traditional 
understandings of the way the supernatural and natural worlds worked, and emerging and 
developing methods that increasing favored naturalistic explanations while carving out  space for 
the continued existence of the supernatural. 
 
The Case of Joaquín de Vera, Faker of Demonic Possessions (Granada, 1776) 
Feijóo’s categorization of possession can be seen concretely in the records of an 
Inquisition case which was conducted nearly forty years after Feijóo wrote “Demoniacos.”  
While far from being conclusive evidence, the following case of Joaquín de Vera does serve as 
                                                 
374 TCU.VIII.6§52. “Las enfermedades extraordinarias, apenas alguna vez dejan de tomarse por señas de maleficio, 
o posesión. De esto tienen la mayor culpa, por lo común, los Médicos indoctos, que cuando ven síntomas, de que no 
hallaron noticia en los pocos libros que leyeron, y no alcanzan la causa, ni el remedio, echan la culpa al Diablo, y 
llaman por auxiliares las armas de la Iglesia.”  This passage is likewise highlighted in Tausiet, “De la ilusión,” 15. 
To aid in the “boundary problems” faced by the religious-intellectual elite, Feijóo attempted in “Demoniacs” to 
stake out some clear characteristics of the physiology of possession to aid priests in determining if an exorcism was 
needed, including speaking in tongues and other demonstrations of extra-natural power.  
 Although Feijóo was neither a professional scientist nor a doctor, it is clear from his writings that he was 
well versed in scientific and medical knowledge of his time.  In “Demoniacos,” for example, he cites as authorities 
the work of Francisco Vallés (1524-1592),  a Renaissance doctor who had written on Epilepsy in his De sacra 
philosophia (1587); Lucas Tozzi (1638-1717), an Italian doctor from Naples and leading member of the medical 
academy Accademia dei Discordanti, who likewise research epilepsy, convulsions, and deliriums in his work, (see 
Charles Edmund Simon, A Manual of Clinical Diagnosis by Means of Microscopical and Chemical Methods 
(Philadelphia: Lea Brothers & Co., 1904), 305-306); Johann George Schenck von Grafenberg (a German physician 
of the early seventeenth century); as well as the Imperial Leopoldine Academy (Deutsche Akademie der 
Naturforscher Leopoldina) in Germany and the Royal Academy of the Sciences (Academia Real de las Ciencias) in 
Madrid.  Feijóo seemed particularly concerned that certain illnesses – especially epilepsy – carried symptoms that 
were almost indistinguishable from the actions ascribed to the traditional physiology of possession (“…la Epilepsia, 
y otros males, cuyos síntomas toman erradamente por efectos de posesión…” Demoniacos, 75.   In this, Feijóo’s 
words are striking similar to Voltaire’s in his article “Démoniaquqes,” in which he described the possessed as Les 
vaporeux, les épileptiques, les femmes travaillées des esprits malins, des démons malfesants, des vengeances des 
dieux.  Nous avons vu que ce mal s’appelait le mal sacré, et que les prêtres de l’antiquité s’emparèrent partout de ces 
maladies, attendu que le médecins étaient de grands ignorants.” (Voltaire, Œuvres Complètes de Voltaire. Tome 
Septième, Dictionnaire Philosophique, I (Paris: Chez Furne, 1835), 412). For more on this traditional physiology, 
see Nancy Caciola, “Mystics, Demoniacs, and the Physiologyof Spirit Possession in Medieval Europe,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 42, No. 2 (Apr., 2000), 268-306.   It is important to note that Feijóo, 
armed with the latest medical knowledge and amid the incipient naturalization of enlightenment philosophy, yet 
carved out a legitimate sphere for preternatural activity. 
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an elaboration of the work that Feijóo began.  Investigations of witchcraft and of demonic 
possession became increasingly rarer throughout the eighteenth-century, and this particular 
examination provides an unusual record of motivations, speculations, and actions of the persons 
involved.  In July of 1775, Joaquín de Vera had come before the Tribunal of the Holy Office of 
the Inquisition in Granada, under investigation for having faked his own possession.375  The 
initial folios of the case summary adumbrate the biographical information and previous 
inquisitional investigation into Joaquín de Vera.  Vera was a member of the Order of Minims - a 
mendicant order originally founded by St. Francis of Paola in Italy in 1435, with a particular 
emphasis on penitence, preaching, and public teaching.376  The order’s first monastery in Spain 
began in Málaga, in region of Granada, in 1493, where Vera resided, and quickly expanded to 
include a secondary order for women and to produce numerous notable religious figures.377  By 
the 1770s, when Vera was brought before the Inquisition, the Minims had expanded to become a 
prominent religious order and well-known throughout Spain, particularly in the province of 
Granada, where they retained their largest presence.378 
Vera had been accused three years before, in 1772, for having pretended to be possessed 
by demons.  After an investigation by his own order, Vera had been stripped of his powers of 
prelacy and placed in confinement within the monastery of Santo Domingo as a remanded 
                                                 
375 Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN), Sección de la Inquisición.3735.Expediente 241. Alegación fiscal del proceso 
de fe de Fray Joaquín Vera, originario de Málaga, seguido en el Tribunal de la Inquisición de Granada, por fingirse 
endemoniado. (1777) Imágen 1. “…echa a la causa de F. Joaquin Vera, relig.ro minimo, r y como de malaga…” 
376 F.M. Rodríguez, “Minimos o Sagrada Orden de los Minimos” in Diccionario de Historia Eclesiastica de España 
(DHEE), Vol. III (Man-Ru).  Quintín Aldea Vaquero, Tomas Marín Martínez, and José Vives Gatella, eds. (Madrid: 
Instituto Enrique Flórez, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC), 1973), 1491.  The Minimi also 
notably followed the rule of vita quadragesimalis (“the perpetual Lenten life”): a lifelong adherence to the dietary 
restrictions of Lent (which entailed abstaining from meat and dairy except in medically dire circumstances). 
377 DHEE, 1491. AHN.Inq.3735.Exp.241, imágen 1. “…echa a la causa de F. Joaquin vera, relig.ro minimo, r y 
como de malaga…” 
378 DHEE, 1491. Based on statistical information from the time, Rodriguez estimates 1,650 active Minims in Spain 
in the year 1770, 450 of which were located in Granada. 
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prisoner by the order of the Vicar-General of the Minims.379  Vera, however, was adamant that 
he was innocent of such calumnious charges and insistent that those who had accused him of 
possession and particularly of committing sacrileges such as spitting on the Gospels, were 
lying.380  After applying for and receiving special permission from the Vicar-General, Vera took 
his case as a plea to the Inquisition Tribunal in Granada, where he “begged two or three times 
that [the Tribunal] would hear him…and the council learned of [his] aggravated request [and] 
served to grant him an Audience…”381 
Thus it was that for two days in July of 1775, Vera, dissatisfied with the previous inquest, 
presented himself to the Inquisition to request a review of his situation.  He recited for the 
Tribunal further reasons why his possession may have been real, or more importantly, why he 
was right to believe that it may have been real.  Numerous other friars and priests in Vera’s 
community were questioned and offered a variety of interesting (albeit not wholly orthodox) 
demonological perspectives.382  Only a brief, eight-page case summary of this investigation 
exists, offering tantalizing glimpses into these perspectives; but by piecing together the 
testimonies of over a dozen witnesses, a reconstructed narrative emerges. The facts were these: 
Vera had fallen seriously ill and soon after began acting strangely.  After some time of suffering 
under this illness which manifested itself in tremors and strange gestures, Vera and others in his 
community suspected that his infirmity may not have been all-natural, but caused by either 
                                                 
379 AHN.Inq.3735.Exp.241.Fol.7, “…recluso por orden del Provisor de su obispado en el Convento de Santo 
Domingo…” 
380 AHN.Inq.3735.Exp.241.Fol.1, “…el motiva de esta ficcion” 
381 AHN.Inq.3735.Exp.241.Fol.1, “…suplico dos y tres veces que se le oire, lo que us tuvo efecto pore star ya 
determinado, el particular y entiendo se agravado pide al consejo se sirva concederle Audience en un punto en que 
estiba su honor…” 
382 For example, Vera offers as a reason why the Inquisitors ought to believe him the fact that he has expressed 
nothing but contempt for the Devil, noting that he had earlier “assigned to the head of the demons the ridiculous 
name of Goat-Droppings” (AHN.Inq.3735.Exp.241.Fol.2) 
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witchcraft or by demonic possession.383  Vera subsequently underwent two exorcisms performed 
by priests within his monastery.  Sometime after these exorcisms, Vera’s maladies dissipated, 
and he was able to return to some position of authority within the religious community.384 
Vera’s case offers a unique perspective on the intersection of competing or 
complementary frameworks of understanding and explaining an unusual occurrence – an alleged 
possession – in late-eighteenth century Spain – what some would call an “enlightened” Spain, 
and what others would argue was an intellectually compartmentalized and incurious context.   
The judicial setting of an Inquisition tribunal highlights the struggle to find an authoritative 
epistemology that occurred with the influx of ‘enlightenment thought’ to Catholic Spain, 
particularly emphasizing the growing influence of naturalism and medicalization.  Moreover, by 
comparing this investigation of the Inquisition into Vera’s appeal with the essays of Feijóo, 
                                                 
383 The Inquisition in Spain had multiple terms to designate the various charges which in English fall under “magic” 
or “witchcraft.”  In the broadest category of superstitious activity, there existed both hechicería and brujería – most 
commonly translated as “sorcery” and “witchcraft,” respectively.  Although there was slippage in the usage of these 
terms, especially outside of peninsular tribunals, the general consensus is that motivation or intent was a key 
determinant in the distinction between hechicería and brujería.  Brujas had made explicit pacts with the devil  
(pactos con el demonio) with the malevolent intent of harming another individual, whereas hechiceras became a 
catch-all category of diviners, healers, and makers of love potions.  Varying points of definition can be found in 
Julio Caro Baroja, Vidas mágicas e Inquisición (Madrid: Taurus, 1967), two volumes; Stacey Schlau, Gendered 
Crime and Punishment: Women and/in the Hispanic Inquisitions (Leiden: Brill, 2013); María Asunción Herrera 
Sotillo, Ortodoxio y control social en México en el siglo XVII: El Tribunal del Santo Oficio (Madrid: Universidad 
Complutense de Madrid, Departamento de Historia de América, 1982); and John F. Chuchiak IV, The Inquisition in 
New Spain, 1536-1820 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012).  
Vera is supposed, however, to be maleficiado – the victim of maleficio.  Maleficio is more specific than 
“evil,” but rather references maleficium – a term developed during the late-medieval and early modern period to 
refer to those practices of witchcraft which were specifically the result of making diabolic pacts in exchange for 
harmful powers.  Waite argues in Heresy, Magic, and Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe that this connection 
became explicit following the late-fifteenth-century publication of the Malleus Maleficarum . See Gary K. Waite, 
Heresy, Magic, and Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 44.  The 
Inquisitional record of Vera’s case thus sidesteps the use of both hechiería and brujería, referring to the specific evil 
of diabolic witchcraft. 
384 This chapter is not at all concerned with the efficacy of the exorcistic rituals performed or for accounting for their 
methodologies.  To do so risks an alarmingly presentist attitude that, more than often not, obscures the historical 
truth of the situation by converting the past experience into modern methods of interpretation and meaning.  It is 
interesting to note that two different words for “exorcism” are employed in the inquisitional record – exorcizar is 
used each time except for one occurrence of conjurar. Techincally, conjurar is a word with wider meaning more 
akin to warding adjurations – however, it appears that these words are used in the record synonymously, with the 
participle conjurando used to emphasize the actual actions made by Padre Yiola during the exorcism. 
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historians can examine how theoretical discussions of the religio-intellectual elite were realized 
in actual investigations.  The case study of Vera’s supposedly-faked demonic possession 
suggests that theoretical essays by Feijóo in 1739 and in 1750 which emphasized skepticism and 
urged a cautious discernment in investigations of possessions were neither abnormal nor ignored 
in early eighteenth-century Spain, but rather represented an unusually prescient articulation of 
theological-intellectual trends of the period.  Taken together, Feijóo’s essays and the 
investigation of Joaquín de Vera argue for an image of eighteenth-century Spain that is 
characterized by a preoccupation with the desire to extirpate superstitions and misconceptions 
(desengañar), while maintaining a distinct and legitimate sphere for supernatural activity.    
Catholic Spain in the eighteenth century was therefore part of a long-standing tradition of 
disillusioning and disenchanting – although far more complicated than the standard, 
unidirectional definition that Weber’s definition of disenchantment provided. 
 
Disenchantment or Disillusionment? 
Given the role of naturalization, medical discourse, and a considerable amount of 
skepticism in these texts, it is tempting to read both Vera’s case and Feijóo’s essays against 
unquestioning credulity and superstition as part of the disenchantment of Spain and of the 
Inquisition during the ‘Age of Enlightenment.’  Indeed, the supreme concern of the Inquisition in 
Vera’s case to determine if he was guilty of faking possession (fingido endemoniado) or if he 
himself was deceived by illness or by the devil can be readily applied to a theme of early modern 
Spain, particularly during the eighteenth century.  This was the concept of desengañar – the 
disillusionment of an individual or society, the act of opening someone to the truth of a 
circumstance.  Feijóo and his contemporaries frequently described their objectives using this 
term.  For example, the famous enlightenment writer Gregorio de Mayans y Siscar wrote to 
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Feijóo in 1728, encouraging him to continue his work despite negative reception by some, 
exhorting him to “Disillusion the world (desengañar al mundo), and above all disillusion 
Spain…without interrupting the course of your most lucid works, despite the protesting of the 
inopportune multitude of some idiots.”385 Similarly, Feijóo wrote approvingly of Mayáns y 
Siscar’s work Il mondo ingannato da falsi medici (The World Deceived) published in Spain the 
following year.386  While a flat equation of desengañador (“disabuser”) and desencantador 
(“disenchanter”) would indulge in ahistorical definitional flexibility, the terms are comparable 
and should certainly be likened to one another.387 
Disillusionment may be the name of the historiographical game for eighteenth-century 
Spain, seen pervasively at all levels, from the ridiculing Caprichos of Francisco Goya to the 
complex, prolonged, and voluminous debates of the religio-intellectual elite. It is less evident, 
however, that this sets the eighteenth century apart in the history of the Spanish empire.  It is not 
demonstrably clear that the presence of medical fideism or naturalization in eighteenth-century 
inquisition cases necessarily reflects the growing importance of enlightenment ideas or the “new 
philosophies.”  Spain, like the rest of early modern Europe, had a long “trajectory of 
disillusionment” from the early-sixteenth century anti-superstition treatises of Martín de 
                                                 
385 Letter from Gregorio Mayans y Siscar to B.J. Feijóo, dated August 18, 1728, available in Antonio Mestre, El 
Mundo Intelectual de Mayans (Oliva: Publicaciones del Ayuntamiento de Oliva, 1978), 172, “…que continúe en 
desengañar al mundo, y singularmente a España, con la discreta libertad que hasta ahora, y sin interrumpir el curso 
de sus lucidísimos trabajos, por más que ladre la multitud importuna de algunos necios…” 
386 Joseph Gazola (Gregorio Mayans y Siscár), El Mundo engañado de los falsos médicos (Valladolid, Valencia: por 
Antonio Bordazar, a costa de Christoval Branchat, mercader de libros, 1729). Biblioteca Nacional de España: 
R/25454. María Tausiet, Jean Sarrailh, and others have noted the existence of a Veronese doctor named Joseph 
Gazola, but there is evidence to suggest that Gazola was a pseudonym created by Mayans y Siscár. Other titular 
works of desengaño include Vicente Fernandez Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosoficos, Que en Obsequio de la Verdad, 
de la Religion, y de la Patria (Madrid: Don Blas Roman, Impresor de la Real Academia de Derecho Español, 1787); 
Juan de Nájera, Desengaños filosóficos (Sevilla: Impresor de la Siete Revueltas, 1737); Cristóbal Lozano, Soledades 
de la vida, y desengaños del mundo (Madrid: Manuel Román, 1713), among others. 
387 See, for example, Richard G. Anderson, “Benito Feijóo: Medical Disenchanter of Spain,” Journal of the History 
of Medicine and Allied Sciences 55, No. 1 (January 2000), 67-79.  Though Anderson’s objective is to argue that 
Feijóo actually retarded the ‘progress’ of medicine in Spain, he yet employs the language of disenchantment. 
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Castañega (“Treatise on Superstitions and Witchcraft,” 1529) and Pedro Ciruelo (“Reprobation 
of Superstitions and Witchcraft,” 1530) through Bernardo Monteagudo’s similar statements 
voiced in his “Satirical Work Against the State of Ignorance and Superstition in which the 
Nation was at the end of the past century…” (1814).388  The work of historians such as Keitt, 
Tausiet, and Fabián Alejandro Campagne has firmly established that despite the persistence of 
caricatured versions of a hermetic, superstitious Spain, the religious intellectuals and the work of 
the Inquisition was actively working to navigate between the proper boundaries of superstition 
and legitimate supernaturalism. 
Nor was the concept of desengañar born in the eighteenth century.  Certainly, the culture 
of Baroque Spain during the seventeenth century was concerned with the idea of illusion and 
disillusion.  Jeremy Robbins writes of this period about the “Baroque obsession with knowledge: 
engaño [deceived], desengaño [disillusioned], ser [to be] and parecer [to seem].”389  Recent 
studies on the novatores of Spain – “pre-Enlightenment” scientists and philosophers whose 
principal work occurred between 1687 and 1725 – bridge the divide between the eighteenth and 
seventeenth centuries even further, and Fejióo becomes, rather than the precursor or father of the 
Spanish Enlightenment, a descendant in a long, intellectual tradition of disillusionment in Spain.  
What made the siglo de las luces distinct, and what can be argued as a constitutive break comes 
from the growing appeal of skepticism and materialism in the universities and learned societies 
                                                 
388 Martín de Castañega, Tratado de las supersticiones y hechicerias [1529] (Madrid, Sociedad de Bibliófilos 
Españoles, 1946); Pedro Ciruelo, Reprobacion de las supersticiones y hechizerias [first ed 1530 (¿)] Rev. ed. 
(Salamanca, Pedro de Castro, 1541). An edition was printed in the Colección Joyas Bibliográficas, Madrid, 1952; 
Bernardo Monteagudo, Oración apologética que en defensa del estado floreciente de España, dixo en la Plaza de 
Toros de Madrid…obra satírica contra el estado de ignorancia, y superstición en que estaba la Nación á fines del 
siglo pasado y el despotismo de su gobierno (Buenos-Ayres: Imprenta de Niños Expósitos, 1814), available throuth 
the Biblioteca Nacional de España, VE/1506/3. 
389 Jeremy Robbins, The Epistemological Mentality of the Spanish Baroque, 1580-1720 (New York: Routledge, 
2007), 225. 
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of Spain, and the gradual (and contested) abandonment of the Scholastic epistemologies of the 
past.390 
In essence, the goal of disillusionment was not at all new to eighteenth Spain and the 
Spanish Inquisition, only the particulars of the debates and the methods used to disillusion.  
Feijóo’s arguments in “Demoniacs,” for example, are not theories which are articulated in a 
Scholastic method nor based on constructions of Thomistic paradigms, but on the far more 
eighteenth-century insistence upon empirical evidence and first-hand observation.  
Advancements in the sciences, in particular, had new epistemological effects that had not 
previously been contended.  He wrote, “…in these recent times, in which the Philosophers, 
starting to open their eyes, have found in experience the singular path of Physical…that without 
the intervention of some preternatural cause all of which we have spoken occurs.”391  With this 
in mind, the field of inquiry is wide open for historians to reconsider the role of disillusionment 
in the shifting nature of Catholic epistemologies in eighteenth-century Europe, adding them to 
the “plain and clear treatment” which will aid in understanding the supernatural and natural 
during the Enlightenment.392 
 
Circumscribing Causalities: Feijóo’s Supernaturalism and the Broader Enlightenment 
What bearing can the peculiar investigations of one amateur scientist and clergyman have 
on the interpretation of the epistemological debates of the Spanish enlightenment?  First, it is 
                                                 
390 This epistemological marker is likewise supported by Robbins. 
391 TCU.VIII.6§62, “Mas ya en estos últimos tiempos, en que los Filósofos, empezando a abrir los ojos, en la 
experiencia hallaron la única senda de la Física, se ha reconocido, que sin intervención de causa alguna preternatural 
sucede lo que hemos dicho.” 
392 From Covarrubias’s circular definition of “Desengañar”, in which he writes, “…sacar de engaño al que está en el.  
Hablar claro, porque no conciban una cosa por otra.  Desengañarse, caer en la cuenta, de que era engaño lo que tenia 
por cierto.  Desengaño, el trato llano y claro, con que desengañamos, o la misma verdad que nos desengaña 
Desengañado.” Covarrubias, Tesoro de la lengua castellana o española, (Madrid: por Luis Sanchez, 1611), 656. 
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important to emphasize that the concern over “boundary” disputes was widespread, not only in 
Spain but throughout the continental enlightenment.  Miracles, in particular, were a popular 
subject of study.  In Spain, in addition to Feijóo, Antonio José Rodriguez, Juan Oloriz, Andrés 
Piquer, and countless others wrote concerning miracles, while the theme was taken up elsewhere 
famously by both Voltaire and Hume.  Indeed, since the latter two dismissed the possibility of 
miracles out of hand, the Spanish example provides a richer debate of intellectual rigor and 
scrutiny than the radical enlightenment experience.  Spiritual possessions, magic, and miracles 
were all instances in which the overlapping realms of the supernatural (or preternatural) and 
natural allowed for contestation over the cause and the principles of such events.  In both the 
articulation of the definitions of supernatural activity and in the methodology for discerning true 
cases of supernatural occurences, a noticeable shift in the epistemology of enlightenment Spain 
is evident. 
Fundamentally, enlightened Spanish Catholics uniformly asserted as their position on 
divine action the following: that it was possible, that it existed, and that it was extraordinarily 
rare.  Echoing Feijóo, Piquer stated about miracles that “their existence is certain, but they are 
not so common as the vulgo think.”393  Following the traditional line of scholasticism, these 
ilustrados were inclined to advocate methodological, but not philosophical, skepticism and 
naturalism when it came to investigating the natural world.  This, in turn, prompted a subtle shift 
towards increasing reliance upon the explanatory power of science, rather than theology and 
philosophy.  At the same time, however, these same intellectuals continually reaffirmed primacy 
of theology and revelation, both as a mode of knowledge and in value of the subject.  
Enlightened Catholics in Spain saw no contradiction between these two beliefs.  
                                                 
393 Andres Piquer, Logica de D. Andres Piquer, third edition (Madrid: 1781), 101. 
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Methodologically, the investigations into miracles, paradoxes, and the supernatural suggest a 
variety of ways which supported the aforementioned epistemological shift, including 
quantification, methodological naturalism, medical fideism, and a general evolution in the 
axiology of authorities. 
Quantification 
By examining legal history, Lorraine Daston has indicated that while earlier theories of 
jurisprudence included a “hierarchy of proofs” which favored some evidence more favorably 
than others, the evaluation of these evidences was unique to an almost case-by-case basis.394  She 
highlights the description by jurist Jean Domat at the end of the seventeenth century, who wrote 
that “The use and application of all of these rules, according to the quality of the facts and 
circumstances, depends upon the prudence of the Judge.”395  Inversely, the increased, 
‘objectified’ weight of each individual piece of evidence and rules of probability created a 
scenario where quantification of evidence and testimony became increasingly important.396  This 
is certainly true for investigations of miracles and the supernatural in eighteenth-century Spain. 
In the proceso de fe of Joaquín de Vera, for example, Vera often argues for his by emphasizing 
the number of witnesses or reasons that he is able to summon in his defense. 
 
Methodological Naturalism397: 
                                                 
394 Lorraine Daston, “Testimony and the Probability of Miracles,” in Classical Probability in the Enlightenment 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 306-341. 
395 Jean Domat’s Les loix civiles dans leur ordre natural (1689-94), cited in Daston, “Testimony and the Probability 
of Miracles,” 306. 
396 Daston, Testimony and the Probability of Miracles,” 306. 
397 See David Papineau, "Naturalism", in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), Edward 
N. Zalta (ed.),  http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/naturalism/; also C. Dubray, “Naturalism,” in The 
Catholic Encyclopedia (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1911). 
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An examination of early modern attempts to define and classify superstitions clearly 
demonstrates that the discussion of the theological tripartite order of being – natural, 
preternatural, and supernatural – was essential to forming opinions about superstitions.  
Following Aristotle’s Metaphysics, many theologians posited that if one observed an event for 
which no natural explanation exists, then it was most probable to posit a supernatural 
explanation.398  This involves what the historian Fabián Alejandro Campagne has called “the 
triple order of causalities of traditional Christian cosmology:” the natural, the preternatural, and 
the supernatural.399  All activity was defined as belonging to one of these three orders of 
activity.400  The first order was reserved for the activity of God.  These actions, which often 
occurred outside of the realm of natural law, could be classified as miracles divine activity.  This 
was the supernatural order. The second, middle order belonged to the actions of supernatural 
agents (angels and demons) that operated within the natural order.  Because the knowledge of 
these demons and agents was believed to be extensive to an almost infinite level, the devil could 
manipulate natural events while appearing to be supernatural.  The famous sixteenth-century 
theologian Pedro Ciruelo wrote, for example, “The devil knows the total contemporary situation 
everywhere in the world, no matter how concealed or disguised it may be, except for the 
thoughts that reside in the heart of man,” and that the devil had access to “three kinds of hidden 
things: namely, the past, the present, and the future.”401   Similarly, in 1739, Feijóo wrote that 
“The Devil, as a pure Spirit, does not need some disposition in a body in order to introduce 
                                                 
398 See Andrew Gregory, The Presocratics and the Supernatural: Magic, Philosophy, and Science in Early Greece 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2013). 
399 Fabian Alejandro Campagne, “Witchcraft and the Sense-of-the-Impossible in Early Modern Spain: Some 
Reflections Based on the Literature of Superstition (ca. 1500-1800).” The Harvard Theological Review Vol. 96, No. 
1 (Jan., 2003): 25-62; 31.  See also Stuart Clark, Thinking with Demons. 
400 Campagne, “Witchcraft and the Sense-of-the-Impossible,” 30-31. 
401 Pedro Ciruelo, Pedro Ciruelo’s A Treatise Reproving All Superstitions and Forms of Witchcraft: Very Necessary 
and Useful for All Good Christians Zealous for Their Salvation. Translated by Eugene A. Maio and D’Orsay W. 
Pearson, (London: Associated University Presses, 1977), 171. 
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himself in it and to work in it, nor is there any disposition that facilitates or hinders his entrance.  
In all the bodies of whatever temperament, specie, or condition that there is, he is able to 
penetrate, because he is unconditional, and general penetrability is essential to all pure spirits; 
and this is more clear than the light of day.”402 It was also for this reason, for example that 
foreseers, soothsayers, and some astrologers were able to predict the future accurately (through 
diabolic empowerment).  This was the preternatural order.  Lastly, the third order consisted of an 
event which operated within the bounds of natural law and was explained by natural causes.  
This was the natural order. 
Both Fabián Alejandro Campagne and Andrew Keitt have noted an inherent definitional 
instability in the triple causal categories of natural, preternatural, and supernatural.403  All of 
these debates are best summarized in Keitt’s analysis of attempts to define superstition in the 
seventeenth century: 
The perceived need to safeguard a miraculous supernatural sphere, reserved 
for God alone, resulted in an increasing tendency to subsume the preternatural 
within the expanded realm of the natural...The processes of naturalization and 
demonization were actually two sides of the same coin, since demons, 
although not material beings themselves, could only function according to 
causal principle operative in the physical world....404 
Research suggests that the processes of naturalization and demonization of superstition has a 
long trajectory, as early as the late-fifteenth century and certainly established by the Council of 
                                                 
402 TCU.VIII.6 “El Demonio, como espíritu puro, no necesita de disposición alguna en el cuerpo para introducirse, y 
obrar en él, ni hay disposición alguna, que le facilite, o dificulte la entrada. En todos los cuerpos de cualquiera 
temperie, especie, o condición que sean, se puede penetrar, porque esta absoluta, y general penetrabilidad es esencial 
a todo espíritu puro; y esto es más claro que la luz del día.” 
403 Keitt, Inventing the Sacred, 84-85, see also Fabián Alejandro Campagne, Homo Catholicus, Homo 
Superstitiosus. El discurso antisupersticioso en la España de los siglos XV a XVIII (Madrid: Miño y Dávila, 2002), 
404 Keitt, Inventing the Sacred, 84-85. 
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Trent, but methodological naturalism and naturalization of the “boundaries” is even more 
markedly noticeable in the eighteenth century.405 
Still, if the historiography which postulates a sweeping epistemological change in 
eighteenth-century Spain due to scientific revolutions and new philosophical rationalism and 
empiricism is correct, an increased readiness to attribute natural causes and an overall 
“naturalized” process and explanatory framework should be seen as being adopted by Inqusition 
officials.  Often, this may simply take the form of an increased amount of speculation, of doubt, 
or of uncertainty.  More and more, the default position was to assume that an event was a natural 
occurrence, belonged to the realm of natural philosophy, and could be explained by using the 
methodologies of the sciences independently of philosophy or theology. 
 
Medical Fideism 
Medicine was the concomitant methodological arm of naturalism, particularly in cases of 
possession, exorcisms, witchcraft, and miraculous healings.  Since the sixteenth-century, there 
was a clear attempt by theologians to defend natural activity and medicine as a legitimate 
recourse, one that was only superstitious when falsely claimed as supernatural activity.  Rather 
than a dichotomy between religious orthodoxy and natural philosophy, theological treatises and 
inquisitorial manuals reflect the attempt by Catholic thinkers to coopt science and medicine as a 
working partner with religion.  This estimation coincides with the pattern that Keitt has noticed 
in the evaluation of spiritual visionaries during Golden Age Spain.406  In his article, “The 
Miraculous Body of Evidence: Visionary Experience, Medical Discourse, and the Inquisition in 
                                                 
405 See, for example, Fabián Alejandro Campagne, Homo catholicus. Homo superstitiosus. El discurso 
antisupersticioso en la Espana de los siglos XV a XVIII. 
406 Keitt, Inventing the Sacred, 77. 
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Seventeenth-Century Spain,” Keitt argues that Catholic officials increasingly used new 
physiological studies and a reliance on medical knowledge to evaluate claims of possession and 
visions, especially in post-Tridentine Spain.407 
 Keitt labels this trend “medical fideism,” by which he means the use of medical 
knowledge and writings to support orthodox theology for the end goal of decreasing superstition 
and increasing control.408  Keitt cites Gerónimo Planes’s 1634 confessor’s manual, Tratado del 
examen de revelaciones verdaderas y falsas y de los raptos, as a prime example of a religious 
treatise that suggests that the clergy seek the help of a medical professional during their 
evaluations.  He could equally have selected Martín Castañega’s Tratado de las supersticiones, 
published over a century earlier; Castañega not only employs new medical knowledge to 
demonstrate the natural virtue of many superstitions, but devotes the entire fifteenth chapter, 
“Cuáles Empéricas de los médicos no son supersticiones ni hechizos” to defending those who 
study medicine.409 
It became increasingly common in the seventeenth century, according to Keitt, for 
inquisitors and theologians to employ this tactic to help draw the divisionary line between 
supernatural, preternatural and natural.410  The apex of medical fideism, therefore, according to 
both Keitt’s trajectory and to the more common enlightenment narrative, should be the 
eighteenth-century.  Thus, an emphasis on the role of medical evidence, the particular worthiness 
                                                 
407 Keitt, Inventing the Sacred, 77. 
408 Keitt, Inventing the Sacred, 77. 
409 “Empirical Studies of Doctors are neither Superstitions nor Witchcraft.” Martín de Castañega, Tratado de las 
supersticiones y hechicerias [1529] (Madrid, Sociedad de Bibliófilos Españoles, 1946), chapter five and pg. xv. 
410 Keitt also highlights Hernando de Camargo y Salgado’s Luz Clara de la Noche Obscura (Madrid, 1650), Juan 
Francisco Villava’s Empresas espirituales y morales (Baeza, 1613), Thomas Murillo’s Secretos sagrados y 
naturales (1673), Gaspar Navarro’s Tribunal de supersticion ladina (Huesca, 1631), and Martín Del Río’s 
Investigations into Magic (Keitt, Inventing the Sacred, 88).  See also original research of the AHN.Inq.Libro 1226, 
“Prática, e interrogatorio judicial para el examen de revelaciones, visiones, luces, e ilustraciones interiores, y 
apariciones exteriors, raptos, éxtasis, mociones internas, y externas,” which Keitt also believes to exhibit medical 
fideism. 
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of medicine and of medical advice, the reliance on medical professionals (curiously absent from 
Joaquín de Vera’s case), and the recourse to medical explanations (abounding in de Vera’s case) 
is evident. 
 
Evolving Epistemic Authority 
Though this is clearer in theological treatises than in Inquisition records, the amount of weight 
given to either revelatory, authority, empirical, or deductionistic rationalist statements will be 
important.  In the seventeenth-century Libro 1226 of the Archivo Histórico Nacional, for 
example, the calificacción of various visions and raptures relies heavily on biblical citations and 
references to patristic writings or well-established and traditionally orthodox works (Aquinas, 
Anselm, etc.).  As the first-hand, empirical, and matter-of-fact became increasingly important, 
such references decreased.  The historian Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra has argued that during the 
eighteenth century, a “new art of reading” began in Spain and in Spanish America that dismissed 
the primacy of eyewitness narratives and stressed ‘internal consistency’ and coherence.411  In his 
work, How to Write the History of the New World, Cañizares-Esguerra studies this textual 
criticism specifically within the context of historiography and the writing of natural and 
geographic histories of the Spanish New World.  He notes however, that this “new art of 
reading” both influenced and was influenced by similar discussions of spiritual discernment and 
religio-intellectual verification.  He writes that, “[U]nlike Renaissance arts of reading, this new 
art did not privilege eyewitnesses.  As part of larger scholarly debates about the probability of 
                                                 
411 Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, How to Write the History of the New World: Histories, Epistemologies, and Identities 
in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 6. 
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miracles, some authors began to argue that testimonies needed to be judged by their internal 
consistency, not by the social standing or learning of the witnesses.”412 
This was part of wider debates being held across the Spanish empire, and indeed, 
throughout early modern Europe, about epistemology at this time. Cañizares-Esguerra rightly 
relies upon the work of Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, who have studied the impact that 
scientific and technical advances had in carving out an epistemological niche for the factual and 
the ‘matter of fact.’413  The work of botanical expeditions, geographic histories, and natural 
discourse that dominated Spanish and Spanish American intellectuals during the eighteenth 
century are indicative of this factual, natural approach to epistemology.414  The ‘matter of fact’ 
impulse of scientific, technical, and medical discourse did not only impact the writing of history 
and the revisionism experienced by Spanish, and even more so, criollo intellectuals examining 
stories of the encounter.  It also affected theologians, inquisitors, and religious intellectuals 
concerned with discouraging superstition, discerning orthodoxy from heterodoxy, and 
establishing what Cañizares-Esguerra has labeled “emerging evolutionary scales of 
credibility.”415  These later changes were particularly important in the trial settings of the 





                                                 
412 Cañizares-Esguerra, How to Write the History of the New World, 6. 
413 Cañizares-Esguerra, How to Write the History of the New World, 16. 
414 See, for example, Daniela Bleichmar, Visible Empire: Botanical Expeditions and Visual Culture in the Hispanic 
Enlightenment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012). 
415 Cañizares-Esguerra, How to Write the History of the New World, 7. 
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Conclusion 
In her ode to Feijóo, written to commemorate the two-hundredth anniversary of his birth 
in 1876, Doña Emilia Pardo Bazán wrote that for Feijóo, “Science [was] the way, but God [was] 
the goal.”416  Feijóo, representative of the more progressive edge of the Catholic Enlightenment, 
saw science not only as reconcilable to religion, but an aid to the faith.  He sought to incorporate 
new philosophies and methodologies of sciences, introduced to Spain by individuals like his 
friend Martínez, in order to strengthen the Spanish understanding of natural philosophy.  The 
four methodological changes – quantification, methodological naturalism and skepticism, 
medical fideism, and changes to the valuation of epistemic authorities – both shaped and were 
shaped by the new philosophies of sciences practiced by the novatores and by foreign thinkers.  
Their practice and introduction to the Spanish empire did not go unnoticed. 
As has been shown in both the examples of Martínez and Feijóo, both ilustrados were 
aware that their work made claims which altered the epistemological atmosphere of eighteenth-
century Spain.  In the case of Martínez, his avocation of methodological skepticism embroiled 
him in a debate which lasted two decades.  Feijóo, far more popular and accessible than 
Martínez, was the subject of an even greater and more protacted firestorm of publications, which 
was only abated by the specific protection of Ferdinand VI.  The following chapter examines this 
debate to elucidate the counter-enlightenment response to Feijóo, and in chapter four, a late, 
middle-of-the-road Catholic Enlightenment response to the changing methodology, the typical 
epistemological stance in Spain at the end of the century, is analyzed in detail. 
  
                                                 
416 Emila Pardo Bazán, “Oda al Insigne Filósofo Feijóo,” 173. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
La Verdad Católica vs. La Falsa Filosofía: 
the Anti-Teatrista Polemics of Salvador Josef Mañer and the Counter-Enlightenment 
Response in the Early-Eighteenth Century, 1728-1749 
 
…Learned Feijóo, your opinions 
Convince, and although the expiring breaths sing 
And cede to such an Alcides417 their breaths -  
The Vulgo are susceptible to such invasions. 
But hear that Salvador has fought 
Against the Theatro Crítico; Your victory 
Has been confounded with your own ruin. 
In fame you establish your memory, 
Great Mañer, for your pen has pursued 
To make vulgar the glory of the Crítico. 
 - Don Leopoldo Geronymo Puche, “Sonnet”418 
With this satirical poem, readers in 1729 were introduced to the Anti-Theatro Crítico, a 
work by the publisher and public intellectual Don Salvador Joseph Mañer.  The polyglot 
Benedictine Benito Jerónimo Feijóo had published the first volume of his Theatro Crítico 
Universal, following it with a second volume in 1728.  Much of his work was greatly acclaimed, 
and to this day, Feijóo dominates studies of eighteenth-century ilustrado literature, far more than 
either Martín Martínez, or Andrés Piquer.  Feijóo considered himself to be working for the 
enlightenment of the populace of Spain.  Yet in this poem, written by Puche, a presbyter and 
                                                 
417 A Latinic name for Hercules, particularly popular in France and Italy. 
418 “Erudito Feijóo, sus opiniones/redarguye, y aun canta vencimientos cedia a tanto Alcides sus alientos/débil el 
vulgo a tales invasiones./Mas oy que Salvador ha combatido/al Critico Theatro, su victoria/entre su propia ruina ha 
confudido:/En la fama estableces tu memoria,/Gran Mañer, pues tu pluma ha conseguido/hacer vulgar del Critico la 
gloria.” Soneto de Don Leopoldo Geronymo Puche, Presbytero, y Beneficiado de la Iglesia Parroquial del Pino de 
la Ciudad de Barcelona, en alabanza del Autor, su intimo amigo, in Don Salvador Joseph Mañer, Anti-Teatro 
Crítico sobre el primero, y Segundo tomo del Teatro Crítico Universal del Rmo. P.M. Fr. Benito Feijoo, Maestro 
General de la Religión de S. Benito, y Catedrático de Visperas de Teología de la Universidad de Oviedo; en que se 
impugnan veinte y seis Discursos, y se le notan setenta descuidos (Madrid: la casa de Juan de Moya, 1729). [Critical 
Anti-Theater about the first and second volumes of the Universal Critical Theater of the Most Reverend Father 
Master Friar Benito Feijoo, Master General of the Religion of Saint Benedict, and the Vespers Chair of Theology at 
the University of Oviedo; in which Twenty-Six Discourses are impugned, and seventy errors are noted.] 
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benefice at a parish church of Barcelona for his “close friend,” Don Mañer, Feijóo is 
unequivocally cast as the antagonist of the Spanish people.419  Mañer’s work, revealingly titled 
the Anti-Theatro, worked to correct what Mañer saw as the errors and oversights of Feijóo that 
were actually leading his readers astray.  Mañer’s work is by no means irregular or 
unaccompanied in the publication record of eighteenth-century Spain.  Many other intellectuals 
wrote decrying Feijóo’s works and, more broadly, the advancement of the ilustración – the 
enlightenment.  Yet the question as to why many religious intellectuals in eighteenth-century 
objected to the introduction of enlightenment philosophy, how they argued against it, and what 
alternatives they proposed remains unsatisfactorily answered by historians. 
In this third chapter, the work of individuals who critiqued the “new philosophy” is 
analyzed in an attempt to answer these questions.  Previously, this dissertation has assessed the 
introduction and adoption of the “new philosophy” and “new science” in early eighteenth-
century Spain.  Specifically, these chapters showed how many Catholic thinkers found much of 
these currents of thought helpful and reconcilable with their religious framework, leading to what 
some scholars have labeled the eclecticism of eighteenth-century Spain, or of the ‘Catholic 
Enlightenments’ of the Iberian Peninsula.  This chapter examines intellectuals in Spain who 
reacted against the introduction of enlightenment modes of thought, analyzing their reasons for 
critiquing the New Philosophy and their suggestions for alternative epistemologies.  This school 
of thinkers, often labeled anti-ilustrados (anti-enlightened) or tradicionalista (traditionalist) has 
been particularly maligned in the historiographical record of this period, which has portrayed 
these individuals as dogmatic, irrational, and one-dimensional figures.420  This chapter examines 
                                                 
419 “intimo amigo”, Soneto de Don Leopaldo Geronymo Puche in Mañer, Anti-Theatro Critico, frontmatter. 
420 This paper hesitantly employs anti-ilustrado as the term given to those writing against enlightenment authors, 
publications, and ideas.  It does so for several reasons: first, that the parallel French term anti-philosophe is already 
in circulation; second, that the ubiquitous use of ilustrado and ilustración makes anti-ilustrado readily perspicuous.  
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why these anti-ilustrados argued against a “Catholic Enlightenment” of eighteenth-century 
Spain, what their specific objections were, and how these objections were rationalized and seen 
as legitimate arguments at the time. 
The literature of anti-ilustrado included a vast spectrum of works written by scientists, 
medical professionals, Spanish religious, university professors, theologians, and public 
intellectuals, and therefore reflected a wide variety of growing concerns about what these 
individuals perceived as “enlightened” thought.  Many of the initial objections of anti-ilustrado 
literature engaged the works of the “new science” on a medical, scientific, and logical level, 
arguing against axiomatic inconsistencies, philosophical presuppositions, and technical 
objections (though grounded in a thoroughly Catholic understanding).421   Other, often later, anti-
ilustrado works argued on a more-explicitly (and often exclusively) religious basis.  The 
majority of these anti-ilustrados objected to Enlightenment philosophies based on what they saw 
as a direct relationship of causality between New Philosophy and such dangers as atheism, 
materialism, or deism. 
This chapter analyzes the works of those early critics of enlightenment thought in Spain, 
particularly highlighting the efforts of two anti-theatristas (individuals who wrote against 
Feijóo’s Teatro Crítico): Salvador José Mañer (1676-1751), a public intellectual and 
periodicalist, and Ignacio de Armesto y Ossorio (s. XVIII), a Spanish religious. Both Mañer and 
Armesto y Ossorio’s works belong to Ivy McClelland’s designation of “comprehensive 
polemics,” in that they engage Feijóo’s work systematically, discourse by discourse, and advance 
                                                 
See, for example, P. José Gumilla, S.J., El Orinoco Ilustrado, y Defendido, Historia natural, Civil, y Geographica 
de este Gran Rio, y de sus Caudalosas Vertientes… (Madrid: por Manuel Fernandez, Impressor de el Supremo 
Consejo de la Inquisicion, 1745); Francisco Javier Lampillas, Ensayo historico-apologetico de la literature 
Española contra las opinions preocupadas de algunos escritores modernos italianos (Zaragoza: en la oficina de 
Blas Miedes…, 1784); and the work of Félix Amat de Palou y Pont (1750-1824). 
421 This included the works of Araujo and Lesaca previously analyzed in chapter one, as well as works by Mañer, 
Don Ignacio Armesto y Ossorio, Fray Luis de Flandes, and Don Juan Gil. 
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their arguments largely based on logical errors committed by Feijóo, oversights in his essays, or 
contrary scientific and experimental evidence to Feijóo’s conclusions.  This is distinct from the 
objections made by other anti-ilustrados to the nueva filosofía on religious grounds or on the 
accusation of guilt by association with French philosophy, atheism, or materialism.  Indeed, this 
chapter demonstrates that far from being merely broadsides railing against the importation of 
new ideas, counter-enlightenment thinkers offered serious and valid objections to the new 
philosophies and new sciences of the enlightenment. 
By examining the publications of these critics, this chapter argues for three central 
characterizations of early anti-enlightenment thought in Spain.  First, that the critique of the new 
philosophy was characterized by a hesitancy to adopt new philosophical systems such as 
empiricism, rationalism, and skepticism, particularly manifested in the sciences.  Second, that 
anti-ilustrados therefore argued for a reaffirmation of traditional sources of knowledge and for 
the supremacy of Biblical and patristic authority.  Thus, lastly, this chapter argues that critics of 
enlightenment thought believed in a unified conception of truth that did not allow for the 
demarcation between matters of religion, philosophy, and the natural sciences.  These beliefs, 
though nuanced by each anti-ilustrado are representative of what this research terms the 
“conservative epistemology” of the early Spanish counter-enlightenment, and are distinct from 
later anti-enlightenment and anti-revolutionary movements in Spain. 
 
The Curious Neglect of the Counter-Enlightenment 
 I have already stated that the Spanish enlightenment, as a whole, tends to be reduced to 
matters of public policy, political and economical platforms, issues of social justice, theories of 
natural law and rights, scientific innovation, and particularly in the realm of religion – regalist 
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policies.  In the final chapter, I demonstrate how this reductionism is undermined by the textual 
evidence, even in the case of the Jansenist debates and the expulsion of the Jesuits from the 
Spanish empire.  Here, it is worth noting that the historiographical abuse which the Spanish 
ilustrados have suffered pales in comparison to the neglect, and in some cases, the contempt with 
which counter-enlightenment individuals have been held. 
 
Mañer, Armesto y Ossorio, and the Anti-Theatrista Polemics 
This chapter describes the conservative epistemology of the Spanish anti-ilustrados by 
examining two of the earliest works of the Spanish anti-ilustración by Mañer and Armesto y 
Ossorio, both anti-theatristas writing at the end of the 1720s in Madrid.422 Mañer’s Anti-teatro 
crítico sobre el primero, y Segundo tomo del Teatro crítico, written in 1729 against Feijóo’s first 
and second volumes of the Teatro Crítico Universal (1726 and 1728, respectively) is examined, 
as well as Armesto y Ossorio’s Theatro anti-critico universal sobre las obras del R.P.M. Feyjóo 
del P.M Sarmiento, y de Don Salvador Mañer (libro tercero), written in 1737 in response to 
Feijóo’s  third volume (1729).423  These works, critical of Feijóo’s publications, and read in 
conjunction with early denunciations of Martínez’s medical and philosophical skepticism, may 
be considered the first generation of anti-ilustrado thought in early eighteenth-century Spain.   
Mañer was born in Cádiz in 1676.  After having traveled to Caracas and spending several 
years in the colonies, he returned to Spain and became the author and editor of many works, as 
                                                 
422 An excellent and exhaustive overview of the controversies surrounding Feijóo’s publications can be found in the 
anonymous Noticia which prefaces the 1773 reprinting of Feijóo’s TCU, Tomo Primero (Madrid: Joachin Ibarra, 
Acosta de la Real Compañia de Impresores y Libreros, 1773). The notice, which is forty pages long, gives clear 
bibliographic information regarding some of Feijóo’s most popular opponents, including Mañer and Soto y Marne. 
423 Mañer, Anti-Teatro Crítico; Igancio de Armesto y Ossorio, Theatro anti-crítico universal, sobre las obras del 
muy R.P. maestro Feijoo, de el padre maestro, Sarmiento, y Don Salvador Mañer (Madrid: en la oficina de 
Francisco Martinez Abad, 1735-1737).  [Anti-Critical Universal Theater, about the works of the very Reverend 
Father Master Feijoo, of the Father Master Sarmiento, and Don Salvador Mañer.] 
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well as the founder of the widely-read periodical, the Mercurio histórico y político (1738).  One 
of the earliest of Mañer’s contributions became an intellectual debate which dominated the entire 
span of his career as a public intellectual, ceasing only with his death in 1751.424  After the 
publication of the first two volumes of Feijóo’s Teatro Critico Universal, a collection of essays 
informed by the reception of the “new philosophy” of science, Mañer authored several 
argumentative responses that corresponded in title to the original essays of Feijóo.  Indeed, as the 
author of perhaps the first critique ever to be leveled against Feijóo and his Teatro Crítico 
Universal, Mañer spent the next twenty years and four additional volumes debating with Feijóo 
in the public sphere.425   For example, later in the year 1729, Feijóo responded to Mañer’s 
critiques, and others, by issuing the Ilustración apologética al primero, y Segundo tomo del 
Teatro Crítico.426  Two years later, in 1731, Mañer responded to Feijóo’s Ilustración apologética 
with his own Réplica Satisfatoria a la Ilustración Apologética del Padre Feyjoo, Benedictino.427 
                                                 
424 For more information on the press in early-eighteenth century Spain and the foundation of the Mercurio, see 
Christian von Tschilschke, Identität der Aufklärung/Aufklärung der Identität: Literatur und Identitätsdiskurs im 
Spanien des 18. Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt: Vervuert Verlag, 2009), 153; also Jaume Guillamet, História del 
Periodisme: Notícies, Periodistes, I Mitjans de Comunicació (Barcelona: Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona, 
2003), 46. For biographical information,consult Verdes Memorias para la Biografia or D. Joseph del Campillo y 
Cossio’s Diario de los literatos de España, tomo 7, página 234 (Madrid, 1742) 
425 D. Nicolas Maria de Cambiaso y Verdes, Memorias para la Biografia y para la Bibliografia de la Isla de Cadiz, 
Diccionario de Personas Célebres de Cadiz, Tomo Primero, Desde A Hasta J Antes de O, (Madrid: En la Imprenta 
de D. Leon Amarita, 1829), 193-198.  Verdes writes that “De todas las impugnaciones que sufrió el “Teatro Critico” 
tiene el primer lugar el “Antiteatro Critico”, que empezó á salir en principios del año de 1729, tres años años 
después que se publicó el primer tomo del “Teatro.”” (194) While it is likely so, there is no evidence to discount that 
Ciscodexa’s Antiteatro Delphico was not published first. 
426 Benito Jerónimo Feijóo, Ilustración apologética al primero, y segundo tomo del Teatro Critico donde se notan 
más de cuatrocientos descuidos al Autor del Anti-Teatro; y de los setenta, que éste imputa al Autor del Teatro 
Crítico, se rebajan los sesenta y nueve y medio.  Escrita por el por el muy ilustre señor D. Fr. Benito Jerónimo 
Feijoo y Montengero, Maestro General del Orden de San Benito (del Consejo de S.M. &c. Madrid, Francisco del 
Hierro, 1729). [Apologetic Enlightenment to the First and Second Volumes of the Teatro Crítico, in which it is 
noted more than four hundred errors of the author of the Anti-Teatro; and of the seventy which he imputed to the 
author of the Teatro Crítico, sixty-nine and a half are rebuffed.] 
427 Don Salvador José Mañer, Replica Satisfatoria a la Ilustracion Apologetica del Padre Feyjoo, Benedictino. (En 
Madrid: En la Oficina de Juan de Zuñiga. S.A.-1731?). [Satisfactory Reply to the Apologetic Enlightenment of 
Father Feijóo, Benedictine] 
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Mañer’s work has suffered much abuse at the hands of historians of the Spanish 
Enlightenment who, regarding Feijóo in such literate esteem, often completely ignore Mañer’s 
work.   This is a methodological mistake, as Mañer’s work is certainly responsible in shaping the 
way that Feijóo authored his later volumes of the Teatro Crítico and other works.  If historians 
have read Mañer, their analysis tends to denigrate his essays as stubbornly dogmatic, blindly 
traditional, or naively irrational.  The scholar Américo Castro (1885-1972), for example, 
characterized him as the “obtuse antagonist” of Feijóo, attributing to him the “inane vacuity” of 
the literature of the eighteenth-century anti-ilustrados.428  Other scholars, implicitly adopting a 
progressive view of history, denounce Mañer’s critiques of Feijóo, assuming that they must be 
closer related to illogical passion and custom rather than rational argumentation.429 
In Mañer’s time, however, his influence was considerable, with a wide readership and 
with a substantial voice that ilustrados such as Feijóo were obligated to answer, even if they 
were dismissive of his charges.  In 1742, for instance, the Diario de los literatos wrote under the 
entry of the anonymously published Mercurio Histórico that, 
…The thin veil with which this work has dissimulated its author’s name, Don 
Salvador Joseph Mañer, nobody has heard any doubt that he is its true Author, 
because of what other circumstances have occurred with him in public 
notoriety…430 
                                                 
428 Américo Castro, The Spaniards: An Introduction to Their History, trans. Willard F. King and Selma Margaretten 
(Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), 368. 
429 See, for example, Theresa Ann Smith’s The Emerging Female Citizen: Gender and Enlightenment in Spain 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), pg. 35, commenting on Mañer’s arguments against Feijóo’s 
famous discourse on the rights of women.  Similarly, Ivy McClelland includes Mañer in her analysis of “the vulgo-
conception of scientific evidence,” commenting on Mañer’s opportunist, and in McClelland’s opinion, misinformed 
use of science (neglecting to observe that although Mañer had no formal scientific or medical training, neither did 
Feijóo); see McClelland, Ideological Hesitancy in Spain (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1991), 63.  Indeed, 
one of the few works which analyzes the dialogue between Feijóo and Mañer is Bernadette Bideau’s Analyse der 
Polemik um Benito Jerónimo Feijoos “discurso Voz del pueblo” aus dem “Teatro crítico universal” (1726-1739) 
(Norderstedt: Auflage, 2006), pg. 10 and following. 
430 “El ligero disfraz con que para esta traducción ha dissimulado su apellido Don Salvador Joseph Mañér, á nadie 
tiene oy en la duda de que de ella es su verdadero Autor, para lo que también concurren otras circunstancias de 
publica notoriedad.”  D. Joseph del Campillo y Cossio’s Diario de los literatos de España, tomo 7, página 234 
(Madrid, 1742). 
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The “public notoriety” that the Diario alludes to is most certainly the debates between Mañer 
and Feijóo, which by 1742 were already beginning to wane. Though the entry as a whole is 
critical of the Mercurio and of Mañer’s ability to translate from French to Spanish in particular, 
it yet evinces a serious estimation of Mañer’s influence and followers. 431   
Moreover, Mañer’s work had a clear impact on other thinkers.  Friar Luis de 
Flandes, a Capuchin lecturer of theology and calificador (external theological evaluator) 
for the Inquisition, dedicated his work, The Ancient Academic Against the Modern 
Skeptic, to Mañer.432  In this dedication, Flandes wrote of Mañer’s Anti-Theatro (by then, 
having five volumes), that, 
So much truth is inspected in your printed works that [my] discourse stammers, 
doubting if the more admirable thing is the History, or the Mathematics, or the 
Philosophy, or the Theology, for I find them all integrated together in the 
classification of doctrine.433 
To many anti-ilustrados such as Flandes, then, Mañer’s work was a faultless representation of 
counter-enlightenment thought.  The historian Ivy McClelland describes Mañer’s Anti-Theatro 
as “the most conspicuous and extensive polemics in which Feijóo engaged.”434  Comprehensive 
is the proper description due to Mañer’s work.  The Anti-Theatro is structured to be read 
                                                 
431 The article continued to comment about the existence of “the passionate enthusiasts of Sr. Mañer (and we are 
given to understand that they are many and refined).”   “Los apasionados del Sr. Mañer (que tenemos entendido son 
muchos, y muy finos)…” Campillo y Cossio, Diario, Art. XII, 235. 
432 Luis de Flandes, El Antiguo Academico, Contra el Moderno Sceptico, o Dudoso, Rigido, O Moderado. Defesna 
de las Ciencias y especialmente de la Physica Pytagorica, y Medica en el conocimiento, y practica de los Medicos 
Sabios. (Madrid: En la Imprenta del Reyno, 1743[?]). [The Ancient Academic against the Modern Skeptic, or 
Doubter – Rigid or Moderate.  A Defense of the Sciences, Especially of Pythagorean Physics and Medicine in 
Knowledge and Practice of Medical Sages] 
433 “Tanta verdad reconozco en las obras impressas de Vmd. que titubea el discurso, dudando si lo mas 
admirable, es lo Historico, o lo Mathematico, la Phylosofia, o la Theologia; pues las hallo cabalísimas en 
todo linaje de doctrina.” Flandes, El Antiguo Academico, 3. 
434 I.L. McClelland, Benito Jerónimo Feijóo (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1969), 117.  In her study of 
Feijóo and his commentators, historian Ivy McClelland divides the polemics that were raised against Feijóo into 
three dominant strains – medical attacks, to which I would add scientific objections, comprehensive polemicists, and 
religious opposition, to which I would include broader philosophical and epistemological apprehensions.  See 
McClelland, Feijóo, Chapter 6: “Feijóo in Polemic,” 107. 
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comparatively alongside the Teatro Critico; it follows each discourse in turn, noting both minor 
and major errors and lapses (errores y descuidos).  The title of the initial volume promises that 
over seventy significant errors are deduced in the twenty-six discourses of the work.435 
A similar endeavor was undertaken only a few years later by Ignacio de Armesto y 
Ossorio. Armesto y Ossorio was most likely the pseudonym of the doctor of theology, José 
Quiroga Somoza y Losada.436 It is known that he lived in Madrid, where he published his 
Theatro anti-crítico universal, but his only other remaining historical record occurs through his 
writings.437  Secondary sources have had mixed opinions on the value of Armesto y Ossorio’s 
publications.  Menéndez Pelayo, for example, stated that Armesto y Ossorio’s work was “from 
                                                 
435 Mañer, “en que se impugnan veinte y seis Discursos, y se le notan setenta descuidos” title of the work.  It is 
worth noting that Feijóo Ilustración Apologetica promises four hundred errors in Mañer’s work, as well as refuting 
sixty-nine and a half of his supposed mistakes. 
436 Somoza y Losoda was the author of the Breve exposición o informe que haze al Consejo el Dr. D---- de las 
razones y fundamentos legales que asisten a su Colegio de San Clemente, de Santiago, sobre la retención de la 
Cédula de mayoría concedida al Colegio de mayoría concedida al Colegio de Santiago Alfeo, de la misma Ciudad.  
This position is advocated by Francisco Aguilar Piñal, Bibliografía de autores españoles del siglo XVIII: N-Q, 
Tomo VI (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1983), 532-533; Atanasio López, La imprenta 
en Galicia: Siglos XV-XVIII (Madrid[¿]: Biblioteca Nacional, 1953), pg. 172; and Iris M. Zavala, Clandestinidad y 
Libertinaje Erudito en los Albores del Siglo XVIII (Barcelona: Ed. Ariel, 1978), 402. 
Pseudonymic writing was common in academic publications during this time period as a means of hiding one’s 
identity from colleagues or, more probably, from the investigation of the censors of the Holy Office of the 
Inquisition (which, though in decline during the eighteenth century, was still prohibiting the publication of selected 
works - for example, Feijóo’s eighth volume of the Teatro Crítico Universal).  Mañer, for example, also authored 
some of his works under the French pseudonym “Monsieur Le Margne.”  These works seem to have had a mixed 
reception outside of Spain.  In an introduction to a set of political biographies in 1814, author George Moore noted 
that, “I received from Spain a translation of a Life of Ripperda which appeared in Holland…the name of Mr. Le 
Margne in the title-page is, I am informed, fictitious.  His real name was [v] Don Salvador Maner [sic]…under one 
or the other, I believe he is equally a stranger to the English Reader.” George Moore, Lives of Cardinal Alberoni, the 
Duke of Ripperda, and Marquis of Pombal: Three Distinguished Political Adventurers of the Last Century 
exhibiting A View of the Kingdoms of Spain and Portugal during A considerable Portion of that Period, Second 
Edition (London: J. Brettell, Printer, 1814), iv-v. 
For information on censorship practices in early modern Spain, consult: Virgilio Pinto Crespo, Inquisición 
y control ideológico en la España del siglo XVI (Madrid: Taurus, 1983); and Patricia Manning, Voicing dissent in 
seventeenth-century Spain: Inquisition, social criticism and theology in the case of El Criticón (Leiden: Brill, 2009).  
Carlos IV (1788-1808) would later ban the use of pseudonyms during the early 1790s as a counter-measure to the 
influx of French revolutionary ideas. Censorship was also revitalized, and only two periodicals were granted the 
right to publish their works.  See Anthony McFarlane, “Science and Sedition in Spanish America: New Granada in 
the Age of Revolution, 1776-1810,” in Enlightenment and Emancipation, edited by Susan Manning and Peter 
France (Cranbury, NJ: Rosemont Publishing and Printing Corp., 2006), 100. 
437 “Su autor D. Ignacio de Armesto y Ossorio, residente en la villa de Madrid.” Don Dionisio, Boletín Bibliográfico 
Español, Tomo IV (Madrid: Imprenta de las Escuelas Pias, 1863), 69. 
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its birth condemned to perpetual obscurity and oblivion.”438  Contrasted against the genius of 
Feijóo, the majority of historians have ceased to examine the arguments made by Armesto y 
Ossorio against Feijóo’s work, the Teatro Crítico Universal.  Yet Armesto y Ossorio’s work, 
though written after Mañer’s and long after the initial publications of Feijóo’s Teatro Crítico, is 
yet one of the most substantive and important anti-ilustrado works of the first-half of eighteenth-
century Spain. 
Carefully constructed, cautious in its conclusions, and systematically argued, Armesto y 
Ossorio’s Theatro Anti-Critico Universal is the condensed synthesis of all of the works of 
Feijóo, his ardent apologist Martín Sarmiento, and of his great critic Mañer through 1737, the 
year of the publication.  Armesto y Ossorio describes his format in his prologue to the reader, 
noting that “in the first paragraph the reader will find all of the substantial [material] for each 
discourse of the Theatro Crtico…,” and that following this, “…in the second paragraph one can 
see aired out and defined with indifference to the disputes, that which Don Salvador has moved 
against the two Most Reverend Fathers.”439  In both title and stated aim, Armesto y Ossorio’s 
intention was to analyze all three works and to “distribute Justice among the three theatristas.”440  
Yet Armesto y Ossorio also made his conclusions of this analysis evident in the very title of his 
work, noting that “it is convinced [that] the Truth is contrary to the principal assumption and 
other opinions of the Theatro, for the relief of common errors.”441  Armesto y Ossorio further 
                                                 
438 “Tales fueron don Salvador Joseph mañer y don Ignacio Armesto y Ossorio, autor el primero de un Anti-Theatro, 
y el oro de un Theatro anti-crítico univeral, libros condenados desde su nacimiento a perpetua oscuridad y olvido.  
Lo que alcanzaban estos hombres en materia de educación estética…” Menéndez Pelayo, Marcelino. Historia de las 
Ideas Estéticas en España, Vol. I. Madrid, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1993. Pg. 1595 
439 “…en que hallará el Lector en el párrafo primero de cada Discurso todo lo substancial del Theatro Critico….En 
el segundo párrafo verá ventiladas, y definidas con indiferencia las disputas, que movió Don Salvador Mañer contra 
los dos PP.MM.” Don Ignacio de Armesto y Ossorio, Theatro Anti-Critico Universal Sobre Las Obras del R.P.M. 
Feyjoo, del P.M. Sarmiento, y de Don Salvador Mañer…, “Prologo al Lector.” (1737) 
440 “Se Reparte la Justicia Entre Los Tres Theatristas,” Armesto y Ossorio, Theatro Anti-Critico Universal, titlepage. 
441 “Se convence la Verdad contra los Principales Assumptos y otras opiniones del Theatro Para Desagravio de 
Errores comunes.” Armesto y Ossorio, Theatro Anti-Critico Universal, titlepage. 
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explains that the delay in his work was to grant him the time needed for such an analytical work 
to be written and suitably published, “not only for the solid disillusionment to the truth, but also 
for the benefit of reading [his] writings with more pleasure.”442 
These publications ought to be read as a dialogue – a back and forth transmission of ideas 
by intellectuals who were well aware of the claims and arguments of their opposition and who 
often wrote with their specific antagonists in mind.  Spanish critiques of the “new philosophy” 
(Filosofía nueva) and of the “new science” (Ciencia nueva) began immediately and far earlier 
than in other countries.  Concomitant with the initial publications of the novatores, responsorial 
works that voiced the concerns of a conservative academic and religious platform were 
published.  As has been examined in chapter one, this was the case with the early publications of 
Martín Martínez.  In the three years between the publication of the two volumes of Martínez’s 
Medicina scéptica y cirugía moderna in 1722-1725, Martínez had such a plethora of letters and 
works written against him that he devoted the entire first half of his second volume to responding 
to these comments.443 
Moreover, the authors of both ilustrado and anti-ilustrado works enlisted the aid of their 
colleagues in writing introductory material to their publications.  Each treatise contained 
numerous approbations (aprobaciones), publication licensures (licencias del ordinario), 
defensive prefaces (aprobaciones apologéticas, apologias), and open letters (cartas) written by 
                                                 
442 “no solo el desengaño sólido de la verdad, sino también el beneficio de leer con mas gusto mis Escritos.” 
Armesto y Ossorio, Theatro Anti-Critico Universal, “Prologo al Lector,” 1737. 
443 In 1725, for example, Bernardo López de Araujo, who had worked at the Hospital General prior to Martínez’s 
positioning there, authored the Centinela medico-aristotelica contra scepticos: en la cual se declara ser mas segura 
y firme la doctrina que se enseña en las universidades españolas against Martínez’s first volumen in 1725.  
Martínez’s preface in his second volume responded to all of his critics, particularly engaging Araujo in his 
apologema of the second volume.  He wryly commented that if Araujo were to continue to critique him so 
thoroughly (the Centinela covered only nine of Martínez’s discourses), that he would need “God to give him the life 
in order to see the nineteen volumes which he [Araujo] would offer us against the Medicina Sceptica.” (Martín 
Martínez, ME.II.2 “Digo, que he visto el libro Nuevo: quiera Dios darme vida, para ver los diez y nueve Tomos, que 
nos ofrece contra la Medicina Sceptica, que son los que corresponden a lomo por cada nueve hojas…”). 
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well-known scholars and religious figures to lend credence, establish orthodoxy, and add 
authoritative weight to each work. The introductory material of each work often is close to one 
hundred pages in length, and both sides of the epistemological debate here examined employed 
such appeals.  What becomes clear, therefore, is that these works form a dialogue between 
ilustrados and anti-ilustrados that was worked out in the published sphere.  The challenges and 
delays of eighteenth-century publication and misinterpretations often created scenarios where 
these figures spoke past each other rather than addressing a central concern, yet in order to 
understand either side’s assertions, they must be read in the wider context of published 
intellectual debate. 
This dialectical methodology is especially important for any textual analysis of Feijóo’s 
work and that of his critics.  Because Feijóo authored both of his significant works in multiple 
installments over a wide period of time (the Teatro Crítico Universal was written in nine 
volumes between 1726-1740, and his Cartas Eruditas y Curiosas in five volumes between 1742-
1760), one must read his works in the context of the constant dialogue between Feijóo his 
supporters and defenders, and his critics and opponents.444  Doing so allows key themes of the 
conservative epistemology of the anti-ilustrados to be highlighted topically across multiple 
publications. 
  
                                                 
444 For anti-theatristas (the term which I am using to encompass all authors who wrote against Feijóo or his 
publications), see Don Geminiano Zafra Ciscodexa Antitheatro Delphico Judicial Jocoserio, Al Theatro Critico 
Universal del Reverendissimo Padre Maestro Fray Benito Feijóo, Benedictino, Cathedratico de Visperas de 
Theologia de la Universidad de Oviedo, &c. (Madrid, 1727); Soto y Marne, Reflexiones crítico-apologéticas sobre 
las obras de…Feijóo (Salamanca, S.A.); Fray Alonso Rubiños, Teatro de la Verdad… (Madrid, 1747); For a 
supporter, see Martin Sarmiento Demonstracion Critico-Apologetica del Theatro Critico Universal que dio a luz el 
R.P.M. Fr. Benito Geronymo Feijoo, Benedictino…(En Madrid, 1739).  Further information on Feijóo’s polemic can 
be found in I.L. McClelland, Benito Jerónimo Feijóo (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1969). 
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Figure 2: Feijóian, Teatrista, and Anti-Teatrista Publications, 1725-1783*445 
*Unless otherwise noted, all of the publications were printed in Madrid.  This does not include reprints of publications.  
1725 Benito Jerónimo Feijóo, Apología del escepticismo médico (Oviedo), defending M. Martínez 
1726 Feijóo, Teatro Critico Universal [TCU], Vol. I 
 Martín Martínez, Carta defensiva sobre el primer tomo del Teatro crítico universal 
1727 Feijóo, Satisfacción al Escrupuloso [s.a, unknown location] 
Anonymous, Respuesta a la carta que dictó el RPM Fr. Benito Jerónimo Feijóo 
Feijóo, Respuesta al discurso fisiológico-médico (Oviedo) 
Diego de Torres Villarroel, Entierro del Juicio Final 
Anonymous, La Razón con desinterés fundada, y la Verdad cortesanamente vestida 
Geminiano Zafra Ciscodexa, Antitheatro Delphico Judicial Jocoserio 
1728 Feijóo, TCU, Vol. II 
1729 Salvador José Mañer, Anti-teatro crítico sobre el primero, y segundo tomo del Teatro crítico 
Feijóo, TCU, Vol. III 
Antonio Heredia y Ampuero, El estudiante preguntón 
Feijóo, Ilustración apologética al primero, y segundo tomo del Teatro Crítico 
Mañer, Belerofonte literario y respuesta apologética  
1730 Feijóo, TCU, Vol. IV 
1731 Mañer, Anti-theatro critico, sobre el tomo tercero del Theatro Critico 
Mañer, Replica satisfactoria a la Ilustracion Apologética, Vol. I and II [s.a] 
Carlos de Montoya y Uzueta, Critico y cortes castigo de pluma contra los engaños… 
1732 Martín Sarmiento, Demostración crítico-apologética del Teatro Crítico Universal 
1733 Feijóo, TCU, Vol. V 
1734 Feijóo, TCU, Vol. VI 
Mañer, Crisol Critico...del Theatro Critico, Vol. I and II (contra Feijóo and Sarmiento) 
Manuel Mariano Ballester y de la Torre, Combate Intelectual [estimated year] 
Antonio de Monrava y Roca, Feijoo Defendido y Ribera Convencido 
1735 Ignacio de Armesto y Ossorio, Theatro anti-crítico universal, Vol. I [s.a.] 
Armesto y Ossorio, Theatro anti-crítico universal, Vol. II 
1736 Feijóo, TCU, Vol. VII 
1737 Armesto y Ossorio, Theatro anti-crítico universal, Vol. III 
1739 Feijóo, TCU, Vol. VIII 
1740 Feijóo, Suplemento de el Teatro Crítico 
1742 Feijóo, Cartas Eruditas y Curiosas [CE], Volume I 
 Francisco de Soto y Marne, Reflexiones Critico-Apologeticas  
1745 Feijóo, CE, Vol. II 
1747 Feijóo’s TCU, Vol. VIII, is placed on the Index Librorum Prohibitorum for Spain 
1749 Feijóo, Justa repulsa de inicuas acusaciones 
1750 Soto y Marne, Advertencia contra las publicaciones de Feijoo 
Fernando VI prohibits any future condemnations of Feijóo’s works446 
Feijóo, CE, Vol. III 
1753 Feijóo, CE, Vol. IV 
Miguel Pereira de Castro Padraõ, Propugnación de la racionalidad de los brutos (Lisbon) 
1760 Feijóo, CE, Vol. V 
 Cigala, Carta Segunda a Feijóo [s.a] 
1783 Feijóo, Adiciones  
                                                 
445 Digitally available through the Biblioteca Feijoniana, from the Proyecto Filosofía en español project online 
(http://www.filosofia.org/feijoo.htm).  See also the catalog of works provided in the 1765 reprinting of the first 
volume of the Teatro Critico: Feijóo, Teatro Critico Universal (Madrid: En la Imprenta Real de la Gaceta, 1765). 
446 Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler, eds, The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 733; also, Germán Bleiberg, Maureen Ihrie, and Janet Pérez, eds., 
Dictionary of the Literature of the Iberian Peninsula (A-K) (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1993), 375. 
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Though a few studies of anti-ilustrados and anti-theatristas exist, these works almost 
uniformly side in relegating them to a dogmatic, irrational, and culturally irrelevant position.  
This charge is not new – it was, in fact, a claim made by ilustrados during the eighteenth 
century.  In the 1720s, a physician in Cordoba, Doctor Gonzalo Antonio Serrano, published a 
paper attacking Mañer, which he titled the “Trifles of Mañer.”  Serrano believed that many of the 
critiques Mañer was making were inconsequential or tangential to the real claims made by works 
of the novatores.447  Similarly, the modern day scholar Ivy McClelland has argued that “apart 
from a rare inaccuracy…[Feijóo] was largely being attacked…because he was being 
misinterpreted; because his statements were being used misleadingly out of their context….”448  
No examples are given.  It is true that Feijóo complained that his critics were misapplying his 
work and misunderstanding his terminology (similar to Martínez’s lament over the 
misunderstanding of “skepticism”).449  Similarly, McClelland argues that Mañer’s comments 
were unsubstantial and nitpicky, finding “reasoning on minor points of logic” and “pettifogging 
logic.”450  In this way, McClelland aligns herself wholly with Feijóo’s critiques of Mañer’s 
review of his work.  In the prologue of his Ilustración Apologética (1729), Feijóo wrote that, 
…the Anti-Teatro is nothing more than the stage rigging of a theater, a chimera of 
criticism, a comedy of eight farces, a naïve person’s illusion, an infant’s 
boogeyman, a castle in the air, without base, truth, or reason…I could save many 
                                                 
447 Unfortunately, the Fruslerias de Mañer by Serrano does not appear to have survived to the present day.  The only 
remaining knowledge of it comes from Mañer’s response to it.  See Salvador Joseph Mañer, Belerofonte literario y 
respuesta apologetic a el papel intitulado: Fruslerias de Mañer, hecho por el Doct. D. Gonzalo Antonio Serrano, 
Philomatemathico, y Medico de Cordova (Madrid: se hallarà en casa de Juan de Moya, 1729), BNE: VE/1447/5. 
Available digitally through Biblioteca Digital Hispánica.  
448 McClelland, Feijóo, 117.  To be fair, Mañer wrote so much that it would be unreasonable to expect complete 
perfection.  Even Armesto y Ossorio points out the occasional flaw in Mañer’s volumes.  For example, in his 
analysis of “Antipatia de Franceses & de Españoles,” Armesto y Ossorio writes about “a stupid trifle on the part of 
the Anti-Theatro.” “…una friolera tonta de parte del Anti-Theatro.” Aremeto y Ossorio, Anti-Theatro, Lib.III. 
Discurso XXV, 203. 
449 See, for example, Feijóo’s Ilustración Apologética or Martínez’s Philosophía Scéptica. 
450 McClelland, Feijóo, 117-118. 
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the money that it costs to buy his Writings and the consumption of time that it 
takes to read them.451 
Elsewhere, Feijóo describes his contempt for the sophistry of eighteenth-century counter-
enlighteners.  He wrote that it was “born from a poor study of the dialectic of our 
Schools,” and was an “abuse of verbal disputes.”452  Scholars studying the anti-ilustrados 
and anti-theatristas have accepted Feijóo’s condemnation of Mañer as true.  This chapter 
challenges this acceptance, asserting that the anti-ilustrado platform was neither irrational 
nor illogical, but rather operated from a different, conservative epistemological axiology 
that promoted cautiousness in adopting new methods of inquiry and promoted traditional 
sources of authority.453 
 
Anti-Ilustrados and Epistemological Cautiousness 
The first marker of this conservative epistemology was a hesitancy to adopt the methods 
of the “new philosophy,” specifically, empiricism, skepticism, and rationalism.  The period of 
the novatores (1687-1725) had inundated Spain with a variety of new concepts, and the novelty 
of these ideas made them suspect to many anti-ilustrados. Indeed, the very word novedad 
signifies in Spanish both “novelty” and “mishap.”454  “Various wits moved themselves against 
                                                 
451 “… el Anti-Teatro no es más que una tramoya de Teatro, una quimera crítica, una Comedia de ocho ingenios, una 
ilusión de inocentes, un coco de párvulos, una fábrica en el aire, sin fundamento, verdad, ni razón…con este 
desengaño les ahorraré a muchos el gasto de dinero en comprar sus Escritos, y el consumo de tiempo en leerlos....” 
Feijóo, Ilustración Apologética, Prólogo al Lector, 1729. Feijóo makes a wordplay between the title of his work as a 
Teatro – a theater in the sense of a field of operations or a place for action to occur – and the rigging and falseness of 
stage scenery of a dramatic theater.  Decrying an opponent’s work as a chimera was a popular means of discrediting 
them as irrational and nonsensical.  The eight comedies is a reference to Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra’s popular 
work, Ocho Comedias y Ocho Entremeses Nuevos, Nunca Representados (1615). 
452 From the 1765 version of Feijóo’s TCU.I, pg. viii. 
453 Particularly in the case of “misunderstanding” terminology and concepts, this paper argues that anti-ilustrados 
deliberately destabilized certain concepts to assert a weakness in the theory behind each. 
454 In Covarrubias’s 1611 Tesoro, he defines “novedad” as “a new and unaccustomed thing.  Usually [thought] to be 
dangerous by bringing with it change from ancient use.”  (“Novedad:: cosa nueva y no acostumbrada. Suele ser 
peligrosa por traer consigo mudança de uso antiguo.” Covarrubias, Tesoro, 1168).  This has been noted by John 
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the new work,” Mañer wrote, and “the Presses sweated under a multitude of witty writings.”455  
Mañer sought to distinguish his critiques, writing, “…in short, novelty always arrives dressed in 
the foreign, and looked upon with strangeness…”456  Feijóo himself would later comment on the 
way in which all innovation was subject to suspicion in Spain.  In the second volume of his 
Cartas Eruditas y Curiosas, Feijóo echoed Mañer’s statements, describing 
…the preoccupation that is in the kingdom of Spain against all novelty.  Many say 
that when it comes to doctrines, the title of “the new” is enough needed to censure 
them; because the novelties in the field of doctrine are suspicious…the new 
doctrines in the Sacred Sciences are suspect, and all those with this judgment have 
censured the doctrinal novelties, of these they have spoken.457 
Mañer’s comments against newness underscore the fact that he, like many anti-ilustrados, did 
not seek to reject the “new philosophy” out of hand entirely.  Rather, Mañer advocated that 
discerning and intellectually responsible individuals would analyze these new ideas slowly and 
carefully.  Fray Francisco de Soto y Marne, a Franciscan anti-ilustrado emphasized the 
connection between novelty and falsehood in his Alphabetical Index of Notable Things, stating 
that novelty “…is extremely risky.  It hides the poison of falsehood which harasses geniuses, by 
means of exquisite attractiveness it captivates minds.  It is the daughter of the levities of 
discourse, the sister of assented superstitions, and the mother of reckless judgments.”458 
                                                 
Browning, “Fray Benito Jerónimo de Feijóo & the Sciences in 18th-Century Spain,” in The Varied Pattern: Studies 
in the 18th Century, ed. Peter Hughes and David Williams (Toronto: A.M. Hakkert, Ltd., 1971), 353. 
455““Varios ingenios se conmovieron contra la nueva obra…sudaron con la Prensas una multitud de ingenios….” 
Mañer, Anti-Theatro Critico sobre el Primero y Segundo Tomo del Theatro Crítico Universal…, Prologo al Lector,” 
[1727?] Given that Mañer’s work is one of the earliest printed books available by anti-theatristas, it is most likely 
that the works to which Mañer refers were short essays, sermons, pamphlets, or periodical pieces that have since 
been lost. 
456 “…o porque en fin, siempre la novedad viene vestida de estrangera, y mirada con extrañeza...” Mañer, Anti-
Theatro Critico sobre el Primero y Segundo Tomo del Theatro Crítico Universal…, Prologo al Lector,” [1727?] 
457 “…La segunda causa es la preocupación, que reina en España contra toda novedad. Dicen muchos, que basta en 
las doctrinas el título de nuevas para reprobarlas, porque las novedades en punto de doctrina son sospechosas…Las 
doctrinas nuevas en las Ciencias Sagradas son sospechosas, y todos lo que con juicio han reprobado las novedades 
doctrinales, de estas han hablado.” CE.II.16§6-7, “Causas del atraso que se padece en España en orden a las 
Ciencias Naturales,” 1745.  
458 “Novedad. En materias de Literatura, i Doctrina, es sumamente arriesgada…oculta la venenosa falsedad con que 
atosiga los ingenios, entre aquel exquisito atractivo, con que embelesa los animos...Es hija de las levedades del 
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Similarly, Armesto y Ossorio compared his task of analyzing Feijóo and Martín 
Sarmiento to that of a ship’s pilot, constantly referencing the maps and charts that had been 
drawn by earlier navigators.  “Because in navigation,” he writes, “what comes of always looking 
at the nautical rules is that one frees himself from many rocks upon which others have 
shipwrecked incautiously.  At least up to now my maxims have run without contradiction.”459  
Armesto y Ossorio’s nautical metaphor perfectly emphasizes the circumspect which 
scientifically-informed thinkers urged in response to the nueva filosofía.  Restraint in assent was 
needed until methods could be verified, findings double-checked, and philosophical 
presuppositions reconciled with earlier authorities. 
A cautious epistemological attitude towards novelty resulted in a hesitancy to quickly 
adopt empirical methods or philosophies that, in the view of the anti-ilustrados, had only 
recently been established and which had not yet suffered enough scrutiny to be blindly trusted as 
scientific doctrine.  In his review of Feijóo’s discourse on medicine, for example, he notes that 
“In this present Discourse, I feel that your Reverence [has made] an error, which consists in the 
excessive confidence which he makes in Medicine….”460  Mañer prudently notes the use and 
benefit of medicine as a source of knowledge, as well as the progress which had been recently 
made in that field.  In his initial critique of Feijóo, Mañer was keen to thank the Benedictine for 
the contributions which he had made towards the correction of errors in Spain.  “[The] remedy,” 
he wrote in his prologue to the reader, “and general purging [of common errors] was taken out of 
                                                 
discurso; hermana de las supersticiones del assenso; i madre de las temeridades del juicio…” Indice Alphabetico de 
las Cosas Notable contenidas en este primero Tomo in Soto y Marne, Fray Francisco de, Reflexiones Critico-
Apologeticas sobre las Obras del RR. P. Maestro Fr. Benito Geronymo Feyjoo… (Salamanca: por Eugenio Garcio 
de Honorato i S. Miguel, 1749. 
459 “…porque el navegante, que lleva siempre à la vista las reglas de la Nautica, se liberta de mucho escollos, en que 
otros han naufragado incautos.” Armesto y Ossorio, Anti-Theatro, Lib.III.Prologo.ii. 
460 En el presente Discurso sienta su Reverendísima un error, que consiste en la nimia confianza, que se hace de la 
Medicina…” Don José Salvador Mañer, “Medicina, Discurso Quinto,” in Anti-Theatro Critico, Sobre el Primero y 
Segundo Tomo del Theatro Critico Universal (1729), 52-53. 
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the public light this past year of 1727 in the first volume of his Theatro Crítico Universal.”461  
His praise is effuse and poetic, noting that “with his grand scholarship washed our eyes of our 
blindness, removing the cataracts of our deceit in the common errors which has appeared to 
us.”462 
With a particular care for how an overreliance on things medical and empirical could 
influence individuals, particularly the vulgo, Mañer sought to curtail Feijóo’s endorsement of the 
medical field.  He wrote, “For there are many, and I know not a small number, that if the 
confidence which one has in medicine is good, when it is too much, it can have by mistake the 
common defect of excess, and this is what one finds in the vulgo, just as your Reverence 
wants…”463  For Mañer, and for many anti-ilustrados, scientific and medical advancements had 
yet to earn the trust granted by the test of time.  Ilustrados such as Feijóo, according to Mañer, 
had placed “nimia confianza” –  excessive confidence – in the new philosophy and science of the 
novatores. 
A common critique voiced by Feijóo and his supporters and supported by the 
historiography is that many of the anti-theatristas lacked the appropriate scientific and medical 
                                                 
461 “De esta suma felicidad no experimento la física iguales ventajas, que como parte menos noble, y mas pegada a 
lo tereno, quedó solo sostenida de las débiles fuerzas de lo humano, con las que arrastrando el hombre sus deseos 
por el dilatado giro de tantos transcursos, ha ido de un tiempo en otro logrando en la naturaleza algunos hallazgos, y 
con ellos ilustrando por los pasados los siglos subsecuentes, se ha arribado a el presente, en que admirándonos de los 
yerros de los antiguos, podamos dejar por sucesión los nuestros; para que los venideros hagan lo mismo, según la 
sentencia de Seneca al cap. 33. Nat. Quaest. Con esta, en fin, insipiencia dilatada, se han ido extendiendo los errores 
hasta llegar a ser comunes, para cuyo remedio, y general expulsión, sacó a la publica luz el año [] pasado de 1727 el 
primer Tomo de su Theatro Critico Universal el Reverendisimo Padre Maestro Fray Benito Feijóo, Maestro General 
a la Religion de San Benito, Cathedratico de Visperas de Theologia en la Universidad de Oviedo,” Mañer, Anti-
Theatro Critico Vol. 1,2, “Prologo al Lector” 
462 “en el que con su grande erudición puso el colirio de nuestra ceguedad, desterrando las cataratas de 
nuestro engaño en los comunes errores que padecíamos.” Mañer, Anti-Theatro Critico Vol. 1,2, “Prologo al 
Lector” 
463 “Pues muchos hay, y yo conozco no pocos: con que si bien la confianza que se hace de la medicina, cuando es 
demasiada, tenga por error el defecto común de los excesos, y este se halle en el vulgo, como su Reverendísima 
quiere…” Mañer, “Medicina, Discurso Quinto,” in Anti-Theatro Critico, Sobre el Primero y Segundo Tomo del 
Theatro Critico Universal (1729), 52-53. 
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backgrounds to intelligently oppose the position of the novatores.  For this reason, the anti-
ilustrados had to content themselves with pointing out minor logical flaws or mistakes, 
oversights, or to destabilize a work by engaging in semantic devolution.464  This position has 
been strenuously argued against in chapter one of this dissertation, in which it was demonstrated 
that critics of Martínez such as Araujo and Lesaca were scientifically trained and informed, and 
often wrote their anti-ilustrado works with the backing of scientific organizations and university 
faculties.  Similarly Mañer wrote extensively in the introductory material of his first critique 
attempting to demonstrate his qualifications, distinguish himself from uninformed critics of 
Feijóo, and to compliment Feijóo on the good work which he had accomplished in disabusing 
many errors.  He writes describing the “weak argument of shallow wits” that ensued after 
Feijóo’s initial writings, specifying that “not all of these were comprehending in the same 
sentiment…” and “…nobody doubts that [there is an] abundant number of idiots.”465  Mañer 
notes that he, unlike other anti-theatristas, had carefully read Feijóo, had delayed his publication 
to ensure that he was cautious in his reviews, and that his comments were critiques of oversights 
and errors that he submitted to the authority of sabios as evidence of their doubtless veracity.  
This is very similar to Luis de Flandes, who expressed in the prologue to his Antiguo Académico 
Contra el Moderno Scéptico, in which he writes, “The aim of my work is to dispute with bad 
                                                 
464 Both Crujeirias Lustres and McClelland argue this position, labeling it a “vulgo conception of science.” See the 
chapter under this title in McClelland, Ideological Hesitancy in Spain; see also McClelland, Feijóo, 118; also, María 
José Crujeiras Lustres, “La filósofa rancia: un pensamiento ignorado,” Anales del Seminario de Historia de la 
Filosofía 10, 45-55, Editorial Complutense, Madrid, 1993, pg. 45-46. 
465 “…pero en lo general era la común quexa el destierro universal que se les había intimado: sobre lo que 
exclamaban era audacia muy destemplada, y demasiada satisfacción propia presumir el Autor de aquella 
obra, ser mas sabio que el resto de los demás hombres, no siendo capaz de que errasen todos, y fuese único 
en el acierto.  Argumento débil de ingenios superficiales: pues ni todos estaban comprehendidos en unos 
mismos sentimientos, ni su Reverendisima era tan único en mucha parte de los suyos, que no se hallasen 
otros ser de su proprio dictamen; que aunque no fuesen tantos como los del sentir contrario, nadie duda ser 
dilatadísimo el numero de los necios.  El diluvio de papeles que salieron como llovidos, aunque no todos 
mojados, hubo de llegar a serenidad, sin embargo el que de tiempos en tiempos goteaban, con lo que al año 
siguiente, que contamos en el pasado, continuando el mismo Autor la obra de su Theatro, sacó su 
segundo…” Mañer, Anti-Theatro (Primero y Segundo), “Prólogo al Lector” 
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Critics, or bad correctors of Philosophy…all of the sages have used and use the rays of the 
sciences…”466  Flandes and Mañer and many anti-ilustrados sought to discern between useful 
and harmful application of the new science to Catholic Spain. 
Armesto y Ossorio, in his colorful prose, wrote in his analysis of “Apparent Wisdom” on 
the distinction between helpful and harmful scientists and medical professionals that “Science 
has her hypocrites, just as Virtue does: and not a small number of the Vulgo is deceived by 
them…”467  These “hypocrites of Science” feigned positions of authority and prestige and were 
able to persuade many to their position.  Armesto y Ossorio insinuates that many of these figures 
occupied prominent positions – perhaps university professors or members of academic societies.  
He wrote that “The unlearned are many, [and they] walk among the plaza of the sabios.  [They 
are] very dexterous men, making their papers in the reserved place of the Theatre of the World, 
in which they add tincture to their letters to serve as color, for to simulate high doctrines.”468    It 
is ironic, perhaps, that while the general history of the period has portrayed the anti-ilustrados as 
intransigent and rigid, they themselves laid the same claim of dogmatism against the followers of 
enlightenment and scientific “doctrine.” 
Armesto y Ossorio, Mañer, and many anti-ilustrados, were particularly alarmed at the 
potential that the new philosophy, as well as its misconstructions, could have upon a largely 
undiscerning and lay public, known in Spain as the vulgo (the common reader).  Historians have 
noted that many of the ilustrados were concerned to portray themselves as disillusioning the 
superstitious vulgo of Spain’s populace.  Feijóo, for example, stated that if the “…deceived will 
                                                 
466 Flandes, Antiguo Academico, second page of prologue. “Mi trabajo se encamina à disputar con malos Criticos, ò 
malos correctores de la Philosofia….Todos los Sabios han usado, y usan de las raìzes de las ciencias…” 
467 “Tiene la Ciencia sus hypocritas, como la Virtud: y no menos es engañado el Vulgo por aquellos, que por 
estos…” Armesto y Ossorio, Anti-Theatro Lib.III. “Sabiduria Aparente,” 180. 
468 “Son muchos los indoctos, que pasan plaza de sabios.  Ay hombres muy diestros, en hacer el papel de cotos en el 
Theatro del Mundo, en quienes la leve tintura de las letras sirve de color, para figurar altas doctrinas. “Armesto y 
Ossorio, Anti-Theatro Lib.III. “Sabiduria Aparente,” 180. 
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not be disabused of error, I will not rest from my responses, neither to Señor Mañer nor to the 
other.”469  Yet anti-ilustrados also wrote concerning the vulgo.  Armesto y Ossorio, specifically 
noted that the hypocrites of science promoted false “doctrines” that could fool the majority of 
Spaniards.  “If what [the hypocrite] paints is [as good as] Zeuxis470 , the little birds will fly 
without caution to the painted grapes as if they were true ones.”471  Again, Armesto y Ossorio 
emphasizes the danger of rash adoption of empirical practices – “flying without caution” and 
without a careful examination of the material represented to anti-ilustrados a lack of prudence 
and irresponsible academic virtue.  Like the earlier critiques against Martínez, anti-theatristas 
and advocates of the conservative epistemology resented the fact that new and unproved 
knowledge was being disseminated widely, often in the vernacular, and poorly to a readership 
who agitated Spanish society in their confusion.  Critics of enlightenment therefore sought to 
counter the uncertainty of new concepts with the reliability of familiar sources. 
 
The Reaffirmation of Traditional Sources of Authority 
The second marker of the conservative epistemology of the early anti-ilustrados was 
therefore the reaffirmation of traditional sources of authority.  For individuals such as Mañer and 
Armesto y Ossorio, this included ancient figures such as Aristotle or Galen, as well as Biblical 
                                                 
469 En esta Apología se verá, que el Anti-Teatro no es más que una tramoya de Teatro, una quimera crítica, una 
Comedia de ocho ingenios, una ilusión de inocentes, un coco de párvulos, una fábrica en el aire, sin fundamento, 
verdad, ni razón. Y siendo cierto, que el Sr. Mañer con todos sus asociados no podrá escribir de aquí adelante, sino 
como escribió hasta aquí, con este desengaño les ahorraré a muchos el gasto de dinero en comprar sus Escritos, y el 
consumo de tiempo en leerlos. Mas si el Sr. Mañer prosiguiere, y los engañados no se desengañaren, no me cansaré 
en más respuestas, ni al Sr. Mañer, ni a otro alguno. Continuaré mi Obra, sin cuidar de satisfacer a objeciones de 
trampantojo, o ya mis contrarios lo canten como triunfo, o ya lo lloren como desprecio.” Feijóo, Ilustración 
Apologética, Prólogo al Lector, 1729. 
470 Zeuxis was a Greek painter renowned for his illusionism and ability to create life-like paintings, described in an 
anecdote about birds trying to eat grapes he painted.  Although none of his works have survived, he is referenced in 
several ancient Greek texts. 
471 “Si el que pinta es un Zeuxis, volaràn las avecillas incautas à las uvas pintadas, como à las verdaderas.” Armesto 
y Ossorio, Anti-Theatro Lib.III. “Sabiduria Aparente,” 180. 
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and patristic writers.  Anti-ilustrado discourse did not solely consist of denials and inversions of 
enlightenment thought – they advocated, in its place, the mental framework which had girded 
their institutions and their society for fifteen hundred years.  Traditional sources of authority, 
including scriptural and patristic authors, conciliar and papal pronouncements, and the works of 
established writers such as Aristotle and Galen were all reasserted as the sabios to whom all 
work had to at least be consulted and compared before promulgated.  In this exaltation of 
traditional authority, the anti-ilustrados emphasized the newness of the filosofía often.  In the 
introduction of his half-mocking, half-serious critique AntiTheatro Délphico Judicial Jocoserío, 
Don Geminiano Zafra Ciscodexa jested that: 
This scholarly man [Feijóo], 
With notable scholarship, 
Gives rules, but they aren’t 
Like those of Saint Benedict.472 
The solution, for Ciscodexa, as well as for Mañer and Armesto y Ossorio, was to reassert the 
traditional stance – to carefully investigate the informal canon of authority and to compare the 
findings of the nueva ciencia with what had come before.  It is important to emphasize that for 
anti-theatristas, within the sphere of anti-ilustrados, Feijóo had not failed to consult the 
authorities, but had rather come to the wrong conclusions or had made “oversights” (descuidos) 
in his study.  Feijóo, as well as the generic Spanish ilustrado, was no philosophe, in the sense 
that he did not reject authorities, but rather sought to reinterpret them and to recognize the limits 
of their applicability. 
                                                 
472 “Este varon erudito/Con notable erudición,/Reglas dà, pero no son/Como la de San Benito.” From “Pro Theatri-
Anticritici Auctore in Theatri Critici Auctorem D. Thomae Antonii de Bedón, latinitatis Magistri,” in Zafra 
Ciscadexa, Antitheatro Delphico, 1727, frontmatter (vi).  Feijóo was a Benedictine, making the departure noted by 
Zafra Ciscodexas more pronounced. 
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In the Anti-Theatro, Mañer references not only scriptural, patristic, and traditional 
ecclesiastical authorities, but also relies upon the traditional teachings of established medical and 
scientific thinkers.  He mentions, for example, on three successive pages in one discourse, 
“…[his] reverence for the authority of Señor Hippocrates…,” that as anecdotal evidence, he did 
“remember reading in the City of God of St. Augustine…,” and that Feijóo himself had 
supported an opinion “…with the authority of Sanctorius, Galen, and Paulo Zaquias….and that 
of Doctor Luis Lemeri.”473  By including Hippocrates along with Augustine, and Galen with the 
holy scripture, Mañer exemplifies the attitude which many anti-theatristas and anti-ilustrados 
had towards authority.  In the face of new and unknown ideas, these authorities were to be 
reevaluated, not dismissed. 
Similarly, Armesto y Ossorio positioned all of his work in reference to the sabios – the 
established authorities which had been long trusted as sources of knowledge.  This included 
Church Fathers, such as Augustine and Aquinas, as well as secular authorities such as Galen and 
Aristotle.  Armesto y Ossorio wrote that “I can promise myself without vanity, that what will 
appear [in this work] has little contradictions to the Sages, and to the Wise Ones…”474 Anti-
ilustrados countered the “spirit of empiricism” of enlightenment thought with a reassessment of 
the value of revelation and tradition as legitimate sources of knowledge.475  In a particularly 
                                                 
473 “Si yo profesará la Medicina, le hiciera mi reverencia a la autoridad del Señor Hippocrates; mas 
hallandome fuera de sus dominios, debo decir, que no esbastante el que porque un manjar no sea nocivo en 
lo singular, se siga no lo será tampoco en lo general. “ (64); “Acuerdome haber leído en la Ciudad de Dios 
de San Agustin, que el Santo refiere que en su tiempo vió un hombre, que movia las orejas a un tiempo, y 
sucesivamente”. (65); “En el numero 10 en materia de mantenimientos, se declara su Reverendisima contra 
las carnes, en favor de los peces, con la autoridad de Sanctorio, Galeno, y Paulo Zaquias; y hace lo mismo a 
favor de las yerbas, con la del Doctor Luis Lemeri.” (66)  From “Regimen para Conservar la Salud 
(Discurso Sexto),” in Mañer, Anti-Theatro Critico sobre el Primero y Segundo Tomo del Theatro Crítico 
Universal… (1727?) 
474 “Puedo prometerme sin vanidad, à que padecerè pocas contradicciones de los Sabios, y Prudentes…” Armesto y 
Ossorio, Anti-Theatro, Lib. III., Prologo.ii. 
475 John Lynch, Bourbon Spain 1700-1808 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 254. 
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dramatic example, Armesto y Ossorio comments upon the “Philosophical Wars” which Feijóo 
initially described in the third volume of his Teatro Crítico Universal.  He contrasts the tension 
between Cartesianism, Gassendism, and atomism, and the relative placidity of the former 
Aristotelian thought.  In piety and temperance, Armesto y Ossorio found the moderns sorely 
lacking.  He writes that “In Catholic Schools, perhaps one can see an offensive word, which one 
detests as a monster of the classroom…”476  Armesto y Ossorio contrasts this to the modern 
school of philosophy, noting “…that in the Schools of the Philosophers the greatest impiety 
arrives [as] the abominations of anger.”477  Thus, he suggested that the new philosophies carried 
with them an inherent contradictory nature and fundamental instability. 
 Like Mañer and Armesto y Ossorio, later anti-ilustrados also critiqued the devotion to the 
modernos (modern philosophers) which ilustrados such as Feijóo held.  Writing in 1749, Fray 
Soto y Marne wrote that “you will find evidenced that the Histories, both Sacred and Profane, 
with the three irrefutable Testimonies of Authority, Experience, and Reason argue that the World 
was getting worse in custom with each step that grew in age.”478  Soto y Marne would later 
critique Feijóo, denouncing him as a follower of Newton, Descartes, and Gassendi.  Although 
Feijóo countered this charge, stating that “I do not constitute a follower of any of these three,” 
his frequent reference to the philosophies of each and eclectic adoption of some of their ideas 
caused conservative thinkers to associate him with wholesale acceptance of these 
philosophies.479  The solution for anti-ilustrados was to reassert the value of trusted and 
                                                 
476 “En las Escuelas Catholicas tal vez se nota una palabra ofensiva, que se abomina, como monstruo de la Aula;…” 
Armesto y Ossorio, Anti-Theatro Lib.III., “Guerras Philosoficas,” pag. 1 
477 “En las Escuelas de los Philosofos llegaron à mayor impiedad las abominaciones de la ira.” Armesto y Ossorio, 
Anti-Theatro Lib.III., “Guerras Philosoficas,” pag. 1 
478 “…porque haré constar, que las Historias, así Sagradas, como Profanas, con los tres irrefragables Testimonios de 
la Autoridad, Experiencia, i Razón, convencen, que el Mundo fue empeorando en costumbres, al paso que fue 
creciendo en años.” Soto y Marne, Reflexiones Critico-Apologeticas, 111 (XIV.155). 
479 “De ninguno de los tres me constituyo sectario.” Feijóo, Justa Repulsa de Iniquas Acusaciones, en Carta del 
Maestro Feyjoó a un Amigo Suyo [s.a.], 16. 
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sanctioned authorities; Soto y Marne, for example, in his index, describes Aristotle as the one 
who “established the principality of his doctrine on the ruins of his opponents,” and writes that 
Feijóo has misunderstood and underappreciated Saints Augustine and Ambrose, both Doctors of 
the Church.480 
 
The Unity of Truth in the Conservative Epistemology 
The epistemological hesitancy upon which early critics of the enlightenment insisted and 
the subsequent reaffirmation of traditional sources of authority are both indicative of the final 
marker of the conservative episteme – a unified conception of truth.  To anti-ilustrados of early-
eighteenth century Spain, all areas of knowledge – physics and metaphysics, science and 
philosophy – were inextricably connected to each other, particularly by modes of 
epistemological inquiry and justification.  The reason why ilustrados such as Feijóo could 
challenge the utility and application of established authorities such as Aristotle or Aquinas were 
because of the demarcation of separate fields of knowledge.  Feijóo argued against the 
application of suspicion to novelty in the fields of the natural sciences (as opposed to what Feijóo 
called the “Sacred Sciences”).  In the sciences, as in the arts, Feijóo argued, “there is no 
discovery or invention which was not at some time new.”481 
…to extend this grudge [against novelty] to those that appear new in those 
Faculties that do not leave the enclosure of Nature is to lend their sponsorship to 
obstinate ignorance with a stupid remark.  All novelty should be congratulated 
rather than suspected.  Nobody should be condemned for mere suspicion.  With 
this these Scholastics can never escape being unjust.  Suspicion induces 
                                                 
480 “Aristoteles….establecio el principado de su doctrina, sobre la ruina de las contrarias…Augustine….contra el 
sentir del Rmo. Feyjoo….San Ambrosio…como falsamente le insuta [insulta?] el Rmo Feyjoo…” Indice in Soto y 
Marne, Reflexiones Critico-Apologeticas. 
481 “En materia de Ciencias, y Artes no hay descubrimiento, o invención, que no haya sido un tiempo nueva.” 
CE.II.16§9, “Causas del atraso que se padece en España en orden a las Ciencias Naturales,” 1745.  
183 
examination, not for decision: this is for all genres of material, excepting only that 
of the Faith, where objective suspicion is odious and just as damnable.482 
Thus Feijóo, like Martínez before him, argued that science and theology operated with two 
separate epistemological standards.  The nueva ciencias of the novatores were accompanied by a 
philosophy of the new sciences which claimed that they never strayed from the “enclosure of 
Nature.”  Indeed, Martínez’s concept of “medical skepticsim” argued that the same methodology 
could be beneficial in natural examination and dangerous in metaphysical reflection.  Similarly, 
Feijóo noted of Descartes that he “impugn[ed] him with all the strength possible, not only as 
improbable in the Physical, but also as dangerous in places of Theology.”483 
Feijóo often described the fields of the física (physical) and teología (theology, 
metaphysical) as bounded and finite.  Yet at times, he betrayed this concept by admitting that 
filosofía (philosophy) could impact both.  Indeed, the word filosofía was ambiguously employed 
in Spanish to mean both physical and metaphysical inquiry.  Feijóo wrote that “I know that 
without leaving the [realm of] Philosophy, one can fabricate dangerous systems for 
Theology.”484 Mañer and Armesto y Ossorio, along with other anti-ilustrados, recognized the 
porosity of the proposed demarcations between the natural (física, naturaleza, ciencia, medicina, 
filosofía) and the supernatural (teología, fe, ciencias sagradas, filosofía).  These thinkers 
espoused, in contradiction to the epistemological demarcation of the ilustrados, a conservative 
epistemology that emphasized the unity of knowledge.  This was particularly true for methods of 
                                                 
482 “…Pero extender esta ojeriza a cuanto parece nuevo en aquellas Facultades, que no salen del recinto de la 
Naturaleza, es prestar, con un despropósito, patrocinio a la obstinada ignorancia. Mas sea norabuena sospechosa 
toda novedad. A nadie se condena por meras sospechas. Con que estos Escolásticos nunca se pueden escapar de ser 
injustos. La sospecha induce al examen, no a la decisión: esto en todo género de materias, exceptuando sólo la de la 
Fe, donde la sospecha objetiva es odiosa, y como tal damnable.” Feijóo, CE.II.16§6-7 “Causas del atraso que se 
padece en España en orden a las Ciencias Naturales,” 1745. 
483 “El de Descartes, no en un parte sola impugno con toda la fuerza posible, no solo como improbable en lo 
Physico, mas también como peligroso en algunas de sus partes ácia lo Theologico….” Feijóo, Justa Repulsa, 16. 
484 “Sé, que sin salir de la Filosofia, se pueden fabricar sistemas peligrosos para la Teología.” Feijóo, Ilustracion 
Apologetica, 227. 
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justification; if materialism and skepticism were adopted as methods of legitimate inquiry in the 
natural sciences, anti-ilustrados argued, it would not be long before they were insisted upon as 
the only methods for metaphysical investigations. 
While many historians have previously studied the epistemology of the sciences of the 
enlightenment, few have studied its impact in religious thought from the same period.485  Yet it is 
in this unified conception of knowledge that Armesto y Ossorio could describe his work as 
countering the Theatro Crítico with “the Truth.”486  This was, in fact, the same word that Feijóo 
used to describe the knowledge he sought, a knowledge that was “neither antiquity, nor novelty, 
but the truth, in which I hope to be and in which I imitate the Father of Families of the 
Gospels.”487 
Thus, although this chapter has distinguished between “scientific objections” and 
“religious objections” raised by anti-ilustrados, these are artificial categories.  Nearly every one 
of the works of “scientific objections” were girded with theology and Catholic doctrine, and 
many of the “religious objections” contained references to scientific works and accreditations by 
notable professionals in natural philosophy and medicine. It has been an ongoing concern of this 
dissertation to highlight the way in which the eighteenth-century Spanish mind conceived of the 
relationship between the fields of science and religion – what Will and Ariel Durant described as 
“…that pervasive and continuing conflict between religion and science-plus-philosophy which 
became a living drama in the eighteenth century, and which resulted in the secret secularism of 
                                                 
485 See, for example, Andrea Costa and Graciela Domenech, “Historia y Epistemología de las Ciencias,” Enseñanza 
de las Ciencias 20.1 (2002), 159-165; also W.R. Daros, “Epistemología y Ciencia: ¿Es Ciencia la Teología?” 
(independent, unpublished paper). 
486 Taken from the title of Armesto y Ossorio’s Theatro Anti-Critico. 
487 “me explico con amargura contra los modernos, que tratan con desprecio á Aristoteles….en fin, todos mis 
Escritos vocéan, que ni prefiero para el asenso, ni la antigüedad, ni la novedad, sino la verdad, en quanto me parece 
serlo; y que procuro imitar al Padre de Familias del Evangelio…” Feijóo, Justa Repulsa, 16. 
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our times.”488  To this narrative, the testimony of anti-ilustrado literature is one which argues for 
a highly compatible, mutually dependent view.  Any “living drama” which occurred in Spain 
only serves to underscore how seriously the relationship was viewed. 
 
“If Feijóo Writes in Silver, You Have Impugned Him in Gold:” The Case Study of Cigala 
All three of these markers – epistemological cautiousness, a reaffirmation of traditional 
sources, and an insistence on the unity of knowledge – are revealed in the case study of 
Francisco Ignacio Cigala, a Jesuit-educated intellectual, gentleman, and amateur scientist living 
in Mexico during the mid-eighteenth century.489  Around 1760, Cigala published an open letter, 
                                                 
488 Durant, Age of Voltaire, vii. 
489 Little is known about the life of Francisco Ignacio Cigala.  Most scholars agree that he was born in Havana in the 
first half of the eighteenth century; some have posited 1712 as his birth year. (Salvador Bueno argues that Cigala 
was born in 1712, without much evidence, in Salvador Bueno, “México en la literature cubana,” Revista de la 
Biblioteca Nacional de Cuba [s.a.?].)  At an unknown age, after studying science at the Franciscan college in 
Havana, he traveled to Mexico, most likely sometime around the middle of the century.  There, he furthered his 
studies, particularly concentrating within the fields of agricultural science and physics.  (Gonzalo Díaz Díaz, ed., 
Hombres y documentos de la filosofía española. Vol. 2 (C-D) (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones 
Cientificas, Instituto de Filosofia “Luis Vives,” 1983), 330.) Gonzalo Díaz Díaz lists Cigala as a Jesuit in his 
Hombres y documentos de la filosofía española, a fact which is repeated often in the secondary literature.  (Díaz 
Díaz, Hombres y documentos, 330.) However, there is no evidence whatsoever that Cigala was a member of the 
Society of Jesus, whereas there is ample reason to believe that he was not a member.  In a letter dated July 27th, 
1767, Cigala refers to “your order” of the Jesuits, rather than “our order.” (“Carta de Cigala a Señor Sargento Mayor 
Don Luis Ignacio Milhau,” 30 de julio, 1767, in Archivo General de la Nación, Indiferente Virreinal, Caja 4880, 
9959/26, Expediente 026 (Jesuitas Caja 4880).)  In November of that same year, Cigala is absent from any of the 
registries (neither in the i catalogi annuals, the so-called “breves” which annually reported the number and names of 
each member and the college and province of each, nor in the I catalogi triennales, special registries given every 
three years by the Province to the General).  Neither is he in the manifests of Jesuits during the expulsion of the 
Society from Veracruz to Havana and from Havana to Cádiz. (“Carta de Cigala a Señor Sargento Mayor Don Luis 
Ignacio Milhau,” 30 de julio, 1767, in Archivo General de la Nación, Indiferente Virreinal, Caja 4880, 9959/26, 
Expediente 026 (Jesuitas Caja 4880); also ARSI.Antica Compagnia, Assistentia Hispaniae, Mexico, Tomo 8 
“Catalogo Trien et Breve 1751-1764,” and Tomo 11 “Catalogo de los Sujetos de la Compañía, 1767.”) Most 
obviously, Paredes specifically describes Cigala as a “Caballero secular” in his introduction to Cigala’s second letter 
to Feijóo. (Paredes, “…un Americano, y erudite Caballero secular…” Introductory Letter in Cigala’s Carta 
Segunda, pg. xxv.)  Beristáin y Souza, a contemporary scholar of Cigala’s, does not describe Cigala as a Jesuit in his 
brief biographical sketch of the man. (Beristáin y Souza, José Mariano. Biblioteca Hispanoamericana Septentrional. 
México, s. i., 1816, Vol. 1, pg. 345.)  Instead, it seems that Cigala was a secular gentleman and landowner, probably 
of some wealth and stature, likely involved in the industry of sugar mills, and in close contact with leading 
academics and particularly with members of the Society of Jesus. 
It is certain, however, that Cigala was a widely-read and well-connected individual.  References in his work 
evince a familiarity with learned publications from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and his second letter 
received the endorsement of Juan Joseph de Eguiara y Eguren, the bishop of Yucatán and before then the Chancellor 
of the Real Universidad de Mexico and Catedrático Jubilado en Prima de Sagrada Teología, as well as a calificador 
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one hundred and eighty-one pages in length, through Eguiara y Eguren’s Biblioteca Mexicana in 
response to Feijóo’s Teatro Crítico Universal.  The letter, titled Cartas al Ilmó. y Exmó. P. Mró 
F. Benito Geronymo Feyjoó Montenegro, was the second of several written, but the only which 
secured publication in Spain.490 
Cigala’s second letter, the only to be studied by scholars, offers a response to the 
impugnations made by Feijóo against Scholasticism, a method which Cigala describes as still 
employed in mid-eighteenth century Mexico, stating “in [which] method our Universities 
examine all of the Sciences.”491  Feijóo’s Teatro Critico had been published; when Cigala 
received the work in Mexico, he had originally hoped that it would demonstrate the complaints 
(some of which were legitimate) of the anti-scholastics of the Spanish Enlightenment, analyzing 
the utility of the new philosophies and reconciling them with the Catholic status quo.  “From 
there one will be convinced to give some probability [of utility and truth] to the Mechanical 
Philosophy, which the most Illustrious Feijóo so celebrates,” wrote Cigala, “[but] he ought to 
                                                 
and ordinary inquisitor in the bishopric of Puebla and a synodal examiner for the archbishopric of Mexico.  In 
addition to Eguiara y Eguren’s endorsement, however, he also received the sanction of Francisco Xavier Lazcano 
and Ignacio Paredes, both prominent intellectuals within the Society of Jesus, and Fray Felix de Castro, who 
authored a treatise in defense of Jesuit doctrines.  A later letter from 1767 shows that Cigala was in contact with 
several priests and leading figures within the Society of Jesus, perhaps even safeguarding their property during the 
expulsion. (“Carta de Cigala a Señor Sargento Mayor Don Luis Ignacio Milhau,” 30 de julio, 1767, in Archivo 
General de la Nación, Indiferente Virreinal, Caja 4880, 9959/26, Expediente 026 (Jesuitas Caja 4880).) 
490 W.B. Redmond, Bibliography of the Philosophy in the Iberian Colonies of America (The Hague, Netherlands: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), 30; also Alberto Ortiz, who writes “Es la única epístola que se conoce del autor, a pesar de 
que por el título y por él mismo sabemos de una primera que envoi al benediction asturiano, ésta nunca se public y si 
existió una tercera, no la conocmeos.” Alberto Ortiz, “Cigala reponde al Feijóo,” Estudios del pensamiento 
novohispano, (Conference proceedings from meeting held in Zacatecas, 2001, by the Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de Mexico), 244.  A third letter does exist, however, in manuscript form and which I am the first to 
transcribe in full.  See: Francisco Ygnacio Cigala, Cartas al Ilmo. y Rmo. P. Mio F. Benito Geronimo Feyjoo 
Montenegro; que le escribia sobre el Theatro Critico Universal (BNE: MSS/21312). 
491 “En que nuestras Universidades examinan todas las Ciencias,” from Francisco Ignacio Cigala. Cartas al Ilmó. y 
Exmó. P. Mró F. Benito Geronymo Feyjoó Montenegro, que le escribia, sobre el Theatro Critico Universal, 
Francisco Ignacia Cigala, Americano.  Quien las dedica a las Universidades de España y de la America. Carta 
Segunda. [Mexico?]: Con Licencia en la Imprenta de la Biblioteca Mexicana, 1760.  BNE: 5/5209 [Alcalá de 
Henares]. Pg. iv. 
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have subordinated it to that [philosophy] of Aristotles.”492  This method of “subordinating to 
Aristotles” had been the modus operandi of Catholic theologians for centuries – “pillaging the 
Egyptians” or “constructing roads from Athens to Jerusalem” by evaluating contemporary 
philosophical trends for their utility and truthfulness, and reconciling them by adaptation, 
adoption, or rejection into the Catholic canon.  This is, in fact, the same process of Catholic 
Rationalism which guided Feijóo in his own evaluation of contemporary intellectual 
developments in his anti-superstiton campaigns. 
What Cigala argued, however, was that Feijóo had, instead of subjugating the Mechanical 
Philosophy to Scholasticism, exalted it at the cost of depreciating the Scholastic tradition, and 
had therefore committed several grave mistakes.  First: the Mechanical Philosophy did not 
adequately describe the natural world and contained several “scientific” mistakes.  Secondly, and 
perhaps more importantly, although the Mechanical Philosophy was useful for understanding 
much of the natural world, it did not offer a comprehensive framework for understanding the 
entirety of knowledge and had nothing to offer in the way of accounting for metaphysical 
questions.  The answer, proscribed by Cigala, was to demonstrate these insufficiencies and to 
“subordinate” Mechanical philosophy back to its ancillary role beneath the overarching 
worldview of Catholic Scholasticism, as exemplified in the traditional litany of scholars, 
including “Albertus Magnus and his disciple and our teacher Saint Thomas, Saint Bonaventure, 
Duns Scotus, Suarez, Molina, Vasquez, and all of the learned Catholics.”493 
 Accordingly, Cigala’s motives structure his second “letter” to Feijóo: to demonstrate the 
errors in natural philosophy committed by Feijóo in his employment of the Mechanical 
                                                 
492 “De donde se convencerá, que para dar alguna segura probabilidad a la Philosophia Mechanica, que tanto celebra 
el Ilmo. Feyjoo, debio subordinarla a la de Aristoteles,” from Cigala, Carta Segunda, vi. 
493“ el Grande Alberto, y su Discipulo, y nuestro Maestro Santo Thomas, San Buenaventura, Escoto, Suarez, Molina, 
Vasquez, y todos los Doctores Catholicos…” Cigala, Carta Segunda, viii. 
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Philosophy, to show the general deficiency of the Mechanical Philosophy to account for the 
entirety of knowledge, to reaffirm the scholastic teachings of the universities of Spain, and 
thereby, to properly subordinate science beneath religion.  These aims align with the 
characteristics of conservative epistemology gathered from Mañer’s work on the Spanish 
Peninsula roughly a quarter of a century earlier.  Epistemological cautiousness is urged by 
demonstrating the untrustworthy nature of the new philosophy, traditional Scholastic inquiries 
are reaffirmed, and the unity of knowledge, rightly structured, is reasserted. 
Cigala achieves the first goal by problematizing Feijóo’s engagement of the Barometrical 
Paradox, introduced to Feijóo by Leibniz and made more famous, perhaps, by a paper presented 
on the same subject to the Royal Academy of Sciences in London in 1711.494  The question: 
“Why in calm times, the air is heavier than in rainy times?” had been addressed by Feijóo in 
“Physical Paradoxes,” the ninth discourse of his fifth volume of the Teatro Crítico, published 
originally in 1733.  Importantly, however, Feijóo had failed to sufficiently account for the 
paradox – his essay, and indeed the efforts of the wider scientific community, could not regularly 
explain the reason why air with more water vapor was lighter, rather than heavier.  Cigala’s 
choice to use this particular point as the distillation of his entire attack against the Mechanical 
Philosophy was strategic. 495 To the eighteenth-century mind, the paradox, especially the natural 
                                                 
494 “Remarks on a Paper in the History of the Royal Academy of Sciences, for the Year 1711, concerning the Cause 
of the Variation of the Barometer: to show that the Way of accounting for it in that Paper is sufficient, and that the 
Experiment made use of to prove what is there asserted, does no way prove it.  By J.T. Desaguliers, M.A., F.R.S. No 
351, p. 570,” in Charles Hutton, The Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, from their 
Commencement, in 1665, to the Year 1800, Vol. VI, from 1713-1723 (London: C. and R. Baldwin, 1809), 283. 
495 So, too, was his use of the barometer – a comparably recent invention of the early-seventeenth century whose 
uses were being regularly explored and explained throughout the eighteenth-century in relation to climatology and 
atmospheric sciences and was a well-beloved discovery of the nuevas ciencias.  See Theodore S. Feldman, “Late 
Enlightenment Meterology,” in The Quantifying Spirit in the 18th Century, Tore Frängsmyr, J.L. Heilbron, and 
Robin E. Rider, eds. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 143-178, especially pg. 156. Indeed, one 
scholar has described the barometer “as an almost magical instrument of the natural scientist…” pointing towards 
paintings of Alexander von Humboldt in particular. Ottmar Ette, Literature on the Move, trans. by Katharina Vester 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2003), 101. 
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paradox, offered a clear instance where current understanding was insufficiently explanatory, 
and therefore allowed an opportunity to demonstrate how a particular framework could offer a 
new solution, thus overcoming the paradox496  Thus, by targeting a paradox, Cigala chose to 
strike against Feijóo and the Mechanical Philosophy at an already weak spot in philosophic 
understanding.497 
 Cigala’s critique, as has been noted by scholars, contested Feijóo’s presentation of the 
paradox on several grounds:498 that Feijóo had not properly understood Boyle and Leibniz, that 
Leibniz’s actual solution to the barometrical paradox was insufficient for explaining the 
occurrence of the phenomenon, and that Feijóo’s critiques of the Scholastic Philosophy rested 
upon axioms made from the Scholastic Philosophy, and that he therefore undermined his own 
position.499  Feijóo, claimed Cigala, could not escape “the secret influence of Scholasticism.”500  
Scholasticism had, for several centuries, ingrained in Spanish intellectuals not only a body of 
knowledge, but the very format for posing a question or hypothesis, interrogating it to test its 
validity, and synthesizing diverse information to produce an answer.501  These criticisms made 
by Cigala can not be dismissed as ‘sophistry’ or equivocation – the scientific objections were 
                                                 
496 Paradoxical commentaries were therefore a popular genre of the period, although it should be understood that 
paradox was often used loosely to mean a difficult problem or inconsistency.  See, perhaps, the side discussion of a 
“genre of paradox” in Charles D. Presbery, “Hearing Voices of Satire in Don Quixote,” Cervantes: Bulletin of the 
Cervantes Society of America 26.1 (Spring-Fall 2006 [2008]), 257-276. 
497 Neither Cigala nor Feijóo had the means of fully understanding the dilemma; Count Lorenzo Romano Amedeo 
Carlo Avogadro (1776-1856), the Italian physicist whose law and work on molecular theory helped to explain the 
‘paradox’ of barometrical pressure had yet to be born. 
498 Most importantly, by Mauricio Beuchot, Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, and Alberto Ortiz. 
499 Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, Nature, Empire, and Nation: Explorations of the History of Science in the Iberian 
World (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), pg. 177, footnote 50.  See also Alberto Ortiz, “Cigala Responde 
a Feijoo,” Literatura y emblemática (Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas, s.a.), 243-264. 
500 “el secreto influjo de la Filosofía Escolástica Cigala,” Cigala, Carta Segunda, vii. 
501 Cigala very pointedly structures his letter as a classically ordered quaestio disputata as developed during the high 
middle ages.  For futher information, see Brian Lawn, The rise and decline of the scholastic ‘Quaestio Disputata’: 
with special emphasis on its use in the teaching of medicine and science (Leiden: Brill, 1993); also Ulrich G. 
Leinsle, Introduction to Scholastic Theology, trans. by Michael J. Miller (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 2010). 
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valid, and the methodological ones persuasive.  When Cigala’s published his counter-
enlightenment critique, an introductory poem praised the author, noting that “if Feijóo writes in 
silver, you have impugned him in gold.”502 
Besides pointing out the insufficiency of the explanatory power of Mechanical 
Philosophy for understanding the natural world with the specific example of barometric pressure, 
Cigala was keen to demonstrate that this new philosophy of science, at best, offered a weak view 
of a Creator God derived from natural theology.  More often, it offered a practically atheistic 
response to metaphysical questions.  Cigala wrote that “although by this path they arrive at a 
comprehension of Nature, from there they are very distant, they can only lift themselves up from 
there to a simple knowledge of its Author, God, against the Atheists, but they could never make 
rational our supernatural Faith as Scholasticism does.”503  These topics that were beyond the 
explanatory power of mechanical philosophy included, for Cigala, “the evident credibilty of 
revealed Mysteries, [and] following in this line the most formal consequences which are deduced 
from Sacred Scripture, Councils, and Fathers those highest truths wich which the Holy Roman 
Church foments piety in her children…”504  The choice, then, for Cigala, was between an 
incomplete, though increasingly useful, natural philosophy with no metaphysical recourses, or a 
fully replete metaphysical system with incomplete explanations for the natural realm.  To Cigala, 
as to many counter-enlighteners in Spain, the choice necessitated a ‘conservative’ stance. 
 
                                                 
502
 “Que si Feyjoo escribe en plata/Tu le has impugnado en oro.” Cigala, Carta Segunda, xxxviii. 
503 “pero aunque por ese rumbo llegaran a comprehender la Naturaleza, de que aun están muy distantes, solo 
pudieran levantarse de ahi, al simple conocimiento de su Autor Dios, contra los Ateistas, pero nunca sabrían hacer 
racional nuestra Fé sobrenatural, como la Escolastica.” Cigala, Carta Segunda, viii-ix. 
504 “la evidente credibilidad de los Mysterios revelados, prosigue con el hilo de formalisimas consequencias, a 
deducir de la sagrada Escriptura, Concilios, y Padres, aquellas verdades altísimas, con que la Santa Iglesia Romana 
fomenta la piedad de sus hijos…” Cigala, Carta Segunda, ix. 
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Conservative Epistemology Contrasted To Anti-Revolutionary Thought 
The conservative traditionalism of anti-ilustrado discourse promoted not only established 
authorities, but also specifically emphasized the trustworthiness of traditional Spanish 
authorities.  Yet this did not mean that Spanish anti-ilustrados (like their ilustrado counterparts) 
did not hesitate to read and examine the works of foreign thinkers – especially English and 
French publications.  As has been shown individuals such as Lessaca or Cigala demonstrated a 
clear knowledge of the works of philosophers such as Descartes, Gassendi, Malebranche, and 
even Voltaire.  The general historical narrative of the eighteenth century in Spain has described a 
xenophobic print culture jealously guarded by the Inquisition, with perhaps the reign of Carlos 
III as the only exception.  “The literature of the French philosophes,” according to historian John 
Lynch, “was known to only a small minority of educated Spaniards, a few thousand at 
most…”505  This may be true, but the few who had access to these works disseminated the 
knowledge most prodigiously – this is the very reason why so many of the anti-ilustrados 
decried the deception of the vulgo to the new philosophy.  The response of the early anti-
ilustración was not, however, an embargo against foreign philosophy, but rather a more 
responsible engagement of it. 
Both ilustrados and anti-ilustrados were conscious of the intellectual exchange between 
France and Spain; while ilustrados sought to distinguish the “good” from the “bad” in French 
Enlightenment thought and ultimately attempted to distance themselves from the application of 
these ideas in French society.  The xenophobia which would become manifested during the 
revolutionary period (1789-1815) grew only in the latter decades of the century as anti-ilustrados 
conflated the relationship between French and Spanish modernos and condemned the 
                                                 
505 John Lynch, Bourbon Spain 1700-1808, 255. 
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introduction of New Philosophy as afrancesada and directly related to atheism and social ruin.  
This attitude was non-existent in the work of Mañer and Armesto y Ossorio.  For the first half of 
the eighteenth century, for example, Mañer’s works could be found in the “French Library” at 
the popular plaza of the Puerta de Sol in Madrid.506  Mañer’s wariness of several of the ideas 
held by French philosophes did not prevent him from reading and engaging their work, 
propagating their influence by their references in his own works.  Similarly, Armesto y Ossorio 
wrote about the “diversity of wits” and the “genial dissonance” of “a natural antipathy” between 
the nations.507 
The  majority of anti-ilustrados, particularly during the second-half of the eighteenth 
century, objected to enlightenment philosophies based on what they saw as a direct relationship 
of causality between “new philosophy” and such dangers as atheism, unethical behavior, 
materialism, or deism.   Before the outbreak of the revolution in France and particularly after the 
Napoleonic invasion of the peninsula, the counter-enlightenment proper of the anti-ilustrados 
should be seen as distinct and separate from the “reactionary literature: of the revolutionary 
period between 1789-1815.  In this distinction, the historiography has failed to be clear and 
consistent in terms. 
In 1971, Javier Herrero published Los Orígenes del Pensamiento Reaccionario Español, 
the first significant work devoted exclusively to assessing the position of Spanish conservative 
thought in the eighteenth century.  His claim was bold: that the rhetoric used by the emergent 
                                                 
506 The title page of Mañer’s Crisol Critico advertises that it can be found at this store, along “with the Anti-Theaters 
and other works of the Author.” (“Se hallarà en la Libreria Francesa de la Puerta del Sol, con los Anti-Theatros, y 
demás Obras del Autor.” Salvador Joseph Mañer, Crisol Critico, Theologico, Historico, Politico, Physico, y 
Mathematico, en que se Quilatan las Materias, y Puntos que se le han Impugnado al Theatro Critico, y Pretendido 
Defender en la Demonstracion Critica el M.R.P. Lector Fr. Martin Sarmiento, Benedictino, Parte Primero (Madrid: 
En la Imprenta de Bernardo Peralta, 1734),  i, and similarly found in Mañer, Crisol Critico, Parte Segunda, i). 
507 “La diversidad de genios,” “aquella genial dissonancia,” and “una antipatía natural” in Armesto y Ossorio, Anti-
Theatro Lib.III., Discurso XXV, 205. 
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right at the end of the century against Jansenism, Freemasonry, and other Philosophical sects was 
wholly imported into Spain and without any factually substantive basis.  “There is nothing…” 
Herrero asserted, “…traditional or Spanish in the "Great masters of the Spanish tradition.”508  
Yet this chapter asserts that Herrero’s premises, largely true for the works published during the 
revolutionary period, are incorrect for examining the broader trajectory of anti-ilustración across 
the long eighteenth century, and certainly for the conservative epistemology of early anti-
ilustrados.  Herrero conflated “counter-enlightenment” discourse for the “reactionary 
mythology” (particularly anti-Jansenist, anti-Masonic, and ultraconservative Anti-Philosophical 
rumors propagated during the Napoleonic invasion).509 Herrero’s position has been the dominant 
history of conservative thought in the eighteenth century, and helps to explain why many 
subsequent historians have overlooked the anti-ilustrado discourse.510 
Thus, not only does this chapter distinguish early anti-ilustrados from later, more 
religious objections against the enlightenment, but it differentiates between all of these works 
and the specifically anti-revolutionary, reactionary thought that characterized Spain from 1789-
1815.  Between Spain’s Catholic Counter-Enlightenment and other countries, even more 
differences exist.   In this way, the Spanish anti-ilustración is as unique as the Spanish 
ilustración – indeed, as fractious as the historiography of the enlightenment is, so too is the 
                                                 
508 “…nada hay de español en los discípulos del abate Barruel.  Zeballos, el padre Alvarado, Rafael de Vélez forman 
parte de una corriente de pensamiento que ha surgido en Europa como oposición a las Luces y que cuenta, en la 
época en que éstos escriben sus obras más importantes, escasamente medio siglo.  Nada hay, pues, de tradicional ni 
de español en los “Grandes maestros de la tradición española”.” Javier Herrero, Los Origenes del Pensamiento 
Reaccionario Español (Madrid: Editorial Cuadernos para el Dialogo Edicusa, 1971), 24. 
509 Herrero, 24. 
510 The hispanist Kessel Schwartz echoed Herrero’s presentist connection “of historical narcissism and the great 
myth which still causes so much anguish as its proponents attempt to rule our consciences and our lives…” (Kessel 
Schwartz, “Review Essay of Los orígenes del pensamiento reaccionario español by Javier Herrero,” Hispania 56, 
No. 1 (Mar., 1973), 176.)  It is interesting to note that McMahon, in his study of anti-philosophe thought, also argues 
that the conservative faction in France was “not “conservative” in any strict sense, not archaically traditional, not 
romantically medieval…in fact radical, striving far more to create a world that had never been than to recapture a 
world that was lost…” (McMahon, Enemies, 14).  There is no clear evidence which would indicate that the 
conservative faction of anti-ilustrados in Spain invented their traditions. 
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counter-enlightenment, because the historiography of the counter enlightenment is the mirror, the 
countersign of the enlightenment.  The two must be read together always, one in dialogue with 
the other, as was the case in the actual intellectual sphere of eighteenth-century Spain. 
In the following chapter, the late, primarily religious, anti-ilustrado works are analyzed, 
highlighting the work of Vicente Fernández Valcárcel, and then compared with the literature 
assessed by Herrero as part of the “reactionary myth” of late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth 
century Spain.  These are particularly contextualized within the Jansenist debates of the late-
eighteenth and early-nineteenth century Spanish Catholic Church within broader ecclesiastical 
efforts to regulate reform and doctrinal critique, as well as to maintain epistemological 
hegemony.  These themes are then explored through the works of Spanish Jansenists, assessing 
how Jansenism was classified as a heterodox variety of Catholicism, what Jansenists professed in 
their texts, and how Spanish theologians responded and reacted to it.  To do so, it specifically 
analyzes El Jasenismo, a religious dialogue and debate written by Joaquín Lorenzo Villanueva in 
1811, as well as a series of editorial letters authored by Fray Francisco Alvarado.  In the 
Jansenist debates of the end of the century, one sees the full fruition of reactionary literature 
coincide with the culmination of earlier anti-ilustrado work. 
 
Conclusion 
The Mexican Enlightenment and the Case Study of Cigala 
The great Mexican philosopher Mauricio Beuchot characterized Cigala as part of the 
second phase of eighteenth-century thought, that is, “Scholasticism’s reaction against 
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modernity.”511  Beuchot’s narrative is one of gradual progression towards modernity – at the start 
of the century, the major thinkers were all scholastics – by the middle of the century, they were 
firm eclectics with a penchant for tradition, and at the end, and only at the end, did modernity 
refute scholasticism.512  That Cigala was an ardent defender of scholasticism against Feijóo is 
certain – he states in the prologue to his letters that this is his aim, it is made patently clear by his 
arguments, and the secondary literature supports this.  Take, for example, Beuchot’s description 
of Cigala’s work: 
Cigala would see the falacies that hid in the modern philosophy and would 
devolve the splendor of Scholasticism.  Above all, [he saw] that modernity had 
already brought many atheists.  Since Spain was by nature religious and Catholic, 
he would defend the insult to the faith and would aid Scholasticism, which had 
been the most ad hoc philosophy for Catholic theology…513 
But it is not enough to leave Cigala and the generations of Mexican intellectuals of the 
eighteenth century as simple reactionaries, responding to the “jactancias” of the new sciences 
and responding with the tired, traditional scholastic position. 
 First, it must be emphasized that eighteenth-century Mexican scholastics participated in 
the contemporary debates of the broader enlightenment.  To speak of the “Spanish 
Enlightenment,” one must consider the contributions made from thinkers throughout the entire 
early modern Hispanic world.  Individuals like Cigala had read and understood the most recent 
works by individuals such as Bacon and Leibniz.  Not only had they read these works, but 
Cigala, at least, understood them well enough to “demonstrate that the expirements were 
                                                 
511 Beuchot, Mauricio. “The Study of Philosophy’s History in Mexico as a Foundation for Doing Mexican 
Philosophy.” (Chapter Five) The Role of History in Latin American Philosophy: Contemporary Perspectives. Arleen 
Salles and Elizabeth Millan, eds. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. Pg. 116. 
512 Mauricio Beuchot, Filosofía y ciencia en el México dieciochesco (Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 
Mexico, 1996), 8. 
513 Beuchot, Filosofía y Ciencia en Mexico Dieciochesco, 23. Pablo González Casanova, El misioneismo y la 
modernidad cristiana en el siglo XVIII. México: Publicaciones del Centro de Estudios históricos del Colegio de 
México, 1948). 
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fallacies, and the reasonings and opnions false with respect to the theme indicated and made by 
Feijóo…”514  Mexican counter-enlighteners were not simply reacting to modern philosophy in a 
recalcitrant position of stubborn traditionalism, but instead carefully refuted the utility of the new 
sciences for understanding the natural world.  This, moreover, is emphasized by Cigala’s 
admittance that the modern philosophy had many “advantages…for society, but is unsuitable for 
Heaven.”515 
 The second, and perhaps most important point that Cigala demonstrates, therefore, is the 
most characteristic tendency of Catholic Enlightenment thought – how to properly subordinate or 
subjugate the advancements made by the new philosophies of science to the overall glory and 
utility of the metaphysical structure of the Catholic Faith.  To Cigala, the new philosophies were 
utterly insufficient in this regard – at best, offering a simple view of a Creator God derived from 
natural theology, and at worst inviting materialism, skepticism, and atheism.  Beyond these 
points, Cigala offers numerous other avenues to explore Mexican thought in the eighteenth 
century – further research is needed, for example, to adequately understand the importance of 
Cigala labeling himself an “Americano,” pointedly dedicating his work to the university system, 
printing his work in the Biblioteca Mexicana, and the general “Mexicanaity” or indigeneity of 
Cigala’s thought as distinct from Peninsular enlightenment trends.516  Likewise, attention could 
be given to understand the role of intellectual groups, religious orders, universities, and academic 
communities in functioning as transactional networks which facilitated publications such as 
Cigala’s letter.  What is clear, however, is that the debates between modernism and scholasticism 
                                                 
514 Alberto Ortiz writes that Cigala could “demostrar que los experimentos son falaces, falsos los razonamientos y 
opinions que al respect del tema indicado hizo Feijóo…” Ortiz, “Cigala Responde a Feijóo ,” 257. 
515 Cigala, Carta Segunda (1760). 
516 Recent groundbreaking work in this area may prove extremely helpful, including Gabriela Ramos and Yanna 
Yannakakis’s Indigenous Intellectuals: Knowledge, Power and Colonial Culture in Mexico and the Andes (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2014); and Peter B. Villella, Indigenous Elites and Creole Identity in Colonial Mexico, 
1500-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
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which occurred in eighteenth-century Mexico are far more complex and have much richer 
histories to yield. 
 
Characterizing Conservatism and Consilience 
In her characterization of the Spanish Catholic Enlightenment, the historian Andrea 
Schmidt identifies three key aspects which defined the ilustración intellectually: first, that 
Catholicism was distinct from Aristotelianism; second, that religious authorities were not 
necessarily authorities on nature; and third, that laypeople could study theology and philosophy 
apart from the magisterial guidance of the church.517  Correspondingly, then, this chapter has 
asserted that three of the main ideological markers of the conservative epistemology that defined 
the Spanish counter-enlightenment engaged these topics.  While ilustrados worked to 
differentiate Catholicism from the Aristotelianism beloved since Aquinas and entrenched in the 
scholastic university system, anti-ilustrados urged intellectuals to be cautious and prudent in 
their estimation of new methods of inquiry.  While individuals such as Feijóo denied that 
Biblical and patristic authorities were equally valid as experts in natural philosophy, thinkers 
such as Mañer, Armesto y Ossorio, and Cigala reaffirmed the trustworthiness of such sources.  
These issues were seen as particularly important when considered that laypersons and the wider 
public (the vulgo), were increasingly bearing witness to debates in publications that were once 
held only by the intellectual elite. 
Lastly, the fact that the conservative epistemology held by anti-ilustrados conceived of a 
unified theory of knowledge has important implications for how historians might approach 
                                                 
517 Andrea Schmidt, “Luces por la Fe: The Cause of Catholic Enlightenment in 18th-Century Spain,” in A 
Companion to the Catholic Enlightenment in Europe, ed. Ulrich L. Lehner and Michael Printy (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 
419. 
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intellectual histories of early modern Europe.518  In his work, Consilience: The Unity of 
Knowledge, biologist E.O. Wilson conceived of the notion of consilience – a term that not only 
expresses the synthesis of all the fields of knowledge, but the belief in an ordered and unified 
world. Wilson specifically highlights the Enlightenment as a case study, arguing that “the dream 
of intellectual unity first came to full flower in the original Enlightenment…[through] a vision of 
secular knowledge in the service of human rights and human progress….”519  Yet the textual 
evidence of both ilustrados and anti-ilustrados in early eighteenth-century Spain argues for a 
different interpretation of the history of the unity of knowledge.  In Catholic Spain, it was the 
ilustrados who sought to partition fields of knowledge and modes of belief, while anti-ilustrados 
insisted that science and religion were inextricably linked and would not allow for such a 
division.  While the broader implications remain unclear, it is certain that the early anti-
ilustrados of Spain, once relegated to dogmatic obscurantism and cultural irrelevance, actually 
constituted a complex and nuanced position in a dialogue over epistemological authority in the 
enlightenment. 
  
                                                 
518 The unity of knowledge has been a longstanding problem in the history of philosophy; some recent works have 
renewed scholarly interest in the concept.  See Dorothy M. Emmet, “Philosophy and “The Unity of Knowledge”,” 
Synthese Vol. 5, No. ¾ (Jul. – Aug., 1946), 134-137; Harold K. Schilling, “The Unity of Knowledge,” The Journal 
of General Education 17, No. 4 (January, 1966), 251-258; Stephen Jay Gould, The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the 
Magister’s Pox: Mending the Gap between Science and the Humanities (New York: Harmony Books, 2003), and 
Alister E. McGrath, The Foundations of Dialogue in Science and Religion (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998). 
519 E.O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (New York: Random House, Inc., 1998), 15. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
‘Each Subject Has Its Method:’ Negotiating Science and Religion in Valcárcel’s 
Desengaños Filosóficos (1787-1797) and the Spanish Counter-Enlightenment 
 
“The reverence of the first professors of this university [Salamanca] for Aristotle and for Thomas 
Aquinas, continues to the present day.  The court indeed has long declared war against them 
both, and repeatedly commanded that they should be abandoned; but, not having adopted such 
methods as are practicable, to secure obedience, the old professors walk in the same path in 
which their fathers walked before them.” 
-Joseph Townsend, A Journey Through Spain in the Years 1786 and 1787 (1791)520 
 
Change was a constant hallmark of the eighteenth-century experience in Spain.  By the 
end of the siglo de las luces, nearly all sectors of life were dramatically different from the state 
of affairs left by the last Hapsburg monarch, Carlos II (r. 1665-1700).  The Bourbon Reforms 
issued under Felipe V (r. 1700-1746)  had challenged the political and administrative structure of 
the kingdom, the reigns of Fernando VI (r. 1746-1759) Carlos III (r. 1759-1788) witnessed 
societal reordering and economic growth as agrarian reforms were implemented, and industrial 
ventures encouraged, and by the advent of Carlos IV (r. 1788-1808), even the church, especially  
the religious orders, had been challenged by regalist reforms and expressions of monarchial 
power, such as the expulsion of the Society of Jesus in 1767.  Likewise, changes and challenges 
had been introduced into the very way that Spaniards thought.  This dissertation has thus far 
traced the intellectual debates which occurred in the Spanish empire throughout the eighteenth 
century, from the first works of the novatores to the teatrista debates of the counter-
enlightenment.  Towards the end of the eighteenth century, Spanish philosophers and theologians 
produced some of the most systematic treatises that reconciled the developments made by the 
new or modern philosophies with the existing Scholastic tradition, and above all, articulated a 
                                                 
520 Joseph Townsend, A journey through Spain in the years 1786 and 1787 with particular attention to the 
agricultura, manufactures, commerce, population, taxes, and revenue of that country; and remarks in passing 
through a part of France (London: C. Dilly, 1797), three volumes, pg. 78. 
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clear epistemological platform which would both preserve the Catholic religion and define its 
relation to philosophy, both natural and metaphysical. 
In 1787, Vicente Fernández Valcárcel, a canon for the cathedral in the town of Palencia, 
fifty kilometers north of Valladolid, noted the changes to the Spanish mentality.  “One does not 
think today like the ancient Fathers used to think, and even less like the Scholastics thought,” 
Valcárcel stated; “there are other ideas, other voices, another style and method.”521  Valcárcel’s 
response to this epistemological shift was to author one of the defining works of the Spanish 
Counter-Enlightenment, the four-volume Desengaños Filosóficos (“Philosophic 
Disillusionments”), published in Madrid from 1787-1797.522  In these publications, Valcárcel 
explained what he viewed were the failures and shortcomings of modern philosophy, offered a 
defense for both innovation and tradition, and most importantly, clearly proposed an 
epistemological method for the way in which metaphysics and physics were to relate with one 
another.  On this last point, Valcárcel was unadornedly direct: “Each subject has its [own] 
method.”523  To Valcárcel, as to other Spanish intellectuals of the eighteenth century, the conflict 
between Catholicism and traditional Scholasticism and the modern philosophies arose from 
misunderstandings of the jurisdiction of each field of knowledge; conversely, the separation of 
science from theology and philosophy allowed for the pursuit of “different classes of truths” in 
mutually complementary subjects.524  This chapter assesses Valcárcel’s contribution to the 
Spanish Catholic Enlightenment platform, specifically highlighting how his notions of separate 
                                                 
521 Valcárcel, Desengaños I.3, “No se piensa hoy como pensaban los Padres antiguos, y menos como pensaban los 
Escolásticos, otras ideas hay, otras voces, otro estilo y método;”  Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my 
own. 
522 Fernández Valcárcel, Vicente. Desengaños Filosóficos, que en obsequio de la verdad, de la religión, y de la 
patria, da al publico el Doctor Don Vicente Fernández Valcárcel, canónigo de la Santa Iglesia de Palencia. Four 
volumes (1787, 1788, 1790, 1797). Madrid: Don Blas Roman, Impresor de la Real Academia de Derecho Español y 
Publico. 
523 Valcárcel, Desengaños I.408,“Cada materia tiene su metódo.” 
524 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos I.408, “…cada clase de verdades…” 
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bodies of knowledge differed from other models of the relationship between science and religion 
during the eighteenth century, how Valcárcel negotiation of science and religion allowed for the 
accommodation of the natural sciences while privileging Catholicism, and the legacy of 
Valcárcel’s thought at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries.  
Valcárcel is emblematic, therefore, of the work of Spanish thinkers during the “high” or “late” 
enlightenment which bridged the two camps which had developed in earlier epistemological 
discussions.  On the one hand, Valcárcel delighted in the advancements made by the new 
sciences and encouraged the use of new epistemological methods to make these discoveries.  On 
the other hand, he reaffirmed clearly the supremacy of revealed knowledge and the sacrosanct 
truth of Catholicism.  In order to effectively establish a “middle ground” between the progressive 
and conservative strains, Valcárcel worked to clearly negotiate the way in which the two fields of 
“science” and “religion” engaged with one another. 
 
Situating Valcárcel in the Spanish Enlightenments: Catholic or Counter? 
Vicente Fernández Valcárcel (alternatively spelled “Valcarce”) was born April 4, 1723, 
in Palencia.  It is unclear where he received his education, but given his placement of positions 
and his familiarity with scholasticism, some scholars suggest that he received his doctorate from 
the University of Alcalá.525  By 1748, he was ordained a priest by the bishop of Palencia, and 
was later a curate in Boadilla, a small town to the west of Madrid.  In 1757, he received a 
position in the Royal Chapel, was named Royal Chaplain to Fernando VI in 1758, and 
penitentiary and personal preacher to Carlos III in 1761, positions not without considerable 
                                                 
525 This is the supposition of Antolín Alvarez Torres, S.J, Historia crítica de la filosofía racionalista y empirista en 
la obra del Dr. Vicente Fdez. Valcarcel (tesis doctoral, Universidad de Valladolid) (Palencia: Excma. Diputación 
Provincial de Palencia, Departamento de Cultura, 1991), 41.  On his scholastic training, Menéndez Pelayo described 
him colorfully as one who, in the vein of Achilles, “nourished on the marrow of the lion of scholastic philosophy.” 
Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo, Historia de los heterodoxos españoles (Alicante: Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de 
Cervantes, 2003), VI.iii§VI.607. 
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political and social advantage.526  He was later a synodal examiner, a canon of the Catedrál de 
San Antolín in Palencia, and in 1796, named dean of that same cathedral by Carlos IV while 
retaining his canonship.527  He died on the 28 of January, 1798, and was buried in the chapel of 
San Sebastián in the cathedral of Palencia.528  When Valcárcel is remembered, however, it is not 
for these clerical positions, but rather for his Desengaños Filosóficos, a widely-read set of books 
which articulated Valcárcel’s mediatedly conservative position against the modern philosophies 
associated with the Spanish Enlightenment.529 
Valcárcel was by no means the only individual to undertake such a work, and how to 
characterize his contribution to Spanish thought at the end of the eighteenth century is the subject 
of considerable historiographical variance.  Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo classified his work as 
part of the “apologetic literature [and] Spanish impugners of encylopedism,” placing him within 
a broad class of individuals including Juan Pablo Forner, Fernando de Cevallos y Mier, Fray 
Diego de Cádiz, Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, and Pablo Antonio José de Olavide y Jáuregui, 
                                                 
526 See, De las Exequias, que el Real Colegio de San Phelipe, y Santiago de la Universidad de Alcala, fundación del 
Rey Don Phelipe II para la educación de los Hijos de los Criados de la Casa Real.  Celebró por el Rey Nuestro 
Senor Don Fernando VI (que esté en gloria) en la Real Capilla de San Diego de Alcala, los días 16 y 17 de Marzo 
del año de 1760.  Y Oracion fúnebre que en ellas dixo el Doctor Don Vicente Fernandez Valcarce, Capellan de 
Honor de S.M. y Penitenciario de su Real Capilla. Madrid: Antonio Perez de Soto, Impresor de los Reynos, 1761. 
Granda Lorenzo, Sara. “La Capilla Real: la presencia del capellán real en la élite del poder político.” Libros de la 
Corte.es No. 3, 2011: 21-35.  The prestige was not so great, perhaps, as it was before the Concordat of 1753, when 
the procapellán mayor of the Royal Chapel was also given the honorific Patriarchate of the West Indies.  After 
1753, the Royal Chapel oversaw only the Royal Palace, El Pardo, and Aranjuez, but still would have placed 
Valcárcel in a position where he was regularly in contact with the Royal household and important court figures.  See 
also Beatriz Comella, “La Jurisdicción Eclesiástica de la Real Capilla de Madrid (1753-1931),” Hispania Sacra 58, 
No. 117 (Enero-Junio, 2006): 145-170. 
527 Mercurio de España, Enero de 1796, Tomo I (Madrid: En la Imprenta Real), 158. 
528 Full biographical information may be ascertained from Alvarez Torres, 37-44, from Menéndez Pelayo, HHE 
VI.iii§7 and from Matías Vielva’s response to Menéndez Pelayo’s initial complaint of the dearth of information on 
Valcárcel, published in La Propaganda Católica 24, no. 2 (1897): 73-74, and reproduced in facsimile in Alvarez 
Torres’s work. 
529 There is evidence, for example, of Valcárcel’s work as far as Guanajuato, Mexico.  See Harry Bernstein, “A 
Provincial Library in Colonial Mexico, 1802,” The Hispanic American Historical Review  26, No.2 (May, 1946): 
162-183.  This reinforces the concept of a mutual exchange of ideas across the Spanish Atlantic as established in the 
conclusion of chapter three. 
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among others.530  As a descriptive category, “apologetic literature” is too vast a category to be of 
much use for understanding Valcárcel; while it is true that both his work and the works of 
Jovellanos and Olavide defended Spain, they did so from radically different perspectives about 
the truth and utility of modern philosophy and the new sciences. 531  Indeed, to describe 
Valcárcel foremost as a Spanish apologist in the same category as Forner’s Oración apologética 
por la España y su mérito literario (1786) and as an anti-encylopedist is misleading.  Spanish 
society is invoked as an applicative case, especially in the fourth volume (1797), but the first two 
volumes of Desengaños Filosóficos (1787, 1788) are almost entirely theoretical, and the third 
(1790) is more aptly described as a treatise on moral, social, and natural law, rather than a 
Spanish apologetic.  The same problem of generalization exists, from the opposite 
historiographical perspective, in Mario Méndez Bejarano’s relegation of Valcárcel to the 
“stagnation of scholasticism” in the eighteenth century, placed once again with Cevallos, but also 
with José de San Pedro de Alcántara Castro, Juan Martín de Lessaca, and Bernardo López de 
Araujo y Azcárraga.532  Valcárcel’s work, sixty years after that of Lessaca and Araujo, makes 
concessions to the new sciences that they denied, and his approach to the refutation of modern 
philosophy is undertaken on completely different grounds from Cevallos. 
 Yet the three greatest histories of eighteenth-century Spain written have followed these 
classifications, thereby perpetuating this misunderstanding of Valcárcel, and through this, miss 
the complexity of the counter enlightenment position.  Jean Sarrailh lists Valcárcel’s work 
alongside that of Cevallos, Alcántara Castro, Juan Bautista Muñoz, and Teodoro Almeida, 
                                                 
530 Ménedez Pelayo, HHE VI.iii§VII, 580. 
531 Menéndez Pelayo notes distinctions between each thinker, but still describes them collectively as “hermoso 
movimiento de restauración católica y nacional…” VI.iii§VII, 581. 
532 Mario Méndez Bejarano, Historia de la filosofía en España, hasta el siglo XX (Madrid: Renacimiento, 1929), 
XVI§IV, 357. 
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among others, describing them collectively as “lightning rods,” and as “thick and heavy books 
which added to other thick books,” (a complaint which Menéndez Pelayo also levied) and 
referring readers to consult Menéndez Pelayo’s analysis of this period of “apologetic 
literature.”533  He accordingly conflates this phase of Spanish counter-enlightenment literature 
with the debates over the merits of Spain, the Masson de Morvillers affair, and Forner’s Oracion 
apologética. 534  Richard Herr likewise places him with Forner and Cevallos as part of a general 
“conservative opposition” who worked to document the disruption of the “pax scholastica” by 
thinkers such as Descartes.535  Javier Herrero, like Bejarano, describes Valcárcel and Cevallos 
collectively as “Spanish disciples” and the Desengaños Filosóficos as “an attack on the 
philosophic innovations and a defense of Scholasticism,” but qualifies it by insisting upon 
separating the political nature of the fourth volume, published after a seven year hiatus and in 
light of the events of the French Revolution, from the previous three.536  Only one other work has 
seriously considered Valcárcel’s refutation of rationalism and empiricism in the Desengaños 
Filosóficos since these studies.537 
 To be sure, it is imperative that historians recognize Valcárcel as part of a broad 
trajectory of conservative thought, stretching across the long eighteenth century (1683-1813) 
from the early critics of the novatores to the anti-afrancesado movement during the French 
occupation.  However, Valcárcel’s contribution to the Spanish enlightenments should be distinct 
from other parts of the counter-enlightenment spectrum, including: reactionary social 
                                                 
533 Jean Sarrailh, La España Ilustrada de la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII (Madrid: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 
1957), 366-367. 
534 Sarrailh, 382. Not once does Valcárcel mention the Masson de Morvilliers affair of 1782 in any of the four 
volumes, a reliable bellwether of Spanish apologetics in the polemics of this period. 
535 Richard Herr, The Eighteenth Century Revolution in Spain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), 216. 
536 Javier Herrero, Los origenes del pensamiento reaccionario español (Madrid: Editorial Cuadernos para el Diálogo 
Edicusa, 1973), 91, 111. 
537 Antolín Alvarez Torres, S.J, Historia crítica de la filosofía racionalista y empirista en la obra del Dr. Vicente 
Fdez. Valcarcel. 
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commentaries on the ruinous nature of atheism,538 works refuting advancements made in the new 
sciences in favor of Aristotelian physics,539 religious jeremiads,540 anti-teatrista writings,541 and 
national apologetics.542  Rather, Valcárcel’s work is best understood as part of the philosophical 
disputations which assessed and rejected the metaphysical and epistemological suppositions of 
enlightenment thought in favor of the traditional Scholasticism.543  Valcárcel’s work directly 
addresses all of the major metaphysical and epistemological issues raised by the new sciences 
and modern philosophies of the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries, including the 
role of final causes in natural philosophy, causal structures of nature and divine action, the 
axiology of modes of perception, and the relationships between different magisteria of 
knowledge.  It his contribution to this last notion which is the focus of this paper, and where 
Valcárcel made his most unique and significant influence to Spanish thought.  In the Desengaños 
Filosóficos, Valcárcel argued that metaphysics and physics, and therefore 
philosophy/theology/religion and science, operated entirely independently of one another, 
revealed different types of truths, and employed alternative means of ascertaining these truths.  
Where religion and science seemed to overlap, Valcárcel either pointed to transgressions in his 
independence theory or granted greater explanatory power to religion.  This allowed Valcárcel to 
                                                 
538 Fernando de Cevallos, La Falsa Filosofia, o el Ateismo, deísmo, materialismo, y demás nuevas sectas 
convencidas de crimen de estado contra los Soberanos y sus regalías, contra los Magistrados y Potestades legítimas 
(Madrid: Antonio de Sancha, six volumes 1775-1776); Velez 
539 Bernardo Lopez de Araujo y Ascarraga, Centinela Medico-Aristotelica contra Scepticos (Madrid, 1725); Juan 
Gil, El Triumpho Vindicado de la Calumnia, impostura, e ignorancia contra la medicina sceptica, y sus favtores 
(Cadiz: Herederos de Christobal de Requena, s.a); Juan Martin de Lesaca, Colyrio Philosophico-Aristhotelico 
Thomistico con un discurso Phisico medico anathomico (Madrid: Juan de Ariztia, 1724). 
540 Diego Josef de Cádiz, Razonamiento, traducido por Pedro Manuel Prieto (Sevilla: la Imprenta de Don Manuel 
Nicolas Vazquez, y Compañía, 1784). 
541 Salvador Josef Mañer, Anti-Theatro Critico (Madrid: Juan de Moya, 1729); Ignacio de Armesto y Ossorio, 
Theatro Anti-Critico Universal (Madrid: en la Oficina de Francisco Martinez Abad, 1737); Geminiano Zafra 
Ciscodexa, Antitheatro Delphico Judicial Jocoserio (Madrid: Alfonso Martinez, 1727). 
542 Juan Pablo Forner, Oracion Apologética (Madrid: Imprenta Real, 1786). 
543 Most comparable to the work of Andrés Piquer Arrufat (Lógica moderna [1747], Discurso sobre la aplicación de 
la filosofía a los assuntos de religion para la juventud española [1755/1778]), Antonio Josef Pérez y López 
(Principios del orden esencial de la naturaleza [1785]), and Ramón Campos Pérez (Sistema de lógica [1790]). 
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accept and promote many of the scientific discoveries and advancements from the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries while critiquing the metaphysical systems that often accompanied them.  
This is crucial to understanding not only his critical history of novatore and enlightenment 
thought, but also in defining the fundamentally moderate, ecumenical nature of Spanish Catholic 
Enlightenment thought more generally. 
 
Desengaños Filosóficos (1787-1797): Scope, Style, and Organization 
 In the dedication of the work to Josef Moñino, Conde de Floridablanca and Secretary of 
State under Carlos III, Valcárcel describes his motivation for writing the Desengaños 
Filosóficos.544  He admits that Spain had made many advancements over the eighteenth century, 
and particularly under the leadership of Carlos III and Floridablanca, noting growth in the arts, in 
industry, and the general well-being and honor of Spain.  However, Valcárcel stated that 
coterminous with these advancements was the growth of those “who, valuing their science 
depreciate the ancient maxims and the solid and healthy doctrine.”545  “For many years now, 
your Excellency,” he explained, “I have been observing this disorder and making serious 
reflections about the pretexts that they take in order to deceive their compatriots, giving to the 
public thoughts and maxims contrary to the truth, to piety, and to religion, such that they 
disfigure as much as they can the character of the nation.”546  Valcárcel’s response was to write a 
critical history of the new philosophy in Spain in which he demonstrated the damaging beliefs of 
                                                 
544 Both Menéndez y Pelayo and Alvarez Torres suggest that this was a political ploy for protection, although it may 
have also been related to the fact that Floridablanca was intimately involved in the reformation of the universities in 
Spain. 
545 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.Dedicatoria, “…que preciados de su ciencia desprecian las máximas 
ancianas, y la sólida y sana doctrina.” 
546 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.Dedicatoria, “Há muchos años, Señor Excelentísimo, que estoy observando 
este desórden, y haciendo sérias reflexíones sobres los pretextos que toman para iludir á sus compatriotas, dando al 
público pensamientos, y máximas contrarias á la verdad, á la piedad, y á la religión, hasta desfigurar en quanto 
pueden el carácter de la nación.” 
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the philosophies espoused by rationalism, materialism, naturalistic empiricism, and skepticism, 
among others.  Valcárcel provided “a genealogy of the modern errors as far as the root, which he 
gave to Descartes, and began by Cartesian doubt the process of modern rationalism.”547  The 
genre of histories of philosophy which not only documented and collated past systems but 
usually advanced a particular normative position was well-established by Valcárcel’s venture, 
and many of them, including André-François Boureau-Deslandes’s Histoire critique de la 
philosophie (1737), Johann Jacob Brucker’s five-volume Historia Critica Philosophiae (1742-
1744), and Johann Heinrich Samuel Formey’s Histoire Abrégée de la Philosophie (1760), he 
clearly knew well and referenced multiple times.548 
Valcárcel’s work should effectively refute any historiographical claims that the counter-
enlightenment opposition to the introduction of the New Philosophy was steeped in ignorance 
and characterized by a reactionary fear of the unknown or challenge to the epistemological status 
quo which was, until that point, held firmly by the Church and the scholastic curriculum of the 
university system.  His four volumes comprise nearly 2,500 pages of writing on the philosophical 
and theological implications of the varieties of modern philosophy, during which he clearly 
displays a keen understanding of the most important thinkers and their works.  These not only 
include the usual corpus of classical, patristic, medieval, scholastic, and renaissance writers, but 
over two dozen prominent thinkers from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, including both 
the well-known and the obscure from France, England, Prussia, Austria, and his native Spain.  
Menéndez Pelayo writes that “in the dissection of contrary opinions he was penetrating and 
                                                 
547 Menéndez Pelayo, HHE VI.iii§VII.580. 
548 The role of Desengaños Filosóficos as a critical history of philosophy, and particularly of the history of 
rationalism and empiricism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is emphasized by Antolín Alvarez Torres in 
his work, Historia Critica. For further information on the history of the genre, see Gregorio Piaia and Giovanni 
Santinello, eds., Models of the History of Philosophy, Volume II: From Cartesian Age to Brucker (New York: 
Springer, 2011). 
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sagacious.”549  Indeed, Valcárcel’s attempt at a comprehensive history accounting for the late-
eighteenth century degeneration of metaphysics is, as one historian described it, “sufficiently 
complex.”550 
 The Desengaños Filosóficos, therefore, attempt to account for the philosophical problems 
present during Valcárcel’s life by providing a history of how these philosophies came to exist 
and showing along the way how and why they are erroneous in their claims.  It is in this sense 
that Valcárcel described it as “a writing against the novatores,” because he viewed the novatores 
as eighteenth-century Spanish inheritors of troublesome philosophies created in the seventeenth 
century.551  In particular, he attacked four philosophical systems belonging to the “chief of the 
moderns:” those of Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, and Leibnitz.552  These systems are 
presented and critiqued analytically, particularly in the first volume, and then discussed in more 
applicative ways in the subsequent three works.  Alvarez Torres aptly characterized the four 
volumes, giving them titles: “Volume I: Rationalism and Empiricism: Causes of the Novatore 
Enlightenment” (1787), “Volume II: On the Freedom of Thought and Tolerance (Effects of 
Rationalism and Empricism)” (1788), “Volume III: On Law and Natural Morality” (1790), and 
“Volume IV: Dissertation on Tolerance” (1797).553  The first volume is of special importance to 
this study, as Valcárcel expressly defines his metaphysical and epistemological frameworks in it 
more than in any other. 
                                                 
549 Menéndez Pelayo, HHE VI.iii§VI.607 
550 Herrero, Los origines del pensamiento reaccionario, 110. 
551 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.Dedicatoria “un escrito contra los novadores” 
552 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.4 “gefes de los modernos.” It is worth noting Spinoza’s omission from this 
list, when many of the leading histories of enlightenment thought emphasize its Spinozist origin and particularly 
given Spinoza’s popularity in Spain compared to other philosophers.  See Jonathan I. Israel, Radical Enlightenment: 
Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
553 Alvarez Torres, Historia Critica, 66-74. 
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 Although Valcárcel argued that “It is not our goal to defend Scholastic Philosophy and its 
methods as if it is the only one, or the best, as if the modern does not merit some value,” he does 
ultimately condemn the metaphysics and epistemologies of modern philosophies in favor of 
traditional, Patristic, Scholastic, and Aristotelian understandings, with some crucial 
qualifications.554  He does, more so than almost any other Spanish enlightenment thinker, admit 
that not only was the Scholastic method problematic in some areas (“many impertinent and vane 
questions, much asperity and obscurity in tones and in ideas, much preoccupation and ridiculous 
obstinacy in the particular apprehensions of each School,” he lamented), but that modern 
philosophy had also some laudable ideas.555  He wrote:  
The Philosophy which is used in the Schools has many defects; the Scholastic 
method has many defects.  The modern Philosophy and its method also has 
defects.  One must praise and reprehend in [both] one and the other.  And what 
does our proposition do: with one and another Philosophy, with the ancient 
method and with the modern, they can teach truths and errors.556 
Elsewhere, he again emphasized that both the ancients and the moderns contributed to the corpus 
of knowledge, stating: 
Thus, when we fight against the modern Philosophers, it is not our aim to argue 
that they have nothing good and of use.  When we defend the Scholastics, we do 
not pretend to argue that all that they question and teach is useful and that their 
                                                 
554 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.43-44. “No es nuestro ánimo defender la Filosofía Escolástica, y su método, 
como que ella es la unica, ó la major, y como que la moderna no merece aprecio alguno.”  Alvarez Torres rightly 
notes that Valcárcel’s source of criticism for modern philosophy comes from a generic “substratum of religious-
philosophic tradition” which invokes Plato and Aristotle alongside early Church Fathers, medieval thinkers, and the 
Scholastics of the late-medieval and early modern periods (Alvarez Torres, Historia Critica, 65).  Even Valcárcel’s 
use of scholasticism is an ecumenically palatable, irenically vanilla variety of Thomism without any of the distinct 
flavors of the Schools of the Second Scholastic movement (Suarism, for example) – this could indicate another 
reason to place Valcárcel’s education at Alcalá rather than, for example, Salamanca.  Ecumenism is, according to 
Ulrich Lehner, a hallmark of Catholic Enlightenment theology, given the mediating position of enlightened 
theologians between the world and the church (Lehner, On the Road to Vatican II). 
555 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos II.xiv “muchas questions impertinentes y vanas, mucha aspereza y obscuridad 
en las voces y en las ideas, mucho de preocupacion y terquedad ridicula en las aprehensiones particulares de cada 
Escuela.” 
556 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.43-44. “La Filosofia que han usado en las Escuelas tiene muchos defectos, 
tiene defectos el método Escolástico.  Tambien tiene defectos la Filosofía moderna, y su método.  Hay que alabar, y 
que reprehender en una, y en otra.  Y lo que á nuestro propósito hace: con una, y otra Filosofia, con el método 
antiguo, y con el moderno se pueden enseñar verdades, y errores.” 
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method is the only one, without which you cannot teach truths.  Logic, Syllogistic 
method, Geometrics, Didactics, Rhetoric, the ancient method, or the modern – 
each is worth something for teaching truths.  Each century has its own style, 
language, and method…557 
Valcárcel’s Desengaños Filosóficos was, therefore, his attempt at a balanced reconciliation of the 
old and the new.  This search for the media via between tradition and modernity, between 
science and religion, between the world and the church, describes the way that Catholic 
enlightenment thought was expressed in Spain during the eighteenth century.  Valcárcel not only 
demonstrated the origin and development of philosophical errors present at the end of the 
eighteenth century, but also advanced a theory of knowledge which critically assessed and 
valued both the traditional and the modern.  Part of this theory of knowledge was a necessary 
response to the way in which physics and metaphysics related to each other epistemologically. 
 
Valcárcel’s Epistemological Model: “Each Subject Has Its Method” 
Valcárcel’s entire critical history rests upon his understanding of the epistemology of 
physics and metaphysics: what type of knowledge composes each, what methods each employs 
to ascertain this knowledge, the nature of their relationship, and moreover, how God acts in 
nature.  Indeed, while the first half of the first volume is a history of Valcárcel’s four horsemen 
of modern philosophy, the second “dissertation” of the work is purely theoretical.  Valcárcel’s 
own interpretation, “Each subject has its method,” advances two key points.  First, he argues that 
physics and metaphysics are two separate subjects or magisteria of knowledge that are 
completely independent of one another, while remaining complementary and bound by unity in 
                                                 
557 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.45. “Quando pues combatimos á los Filósofos modernos, no es nuestro 
ánimo persuadir, que nada tienen de bueno, y de servicio.  Quando defendemos á los Escolásticos, no pretendemos 
persuadir que es útil todo quanto questionan, y enseñan, y que su método es el único, y que sin él no se pueden 
enseñar las verdades.  La Lógica, el método Silogistico, y el Geométrico, el Didáctio, ó el Retórico, el método 
antiguo, ó el moderno, tanto valen uno, como otro para enseñar las verdades. Cada siglo tiene su estilo, su idioma, y 
su método…” 
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the sense that they were both authored by an inerrant and omnipotent deity and must therefore 
never be in true disagreement but only apparent conflict.  Secondly, Valcárcel argues that each of 
these subjects employs distinct modes of perceiving the truth.  While some methods might be 
found in both subjects, others belong distinctly to one or the other.  Here, Valcárcel specifically 
emphasized the two modes of ‘natural reason’ and revelation, stressing not only their differences, 
but their necessary, fundamental agreement with one another. 
 
“Each Subject…”: Religion, Science, and Transgressive Philosophy 
Valcárcel argued for (at least) two different types of truth (clases de verdades) – Physics, 
by which Valcárcel included all of the natural sciences and applied variations, and Metaphysics, 
which included religion, theology, philosophy, ethics, morality, natural law, politics, and piety.  
These formed two different bodies or areas of knowledge, and each had two different methods 
for the acquisition and verification of this knowledge.  Valcárcel used the term materia to refer 
to these “subjects” – perhaps a deliberate choice to use a slippery and tricky word, defined 
thirteen different ways by the fourth volume of the Diccionario de Autoridades in 1734, but best 
understood in this case as “subject matter” or “field of knowledge.”558  Valcárcel alternatively 
referred to them as epistemological “jurisdictions” (jurisdicción, competencia). 
Throughout his critical history, Valcárcel was careful to emphasize repeatedly that his 
critiques of the moderns, and particularly of the four “chiefs of the moderns,” were on purely 
philosophical grounds.  “…We do not take care to examine what Robert Boyle, Boerhaave, 
Newton, Musschenbroeck, Haller, and others of this type say,” he explained, restating that, “It is 
                                                 
558 Real Academia Española, Diccionario de la lengua castellana, en que se explica el verdadero sentido de las 
voces, su naturaleza y calidad, con las phrases ó modos de hablar, los proverbios ó refranes, y otras cosas 
convenientes al uso de la lengua, Tomo Quarto: G-N (Madrid: En la Imprenta de la Real Académia Española, 1734), 
512-513.  “un campo del saber” comes from the modern definition of the RAE, availble at: 
http://dle.rae.es/?id=ObWMmRJ. 
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our careful purpose not to examine the speculations, experiments, and discourses of Boyle, 
Newton, Boerhaave, and Muschenbrook, but rather the speculations of Descartes and his three 
successors.”559  Not only did Valcárcel grant these thinkers immunity to his criticism, but he 
exalted their contributions to natural philosophy above that of the Aristotelians, Galenics, and 
Traditional Scholastics, writing, “from this we concede to these men the preference over the 
Scholastics on points of Physics, and we confess what the Microscopes, Telescopes, 
Thermometers, Pneumatic Machine, and Electricity are instruments more apropos for the 
discovery of the secrets of nature than the syllogisms of the Schools.”560 
This point is important to emphasize.  Valcárcel’s blatant acceptance and preference for 
the work of modern natural philosophy belie attacks made by ilustrados (and by a significant 
number of present-day historians) that the Spanish Catholic- and Counter-enlightenment blindly 
ignored scientific advancements in favor of Scholastic and Aristotelian physics.  Furthermore, 
the division between physical knowledge and metaphysical knowledge also rests upon the 
foundation of Valcárcel’s epistemology.  Only because he viewed the physical and the 
metaphysical as entirely independent spheres was he able to write that “the Philosophers, 
therefore, with whom we contest, are not the Physicists, Physiologists, Mathematicians, or 
Anatomists, but those who are properly Philosophers or Metaphysicians.”561  Though at times 
Valcárcel critiqued natural philosophers such as Newton, he was clear to direct his criticism at 
                                                 
559 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.44,82. “Así no nos pone en cuidado lo que dice Roberto Boile, Boerhaave, 
Newton, Muschembroeck, Haller, y otros de esta especie.” “Por tanto nuestro cuidado no es examinar las 
especulaciones, experimentos, y discursos de Boile, Newton, Boerhaave, y Musquembroek, sino las especulaciones 
de Descartes, y sus tres successores.” 
560 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.44, “Desde luego concedemos a estos hombres la preferencia sobre los 
Escolásticos en puntos de Fisica, y confesamos, que los Microscópios, Telescópios, Termómetros, la maquina 
Pneumática, y la Eléctrica, son instrumentos mas á propósito para descubrir los secretos de la naturaleza, que los 
silogismos de la Escuela.” 
561 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.45, “Los Filósofos pues con quienes traemos la contienda, no son los 
Físicos, Fisiólogos, Matemáticos, ó Anatómicos, sino los propiamente Filósofos, ó Metafisicos.” 
213 
their metaphysical forays only.  He affirmed this position, stating: “Sometimes we have to deal 
with the Physicists; but not as Physicists but as Philosophers, and Metaphysicians, and by the use 
and application which they make of physics towards Religion.”562  Again and again, Valcárcel 
emphasized two separate subjects, arguing that the same mind could employ itself either 
metaphysically or physically, and that many had done both within the same work. 
The problem, of which Valcárcel was painfully aware, was the loose employment of the 
term “philosophy/philosopher” (filosofía, filósofo) to mean both the study of the natural world 
and those who made metaphysical speculations.  Writing about the “true sense of the word 
‘philosopher,’” Valcárcel affirmed that as long as Newton and Boyle worked in “natural history, 
mechanics, nautical studies, astronomy, chemistry, anatomy…,” “and “although their 
speculations about these materials could be very profound…they were never prejudicial against 
Religion, Morality, or Politics.”563  “Thus,” stated Valcárcel, “Boyle as well as Newton could say 
truthfully ‘We are Philosophers: our speculations and discourses harm nobody, there is no reason 
to limit our philosophic liberty.’”564  It was not long, however, before individuals blurred the line 
between physics and metaphysics under the same name.  “Here is where the deceit is…it is true 
that they treat many subjects of competence of natural reason…but [also] subjects that are related 
to Religion, Piety or Morality, and Politics are well or poorly treated…the cover of 
“Philosophers” is that which grants free passage into the Republic of Letters.”565  According to 
                                                 
562 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos 1.82. “Algunas veces tendremos que hacer con los Fisicos; pero no en quanto 
Fisicos, sino en quanto Filosofos, y Metafisicos.” 
563 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.354-355. “Del Verdadero Sentido de la Palabra Filosofo.” “…la historia 
natural, la mecánica, la náutica, la astronomía, la chimia, y la anatomía…” “Aunque sus especulaciones sobre estas 
materias fuesen muy profundas…nunca era perjudicada la Religion, la Moral, ni Política.” 
564 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.355. “Asi Boyle como Newton podían con verdad decir, somos Filósofos, 
nuestras especulaciones y discursos a nadie perjudican: no hay razón alguna para limitarnos la libertad filosófica.” 
565 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.355-356. “…aquí es donde esta el engaño...Es cierto que tratan muchas 
materias de la competencia de la razón natural, materias que trataron también los Filósofos antiguos; pero materias 
que bien o mal tratads interesan la Religion, la Piedad, o la Moral, y Politica…la cubierta de Filósofos es la que las 
da paso libre por la República de las letras.” 
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Valcárcel, the exaltation of philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had erased the 
demarcating disciplinary and methodological lines of knowledge, confusing everyone – moderns 
and Scholastics alike. 
Their inquiries are about the origin of the world, about its end, about the 
succession and propagation of humankind, about the origin of society, equality 
and inequality among men, about the materiality or immateriality of the soul, 
about justice or injustice of actions, etc.  In all these matters the Philosopher can 
make elementary mistakes and opine harmfully against Piety and Morality.  In 
this case, does it matter to say, “I am a Philosopher, not a Theologian?”566 
Valcárcel even suggested that tactic (what he calls a “formula”) may have been deliberately used 
in order to escape theological censure, but that it reflected a fundamental misunderstanding about 
the nature of knowledge.567  Valcárcel was especially critical of this excess of philosophy, 
because in it he saw great damage being done to Religion by philosophers who almost playfully 
called revealed truths into doubt.  He wrote,  
This was the delirium of Pomponacio and other philosophers of the sixteenth 
century: they imagined that one could innocently think profoundly about doubts 
and difficulties about an important point to the extent of making it doubtful, and 
even make it seem false, and then later fix it all by saying that it was kept by 
revlation.  That is the same as saying that a thing can be doubtful and even false in 
Philosophy, without ceasing to be true in principles of Religion.  The result of this 
mode of thinking is that the Philosopher brings doubt to where he wants to, and 
later his annoyed reason excludes that which is not to his liking.568 
                                                 
566 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.356, “Sus inquisiciones son sobre el origen del mundo, sobre su fin, sobre la 
sucesión, y propagación del género humano, sobre el origen de la sociedad, igualdad y desigualdad de los hombres, 
sobre la materialidad o inmaterialidad del alma, su inmortalidad o mortalidad, sobre la justica o injusticia de las 
acciones &c.  En todas estas materias puede el Filósofo descaminarse y opinar con perjuicio de la Piedad y el Moral.  
¿En este caso qué importará decir, yo soy Filósofo, no soy Teologo?” 
567 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.353. Valcárcel singles out Montesquieu, Helvetius, Boyer, and d’Alembert 
for using this tactic. 
568 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.369-370, “Este fue el delirio de Pomponacio, y otros Filósofos del Siglo 
XVI: imaginaro que se podía inocentemente profundar las dudas y dificultades sobre un punto importante hasta 
hacerle dudoso, y aun hacerle pasar por falso; y después componerlo todo diciendo, que se atienen la revelación; que 
es lo mismo que decir, que una cosa puede ser dudosa, y aun falsa en Filosofia, sin que por eso dexe de ser 
verdadera en principios de la Religion. Lo que resulta de este modo de proceder es, que el Filósofo lleva la duda 
hasta donde le parece, y luego fastidiada su razón excluye lo que no es de su gusto.” 
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In response, Valcárcel sought to reestablish traditional divisions between areas of knowledge, not 
only to safeguard religion, but also to protect the free inquiry, utility, and development of 
legitimate natural sciences.  These different disciplines both defined and were defined by distinct 
epistemological methods – for Valcárcel, especially, it was important to return to the differences 
between knowing by revelation and knowing by reason. 
 
“…Has its Method”: The “Two Principles” of Revelation and Reason 
The realms of metaphysics and physics had, according to Valcárcel, different methods of 
obtaining knowledge, each legitimate in its own way and useless to the point of absurdity if 
employed in the other.  “If someone were to tell us, that within a regular piece of glass, a 
common pair of eyeglasses, or with the naked eye they had been able to see the satellites of 
Jupiter or sunspots or the animalcules which they say are in vinegar,” wrote Valcárcel, “or if 
someone told us that they had gone and come back from America several times in a fisherman’s 
boat or that they had discovered the origin of the nerves or the valves of veins by making 
syllogisms and meditating on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, we would laugh at him.”569  Valcárcel’s 
jest was meant to demonstrate the absurdity of seeking a particular end by the wrong method.  
He explained his comment, stating that 
the reason for this scorn is that the proposed means are impertinent and not 
suitable for the intent: because in order to perceive such tiny things as corpuscles, 
or distant ones, Microscopes and Telescopes are necessary; in order to record the 
secrets and delicate instruments of the human body, skillful and subtle dissection 
and a proficiency in anatomy is needed; for these, syllogisms won’t work, nor will 
metaphysical speculations.570 
                                                 
569 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.408, “Si uno nos dijese que con un vidrio vugar, un anteojo de los comunes, 
ó con la vista desnuda había alcanzado a ver los satélites de Júpiter, las manchas del sol, los animálculos que se dice 
hay en el vinagre; si nos dijese que había ido, y venido a la America muchas veces en un barco pescador: que había 
descubierto el origen de los nervios, o las válvulas de las venas, haciendo silogismos, y meditando en la Metafisica 
de Aristóteles, nos reiríamos de él.” 
570 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.408, “La razón de este menosprecio es que los medios propuestos son 
impertinentes y nada del caso para el intento: porque para percibir corpúsculos tan menudos, ó distantes son 
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Here, it is almost certain that Valcárcel had in mind the Aristotelian physics and specifically 
Galenic medicine still being upheld by many of the major Scholastic universities in Spain.  The 
difference between Valcárcel and the early counter-enlightenment thinkers is pronounced on this 
point.  Whereas individuals such as Araujo rejected the “skeptical medicine” of the novatores 
out-of-hand, Valcárcel accepted the application of “skepticism” to medicine, as long as medicine 
was carefully and clearly bounded as a field.  “Each class of truths has its [own] particular 
method of being investigated,” explained Valcárcel.571  “If the things are made known by 
experimentation, or by tradition, and you want to know it by speculation, instead of finding them 
you will lose them from sight.”572  Valcárcel’s model worked in both directions: syllogisms 
would not discover natural truths, and microscopes would never be able to determine the 
immateriality of the soul.573 
 While he never provided a complete classification of the “classes of truths” or their 
diverse “methods,” Valcárcel described several different ways of knowing for discovering truths 
throughout the Desengaños Filosóficos, including revelation, authority, tradition, faith, reason, 
logic, speculation, sensory perception, and experimentation.  Valcárcel conveniently collapsed 
all of these, however, into “two principles:” natural reason (logic, speculation, sensory 
knowledge, experimentation, emotions, and intuitions) and revelation (authority, tradition, and 
faith).  Valcárcel expressed the cornerstone of his epistemology at the beginning of his second 
dissertation in the Desengaños Filosóficos, when he explained that: 
                                                 
menester Microscopios, y Telescopios: para registrar los secretos y delicados instrumentos del cuerpo humano es 
menester la diseccion artificiosa y sutil de un anatómico perito; para esto no sirven los silogismos, ni las 
especulaciones metafísicas…” 
571 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.408. “La segunda reflexión es, que cada clase de verdades tiene su método 
particular para ser investigadas.” 
572 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.408. “Si las cosas que se han de saber por experimentos, ó por tradición, se 
quieren saber por especulación, en lugar de encontrarlas las perderemos de vista.” 
573 A similar point was made by Cigala in his second letter to Feijóo. 
217 
Our critiques make various reflections in order to affirm and give weight to this 
maxim.  They say that in man there are two principles which produce truths: the 
first is natural reason and the other revelation.  And that these two principles are 
not to be confounded with one another, because one cannot ask by revelation what 
is not [already] in it, and what is not in contained in reason has to be asked…If a 
thing is against natural reason, it cannot be contained in revelation: and if a thing 
is expressly in revelation, it cannot be that which is against natural reason.574 
In this passage, Valcárcel unmistakably showed the two main modes of knowing: one in which 
undoubtable information is already given, and the other in which it must be discovered.  Just as 
importantly, Valcárcel also affirmed the unity of truth by noting that true reason and revelation 
never contradict one another. 
 
Qualifying Valcárcel’s Model: Encounters Between Science and Religion 
Valcárcel was not the first (nor the last), to set forth an epistemological model describing 
two distinct areas of knowledge.  Saint Augustine, for example, set forth in the Patristic age the 
notion of “two books” – divine revelation in the scripture and the general revelation in the 
natural world; Origin, Tertullian, Aquinas, Paracelsus, and countless other theologians had made 
similar distinctions.  Valcárcel was aware of these contributions, referencing many of them.  In 
many ways, Valcárcel’s model was simply a reassertion of the traditional Catholic model 
proposed by these thinkers, although tailored to fit the demands of eighteenth-century Spain.  
These qualifications are important to understanding not only Valcárcel’s position, but more 
generally the position of the Spanish Catholic Enlightenment and Counter-enlightenment 
resistance to modern philosophy in Spain. 
                                                 
574 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.352, “Nuestros críticos hacen varias reflexiones para afirmar, y dar peso a 
esta máxima.  Dicen que en el hombre hay dos principios fecundos de verdades: el uno es la razón natural, y el otro 
la revelación, y que estos dos principios no se han de confundir en uno; porque no se ha de pedir a la revelación lo 
que no esta en ella, ni lo que no se contiene en la razón se la ha de pedir…Si una cosa es contra la razón natural, no 
puede estar contenida en la revelación: y si una cosa está expresamente en la revelación, no puede ser que la razón 
natural este contra ella.” 
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 First, unlike many of the “independence models” of science and religion, Valcárcel did 
not limit revelation to the metaphysical realm and reason to the natural.  Both methods made 
claims about both areas of knowledge; in other words, despite the general rule of independence, 
there were a few points of contact between the metaphysical and physical realms, principally 
because of overarching claims from revelation.  This was contrary to what many of the 
philosophers of Valcárcel’s study proposed.  “Revelation, say the new Philosophers, is not fit to 
instruct us in the mysteries of nature; this is the jurisdiction of reason and of Philosophy.  Thus, 
once this is made the subject of the jurisdiction of Philosophy, it allows the Philosopher to 
abandon himself to profound thinking with complete liberty.”575  Again, Valcárcel emphasized 
that if these philosophers limited themselves to natural observations, “it isn’t fearful.”576  
Valcárcel, on the other hand, argued that revelation, principally in the form of Scripture and the 
magisterial teaching and tradition of the Church, did make pronouncements about nature.  He 
specifically noted several cases where religion and science meet, for example, “what is or isn’t a 
miracle, what could or couldn’t be the devil, whether an apparition or revelation is true or false, 
whether austerity, celibacy, and tolerance is rational…materials of such gravity.”577  In such 
cases, Valcárcel seriously doubted natural philosophy’s ability to answer such questions.  In this 
regard, Valcárcel engaged with one of the more popular polemics of the Spanish Enlightenment: 
divine action and the existence of supernaturalism. 
                                                 
575 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.352, “La revelación, dicen los nuevos Filósofos, no se ha propuesto 
instruirnos en los misterios de la naturaleza, esto es de la competencia de la razón, y de la Filosofia.  Una vez pues 
que conste que la materia es de la competencia de la Filosofía, se le debe al Filósofo dexar que la profunde con toda 
libertad, y que exercite en ella las fuerzas de su razón…” 
576 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.353, “no es temible…” 
577 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.3, “…lo que es o no milagro, lo que puede o no el demonio, si es verdadera 
o falsa la aparición, la revelación; si es racional la austeridad, el celibato, y el tolerantismo…materias de tanta 
gravedad.” 
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 Secondly, and more importantly, Valcárcel subordinated all the ways of knowing beneath 
the primacy of revelation.578  Following the traditional and scholastic line, he reaffirmed that 
philosophy, both physical and metaphysical, are ancillary methods. 
If a thing is demonstrated in Philosophy, it is certain and true, and nothing can 
happen to make Religion teach the contrary…it is a certain thing that revelation 
can never teach us more than the truth.  If, therefore, we have by revelation notice 
of a thing, philosophical inquiring about it is useless, or can only serve in some 
officiating and helping way to confirm the revealed truth. Curious works do not 
follow after Christ, nor inquiring after the Gospel, said Tertullian.579 
Valcárcel’s curious use of Tertullian was perhaps tongue-in-cheek.  The reference came from 
Tertullian’s De praescriptione haereticorum (On the Prescription of Heretics), whose most 
famous question and answer, “What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?” argued that philosophy 
was of no use to the Church.580  Valcárcel’s own position was far more moderate.  Philosophy 
could be of great use in promoting scientific discoveries and advancements, as Spain had 
witnessed, and it could also “help to confirm” revealed truths.  Philosophy was in danger of 
“taking by deceit” only when it overstepped its epistemological bounds or tried to supersede 
revelation.581  Valcárcel explained that, at the end of the eighteenth century, philosophy often 
attempted to do this to provide some small answer to the mysteries of life. 
That is to say, [some] things are known by one way, and we look for them by 
another, and because we don’t find them by the way that we have chosen, we are 
filled with new difficulties insofar that by bad philosophizing we do not 
philosophize – philosophizing should bring in utility and prove by natural 
principles the truths of the jurisdiction of reason, but we ought not to leave the 
                                                 
578 Just as Cigala desired the “subordiantion” of Mechanical Philosophy to Aristotle in his second letter to Feijóo. 
579 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.370, “Si pues tenemos por la revelación noticia de una cosa, la inquisición 
filosófica sobre ella ó es inútil, ó solo puede servir en quanto oficia, y ayuda para confirmar la verdad revelada: 
Curiositate opus non est post Christum, nec inquisitione post Evangelium, decía Tertuliano.” 
580 See also, Nicholos Wolterstorff, “Tertullian’s Enduring Question,” The Cresset Trinity (1999), Special Issue 
Lilly Fellows Program in Humanities and the Arts, 6-17; Justo L. González, “Athens and Jerusalem Revisited: 
Reason and Authority in Tertullian,” Church History 43, Issue 1 (March, 1974): 17-25. 
581 “Videte ne quis vos decipiat per philosophiam, et inanem fallaciam…,” (Colossians 2:8), which prompted both 
Tertullian’s meditation on the relationship between philosophy and Christianity; Valcárcel opened the first volume 
of the Desengaños Filosóficos with this passage. 
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path which providence traced – this is enough, because this is what God showed 
to us.582 
One of Valcárcel’s most frequent metaphors was to speak of the “way to truth” (camino de la 
verdad); in this passage, as in over twenty others, Valcárcel privileges revelation as a special 
guide in the search for knowledge.  Thus, when philosophic speculation and logic contested 
against revelation on metaphysical points, especially on the subject of religion, Valcárcel argued 
that revelation was always superior.583  When metaphysics and physics appeared to contradict 
one another, however, one had to carefully assess precisely what revelation and natural reason 
taught concerning the issue at hand. 
 Valcárcel therefore qualified his model thirdly by reasserting the traditional doctrine on 
the unity of knowledge, most famously voiced by Saint Augustine. This doctrine asserted that 
since God was the ultimate author of both revealed and reasoned truths, these truths were 
fundamentally agreeable and only ever appeared to conflict with one another.  “It is necessary to 
understand,” explained Valcárcel, “that it is an intolerable illusion to think that it is fitting for the 
spirit of man to have as a certainty a thing in Philosophy and to believe the contrary by Religion.  
Whatever the wise men of this world are able to show in the natural things, our letters cannot 
contradict them, says Saint Augustine.”584  Like his reference to Tertullian, Valcárcel customized 
his use of Augustine.  Augustine’s original intent was to demonstrate the need for biblical 
                                                 
582 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.410, “Es decir, las cosas se saben por un medio, y las buscamos por otro, y 
porque no las encontramos por el medio que habemos elegido, nos llenamos de nuevas dificultades, en manera que 
por mal filosofar no filosofamos: conviene y trae utilidad filosofar, y probar por principios naturales las verdades de 
la jurisdicción de la razón; pero no hemos de salir del camino que trazó la providencia: este es bastante, pues este 
nos señaló Dios.” 
583 Indeed, Valcárcel describes the four modern philosophers of his study as trying to build a “new Metaphysics.” 
Desengaños Filosóficos, I.347. 
584 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, 370. “Es menester entender, que es una illusion intolerable pensar que cabe 
en el espíritu del hombre tener por cierta una cosa en Filosofía, y creer la contraria por Religion: Quidquid sapientes 
hujus mundi de rerum natura demonstrare potuerunt, nostris litteris non potest esse contrarium, que dice San 
Agustin.” 
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scholars to exercise caution in their exegesis of the Scriptures, particularly taking into account 
advancements made in the sciences; the passage is, in fact, from De Genesi ad Litteram, his 
commentary on the creation story of Genesis.585  Valcárcel, while affirming this sentiment, was 
keen to show that it also meant that philosophical speculations had to be checked against 
revelation.  The truth might be always unified, but it would only be recognizably so when 
intellectuals accurately understood the distinctions between different methods and subjects and 
their proper relationships with one another. 
 
The Legacy of Valcárcel’s Model: Understanding the Spanish Counter-Enlightenment 
Valcárcel’s concerns have a strangely modern familiarity to them.  In 1997, to combat the 
constant friction between religion and science and to “mend the gap” between science and the 
humanities, the popular scientist Stephen Jay Gould laid out a normative theory for the 
interaction, or rather, non-interaction between the two fields which he labeled “Non-Overlapping 
Magisteria” theory, more often known by its acronym, NOMA.586  NOMA theory dictated that 
science and religion operate as two distinct fields, each legitimate in its own right and each 
forbidden to cross over into the others domain of knowledge bodies and distinct methods and 
modes of perception.  To science, Gould ascribed all knowledge of the natural world, empirically 
ascertained.  Religion, on the other hand, received ethics, morality, axiology, and virtue.  In one 
memorable expression which Gould cobbled together from previous sources, “science gets the 
age of rocks, and religion the rock of ages; science studies how the heavens go, religion how to 
                                                 
585 Augustine, St. Augustine, the Literal Meaning of Genesis, Vol. 1, Ancient Christian Writers, Vol. 41, translated 
and annotated by John Hammond Taylor, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1982).  See also, Robert A. Ziegler, 
“Augustine of Hippo’s Doctrine of Scripture: Christian Exegesis in Late Antiquity,” Primary Source Volume V: 
Issue II (2015): 33-39. 
586 Stephen Jay Gould, “Non-overlapping magisterial.” Natural History 106 (March, 1997): 16-22.  Also Gould, The 
Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Magister’s Pox: Mending the Gap Between Science and the Humanities (New York: 
Harmony Books, 2003). 
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go to heaven.”587  Gould clearly asserted the theory as normative rather than historically 
descriptive, although he provides examples both of historical advocates of the “two spheres” 
approach and of “violations” against NOMA.  In the subsequent twenty years, the acronymic 
theory has continued to be a common reference point for discussing alternative systems 
describing the relationship between science and religion as one of conflict, concord, or 
autonomy.588 
 Gould’s notion of two separate realms or magisteria of knowledges should sound 
strikingly similar to the framework proposed by Vicente Fernández Valcárcel in Desengaños 
Filósoficos.  Even the vocabulary each used is similar; Valcárcel described the body of 
knowledge in Spanish as “materia,” but when referencing it in Latin, changed his word choice 
from materias to magistra – the same etymological root from which Gould derived his arcane 
use of “magisteria” to describe fields of knowledge.589  Valcárcel’s own system contains 
numerous tenets which Gould would have classified as violations.  Valcárcel allowed for 
revelation to make both physical and metaphysical claims, and defined the areas of knowledge 
(metaphysics and physics) largely from the starting point of two ways of knowing (revelation 
and reason).  If Gould’s NOMA theory is normatively in favor of the natural sciences, 
Valcárcel’s is distinctively tipped towards the primacy of revealed metaphysical knowledge.  In 
this way, Valcárcel’s epistemological model is more aptly comparable to Alister McGrath and 
Francis Collins’s notions of “partially overlapping magisteria” (or POMA), Alvin Plantinga’s 
description of theism and natural philosophy’s “deep concord,” and elsewhere described as the 
                                                 
587 Stephen Jay Gould, Rocks of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life (New York: The Ballantine 
Publishing Group, 1999), 6. 
588 See the bibliography for a list of works related to the relationship between science and religion which reference 
Gould’s NOMA theory or provide alternative perspectives. 
589 Valcárcel, Desengaños Filosóficos, I.413, “magistra natura” 
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“partnership model” between theology and natural philosophy.590  In these models, the two 
realms of knowledge exchange and learn from one another’s methods, and even share 
‘overlapping’ subject matter. 
 The theorizations of Valcárcel’s epistemological model and qualifications occupy 
approximately ten percent of his Desengaños Filosóficos, but they lay the foundation for the four 
volumes and are indispensable to understanding Valcárcel’s critique of the new philosophies and 
the myriad applications to politics, Spanish society, and the Catholic Religion.  Indeed, 
Valcárcel’s contribution is one of the keys to understanding the entire enlightenment experience 
in Spain.  It is rare to encounter such a deliberate exposition of a theory of knowledge in primary 
sources from the eighteenth century.  Without it, the Spanish Catholic- and Counter-
Enlightenment are in danger of being misunderstood as merely reactionary, recalcitrant, and 
backwards.591  Even the most progressive novatore work and the most feverish polemic of the 
Spanish Counter-Enlightenment was generated within the context of a particular epistemology.  
Works such as Valcárcel’s help to understand the mentalities of a period which was 
characterized by dramatic, paradigmatic changes.592  Valcárcel synthesized the two positions of 
progressive and conservative enlightenment reponses so seamlessly that he demonstrates the 
fluid and arbitrary nature of this imposed categorization. 
                                                 
590 Alister E. McGrath and Joanna Collicutt McGrath, The Dawkins Delusion?  Atheist Fundamentalism and the 
Denial of the Divine (Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 2007), 41; Alister E. McGrath, Surprised by Meaning: 
Science, Faith, and How We Make Sense of Things (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2011); Francis 
Collins, The Language of God (New York: Free Press, 2006); Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies: 
Science, Religion, and Naturalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Richard F. Carlson, ed., Science & 
Christianity: Four Views (Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 2000). 
591 José María Jover Zamora, Historia de España (fundada por Ramón Menéndez Pidal), Tomo XXXI: La Época de 
la Ilustración, Volumen I: El Estado y la Cultura (1759-1808) (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, S.A, 1987). 
592 Elena Carpi, “Cambio Semántico y discurso filosófico en el siglo XVIII: los conceptos de idea e imaginación,” 
Dieciocho 35.2 (Fall 2012): 333-364. 
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Moreover, the Desengaños Filosóficos serves as a touchstone for nearly all of the 
significant metaphysical and epistemological concerns that were raised by Catholic and Counter 
Enlightenment intellectuals in response to the new philosophies and new sciences of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  This chapter has focused on the definition of distinct areas 
of knowledge and the role of different modes of perception in creating these distinctions.  
Beyond this, Valcárcel also addressed the teleological nature of natural philosophy granted by 
Christianity, the role of divine action in the causality of nature (supernaturalism, occasionalism, 
naturalism, the study of miracles), and the utility of natural theology in the Catholic tradition, 
among others.593  Ascertaining these deeply embedded epistemologies is crucial therefore, not 
only for understanding the intellectual history of the eighteenth-century, but towards explaining 
the applicative issues of the Catholic Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment as it occurred 
across the Spanish empire, and more broadly, in Europe. 
  
                                                 
593 In an interesting turn, Valcárcel attributes a childishly supernatural or occasionalist position to the modern 
philosophers, who must return to “the recourse of God’s omnipotence” to account for discrepancies between their 




From Ilustrado to Afrancesado: Politicizing Reform, Enlightenment, and Jansenism in the 
Alvarado-Villanueva Debates, 1782-1813 
“I do not disagree with [Abbé Jean] Pey, nor with the French emigrées who attribute to 
Jansenism a supporting role in the French Revolution…the abandonment of all religion is the 
fundamental part of the French Revolution, and the prime and effective cause of all of the 
disasters that have succeeded and taken place in her.  This revolution has consisted of changing 
the monarchial government into a democratic [one], establishing it on the corpse of Louis XVI.  
The last King of France was sacrificed on the altar of the most fiery inhumanity, and that had 
consisted also of the suppression, not only of Christianity, but moreover of any other religion 
whatsoever.” 
-Abbe Lorenzo Hervás y Panduro, S.J., Causes of the Revolution in France in the Year 1789, and 
the Means by Which they Have Made Themselves Enemies of Religion and of the State (1807)594 
Hervás y Panduro wrote his explanation of the French Revolution in 1807, mere months 
before the Peninsular War began.  Four years later, in 1811, during the political instability and 
upheaval of the recent Napoleonic invasion of the Iberian peninsula and subsequent guerilla 
fighting, a Dominican friar published a curious set of epistolary editorials in Madrid under the 
pseudonym “El filósofo rancio” – the aged philosopher.  There was little reason that these letters 
should become particularly influential.  The opening session of the Cortés de Cádiz – the first 
national assembly, held among the Spanish rebels to the French occupancy – had met the 
previous fall, and a deluge of documents and polemical debates frequented every major city in 
Spain.  Yet two of Alvarado’s letters sparked great controversy by claiming that there were 
within the Cortes unsavory individuals who were not only political opponents  and “spies of 
                                                 
594 Lorenzo Hervás y Panduro, Causas de la Revolucion de Francia en el año de 1789, y medios de que se han 
valido para efectuarla los enemigos de la religión y del estado. Tomo I (Madrid, 1807), 8-9. “No disiento de Pey, ni 
de todos los emigrados franceses, que con él atribuyen al jansenismo el complemento de la revolución francesa…el 
abandono de toda religión es la parte fundamental de la revolución francesa, y la causa primitiva y efectiva de todos 
los desastres que en ella han sucedido y acaecen.  Esta revolución ha consistido en mudar el gobierno monárquico en 
democrático estableciéndolo sobre el cadáver de Luis XVI. Ultimo Rey de Fráncia sacrificado en el atar de la mas 
fiera inhumanidad, y ha consistido también en la supresión no solamente del christianismo, mas también de 
qualquiera otra religión…”  As Hervás y Panduro was a philologist, he was especially interested in the use and 
misuse of the term “Jansenism.”  A member of the Jesuits, he wrote his work from Rome, originally in Italian. 
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Napoleon,” but worse, heretics and “sons of perdition:” the Jansenists.595  When a fellow 
theologian, Joaquín Lorenzo Villanueva, responded to these charges by seeking to defend these 
individuals as “Catholic persons,” there began a year-long debate through publication over the 
true nature of Spanish Jansenism.596 
This chapter situates the Jansenist debates of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth 
century Spanish Catholic Church within broader ecclesiastical efforts to regulate reform and 
doctrinal critique, as well as to maintain epistemological hegemony.  These themes are explored 
through the works of Spanish Jansenists, assessing how Jansenism was classified as a heterodox 
variety of Catholicism, what Jansenists professed in their texts, and how Spanish theologians 
responded and reacted to it.  To do so, this chapter specifically analyzes El Jasenismo, a religious 
dialogue and debate written by Joaquín Lorenzo Villanueva in 1811, as well as a series of 
editorial letters authored by Fray Francisco Alvarado.  This chapter analyzes the contested 
definitions of Spanish Jansenism at the end of the eighteenth century and asses its relation to 
Catholic reform and Enlightened Catholicism. It demonstrates how the epistemological debates 
which characterized the enlightenment experience were translated from their abstract and 
epistemological discussions into a political dimension.  Progressive and reformist Catholic 
enlighteners became “liberals” and “Jansenists,” associated with foreign thought and revolution.  
Meanwhile, counter-enlighteners became “conservatives,” reactionaries, and ultranmontanists.  
This chapter shows, therefore, how the enlightenment became associated with the reformist 
movements of “Spanish Jansenism” and with the fundamentally political historiographical legacy 
of the nineteenth century. 
                                                 
595 “Espías de Napoleon” and “hijos de perdición” in El Filósofo Rancio (Francisco Alvarado), Cartas Críticas del 
Filósofo Rancio (Mallorca: La Oficina de Felipe Guasp, 1813-1814). 
596 “Personas Católicas,” in Ireneo Nistactes (Joaquín Lorenzo Villanueva), El Jansenismo, dedicado al Filósofo 
Rancio (Cádiz: En la Imprenta de la Junta Superior, 1811), BNE, R/61037. 
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Spanish Jansenism was simultaneously both a variety of Catholicism, practiced and held 
by clergy within the church, and a heterodox movement.  As an ex officio epithet given to 
various intellectuals and self-acknowledged by many, “Jansenists” were often members of the 
clergy and almost exclusively part of the Spanish intellectual elite.  Their opponents were not 
limited to the Jesuits; many Catholic theologians and religious intellectuals argued against 
Jansenism doctrinally, contesting issues of free will, the preeminence of grace, and moral 
theology.  Though much research has already been conducted into the extent of Spanish 
Jansenists, and particularly into the regalist-ultramontane debates held between Jansenists and 
Jesuits within eighteenth-century Spain, the majority of these histories have focused on the 
political and economic dimensions of Jansenist rhetoric, relegating such doctrinal issues and 
theological-intellectual debates to a lesser, neglected role.  This chapter, however, focuses on the 
theological dimension of Spanish Jansenism as a means of connecting the institutionally and 
doctrinally reformist debates at the end of the century to the epistemologically reformist debates 
which preceded it. 
One historian has noted that by 1750 in Spain, there existed “multiple strands of the 
enlightenment,” but that “all strands of Enlightenment in Spain were responses to a general sense 
of crisis coming out of the late 17th and early 18th centuries and thus centered on the concept of 
reform.”597  Thus, this chapter discusses the theological aspects of the Jansenist debates of the 
late-eighteenth century in Spain, placing them among the broader efforts toward reforming the 
Spanish Catholic Church.  These were, essentially, discussions motivated by the same Catholic 
rationalism which is characteristic of the entirety of the eighteenth-century experience.  This 
research thus explores both the work of Spanish Jansenists to introduce Catholic reform, as well 
                                                 
597 Andrea J. Smidt, “Luces por la Fe: The Cause of Catholic Enlightenment in 18th-Century Spain,” in A 
Companion to the Catholic Enlightenment, Ulrich L. Lehner and Michael Printy, eds., 411, 414. 
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as the Spanish Catholic Church’s efforts in the eighteenth century, particularly during the second 
half, to maintain its status as the source of moral authority, despite the rising popularity of 
interior spirituality, personal devotion, and evolving understanding of the doctrine of grace. 
The debate over the definition of Spanish Jansenism between the Cartas Críticas of Fray 
Francisco Alvarado and the dialogue El Jansenismo, by Joaquín Lorenzo Villanueva, first 
challenges the previous historiography by arguing for a religio-intellectual understanding of the 
term and demonstrating that Spanish Jansenism was a fundamentally, if not always primarily, 
religious category.  Moreover, analyzing Spanish Jansenism as a religious category reveals an 
underlying debate about the permitted extent for epistemological and doctrinal reform within the 
Catholic Church of the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries.  These discussions on the 
theological and political nature of Spanish Jansenism are direct inheritors of the debates of the 
Catholic Enlightenment previously studied in this dissertation.  The Catholic Enlightenment was 
essentially reformist, or, as Ulrich Lehner has defined it, a movement which articulated “…their 
rationality in modern terminology and by reconciling Catholicism with modern culture...”598 
This dissertation has thus far focused on the attempts within Spanish Catholicism to 
reform epistemological topics relating to the interaction of science and religion, the concept of 
distinct academic disciplines and magisterial, and methodologies for acquiring knowledge, 
among others.  Spanish Jansenism, like Martínez’s work on anatomy and surgery, Feijóo’s anti-
superstition campaigns, or Cigala’s investigation into the barometrical paradox, represents yet 
one more applicative dimension of reform in which the Catholic Church and theologians sought 
to reconcile themselves to ‘modern culture.’  Yet it, perhaps more than any other issue, became 
intertwined with political theories about the relationship between Church, state, and society, 
                                                 
598 Lehner, On the Road to Vatican II, 25. 
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notions which dominated discussions about reform and turned “ilustración” (enlightenment) into 
“afrancesadismo” (the love of things French).  Similarly, the thoughtful conservative strains of 
the counter-enlightenment were reduced to unwitting prejudices.   After the French Revolution 
and subsequent Napoleonic invasion, these political dimensions became all that was remembered 
by Spain of her participation in eighteenth-century thought.  By examining in close detail the 
theological, rather than the political, nature of Spanish Jansensim, this chapter asserts the 
connection that the movement had to the earlier reform efforts which characterized the Catholic 
Enlightenment in Spain during the eighteenth century. 
 
The “Ghost of Spanish Jansenism:” Historiographical Reductionism and Skepticism 
The history of these theological debates must be properly situated in the context of 
regalism in Spain, particularly during the Caroline era.  This has been of particular importance 
when analyzing the theological contributions and discussions of the Spanish Catholic Church 
with Jansenism and Jansenists during the final decades of the eighteenth century.599  Historians 
who have viewed eighteenth-century debates between Jansenists and Jesuits in Spain through the 
lens of the political ideology and rhetoric of regalist jurisprudence have, lamentably, reduced 
rich theological and intellectual discussions to ecclesiastical manoeuvers and episcopal ploys to 
court the political and economic power of the Crown.  Jansenism, according to this 
interpretation, was merely a convenient vehicle for regalist rhetoric, a strategically theological 
                                                 
599 Regalism, like Gallicanism in France, was primarily concerned with the assertion of the state and of the Spanish 
Crown over the Catholic Church, especially in the aggrandizement of land, the appointment of ecclesiastical 
positions, and the collection of tithes and taxes.  For further information on regalism, see Gabriel B. Paquette, 
Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform in Spain and its Empire, 1759-1808 (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008). Paquette argues that regalism, as a broader political theory of jurisdictionalism, evolved from Church-State 
relations to become the modus operandi of the Caroline reforms across the Ibero-Atlantic.  See also, Andrea J. 
Smidt, “Bourbon Regalism and the Importation of Gallicanism: The Political Path for a State Religion in 
Eighteenth-Century Spain,” Anuario de Historia de la Iglesia 19 (2010), 25-53. 
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vantage point from which the Royal Cabinet could reduce and ultimately extirpate the 
longstanding power of the Society of Jesus within Spain.  This is tantamount to a political 
reductionism of Spain’s religio-intellectual history, where “the central task of the scholar of 
religion is to explain its doctrines and ideas, its rituals and practices, its regulations and 
prohibitions as the product of something ostensibly more fundamental and ‘real’…”600 
Menéndez Pelayo devotes an entire chapter in his Historia de los Heterodoxos to 
describing Jansenism in eighteenth-century Spain, but labels it with the hybrid term “Regalist 
Jansenism.”  Menéndez Pelayo’s position is clearly stated.  He first defines Jansenism as the 
theological movement born from the five propositions of Jansen’s Augustinus, further expounded 
by Quesnel, and condemned in the papal bull Unigenitus.  He then argues that, “In this strict 
sense [of Jansenism], it is certain that there were never Jansenists in Spain; or, at least, I have not 
found any such book whose purpose is to defend Jansen.”601  The eighteenth century, according 
to Menéndez Pelayo, was simply not the forum for earlier debates on the efficacy or sovereignty 
of effectual grace and predestination, rather, ecclesiastical conversations in Spain revolved 
around themes of episcopal authority and the jurisdictional arguments between Madrid and 
Rome.  Spanish Jansenism, according to Menéndez Pelayo, was not a wholly “inexact” term, 
because late-eighteenth century individuals shared certain “affectations” with the Port-Royal sect 
of the seventeenth century.602  These were, namely: a tendency towards austerity, an antipapal 
stance or lack of belief in papal infallibility, a dislike of the Roman Curia, a “schismatic spirit” 
                                                 
600 Brad S. Gregory, “Can We “See Things Their Way”? Should We Try?” in Seeing Things Their Way: Intellectual 
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602 Menéndez Pelayo, HHE.VI.1. 
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which favored national churches, and a “hatred of the Society of Jesus.”603  Since all of these 
commonalities between the two sects revolved around questions of authority and regalism, 
Menéndez Pelayo’s work subsequently uses Spanish Jansenism synonymously with Regalism. 
 Sarrailh largely supported Menéndez Pelayo’s conclusions, writing that “In any case, 
there does not seem to have existed in Spain a Jansenist group who could compare to that of 
Port-Royal…”604  Sarrailh acknowledges the previous work of Padre Manuel F. Miguélez to 
establish the fact that discussions between Jansenists, Jesuits, and the wider Iberian Catholic 
Church involved debates over the defense of Augustinianism, the doctrines of grace, election, 
and free will, and the so-called “five points” of Jansen’s posthumous publication, Augustinus.  
These theological discussions, according to Miguélez, were as prominent as those of episcopal 
authority, regalism, and papal infallibility – the traditional topics chosen by ecclesiastical or 
political historians as markers of a “Spanish Jansenist.”605  Sarrailh asserts, however, that 
Miguélez conflates Augustianism and the works of Augustian orders throughout Spain with that 
of Jansenism.606  Ultimately, Sarrailh concludes that Jansenism in Spain, while having some 
theological connotations, is incomparable with seventeenth-century Jansenism and far more in 
line with Regalism. 
Herr has similarly argued that Spanish Jansenists “were not direct heirs of the French 
sect,” but were rather distant inheritors of theological corollaries drawn from original Jansenism, 
particularly interested in attacking the ideas of moral probabilism and casuistry in the works of 
Jesuit Luis Molina, and asserting the defense of Augustinian interpretations of grace that 
                                                 
603 Menéndez Pelayo, HHE.VI.1., « Llamarlos jansenistas no es del todo inexacto, porque se parecían a los solitarios 
de Port-Royal en la afectación de… » 
604 Jean Sarrailh, La España Ilustrada de la Segunda Mitad del Siglo XVIII (México: Fondo de Cultra Económica, 
1957), 701. 
605 See P. Manuel Miguélez, Jansenismo y regalismo en España (Valladolid, 1895). 
606 Sarrailh, 701.  See, for example, Miguélez’s work on the Augustinian convent at San Felipe el Real de Madrid. 
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emphasized predestination over free will.607  Unlike Menéndez Pelayo, who had equated 
Jansenism with Regalism, Herr made an important historiographical contribution by arguing that 
the term “Jansenist” in eighteenth-century Spain was primarily associated with one who opposed 
“the theological and moral teachings of the Jesuit order.”608 
The early historiography of Spanish Jansenism therefore presents a startlingly unified and 
forebodingly general consensus that such a thing never existed in Spain, or at least, that the term 
primarily connoted a political position.  The historian Antonio Mestre Sanchís, for example, has 
stated that “Without a doubt, Jansenism never had important doctrinal consequences in Spain, 
unlike in the Low Countries or in France.”609  Similarly, Teófanes Egido describes eighteenth-
century Spain as being haunted by the “‘Ghost’ of Spanish Jansenism,” an insubstantial, 
phantasmal concept.610  Egido, citing the historian Saugnieux, alternatively refers to“jansenists” 
by bracketing the term in skeptical quotation marks.611  Yet both Sanchís and Egido make 
concessions to these strong pronouncements.  Sanchís, for example, allows that primary evidence 
exists for Spanish Jansenism, and that “perhaps Antonio González de Ródenas would be the only 
doctrinal Jansenist [in Spain].”612 Similarly Egido traces the recent efforts of several historians 
who have challenged the dominant narrative that Spanish Jansenism was nothing more than a 
                                                 
607Herr, The Eighteenth Century Revolution, 16.  Probabilism is a system of ethics and morality, primarily associated 
with the Jesuits of the early modern period, which operated from the base premise that in a circumstance in which 
the permissibility of an action was doubtful, it was morally acceptable to follow a liberal view on a degree (even if 
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611 José María Jover Zamora, Historia de España (fundada por Ramón Menéndez Pidal), Tomo XXXI, 418. 
612 Mestre, “Jansenismo Español,” 1224. 
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political buzzword of the late-eighteenth century.613  Moreover, Egido concludes that Spanish 
Jansenism may be better understood by placing it within the context of reformist religious 
attempts within Spanish Catholicism, but that it can never be wholly divorced from the political 
debates of the period.614  In this way, Jansenism serves as a useful conclusion to the 
enlightenment in Spain, connecting to the reformist trends established by the epistemological 
debates of the eighteenth century and transitioning to a purely political discussion which 
dominated the nineteenth century. 
One of the revisionist historians cited by Egido, María Giovanna Tomisch, has 
commented on this difficulty of untangling the skein of Jansenists, Jesuits, and Regalists in 
eighteenth-century Spanish history.  Tomisch asks, 
How does one separate that from this to be able to affirm that this or that 
procedure is a clear sign that religious reform that is easily distinguishable from 
the interests of the regalists? The same meaning of this word, “regalia,” at work in 
the Catholic world –rights which the State has or assumes to intervene in 
ecclesiastical matters – gives us an indication of the deeply embedded 
significance that these issues had.   And with reference to these, one can divide 
the critiques into two currents: one that identifies the movement with the Regalist 
practices and one which considers it something distinct, although not always 
easily separable from, Regalism.615 
Tomisch affirmed in her research that the Jansenist-Jesuit debates of the eighteenth century had a 
distinctive, theological element.  Ultimately, Tomisch asserts that there are three clear “common 
                                                 
613 Egido credits historians such as Apollis, Demerson, Mayans, and Tomisch have all sought to challenge the 
generalized account of Spanish Jansenism given first by Menéndez Pelayo and later researched by Herr and Sarrailh 
614 For a general overview of Spanish Catholic reformism during the second-half of the eighteenth century, see 
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615 María Giovanna Tomisch, El Jansenismo en España: Estudio sobre ideas religiosas en la segunda mitad del 
siglo XVIII (Madrid: Emilio Rubín, 1972), 30-31. “¿Cómo separar aquélla de éstos para poder afirmar que tal o cual 
procedimiento es una clara señal de reformismo religioso fácilmente distinguible de los intereses regalistas? La 
misma acepción de esta palabra “regalía”, vigente en el mundo católicio – derechos que el Estado tiene o se arroga 
de intervener en cosas eclesiásticas – nos da el índice de compenetración que tenían estos asuntos. Y con referencie 
a éstos, se puede divider la crítica en dos corrientes: la que identifica el movimiento con las prácticas regalistas y la 
que lo considera algo aparte, aunque no siempre fácilmente separable del regalismo.” 
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denominators” of Spanish Jansenism in the eighteenth century: a proclivity to jurisdictional 
disputes, occurring during the final decades of the eighteenth century or the early decades of the 
nineteenth, and an ‘orthodoxy’ asserted by the five foundational propositions of Augustinus.616  
While the first of these two points agree with the early historiography on Jansenism, the third 
marks a clear departure from earlier interpretations. 
 The implications of Tomisch’s assertion that “Jansenist” as a term in eighteenth-century 
had a “deeply embedded” theological meaning are not fully examined in her work.  Beyond the 
efforts of Spanish Jansenists to publish the Bible in the vernacular Spanish in the early 1790s, 
Tomisch focuses, rather, on the political-theological debates examined by the historians before 
her.617  The historiography, therefore, remains silent on the possibility of rereading classic 
Spanish Jansenist texts in a distinctively straightforward and theological interpretation.  By 
providing such a reading of the debates between Joaquín Lorenzo Villanueva and Padre 
Francisco Alvarado at the beginning of the nineteenth century, particularly through Villanueva’s 
El Jansenismo, dedicado al Filósofo Rancio, this chapter may support the claims of later 
historians of eighteenth-century Spain that Jansenism as a term must be seriously reconsidered.  
If identifying oneself as a Spanish Jansenist or being labeled as one did, in fact, have theological 
and religious implications, then these primary sources may become a rich source for future 
scholars of Spanish Catholicism during the second half of the eighteenth-century. 
                                                 
616 Tomisch, El Jansenismo en España, 34. 
617 On the publication of a vernacular bible: “Individual and family reading of the vernacular Bible, catechisms, or 
similar civic-religious summaries never spurred literacy in Spain…Until 1782, the inquisitorial prohibitions of 1551 
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did not take place without sharp controversy…”  Frago, “The History of Literacy in Spain: Evolution, Traits, and 
Questions,” 581-582. 
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 This focus on the theological dimensions of eighteenth-century Spanish Jansenism also 
necessarily involves historiographical discussions about the Catholic Enlightenment.  This 
chapter employs Andrea J. Smidt-Sittema’s definition of the Spanish Catholic Enlightenment as 
“encompass[ing] all of the distinctly religiously-motivated and uniquely Spanish attempts at 
bringing science, reason, progress, and greater social utility to Catholicism.”618  Spanish 
Jansenism, placed in this context, is therefore important for demonstrating how theological 
differences prompted Catholic reform.  At the same time, however, it highlights how 
conservative Catholic critics of Jansenism responded to the language of reason, progress, and 
reform.619  Ultimately, this chapter demonstrates how both Jansenists and anti-Jansenists 
dialogued about doctrinal varieties and about the very theological justifications for Catholic 
Reform.  In this analysis, the language of reason and of Catholic rationalism will be particularly 
important. 
 
Polemical Discussions of Spanish Jansenism: El Jansenismo and the Cartas Críticas 
To demonstrate that Spanish Jansenism was a religious classification that was connected 
with issues of reform, this chapter primarily uses a religious dialogue written in 1811; however, 
printed books and published letters from the turn-of-the-century will also be examined to 
discover the theological and religious dimensions between “liberal” and “conservative” 
Catholics.  Thus, the writings of Jansenists, philo-Jansenists, and anti-Jansenists are all 
examined.   This body of primary sources to be assessed is the ‘elite’, theological-intellectual 
                                                 
618 Smidt, “Luces por el Fé,” 411. 
619 In this sense, it may be helpful to eventually label these “multiple strands” such as a Jesuit Catholic 
Enlightenment, a Jansenist Catholic Enlightenment, etc. 
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treatises and works published within Spain.620  The principal primary document that will form 
the center of this chapter is Joaquín Lorenzo Villanueva’s religious treatise El Jansenismo, 
dedicado al filósofo Rancio, published in 1811 in Cádiz, Spain.621  It is a dialogue, a pamphlet 
composed in response to the work of Padre Francisco Alvarado, who wrote a series of letters 
entitle Cartas críticas in which he critiqued several members of the Spanish clergy as 
Jansenists.622  Villanueva’s response was an effort to distinguish between “Spanish Jansenists” 
and French Jansenism by articulating Spanish Jansenist beliefs.  This document, as well as other 
dialogues similar to it, has been analyzed previously as a source of information on the political 
debates of liberalism and regalism. This chapter, however, reads ‘against the grain’ of these 
traditional interpretations, seeking to understand the theological positions being espoused. 
The second corpus of works reflects the learned Catholic response to Jansenist doctrine.  
Unlike the paradigm of the French enlightenment, the Spanish Enlightenment occurred almost 
wholly within the parameters of Catholic belief.623 Thus, this chapter analyzes the efforts of 
conservative theologians and intellectuals within the Spanish Catholic Church who rejected 
Jansenism not solely on political or economic grounds, but for religious reasons.  For this 
dissertation chapter, the primary contra-Jansenist work is the collected letters of the Cartas 
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history of Jansenism at the end of the eighteenth-century.   
621 Joaquín Lorenzo Villanueva, Jansenismo, dedicado al filosofo Rancio, Biblioteca Nacional de España, R/61037 
(Cádiz, 1811).  Unless otherwise noted, Villanueva as a surname will be used to designate Joaquín Lorenzo 
Villanueva, not his brother, Jaime Villanueva. 
622 María Giovanna Tomisch, El Jansenismo en España: Estudio sobre ideas religiosas en la segunda mitad del 
siglo VIII (Madrid: Emilio Rubin, 1972), 164. 
623 Writing about similar intellectual and spiritual movements in Portugal, Evergton Sales Souza notes that, “Such 
dissensions do not correspond to a conflict between partisans and adversaries of the Catholic enlightenment; they are 
disputes which, more often than not, took place within the bosom of the enlightened Catholic group.”  Evergton 
Sales Souza, “The Catholic Enlightenment in Portugal,” in A Companion to the Catholic Enlightenment in Europe, 
377. 
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Criticas of Fray Alvarado.  As part of a debate, these letters offer an unusually defined 
perspective into how Catholic ilustrados and antilustrados thought about Jansenism. 
 
Alvarado and Villanueva: Representative Figures of the Religio-Intellectual Elite 
These letters were written by Fray Francisco Alvarado, one of the most well-known 
“reactionary” Catholic writers and thinkers of the second-half of the eighteenth-century.  Born 
into a peasant family in Marchena, near Sevilla, in 1756, Alvarado attended a Jesuit School 
there, eventually joining the Dominican Order at the nearby Monastery of San Pablo in Sevilla.  
He then studied philosophy and theology at the College of St. Thomas of Sevilla.  Along with 
such theologians as Fernando de Cevallos, Alvarado soon became widely known for his 
conservative critiques of the new philosophies and for his particular work as a writer of 
pamphlets.  From May, 1786 to November, 1787, for example, he published the Cartas 
Aristotélicas, defending traditional Thomistic, Scholastic, and Aristotelian epistemologies.  His 
work has thus been labeled by historians as “reactionary” – the label given to theologically and 
epistemologically conservative Catholic positions during the eighteenth century.  Alvarado 
demonstrates in his work a clear abhorrence for all things French, and viewed with increasing 
disgust the importation of French ideas, philosophy, culture, and publications into Spain, 
culminating in the French Revolution, which Alvarado, along with many Spanish Catholics, saw 
as the logical nadir of irreligious behavior and atheism. 
 When French armies arrived in Sevilla in 1810, Alvarado left for Tavira, in Portugal, 
where he continued to monitor the constitutional discussions occurring in Cádiz, writing forty-
seven opinionated, open letters, the Cartas Críticas, to an editor for publication in Mallorca. 
These letters he wrote under the guise of a pen name, labeling himself “el Filósofo Rancio.”  
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Nearly fifty years later, all of these letters were collected posthumously and published by his 
colleagues Francisco Rodríguez de la Bárcena and Manuel Freyre de Castrillón.624  While it 
appears that his letters were widely circulated when published, all of his letters were eventually 
published in five volumes by 1824-1825, eleven years after his death on August 31, 1814.  His 
letters addressed numerous and varied topics: ecclesiastical reform in Spain, political theology 
and defenses of Absolutism, attacks on ‘progressivism’, arguments against eclecticism and 
skepticism, apologies for the activity of the Inquisition,625 and acerbic writings against the 
‘Enlightenment’, liberalism, Francophilia, Jansenism, and freemasonry.626  Alvarado, along with 
many other ‘reactionary’ Catholic writers, frequently responded to the work of Joaquín Lorenzo 
Villanueva, among other ‘liberal’ Catholics.627  The use of this political language is striking, and 
helps to explain the distorted memory of the Spanish enlightenment in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.  Catholic enlighteners who advocated a more agressive form of reform had 
always been associated with foreign influence and with progressivism, but now, in the polarizing 
context of the Jesuit-Jansenist controversy, the Regalist-Montanist debates, and the fiasco of the 
French Revolution, they became politicized enemies of the state, “liberals,” and “spies of 
Napoleon.”  Thus it was that the slippery category of “Jansenist” helped to transform ilustrados 
such as Piquer, Ramon Campos, and Villanueva into afrancesados. 
 This process holds true for the conservative members of the counter-enlightenment as 
well.  The historian Javier Herrero has critiqued the work of Alvarado as the “Filósofo Rancio” 
                                                 
624 Both Bárcena and Castrillón served as diputados to the Cortes de Cádiz in 1811. 
625 Fernando VII appointed Alvarado a consejero of the Inquisition. 
626 For further information, see Javier Herrero, Los orígenes del pensamiento reaccionario español (Madrid: 
Cuadernos para el Diálogo, 1973); Julio Herrera González, ¿Serviles! El grupo reaccionario de las Cortes de Cádiz 
(Cádiz: Servicio de Publicaciones de Unicaja, 2007). 
627 Alvarado, along with individuals Rafael de Vélez, Macedo, Agustín de Castro, Mozzi, El Setabiense, Miguel de 
Lardizábal, Fernando Ceballos, José Joaquín Colón, and others form the main writers of “casticismo,” while others 
such as Bartolomé José Gallardo and Agustin Arguelles are seen as the proponents of “liberalism.” 
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as being derivative and a poor amalgamation of reactionary positions.  He states in his work, Los 
Orígenes del Pensamiento Reaccionario Español that Alvarado “…no es más que una síntesis 
tosca y confusa de los ‘clásicos’ de la reacción…”628  Herrero notes Alvarado’s clear reliance 
(and direct citations) of Barruel, for example, specifically when developing his ideas of a 
“conspiración de Voltaire y los filósofos…”629  Herrero proceeds, in his textual analysis of 
Alvarado’s work, to evaluate him on these presuppositions.  The line between derivative writing 
and extensive appeals to authority and abundant in-text citation, both of which were frequent 
practices in eighteenth-century writing and particularly proliferated in Scholastic discourse, is 
not clearly defined by Herrero, making his charge problematic. 
Moreover, Herrero fails to prove his critique of Alvarado’s theology as crude or “tosca y 
confusa.”630  Herrero blames the work of Menéndez Pelayo for elevating Alvarado’s pedestrian 
theology to an unduly important level, arguing that for the most part Alvarado represents a 
poorly thought-out, albeit impassioned, defense of Catholic traditionalism.  In one particularly 
damming assertion, Herrero states: “When the Rancio pretends to be profound he instead 
becomes, as we see, incomprehensible…What are those names that did not deal with confronting 
the ancient philosophy and whose ‘correspondence and ideas’ the Gospel had given to the 
world?; and what does this substitution of such ideas for the crimes and passions that the Gospel 
has been confounding consist of?”631  This demonstrates a clear misreading of Alvarado and a 
classic historiographical stereotype of the “reactionary” Catholic position on Herrero’s part.  Not 
                                                 
628 Herrero, Los orígenes del pensamiento reaccionario español, 316. “…[El Filósofo Rancio] is nothing more than 
a tangled and confused synthesis of the ‘classics’ of the reaction[ary movement]…” 
629 Herrero, Los origenes del pensamiento reaccionario español, 316-317.  “conspiracy of Voltaire and the 
philosophes…” (Alvarado’s Carta XXIV) 
630 Herrero, Los origenes del pensamiento reaccionario español, 316. 
631 Herrero, Los origenes del pensamiento reaccionario español, 317. “Cuando el Rancio pretende ser profundo 
suele volverse, como vemos, incomprensible…¿Cuáles son esos nombres que no acertó a formular la filosofía 
antigua y que cuya ‘correspondencia e ideas’ el Evangelio ha dado al mundo?; y ¿en qué consiste esa sustitución de 
tales ideas por los crímenes y pasiones que el Evangelio había confundido?” 
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only are these questions taken out of context of Alvarado’s larger work and part of a broader 
discourse, but they posit that the reader is familiar with both the religious language that Alvarado 
uses as well as knowledgeable about the plethora of references (both implied and explicit) that 
Alvarado employs. Rather than accept Alvarado’s theological justifications on his own terms and 
from his epistemological framework, Herrero, like the consensus of scholars of this period, insist 
upon reading Alvarado from a presentist perspective that clearly favors liberalism over 
traditionalism and modern notions of reason over the logic of older systems of thinking.  The 
result is a clumsy interpretation of ‘reactionary’ literature that posits a free-thinking elite against 
an outdated, irrational, and blindly dogmatic old order of clerics.632  This chapter instead 
positions Alvarado as a dynamic thinker within a well-established network of the religious and 
intellectual elite. 
Also in this network was one of his opponents, Joaquín Lorenzo Villanueva y Astengo, 
the enigmatic author of the treatise, El Jansenismo.  Born in Játiva, in Valencia, on August 10, 
1757 as the son of an Aragonese bookseller, Villanueva devoted his entire life to academic 
training, studying humanities at the school in Orihuela before studying theology in the city of 
Valencia.  Villanueva and his brother, Jaime Villanueva, were trained, for a time, at the 
University of Valencia by the young Juan Bautista Muñoz, who was later appointed Cosmógrafo 
mayor de Indias in 1770 by Carlos III.  Muñoz had established himself as a clear opponent to 
Scholasticism and an advocate of the reforms and new philosophies of the ilustración.  He 
authored, for example, the 1767 treatise De recto philosophiae recentis in theologiae usu 
dissertatio (“A Dissertation on the Right Use of Recent Philosophy in Theology”), in which he 
                                                 
632 Herrero’s problematic readings of Alvarado and of Villanueva stem from his misinterpretation of Jansensim as a 
fundamentally political movement – see, for example, “La Secta Jansenista” in Herrero’s Los Origenes del 
Pensamiento Reaccionario. 
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argued that the new philosophies could be justly used in the study of theology.633  It is likely that 
much of Villanueva’s ideologically formative experiences, as well as future professional 
contacts, first emerged from his study with Muñoz. 
Joaquín Villanueva earned his doctorate from Valencia in 1777 at the age of twenty.   
Until 1780, Villanueva taught philosophy at the seminary in Orihuela, when, after disagreeing 
with his colleagues, he left the school.  By this time, Villanueva had already established himself 
with many thinkers that were categorized as ilustrados or as promoters of liberalismo. The 
Inquisitor General Felipe Bertrán, for example, was a supporter of Villanueva, and used his 
position as bishop of Salamanca to secure Villanueva a new position as a catedrático of theology 
at the seminary there.634  Villanueva was a vehement advocate of reforming censorship practices, 
particularly concerned with allowing the vernacular publication of the Bible and encouraging a 
wider readership of the scriptures.  He published De la lección de la Sagrada Escritura en 
lenguas vulgares, defending the translation of the Bible into vernacular languages, a practice 
which the Catholic Church continued to restrict, in 1791; in 1792 he joined the Real Academia 
de la Lengua and the Real Academia de la Historia, and in 1794, published the Cartas 
eclesiásticas al doctor don Guillermo Díaz Luzeredi, again defending the reading of the Bible in 
Spanish.  Villanueva did not limit himself, however, to the defense of vernacularism.635  He 
                                                 
633 See, for example, Alain Guy, Historia de la filosofía española (Barcelona: Anthropos Editorial de Hombre, 
1985), 204.  Muñoz’s discipline-specific work as a historian may also have influenced both of the Villanueva 
brothers in their efforts at ecclesiastical history, most notably, their collaborative work on the Viaje literario a las 
Iglesias de España (1803). 
634 Bertrán was later denounced as a Jansenist and subsequently defended and vindicated in Villanueva’s El 
Jansenismo.  See Villanueva, 13, where Villanueva (as Nistactes) defends both “…inquisidor general D. Felipe 
Bertrán…” as well as “…D. Joaquín Villanueva…” 
635 It does not appear that Villanueva was advocating either universal education or unguided and unsanctioned 
readings of scripture.  In many of his works, Villanueva notes the potential that the people (pueblo) had for 
misunderstanding.  Villanueva viewed religious errors, particularly moral laxity, as dangerous when adopted by the 
populace, as well as being directly responsible for the increased political disorder experienced at the end of the 
eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries.  See, for example, Villanueva’s chapter, “Errores y doctrinas 
laxas que han fomentado la insubordinación del pueblo a las potestades” (Errors and doctrines of laxity that have 
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wrote frequently and prolifically, commenting on the celebration of the Mass, cataloged popular 
religious celebrations, translated religious works from Latin into Spanish, both defended and 
critiqued the work of the Inquisition, and after the Napoleonic Invasion, opined politically about 
the Cortes de Cádiz.  An inherently argumentative and divisive figure, Villanueva’s 
outspokenness earned him both respect and negative attention. 
In 1808 he retired to the Augustine Convent in Alcalá de Henares, but he returned soon to 
defend Madrid after French armies had entered the peninsula.  He was elected as one of the 
twenty diputados (deputy-representatives), sent from Valencia to the Cortes de Cádiz.636  It was 
in Cádiz, that Villanueva would establish himself as a masterful writer of not only religious 
history, but of political theology.  He published El Jansenismo, the central dialogue of this 
chapter, in Cádiz in 1811, as well as some of his most famous works, including Las angélicas 
Fuentes o el tomista en las Cortes (1811-1813), Memoria crítica de una parte del Dictamen y 
voto por escrito sobre la Inquisición (1813), and Conciliación pólitico cristiana del Sí y el No 
(1813).  Following the return of Fernando VII (“El Deseado”), Villanueva was sent to exile in 
Valencia under house arrest in 1814.  However, after the constitutional system of Spain was 
restored in 1820, he was granted a reprieve.  He was named as ambassador to the Holy See in 
1822, but the papacy, sensitive to some of Villanueva’s outspoken and acerbic critiques, forbid 
him entrance.  Insulted and dejected, Villanueva returned to Spain briefly before traveling to 
Ireland in 1823, where he lived the rest of his life.  He died there in Dublin on March 25, 
1837.637 
                                                 
formed the insubordination of the people against the potentates) in his Catecismo del Estado según los principios de 
la religión (Madrid, 1793). 
636 Federico Suárez, Las Cortes de Cádiz (Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, S.A, 1982), pg. 41.  Villanueva is listed as a 
“Capellán de Honor y predicador de S.M. Canónigo de la Santa Iglesia de Cuenca.  Penitenciario de la Real Capilla. 
Caballero de la Orden de Carlos III.” 
637 For most biographical information, consult Villanueva’s autobiography, Vida literaria ó memoria de sus escritos 
y opinions (London, 1825). 
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Authorship of the Texts: Pseudonymic Writing in Eighteenth-Century Spanish Polemics 
When submitting his Cartas Críticas to the editors, Alvarado chose to sign them as “el 
Filósofo Rancio” – the vintage Philosopher.  The name simultaneously poked fun at Alvarado’s 
liberal and Francophilic opponents, labeling himself a philosophe of a past age, while also 
establishing a connection between Alvarado and Aristotelianism – for the term was originally 
applied by Martin Luther to Aristotle.638  Alvarado therefore used “el Filósofo Rancio” to 
lambast the new philosophy while reaffirming traditional scholastic theology.  Thus, the use of 
the appellation of “Filósofo Rancio” was less pseudonymic in intent than Villanueva’s own 
employment of “Ireneo Nistactes.”639  Patricia Manning has noted that the use of pseudonyms in 
early modern Spain was a widespread practice.640 Writers, especially clerics, used pen names to 
hide their identity and religious affiliation, to bypass in-house censorship processes of religious 
orders, and to avoid persecution by the Inquisition.641  While many of these pseudonyms were 
transparent and identifiable, others were specifically created to avoid decryption – many remain 
unidentified today.  This was not the case in Alvarado’s choice of “Filósofo Rancio,” which was 
more a calculated word play than an attempt to conceal identity.  Indeed, Alvarado assumption of 
the nickname was only developed late in his writing on the occasion of the Cartas Críticas from 
1811 to 1814. 
Villanueva was doubtlessly aware, for several plausible reasons, that the Filósofo Rancio 
who had authored these letters was, in fact, Alvarado himself.  First, as previously mentioned, 
                                                 
638 See William Henry Lazareth’s study of Luther’s denunciation of Aristotle’s Ethics III.7 in Christians in Society: 
Luther, the Bible, and Social Ethics (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 2001), 97. 
639 It remains unclear what the meaning, if any, is of Villanueva’s synonym of Irene Nistactes.  It is never explained 
in any primary source, nor is it immediately apparent from secondary research. 
640 Patricia Manning, Voicing Dissent in Seventeenth-Century Spain, 16-17. 
641 Patricia Manning, Voicing Dissent in Seventeenth-Century Spain, 16-17. 
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Alvarado was not deliberately cautious in his appellation.  Secondly, while Villanueva does not 
specifically reference Alvarado as the author, Villanueva designs the principle antagonist of his 
dialogue after Alvarado, including numerous biographical specifics to underscore the connection.  
The Father Maestro who gives voice to the letters of the Filósofo Rancio is, for example, a well-
established and admired Dominican.642  More incriminatingly, the setting of the dialogue occurs 
in the library and reading room of the convento of San Pablo in Sevilla – the same Dominican 
monastery where Alvarado first took his vows and had remained until his flight to Tavira in 
1811.643 
The reverse may not have been true, however, for Alvarado’s responses to Villanueva.  
Villanueva, writing from a less-sanctioned ideological position, would certainly have had better 
reason for concealing his identity – moreover, his pseudonym is far more deliberately obtuse.  
Whereas Villanueva never refers to both Alvarado and the Filósofo Rancio within the same 
context, Alvarado’s letters mention both Villanueva and Ireneo Nistactes – seemingly as distinct, 
individual persons.644  However, Alvarado correctly suggests that Villanueva’s authorship is 
strikingly similar to that of Ireneno Nistactes, the “Bishop of the Fuentes Angélicas,” and 
                                                 
642 Villanueva, El Jansenismo, 1. 
643 Villanueva, El Jansenismo, 1. 
644 See, for example, a particularly revealing passage from Alvarado’s thirty-fourth letter, in which he references 
both Villanueva and Nistactes individually within the same sentence, writing: “Bien puede ser que el autor de la 
Exposicion del señor Ministro no sea ni Ireneo Nistactes, ni el Obispo de las Fuentes angelicas, ni don Lorenzo 
Astengo, ni don Joaquin de Villanueva; pero las propiedades son, y muy son de alguno de los de esta cuaterna.”  
Alvarado, Carta XXXIV “Sigue la impugnacion del Dictámen de las Comisiones” (1 de Julio, 1813), 343.  In this 
context, Alvarado was seeking to identify the author of a recently-published Exposición del Melchor Cano (which 
Villanueva did, in point of fact, write in 1813).  Alvarado playfully admits the possibility of erring, noting that the 
author of the Exposición may not have been neither Nistactes, nor the “Bishop of the Fuentes Angelicas,” nor 
Lorenzo Astengo – all pseudonyms employed by Villanueva.  Villanueva had used his maternal name, “Lorenzo 
Astengo,” when he published his Cartas de un Presbitero Español in 1798, in which he defended the Inquisition’s 
actions against Bishop Grégoire of Blois – which, given its plausibility as an actual name, can be interpreted as a far 
more concerted effort at concealing identity than his other pseudonyms.  Villanueva may have employed these 
pseudonyms to shield himself from personal attacks – he was imprisoned under Ferdinand VII, exiled from Madrid, 
and had one of his speeches from Cádiz placed on the Inquisition’s Index of Prohibited Works in 1815.  See Henry 
Charles Lea, “Chapters from the Religious History of Spain Connected with the Inquisition, “Censorship of the 
Press” (Philadelphia: Lea Brothers & Co., 1890), 167. 
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Lorenzo Astengo – three pseudonyms previously used by Villanueva.645  Similarly, Alvarado 
suggestively begins his twelfth letter (and his second against El Jansenismo) with a quote 
selected from Villanueva’s Kempis de los literatos.646 These clues support the idea that Alvarado 
was, in fact, able to surmise who his opponent was and to unmask his identity.  Thus, while it is 
conceivable that this exchange of argumentative letters occurred on slightly unequal footing, 
with Alvarado position clearly defined and recognized, while Villanueva’s remained hidden and 
unidentified, it seems more likely that both authors painstakingly worked to reveal each other’s 
identity.  This necessarily impacts the historian’s reading of Villanueva’s text.  If Villanueva 
employed a pseudonym as a merely rhetorical flourish or published his works despite a common 
knowledge of their authorship, it would seem that either his espoused opinions were less 
incendiary than have been argued by previous historians or that his recklessness and disregard 
for reproof was greater.  If, however, Villanueva’s use of a false name was both intended and 
kept to conceal identity, it is plausible that his ideas were seen, at least by the author, as 
potentially incriminating and dangerous. 
 
Spanish Jansenism and Ecclesiastical Reform: The Sacrament of Confession 
Villanueva’s work, El Jansenismo is a fictional dialogue between various religious 
figures.  It begins, after a brief prologue, with the author, Ireneo Nistactes, describing a dream, 
It seemed to me that I was in my homeland of Sevilla, seated in the library of 
Saint Paul, with a Father Maestro of that house [the Dominican Monastery] and 
another two lecturers who were looking at him with veneration.  There entered in 
there at that time two Augustinian friars…next to the table there was a captain of 
                                                 
645 Alvarado, Cartas Críticas. 
646 Alvarado, Cartas Críticas, XII, 2. 
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the frigate named Don Claudio….and a Don Agramato, a cleric of advanced 
age…647 
The choice of the genre was important, allowing Villanueva to address numerous weighty issues 
in an extremely analytical way and with clearly demarcated positions.  At the same time, 
Villanueva’s emphasis on the story’s fictitiousness at both the start of the work and at its 
conclusion, as well as his circumspection in keeping the main speakers anonymous (though 
clearly inspired) provided Villanueva, as Nistactes, an additional protective barrier to challenges 
to his work.  Villanueva’s selected cast is deliberate and revealing – he specifically alluded in El 
Jansenismo to previous “literary clashes” between the Dominicans and the Augustinians, and 
was well aware that the Augustinian order had long been the defenders of Spanish Jansenists.648  
Indeed, the Augustinians in Villanueva’s dream enter the room carrying the letters of the 
Filósofo Rancio, ready for a religious and intellectual debate.  The principal speakers emerge 
quickly in the first pages of the work: one of the Augustinians speaking in defense, as the 
protagonist, of those labeled “Jansenists,” and the Father Maestro of the Dominican order 
supporting the work of Rancio. 
Villanueva himself never joined a religious order, and although he retired to an 
Augustinian convent, he took great care in his dialogue to emphasize that the issue of Spanish 
Jansenism is not easily divided between Augustinians and Dominicans.  He also highlighted his 
deep respect for many Dominicans.  Indeed, Villanueva’s own teacher at Valencia, Muñoz, had 
been a member of the Dominican Order.  At the close of his argument in the dialogue, 
Villanueva reminded the Dominican antagonist that great theological works more sensitive to the 
                                                 
647 Villanueva, El Jansenismo, 1. “Pareció me estar en Sevilla mi patria, sentado en la biblioteca de S. Pablo, con un 
P. Mtro. De aquella casa y otros dos lectores que le miraban con acatamiento.  Iban entrando en el a la sazón dos 
frailes Agustinos, cosa que admire acordándome de cierto choque literario ocurrido allí años hace entre estas dos 
familias.  Junto a la mesa había un capitán de fragata llamado D. Claudio, mui estudioso, a quien conocí en el 
colegio de guardias marinas de Cartagena; y un Don Agramato clérigo de buena edad.” 
648 Villanueva, El Jansenismo, 1. “choque literario” 
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nuances of Spanish Jansenism were at hand. “You, Sir, do not need to beg for this outside of this 
house: in your very order you, Sir, have wise writers that have undertaken to enter this cloud that 
does not allow one to see clearly.”649  He continued to recommend numerous famous works by 
Dominicans from Italy, France, and Spain, such as Tomás de Lemos (1555-1629), Hyacinth Serri 
(circa 1700), Vicenzo Maria Dinelli (m. 1683), Giovanni Vincenzo Patuzzi (d. 1769), Daniel 
Concina (d. 1756), Mas (unknown), Vincent Contenson (1641-1674), and Pietro Maria 
Gazzaniga (1722-1799).650  All these, he labeled “religious and wise persons.”651 
At the time that Villanueva wrote El Jansenismo, it is unlikely that more than the first 
two of Alvarado’s Cartas Críticas has been published. Alvarado’s first Carta Crítica was written 
May 16, 1811.  Villanueva’s response was published in Cádiz at the printing press of the Junta 
Superior at an unknown date in 1811, but it was likely during the late-summer or early-fall of 
that year, most likely during August, while Alvarado was writing multiple critiques.  Alvarado’s 
eleventh letter, the first of seven responding to Villanueva’s published dialogue, was published at 
an unknown date after December 6, 1811. Yet by the publication of this letter, Alvarado 
indicates that Villanueva’s dialogue has been in publication for quite some time, writing, “Dear 
friend – at last the Jansenism of Ireneo Nistactes has arrived in my hands.”652  Furthermore, 
                                                 
649 Villanueva, 22. “No necesita V. para esto mendigar nada fuera de casa: en su misma orden tiene V. sabios 
escritores que le sacaran de entre esa neblina que no le deja ver claro.” 
650 For further information on Dominican theology during the eighteenth century, see the meticulously researched 
and compiled work of Benedict M. Ashley, O.P., “Survivors (1700s)” in The Dominicans (Collegeville, Minnesota: 
The Liturgical Press, 1990), available gratis online at domcentral.org.  For further general information on Moral 
Theology, see also: Charles E. Curran, “Moral Theology before the Nineteenth Century” in The Origins of Moral 
Theology in the United States: Three Different Approaches (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 
1997), 3-45; Antonio Tannoja, The Life of St. Alphonsus Maria de liguori, Bishop of St. Agatha of the Goths, and 
Founder of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer (Baltimore: John Murphy & Co., 1855); J.A. McHugh, 
O.P., “Doctrines of Dominican Theology” in Homiletic & Pastoral Review (New York: Joseph F. Wagner, Inc., 
1936), 709-722; and Servais Pinckaers, The Pinckaers Reader: Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology, John Berkman 
and Craig Steven Titus, eds. (Washington, D.C., The Catholic University of America Press, 2005). 
651 Villanueva, 22. “…personas religiosas y sabias…” 
652 Alvarado, Carta XI, “Querido amigo: por fin llegó á mis manos el Jansenismo de Irenéo Nistactes.”  Villanueva 
was not the first target of Alvarado’s critiques – letters eight through ten, immediately preceeding the letters written 
against El Jansenismo, were written in response to Antonio Puigblanch’s 1811 publication, La Inquisición sin 
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Villanueva’s dialogue engages only the first two letters of Alvarado, written May 16 and June 9, 
1811, failing to engage with any of the other eight which Alvarado authored during the second 
half of 1811.653 Furthermore, Villanueva only works with a select number of passages from these 
two letters, amounting to less than seven total pages of Alvarado’s work.654 
As the debate unfolds over the course of the work, numerous topics are introduced: the 
sacramental status of penance, the practice of confession, free will and moral theology, the 
genealogy of Jansenism, the relationship of Jansenism to reform movements, and the place of 
these reforms within the church.  All topics are strikingly religious and are articulated using 
traditional religious argumentation.  While Spanish Jansenism may have functioned as a slippery, 
polysemic term that could be used by or against political liberalism, regalism, or rationalism, the 
debate presented in Villanueva’s dialogue clearly belongs to that class of critiques which 
Tomisch labeled “distinct” from regalism.655  It is clear from Alvarado’s arguments that his 
concerns about Jansenism are primarily religious ones.  It is equally clear from Villanueva’s 
response that he conceives of Jansenism as a religious or epistemological category.  The 
significance of this for the historian is that Spanish Jansenism, long-abused as a stand-in word 
for political liberalism, has been misunderstood.  Contemporary intellectuals of late-eighteenth 
and early-nineteenth century Spain viewed the category of Spanish Jansenism, even if they 
                                                 
máscara ó disertacion, en que se prueban hasta la evidencia los vicios de este tribunal, y la necesidad de que se 
suprima (The Inquisition Unmasked, Or, A Dissertation, In which it is proved thoroughly the Evidence of the Vices 
of this Tribunal, and the Necessity of its Abolition).  See Filósofo Rancio (Alvarado), Cartas Críticas, VIII-X.  
Also, Natanael Jomtob (Antonio Puigblanch), La Inquisición sin máscara, o disertación en que se prueban hasta la 
evidencia los vicios de este tribunal y la necesidad de que se suprima (Cádiz: Imprenta de Josef Niel, 1811). 
653 Alvarado’s letters were dated by the publisher as follows: I, 5/16/1811; II, 6/9/1811; III, 8/3/1811; IV, 8/16/1811; 
V, 8/21/1811; VI, 8/27/1811; VII, 9/1/1811; VIII, 11/18/1811; IX, 11/29/1811; X, 12/6/1811. 
654 Both Villanueva and Alvarado were extremely prolific.  When Alvarado eventually responded to Villanueva’s 
twenty-two page work, he wrote approximately over 350 pages of commentary. 
655 Tomisch, El Jansenismo en España, 31. 
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believed it to be invented, as a religious one.  Analyzing the specific points of contention 
addressed in Villanueva’s dialogue and in Alvarado’s letters helps to underscore this assertion. 
Villanueva first admits that there is an ambiguity to the term “Jansenists,” and that those 
who do employ the term often offered circular language to define it.  The Augustinian states 
Villanueva’s own position clearly, saying, 
For me, it is as clear as the daylight which illumines us that Jansenism has come 
to be an appellation that one applies detrimentally to catholic and very honorable 
persons.  If Sir [the Dominican Father Maestro] has evidence to the contrary, that 
is, that those who are called Jansenists among us are defenders of some of the five 
propositions of Jansen, and are true heretics as are the Calvinists, Anabaptists, and 
other sects, release me, Sir, from this error.656 
The Dominican responds with words excerpted directly from the letters of Alvarado, speaking, 
as it was, for Alvarado’s position, that he too once believed that this sect “never existed in 
Spain,” or that those who did state it were mistaken, but that he had since received significant 
proof that it did.657  Villanueva’s other characters are alarmed at the possibility of a heterodox 
sect existing within Spain, asking, “What are these Jansenists, because I don’t know,” and 
wanting to know “How does [one] recognize these birds [Jansenists]?”658  The questions are of 
recognition and definition, and Alvarado’s own response is one of clear religious markers in 
belief and praxis. 
                                                 
656 Villanueva, El Jansenismo, 3. “Para mí es tan claro como el día que nos alumbra, que el Jansenismo ha venido a 
ser un apodo que se aplica dolosamente a personas católicas y mui recomendables.  Si tiene V. evidencia de lo 
contrario, esto es, de que los llamados jansenistas entre nosotros son defensores de alguna de las cinco 
proposiciones de Jansenio, y verdaderos herejes como los calvinistas, anabaptistas y otros sectarios, sáqueme V. de 
este error.” 
657 Alvarado, Carta I.42. “Otra casta de pájaros tenemos también tan malos como las filósofos, ó peores, que son los 
jansenistas.  Yo estaba en el mismo error en que todavía están muchos: primero: que de esta secta nada había en 
España: después, que los que había, lo eran por mera ignorancia.  De ambas cosas me he desengañado; y entre las 
causas que han concurrido á mi desengaño…” 
658 Villanueva, El Jansenismo, 3-4.  “?Qué son estos jansenistas? Porque yo no lo sé…. ?En qué conoce V. á esos 
pájaros?”  The origin of the coloquial expression equating Jansenists and heretics with birds is uncertain. 
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Alvarado highlights in his first Carta Crítica that the errors of Jansenism all stem from a 
central doctrinal error concerning free will and the efficacy of grace, but Villanueva chooses to 
begin his critique with a more concrete, external argument, and the first symptomatic “marker” 
of Jansenists that Alvarado lists: the status of the Sacrament of Penance and Reconciliation.  
Alvarado’s position, stated as the Filósofo Rancio, is that “In the first place, they [Jansenists] 
added, instead of denying the Sacrament of Penance like the Protestants do, the need for a new 
system of dispositions, because it is not possible between men.”659  The Jansenists, according to 
Alvarado, reserved the dispensation of grace to the activity of God, thus challenging the 
sacraments of Penance and of the Eucharist. To identify a Jansenist, therefore, one needed to 
look for a person arguing against the practice of these sacraments or abstaining from their 
required participation.660 
Villanueva’s response is to enumerate numerous ‘tried-and-tested’ orthodox Catholics, 
saints, Patristic authors, or ecclesiastical ordinances that support the so-called “Jansenist” 
position either explicitly or implicitly.  The tactic, which Villanueva repeats multiple times, is 
traditional in its articulation – a claim of epistemological verification based on authority and 
traditionalism.  Villanueva therefore, although writing at the end of the Spanish enlightenment, 
displays the lingering prestige that authority and traditionalism had as ways of knowing.  Despite 
the changing hierarchy of ways of knowing, it is useful to remember that the ‘evolution’ was a 
slow process.  Villanueva notes, for example, the work of the Cardinal José Saenz d’Aguirre, a 
much-beloved Spanish Benedictine of the second-half of the seventeenth century, on the 
                                                 
659 Alvarado, Cartas Criticas, 42, “…se le añadió en primer lugar, en vez de negar como los protestantes el 
sacramento de la penitencia, la necesidad de un aparato de disposiciones, que no es possible entre los hombres.” 
660 The Sacrament of Penance and Reconciliation had been a mandatory annual requirement since Lateran IV in 
1215. 
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Sacrament of Penance.661  Quoting Aguirre quoting St. Francis Xavier, Villanueva notes that 
many have sought reform to the ordinances of penitence, restating: 
In confession, one does not sign absolution immediately; first, wash the stains of 
the soul with voluntary punishments, restituting that which is owed – laying down 
their hatreds, enemies, lusts and other vices.  It is best that these things precede 
absolution.  Therefore promising in confession so to do such things, and [then] 
receiving absolution, they [would] forget their word and [would] not fulfill that 
which they promise?662 
Challenges to an established sacramental tradition, in other words, were neither new nor 
inherently heterodox.  Indeed, Villanueva argues that if the label “Jansenist” were to be applied 
to anyone who had questioned or critiqued the Sacrament of Penance, many famous Catholics 
would fall under the category.  In addition to Aguirre and Xavier, Villanueva highlights the post-
Tridentine reforms of Robert Bellarmine.663  Villanueva notes that Bellarmine critiqued laxity in 
confessors, that “they absolve the contrite and the uncontrite, to those that confess well and 
poorly, and to those that are and are not willing to seek satisfaction.”664  The issue, for 
Bellarmine and for Aguirre, was the frustratingly impossible goal of regulating and encouraging 
interior attitudes and feelings of penitence for those who were seeking an external measure of 
                                                 
661 Villanueva’s choices of ‘exemplary’ Catholics are revealing: Aguirre (1630-1699) was a graduate of Salamanca, 
the traditional Thomistic seminary in Spain, and was famous for his thoroughly-Aristotelian refutations of Bossuet 
and of the Declaration of the Gallican Clergy (1682).  If any reader was to assume that Spanish Jansenism had 
connections with Gallicanism or with French Jansenism, Villanueva’s example argues against him strongly. For 
further information, see Aguirre’s works, including S. Anselmi Theologia, Commentariis et disputationibus tum 
dogmaticis tum scholasticis illustrata (1678) and Auctoritas infallibilis et summa Cathedrae Sancti Petri (1683). 
662 Villanueva, El Jansenismo, 6-7, “A la confesión no se siga inmediatamente la absolución, laven primero las 
manchas de su alma con castigos voluntarios: restituyan lo que deben: depongan sus odios, enemistades, lujurias y 
los demás vicios.  Mejor es que es[7]tas cosas precedan a la absolución.  Porque estos tales prometen en la confesión 
que lo harán así, y en recibiendo la absolución se olvidan de su palabra y no cumplen lo prometido?” 
663 St. Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621), S.J. – easily one of the most identifiable figures of the “Counter-
Reformational” Catholic Church, synonymous with Tridentine doctrine, and a grand systematizer of dogmatic 
theology. 
664 Villanueva, El Jansenismo, 7. “…que absuelven a los contritos y a los no contritos, a los que se confiesan bien y 
mal, a los que están y no están dispuestos a satisfacer.” 
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sacramental grace.665  This same critique, Villanueva notes, had been made for centuries by 
luminaries such as S. Carlos Borromeo and Santo Tomas de Villanueva.666 
If the records of such famous and indubitably orthodox Catholics was insufficient 
evidence, Villanueva has the Augustinian friar also recall from memory the pronouncements of 
the eleventh canon of the Third Council of Toledo, the 75th canon of the Fourth Council of 
Cartagena (Murcia), the seventh chapter of the first epistle of Pope Innocent I, and the teachings 
of the Cardinal of Lugo. Even the teachings of the Council of Trent – the latest systematic 
benchmark in orthodox Christianity – were invoked, citing Session XXV, chapter 18, which 
stated that dispensations should be given “with mature consideration.”667 The argument is 
deliberately over-established – Villanueva is insistent upon showing that the teachings of the 
church have, since their inception, been debated by the faithful for reproof, review, and 
                                                 
665 This problem has been noted by many historians of seventeenth-century Catholicism, not only in Penance, but in 
the Eucharist and lay devotion as well.  See, for example, John Bossy, “The Social History of Confession in the Age 
of the Reformation,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society Fifth Series, Vol. 25 (1975), 21-38.  Bossy, in his 
usual reductionist explanation, describes the shift in the practice of penance (the development of individual 
confessions and of the confessional) as “a shift from the social to the personal…the emphasis of the sacrament lay in 
its providing part of a machinery for the regulation and resolution of offences and conflicts otherwise likely to 
disturb the peace of a community.  The effect of the Counter-Reformation was….to shift the emphasis away from 
the field of objective social relations and into a field of interiorized discipline for the individual.” (21)  For a more 
nuanced approach to the problem of “interiorized discipline” see Nathan D. Mitchell, The Mystery of the Rosary: 
Marian Devotion and the Reinvention of Catholicism (New York: New York University Press, 2009).  The Baroque 
Catholic Church, according to Mitchell, wanted to control these notions of the independent and isolated self 
“through a strategy of disciplinamento,” that is, a carefully defined and corporately monitored guide in order to 
establish a “standard and regulatory prescription for devotion.” (18)  By emphasizing this disciplinamento, however, 
the Catholic Church inadvertently supported the development of the individual and interior self, no longer 
emphasizing the communal units of the family or the parish, but the single and solitary self as the base unit for 
communion with God.   While Mitchell concedes that the development of these practices of interior devotion may 
have been post-Tridentine reinventions of the early-sixteenth-century devotio moderna (a theory that Ronnie Po-
Chia Hsia supports), he is less willingly to bridge the Baroque period to the late-medieval Church in such a 
continuity thesis manner.  Rather, Mitchell emphasizes key differences between the early-fifteenth and seventeenth 
century devotions, noting that the Baroque period was uniquely advanced, perhaps even dependent, upon the 
technological innovations which increased print culture and allowed for wider spread literacy.  Literacy and the 
reading of texts, Mitchell notes, inherently promotes reflectivity and interior devotion as a solitary activity in a way 
that oral, liturgical, and communal culture of the early-sixteenth Church simply could not. (97) The individual 
continues to be traced in Mitchell’s work, including the centrality of the self as a moral voice, the privatization of 
confession, and the acceptance of the vernacular translation for numerous religious texts.  
666 Charles Borromeo (1538-1584), Cardinal Archbishop of Milan and key figure of the Counter-Reformation during 
the sixteenth century.  Thomas Villanova (1488-1555), O.S.A., himself the confessor to the pious Carlos V. 
667 Concilium Tridentinium Sessio XXV, Cap. 18 “De Reformatio.” 
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strengthening reform.  In a clever turn of the argument, Villanueva asserts that change and 
reform is the traditional position, while resting in outdated practices is morally culpable and 
ignorant of the Catholic lineage of reformers.  He stated, 
…this same reply was made to St. Charles Borromeo by the lazy ministers of his 
time: ‘One does not suffer our century to the severity of the ancient canons; non 
ferunt haec tempora veterum canonum severitatem. Thus our predecessors had 
lived and proceeded; [that] there is no reason to introduce new things.668 
This was, as has been shown in the preceeding chapters, a common refrain against the broader 
reforming efforts of the Catholic Enlightenment.  Counter-enlighteners such as Mañer, Armesto 
y Ossorio, and Cigala, argued against the newness of enlightenment thought, and ilustrados like 
Feijóo complained that novelty was synonymous with untrustworthiness to Spaniards.  To 
Villanueva, however, the introduction of the new was essential to the preservation of the old.  
Thus, Villanueva sought to carve out the appropriate place for eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century Catholic critiques and reforming efforts at the sacramental system by showing the 
established pattern of self-critique and challenges that had become ecclesiastical tradition.  
Simultaneously, Villanueva attempted to destabilize one of the ‘markers’ of Alvarado’s notions 
of “Jansenism.”669 
 
Spanish Jansenism and Doctrinal Reform:  Libre Albedrío and Orthodoxy 
 The majority of Villanueva’s treatise, however, is devoted to arguing against Alvarado’s 
claims that those individuals charged with Jansenism believe in fundamentally different and 
heterodox understanding of grace, free will (libre albedrío), and human agency.  Scholar Patricia 
                                                 
668 Villanueva, El Jansenismo,  9. “…esa misma réplica hacían á S. Carlos Borromeo los flojos ministros de su 
tiempo: No sufre nuestro siglo la severidad de los antiguos cánones: non ferunt haec tempora veterum canonum 
severitatem: así han vivido y procedido nuestros antecesores: no hay porque introducir novedades…” Elsewhere, 
Villanueva calls this a weakness (“flaqueza”) of his time. 
669 Interestingly, Villanueva does not carry out a similar argument for revisions to the celebration of the Eucharist in 
his dialogue; rather, he ignores this charge completely. 
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Manning has called this “…the great theological polemic of [the] era – the question of the free 
will of humanity versus divine predestination.”670 Though free will had been one of sixteen 
reform issues that the Council of Trent had originally intended to address, no concrete resolution 
was ever pronounced on the doctrine.671  To be fair, the Decree on Justification from the Sixth 
Session of the Council of Trent did state in Canon IV that 
If any one saith, that man's free will moved and excited by God, by assenting to 
God exciting and calling, nowise co-operates towards disposing and preparing 
itself for obtaining the grace of Justification; that it cannot refuse its consent, if it 
would, but that, as something inanimate, it does nothing whatever and is merely 
passive; let him be anathema.672 
The room for a wide number of lateral interpretations, however, were still allowed by this 
pronouncement.  Interestingly, however, the historian J.L. Heilbron has argued that the doctrinal 
factions were normally between the Society of Jesus, advocating a stronger emphasis on free will 
and the performance of faith through works, and the Augustinian and Dominican orders calling 
for a deeper emphasis of the efficacy of grace and predestination.673  Villanueva argued 
similarly, noting to Alvarado that the majority of Dominican clergy had often aligned themselves 
along Augustinians.  However, to Alvarado, the Jansenists believed in a necessitating grace of 
God that manifested itself, ultimately, in a theology much like Calvinism, described by Alvarado 
as a total loss of man’s free will – a notion more clearly contrary to Tridentine orthodoxy.  
Alvarado wrote, 
                                                 
670 Manning, Voicing Dissent, 273. 
671 See John W. O’Malley, Trent: What Happened at the Council (Cambridge: Harvard Belknap Press, 2013), 66.  
“On free will” was article 15 of 16 to be addressed, ahead only of the closely-related issue: “on faith and works.” 
672 The full text of the Council of Trent’s decrees and canons is available digitally through Hanover College (trans. J. 
Waterworth, (London: Dolman, 1848) ).  O’Malley further explains this by writing: “…though justification is not 
the result of human striving, the human agent contributes something to it, always on condition that that something is 
preceded and accompanied by grace.  The individidual “freely consents” to the movement of grace, but the freedom 
of the consent is operative under the influence of grace.” (O’Malley, Trent, 114) 
673 J.L. Heilbron, The Sun in the Church: Cathedrals as Solar Observatories (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1999). 
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According to them [the Jansenists], the grace that they call efficacious 
necessitates [obligates] man to [do] good work; and without this grace, even when 
man wanted to, he could not avoid sin.  Namely, [this is] the same error of 
Calvin’s that negates free will, and removes the merit and demerit of mankind; or, 
that it is an equivalent of the blind fate of the Gentiles, or the destiny of the 
Moslems.674 
It was this misunderstanding of the doctrine of grace, according to Alvarado, that led to the 
rejection of sacraments, anti-ultramontanist sentiment, and discord.675 
 Alvarado’s casual comment on free will was likely intended as a glib insult, not a 
thorough defense of a complex theological position, especially considering the wealth of 
literature that had been expended since the challenge to Catholic notions of grace and free will 
                                                 
674 Alvarado, Cartas Criticas, 42, “Segun él, la gracia que ellos llaman eficaz, necesita al hombre, á que obre el 
bien; y sin esta gracia, aun quando el hombre quiera, no puede evitar el pecado.  A saber, el mismo error de Calvino 
que niega el libre alvedrio, y quita el mérito, y demérito del hombre; ó lo que es un equivalente, el hado ciego de los 
gentiles, ó el destino de los musulmanes.” 
675 It deeply bothered Alvarado that Spanish Jansenists attacked the budding notion of papal infallibility.  He 
compared this to Febronianism in his first letter, writing, “En tercero; que el Romano Pontifice no es infallible, ni 
aun en las decisions dogmaticas, que sus juicios son corrompidos, que ha sido usurpador de los derechos de los 
Obispos, que estos deben reasumir su autoridad, resistirle, y otros errors semejantes.  En un palabra: la doctrina del 
Febronio, Pereira, Sinodo de Pystoya, &c.” (42)  Similarly, Spanish Jansensism has often been equated by historians 
with Pistoianism or Febronianism.  The Synod of Pistoia, a diocesan synod which met under the direction Scipione 
de’Ricci (1741-1810), bishop of Pistoia, was famous for introducing numerous reforms, including the Decretum de 
fide et ecclesia, which ruled that the church lacked the authority to introduce new dogma.  The Synod also 
recommended the vernacularization of the Mass.  Eighty-five of the articles promoted at the Synod of Pistoia were 
later condemned by Pope Pius VII in the papal bull Auctorem Fidei on August 28, 1794.  Febronianism is the 
collective term of the ideology of Johann Nikolaus von Hontheim, who wrote many theological tracts during the 
second half of the eighteenth century condemning contemporary ecclesiastical practices and traditions and 
advocating substantial reforms, including an increased emphasis on the parochial level, transferring authority and 
responsibility from the papacy to the episcopacy, increased education of clergy, and increased frequency of 
provincial synods.  Febronianism, like Pistoianism, was condemned – Hontheim recanted of his position in 1778.  
For futher information, consult both J.B. Peterson, “Synod of Pistoia,” in The Catholic Encyclopedia (New York: 
Robert Appleton Company, 1911); also, F. Lauchert, “Febronianism,” in The Catholic Encyclopedia (New York: 
Robert Appleton Company, 1909). The problem with relating to Spanish Jansenism to either is two-fold: first, that 
Spanish Jansenism, as has been noted, is distinct from the Jansenism of seventeenth- or eighteenth-century France; 
secondly, that Spanish Jansenism was more nuanced and inherently religiously-thematic than the politico-
ecclesiological ideas of Febronianism or Gallicanism.  Despite his earlier comment, Alvarado seems to have later 
established this delineation clearly – Jansenism and Febronianism are both addressed in his Segunda Carta Crítica 
(June 9, 1811), yet are separated by almost fifty pages and contain no reference to each other.  The error of 
Febronius, rather, is presented as an entirely separate issue by Alvarado, writing, “Escribió el enmascarado Justino 
Febrono su pestilente y capcioso libro De statu Ecclesiae.  Recibiéronlo con sumo aplauso los filósofos que 
gobernaban, y lo hicieron pasar á todos los tribunals y juzgados de imprenta, para que sirviese de luz.  Escribieron 
contra Febronio varios católicos.  No conviene, dixo el Sr. Fiscal del Consejo, que los españoles se mezclen y 
enteren en estas disputas.  Escribió el mismo Febronio su retractación, declarando su persona, y tratando de remediar 
su escándalo.”  (II.65) Here, Alvarado almost implies that Febroniasm was never allowed to enter Spain. 
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by the first wave of Protestant theologians in the early-sixteenth century.  Villanueva takes up 
Alvarado’s claim with serious vigor, however.  Villanueva replies with two immediate 
clarification: “the will, without motive, is not inclined to want or not want something…and that 
other [saying]: the will is naturally weighted to bring the good and to shun the bad.”676  
Villanueva had the Augustinian friar restate an argument familiar to the Augustinian order for 
well over two hundred years by 1811: that the total efficacy of grace cooperates by calling the 
free will of a man to be inclined towards God (a notion that is similarly included in the Council 
of Trent’s discussion of justification).677 
 The debate, now articulated by both Alvarado and Villanueva, was between a Catholic 
understanding of grace as either prevenient (preventiva) or efficacious (eficaz).  Though the 
historiography, particularly confessional history, has often argued that the doctrinal camps were 
settled during the early-Tridentine period and calcified throughout the Catholic Reformation, the 
continuation of these debates into the early-nineteenth century demonstrates that this was far 
from the case.678  Once more, Villanueva defends his position by enlisting the help of 
undoubtedly orthodox Catholics, this time citing Saint Thomas Aquinas.679  Taunting the 
Dominican, the Augustinian asks, “Sir, since you are so exacting of conscience…why don’t you 
cite the same Saint Thomas?  His doctrine is to the letter that which the Father now judges as 
                                                 
676 Villanueva, El Jansenismo, 16.  “…aquel aforismo de las escuelas rancias: la voluntad sin motivo no se inclina a 
querer o no querer alguna cosa: Voluntar sine motivis non flecitur ad aliquid volendum vel nolendum? Y aquel otro: 
La voluntad con un natural peso es llevada al bien y huye del mal: Voluntas innato pondere fertur in bonum, et 
malun aversatur?” 
677 See Trent, Session VI, Chapter V: “On the necessity, in adults, of preparation for Justification, and whence it 
procedes,” which states that: “…the beginning of the said Justification is to be derived from the prevenient grace of 
God, through Jesus Christ, that is to say, from His vocation, whereby, without any merits existing on their parts, they 
are called; that so they, who by sins were alienated from God, may be disposed through His quickening and assisting 
grace…” (Council of Trent, 32-33).  Villanueva, El Jansenismo, 16. “…el libre albedrio por si a ninguna parte se 
inclina, y solo se inclina al objeto que le llama…” 
678 For more information, see Joseph Pohle, “Controversies on Grace” in The Catholic Encyclopedia Vol. 6 (New 
York: Robert Appleton Company, 1909). 
679 Again, Villanueva’s choice of Aquinas is deliberate, most likely to prove that the divide between Thomistic and 
Scholastic theology and liberal Catholics that many had claimed was artificial. 
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morisca and as jansenian.”680  Quoting from the Summa Theologica, Villanueva thrice unpacks 
Aquinas’s sentences to demonstrate the compatibility of his understanding of grace and free will 
with Villanueva’s previous definition of free will according to Jansenism.681  In a culminating 
insult, Villanueva has the Augustinian tell the Dominican that “…by your degree and on your 
own merit, you have well established that we may qualify you as one of the primary moros and 
jansenists…You Sir, have been caught in this mousetrap.”682  The mousetrap that Villanueva 
constructed depended on the cautious delineation that libre albedrío as well as efficacious grace 
existed in orthodox Catholic doctrine before its association with Calvin in the sixteenth century.  
The revival of these notions by eighteenth-century Catholic thinkers did not therefore indicate 
heterodoxy, but a return to orthodoxy. 
 This is why, according to Villanueva, the association of Jansenism with those Catholic 
theologians and intellectuals who were anti-probabilistic is particularly bothersome.  Villanueva 
asserts that “The Filósofo Rancio says that Calvinism begets Jansenism…Caramuel, Terilo, and 
Casnedi say that Jansenism begets anti-probabilism.  Therefore, anti-probabilism is the grandson 
of Calvinism.”683  The association between Calvinism and Jansenism, as outlined above, relied 
upon a coincidental similarity between Jansenism and extreme Augustinian views on grace and 
libre albedrío – which was doubtlessly true in seventeenth-century France, but not necessarily in 
                                                 
680 Villanueva, El Jansenismo, 17.  “Ya que es V. tan delicado de conciencia, dijo el Agustino, por qué no cita V. al 
mismo santo Tomas?  Doctrina suya es a la letra esta que el P. gradúa ahora de morisca y de jansenia. 
681 Villanueva uses 1.P.Q.83.A2.In corp; 1.2.Q.9.A.I.ad 3; I.P.Q.82.A.3.In corp; 1.2.Q.9.a.2.Ad.3; 1.P.Q.83.Art.4.In 
corp; and I.2.Q.9.A.4.Ad.2 from the Summa Theologica.  Villanueva’s argument in this section is concerned with 
deconstructing a straw man of a definition which he himself posited.  For more information, see Brian Davies, ed, 
Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae: Critical Essays (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006); Scott MacDonald and 
Eleonore Stump,  eds., Aquinas’s Moral Theory: Essays in Honor of Norman Kretzmann (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1999); Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2003). 
682 Villanueva, El Jansenismo, 18. “…por su grado y por su crédito que le tiene mui sentado, le calificásemos de uno 
de los primeros moros y jansenistas de su sagrada religión…ha sido V. cogido en esta ratonera.” 
683 Villanueva, El Jansenismo, 11. “El filósofo rancio dice que el calvinismo engendró al jansenismo (carta 2. Pág. 
14 y 15. (Caramuel, Terilo, y Casnedi dicen que el jansenismo engendró al anti-probabilismo.  Luego el anti-
probabilismo es nieto del calvinismo.” In point of fact, Alvarado does not state this assertion on Page 14 and 15 of 
his Segunda Carta Crítica – a note that he is keen to make in his seventh letter responding to Villanueva. 
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eighteenth-century Spain.  The second association between Jansenism and anti-probabilism is 
even less-grounded doctrinally and far more problematic.  Villanueva argued that any person 
who voiced disapproval with the Jesuit notion of moral probabilism was unjustly stigmatized as a 
“Jansenist.” Anti-probabilism, which was bitterly contested and far from a universally accepted 
part of Catholic orthodoxy, had been mysteriously transposed to encompass increasingly more 
dire terms: Jansenism, and worse still, Calvinism. 
 The debate over probabilism and libre albedrio should first and foremost clearly signal to 
historians substantial religious claims that cannot be as easily explained away by political 
reductionism.  Indeed, it represents a purely theological argument of a highly specialized and 
abstract nature, one that can only ever be understood if Spanish Jansenism is admitted as a 
religious category.  It therefore adds credence to the assertions that there is a definite religious 
way of reading these religious texts.  Secondly, the position espoused by Villanueva on behalf of 
those accused of Spanish Jansenism allows insight into the back-and-forth debates for doctrinal 
reform and self-critique within the late-eighteenth century church.  As demonstrated, the 
particular issue of free will and of the efficacy of God’s grace was a key doctrinal issue of 
Catholic orthodoxy, and a central tenet to the notion of justification.  Villanueva and Alvarado’s 
debate over terminology and understanding of grace signifies a persistence of doctrinal reform 
and a legitimate recourse for voicing dissent within the Spanish Catholic church throughout the 
eighteenth-century, a church that has been previously characterized as paralyzed in baroque 
rigidity. 
 
Spanish Jansenism as Afrancesadismo: Conspiratorial Atmospheres and Room for Reform 
259 
Alvarado insists in his letter that the existence of Jansenists indicates some sort of 
allegiance with French thinking and heterodoxy. He cautions his readers to “[Keep an] alert eye, 
for those [Jansenists] are they who in France made a league with the philosophes in order to 
demolish the throne and the altar.”684  Indeed, the presence of Jansenists at the Cortes de Cádiz at 
the time represented to him nothing less than “that among us there are many of Napoleon’s 
spies.”685  The complaint was made by many, and not without some understandable grounds.  As 
has been shown, Catholic Enlighteners had been associated with foreign thought, particularly of 
a French influence, throughout the eighteenth century.  This was compounded by Jansensim’s 
doctrinal similarity to Calvinism, a French heresy.686 
In an another interesting rhetorical reversal, however, Villanueva states that it is not the 
Jansenists, but rather those who believe in the existence of Jansenists who are inadvertently 
working for the French against the nation of Spain.  In addition, Villanueva argues that the idea 
of probabilism and probabiliorism were originally French inventions to sow discord amongst the 
theologians and previously unified Catholic schools and seminaries of Spain. 
It is important to understand that the debate over Jansenism’s definition that occurred in 
both Alvarado’s original letters and Villanueva’s dialogue was held during a revolutionary 
climate, civil unrest, political instability, and general uncertainty.  This situational context is 
especially important to remember when assessing the anti-French sentiment and tone of panic 
                                                 
684 Alvarado, Cartas Criticas, 43.  “Su compostura hipócrita, su language seductor, y las malas artes en que han 
excedido a todas las otras sectas, les dieron mucho lugar en la Francia, y se lo están dando entre nosotros.  Creo que 
en Cádiz hay mucha de esta gente.  Ojo alerta, porque ellos fueron los que en Francia hicieron liga con los filosófos, 
para derribar el trono, y el altar.  Yo temo mucho que en la España pretendan otro tanto, y lo consigan, porque veo 
muchas señales de ambas malas razas: sé que ellos no perdonan medio; y creo como si lo viera, que entre nosotros 
hay muchas espias de Napoleon.  He hablado en estos días con uno venido de Sevilla, á quien un amigo mio, cuya 
formalidad, verdad y probidad me es muy conocida, aseguró haber visto patente de francmason despachada en 
aquella ciudad á favor de uno de Cádiz.” 
685 Alvarado, Cartas Criticas, 43.  “…que entre nosotros hay muchas espias de Napoleon.” 
686 See Hervás y Panduro, Causas de la Revolucion, 118, “Articulo IX: Reflexiones del señor Pey sobre el carácter 
de las sectas calvinística, jansenística, y filosófico-atea, y sobre su influxo en la presente revolución francesa.” 
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that is a frequent strain in these works.687  The Peninsular War between Spanish revolutionary 
forces and guerilla insurgents (the “Spanish ulcer” of Napoleon) and French occupying armies 
began in October of 1807 and lasted until 1814.  During this time, juntas and provincial 
assemblies were formed across the nation in absence of a recognized monarch and met at Cádiz 
in 1810 to form a constitution, eventually signed March 19, 1812.  It was during this time, while 
Cádiz was besieged by French troops, that Villanueva, a representative at the Cortés, and 
Alvarado, kept informed by friends there, wrote their debate over Spanish Jansenism. Spanish 
Jansenism, and indeed the question of reform, must therefore be closely seen as an extension of 
the efforts of many Spaniards in Cádiz to define what they believed and to codify what made 
them traditionally and distinctly Spanish.  
Spanish Jansenism was thus used by both Alvarado and by Villanueva as an insult meant 
to label someone an afrancesado – a Francophile, a collaborationist with the usurping regime.  
Employed as a term by both liberal Catholics and traditionalists, “Jansenist” served as a 
defamatory and conspiratorial slander.688  It is clear that the words of jansenismo and jansenista 
were used as bugbears and boogeymen to frighten people towards orthodoxy (or to scare 
experimental intellectuals back into the straight and narrow paths of orthodoxy); likewise, they 
are used as defamatory labels and even conspiratorial (the “spies of Napoleon”).689  Jansenism, in 
this light, was less of a real thing at all – it had little ideological significance and did not reflect 
                                                 
687 For further information, consult: Miguel Artola, La España de Fernando VII (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1999); 
Teofanes Egido Martínez, Carlos IV (Madrid: Arlanza Ediciones, 2001); Charles J. Esdaile, Spain in the Liberal Age 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2000); Charles J. Esdaile, The Peninsular War (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Roberto 
Fernández, Carlos III (Madrid: Arlanza Ediciones, 2001); David Gates, The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the 
Peninsular War (Pimlico, 2002); Gabriel Lovett, Napoleon and the Birth of Modern Spain (New York: New York 
University Press, 1965); John Lynch, Bourbon Spain 1700-1808; Stanley Payne, History of Spain and Portugal (2 
Volumes) (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973); Paquette, Lehner, etc. 
688 Villanueva frequently uses the word “odiosos” – slanders, libels.  This is meant to be not just a notion of honor or 
insult, but is rather a notion of the misrepresentation or distortion of fact. 
689 Alvarado, Cartas Criticas, 43. 
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an ordered system of thought; rather, it was merely a label that could be conveniently wielded as 
a rhetorical weapon.  This flexibility of the term is, this chapter asserts, a principle reason why 
the previous historiography has designated Jansenism to be a myth, a ghost, or a 
misunderstanding.690 
Yet it is important to understand why Spanish Jansenism became such a particular 
denunciatory category during the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries.  
Jansenism functioned during this time as a polysemic term, whether or not this was always 
understood by contemporaries.691 Spanish Jansenism certainly had distinct “outer meanings” –as 
a religious category, as a political category, as a catch-all defamation.  The more elusive central 
origin, or “inner meaning,” may exist in two ideas: first, the notion of innovation and reform; and 
secondly, the association with France.  In the first sense, individuals labeled as Spanish 
Jansenists were figures who advocated ecclesiastical or doctrinal reform (which often spilled 
over into the political category, especially with regalism).692  In the second, these individuals 
were seen as associated with the importation of foreign ideas and new ways of thinking that 
characterized the eighteenth century in Spain, particularly the Catholic Enlightenment.  
Jansensists were, in many ways, the inheritors of the legacy of the longstanding reforming efforts 
of ilustrados throughout the late-seventeenth and eighteenth century.  Their ideas were seen as 
originating in France, where Jansenism was known to originate.  It is quite plausible that Spanish 
Jansenism and the question of change (reform) was a particularly volatile subject in this context, 
particularly during the French occupation (1808-1814). 
                                                 
690 See Egido or McClelland.  This is partly the explanation that historian Javier Herrero makes in his Los Origenes 
del Pensamiento Reaccionario Español – especially in his chapters, “La Secta de jansenismo” y “La Secta de 
Masonería” (note also the proximity of these two consecutive chapters).  
691 See, for example, the work of linguists Charles Fillmore and Beryl Atkins on polysemy. 
692 This may explain the current state of Spanish Jansenism in the historiography. 
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In her analysis of the intellectual climate of the eighteenth-century, historian Ivy 
McClelland has argued that what she labels the “ideological hesitancy” of Spain during this 
period was largely due to the vulgo.693  McClelland describes the vulgo disparagingly, noting 
that: 
Herd-imagination is more difficult for rationalists to deal with than herd-reason, 
because it is not codified by the vulgo’s philosophical authorities, and though the 
average, the vulgo-scholar, was not entirely immune to superstitious influences, it 
was not usually the vulgo-scholar in this regard with whom reformers had to 
contend.  Their engagements against imaginative preoccupations were chiefly 
concerned with uneducated or semi-educated members of the vulgo: those 
dependent on feeling, outer appearance, the electrifying personality of a popular 
speaker, the drama of exciting circumstance, of coincidence, surprise, disaster and 
nervous disturbance.694 
Alvarado was clearly not a member of this type of vulgo, and thus McClelland’s attribution of 
“ideological hesitancy” as some sort of collectively psychological affliction less than persuasive.  
While it is certainly possible that the upheaval of the Napoleonic occupantion of Spain would 
encourage such “herd-imagination,” a less-simplistic and more serious estimation of Alvarado’s 
rational objections is needed.  Connecting Spanish Jansenism with issues of reform, on the other 
hand, helps to understand Alvarado’s deeply rooted mistrust of the religious sect. 
                                                 
693 See I.L. McClelland, Ideological Hesitancy in Spain, 1700-1750 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1991).  
The use of “reason” and “unreason” is extremely problematic and inchoate in historiographical employment.  For 
example, rationalists, as a historiographical label is more confusing than clarifying, to the point of almost ceasing to 
be useful.  The problem with characterizing one group of intellectuals as “Rationalists” is that their opponents 
become, implicitly, irrational.  There exists no benevolent counterpart term to rationalists; “anti-rationalists” is both 
cumbersome and retains notions of irrationality, while “traditionalists” or “casticismo” does not quite accurately 
address the epistemological challenge posited by “Rationalism.”  The term “rationalism,” however, was used in 
early modern Europe (1732, in English) – thus the usage of the word is inescapable and the gauntlet of responding to 
the critique/elevation of Reason was laid by historical agents, not by historians.  Still, it is important to remember 
when reading these texts of our own presentist tendencies to read “anti-rationalist” as being equivalent to irrational.  
This polysemic obfusfcation occurs in even the best of histories of the period.  In Ideological Hesitancy in Spain 
1700-1750, for example, McClelland writes often about a vulgo “unreason,” which is more akin to irrationalism 
rather than anti-rationalism. 
694 McClelland, Ideological Hesitancy, 4.  McClelland, does, however, perfectly describe the problem of polysemy 
in eighteenth-century polemic: “…[the reformer’s] instinct to imitate accepted attitudes, expect definitive rules and 
authority, and use accepted terminology, meant that he and the individual reformer spoke different languages and 
needed an interpreter to mediate between them.  This exercise of interpretation, often unskilled and misleading, 
which seemed so frustratingly unsatisfactory to all parties concerned, is one of the most vital activities of eighteenth-
century polemic…” (3) 
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Much like the hunt for Freemasons within Spain and in Mexico, Jansenists and Jansenism 
as an idea at the end of the eighteenth-century had the potential to be unduly augmented and 
imagined to be a pervasively systematic and utterly secret threat.695  Writing about Inquisitorial 
conceptions of the Sabbath as a conspiracy, the historian Carlo Ginzburg wrote that, 
“Explanations of social movements in a conspiratorial register are simplistic, if not 
grotesque…But conspiracies do exist…what is their actual weight?”696  The question is 
immensely helpful – what is the actual weight behind the conspiratorial notions of Jansenism?  
Historians have seen the political and factional rhetoric of Jansenism as regalism, as a logical 
outcome of the ilustración, or as liberalism, but have largely failed to describe the 
epistemological framework or the religio-intellectual of weight Spanish Jansenism. 
 
Religious Reform in the Nistactes-Rancio Debate, 1811 
Although understanding the revolutionary context of both Alvarado’s and Villanueva’s 
publications grants extraordinary explanatory power to the reading of these texts, it cannot 
account for a full definition of Spanish Jansenism.  Spanish Jansenism was, as Villanueva’s and 
Alvarado’s debates show, a broader and fundamentally religious concern – a blend of fact and 
fiction, a mythologizing of an existing theological division that created a defamatory and 
conspiratorial category that was simultaneously mutable and meaningful.  It is too far a 
simplification of the historical reality to merely equate the critiques of Spanish Jansenism to the 
anti-afrancesado sentiment of the Napoleonic period, because it both existed before the start of 
                                                 
695 See also Juan Ortiz Villalba, La Masoneria y su Persecución en España (Madrid: RD Editores, 2005), and José 
A. Ferrer Benimeli, La Masoneria Española en el Siglo XVIII (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1986) – both of which emphasize 
the libelous/slanderous nature of Freemasonry.  Alvarado specifically compares Jansenism to Freemasonry in his 
first Carta Crítica, stating “…aseguró haber visto patente de francmason despachada en aquella ciudad á favor de 
uno de Cádiz.”  This parallel can also be noted in the records of Inquisition procesos from the eighteenth-century. 
696 Carlo Ginzburg, Ecstasies: Deciphering the Witches’ Sabbath, trans. Raymond Rosenthal (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1991), 12. 
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the French Revolution and employed the vocabulary and ideological of long-term, real, religious-
intellectual debates.  The actual weight of Spanish Jansenism is not in its polemic misuse, but in 
its religious origins and religio-intellectual articulation of reform – both ecclesiastical and 
practical, as well as doctrinal and ideological. 
Thus, once it has been established that the historiographical treatment of Spanish 
Jansenism has been incomplete, and that Spanish Jansenism must be seen as a fundamentally, if 
not always primarily, religious category, then the actual weight of Spanish Jansenism can be 
seen in efforts at reform.  The issue of reform – both doctrinal and ecclesiastical – connect 
individuals labeled as Jansenists with the broader Catholic Enlightenment within Spain, and 
point to a more dynamic and active Spanish Catholic Church during the eighteenth century.  As 
has been seen throughout this dissertation, the epistemological debates of the eighteenth century 
necessarily impacted the way that the Spanish Catholic Church approached the way that revealed 
knowledge or magisterial doctrine engaged with alterior modes of perception.  In this trajectory, 
the Spanish enlightenment was always a “reforming” process.  Moreover, analyzing Spanish 
Jansenism within the Villanueva-Alvarado debates suggests that it was precisely the issue of the 
proper extent of epistemological and doctrinal reform that was the defining feature of the 
eighteenth-century Spanish Catholic Church.  Unless this was determined, a religious intellectual 
could never be fully determined as either an hijo de perdición or a persona católica. 
The theological-political debates of Spanish Jansenism do not, at a superficial glance, 
seem to be related to the epistemological and methodological discussions which have been 
presented by the earlier chapters of this dissertation.  This chapter asserts, however, the 
reforming efforts of Spanish Jansenism are an applicative case and were direct descendents of 
the epistemology articulated during the Catholic Enlightenment.  Jansenist reformers reevaluated 
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traditionally accepted doctrines by hermeneutical techniques gained during the eighteenth 
century.  They argued for a new relationship between State and Church based on contemporary 
understandings of political thought distinct from the monarchial assertions of Scholasticism.  
They playfully destabilized the role that authority and tradition had as a reliable form of 
verifying knowledge.  Most importantly, they often articulated a position which assumed that the 
magisterial of sociopolitical theory and praxis was independent from religious belief. 
To this position, counter-enlighteners, now aligned with a conservative, montanist 
position argued that these methodological innovations were directly responsible for chaos of the 
French Revolution, and ultimately for the invasion of the Iberian Peninsula.  As in science and 
religion, counter-enlighteners saw the disciplines of statecraft and theology as fundamentally 
unified, and blamed the attempt to remove Christianity from political thought as the root cause of 
the “fiery inhumanity” of 1789 and 1807.697  It was during this time that the particular political 
application of reform became the dominant interpretation of the enlightenment.  The “inner 
meaning” of the epistemological debates of the Catholic Enlightenment became forgotten to the 
“outer meaning” of liberalism and conservatism, and ilustrados became afrancesados.698  
                                                 
697 Hervás y Panduro, Causas de la Revolución de Francia en el ano de 1789, 8-9. 
698 “Catholic rationalism” is, as has been noted, the process by which the Spanish Catholic Church, broadly 
conceived, coopted contemporary intellectual trends (in this case, how Jansenists sought reform by encouraging 
these trends) to strengthen the existing epistemological structure of Catholicism. Likewise the language and 
reasoning of the efforts of anti-Jansenists, namely the Jesuits, will contribute to this dissertation’s understanding of 
how ‘conservative’ Catholicism responded to the introduction of enlightened reform.  Thus, this dissertation chapter 
proposes to study Jansenism as a religious variety and expression of Enlightened Catholic reformism, ultimately 
positioning it as a subset of larger questions and concerns of Catholic epistemology over truth, non-truth, and the 
discernment of the two. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Legacy of the Spanish Enlightenment 
 
“What do we owe to Spain?  What has she done for Europe in the past two centuries, in the past 
four centuries, in the past thousand years? ...What else could one expect from a people who have 
to go to a monk for the freedom to read and to think?” 
-Nicolas Masson de Morvillier, Encylopédie méthodique: géographie moderne vol. I (1782)699 
 
“There are undoubtedly in Spain more learned men who modestly cultivate the sciences; more 
men of erudition who are thoroughly acquainted with the history and jusrisprudence of their 
country; more distinguished men of letters and a greater number of poets, who have energy and a 
fertile and brilliant imagination than is generally imagined.  But according to the Spaniards 
themselves, the present state of letters and the sciences is far from what it was in the times of … 
Cervantes, Quevedo, Gracilaso, Calderon, Lopes de Vega, &c., &c. The Spanish universities can 
no longer boast the reputation they formerly professed…” 
-Jean-François de Bourgoing, Travels in Spain (1789)700 
 
The French Revolution and Napoleonic invasion brought to an end the enlightenment 
experiment in Spain.  Invasion, political turmoil, and a reactionary conservatism would produce, 
by the end of the nineteenth century, a generally unfavorable interpretation of Spain’s 
participation in the enlightenment.  It was a scathing vilification of the conservatism of the 
backwards and power-vested individuals who held the nation back while the rest of Europe 
advanced.  The great, sardonic punchline at the end of the eighteenth century in the Spanish 
empire is this: that the predictions of the counter-enlightenment thinkers were proven true, and 
that the careful preventative measures taken by the mediating Spanish ilustrados were ignored 
and summarily discarded.  The hysterical jeremiads of Fray Diego José de Cádiz and panicked 
paroxysms of Fernando de Cevallos, the careful, scholastic reasoning of Mañer, Cigala, and 
Arnesto y Ossorio, even the guarded admonitions of moderate enlighteners such as Piquer and 
                                                 
699 Morvillers, “Espagne,” in Panckoucke, Encylcopedie Méthodique : Geographie Moderne, Tome Premier ((Paris : 
Chez Panckoucke, 1782): “Que devons-nous à l’Espagne? Qu’a-t-elle fait pour l’Europe depuis deux siecles, depuis 
quatre siecles, depuis mille ans?…Que peut-on esperer d’un peuple qui attend d’un moine la liberte de lire & de 
penser?” 
700 Jean-François de Bourgoing, Travels in Spain: containing a new, accurate, and comprehensive view of the 
present state of that country (London; G.G.J. and J. Robinson, 1789), 252-253. 
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Valcárcel – all of these enlightenment responses were worked out, first in France in 1789, and 
then, vividly brought home to the Iberian peninsula during the French invasion from 1804-1808.  
McMahon, writing on the conservative Catholics of the French Enlightenment, described their 
role as “that of Cassandra,” the tragic princess of Troy, blessed by Apollo with the gift of 
prophecy, and cursed by the same god so that nobody would ever heed her warnings and 
foresight.701  The description is apt for the thinkers of the Spanish enlightenments.  So complete 
was the politicization of the turn-of-the-century that for the next two hundred years, Spain’s 
participation in the enlightenment was completely forgotten, her ilustrados portrayed as 
afrancesado outliers and her anti-ilustrados stigmatized as stubborn and unthinking zealots.702  
ignored. 
This dissertation has argued directly against such an interpretation.  Following the work 
of Herr, Saraillh, and others, this research project has asserted that not only was the Spanish 
empire an active participant in the enlightenment, but that the unique strains of Catholic 
enlightenment and Counter enlightenment that emerged in the Spanish dialogue offer a rare 
chance to better understand both the mentalite of eighteenth-century Spain and the religious 
epistemology of the era more broadly.  It has shown, by examining epistemological debates, that 
Spain contributed a unique and substantive body of thought to the eighteenth century.  It has 
done so by surveying the major intellectual debates of Spain during the eighteenth century, 
demonstrating the preeminent concern that religious intellectuals, natural philosophers, 
theologians, and lay scholars had concerning epistemology and metaphysics.  For such thinkers, 
the most enduring and central questions of the eighteenth-century were over defining truth and 
establishing reliable and certain methods for acquiring it. 
                                                 
701 McMahon, Enemies of the Enlightenment, 187. 
702 See, in particular, Mackay’s Lazy, Improvident People. 
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The first chapter explored the introduction of the new philosophies and new sciences to 
the Spanish intellectual sphere, noting particularly advancements made by the novatores from 
1683-1728, and highlighting the work of Martín Martínez, a prominent anatomist, physician, and 
philosopher of science during the first two decades of the eighteenth century.  Martínez’s work, 
particularly his Medicina Escéptica and Philosophia Escéptica evinced a clear epistemological 
challenge that the novatores raised to the existing traditional methods of knowledge (principally 
Aristotelianism and Scholasticism, but more specifically in the medical field, Galenism).  
Importantly, these early enlightenment thinkers in Spain were not only advancing a particular set 
of new medical and scientific knowledge, but were arguing for a distinct way of ascertaining 
knowledge that would be limited to natural philosophy as a field of inquiry.  These were new and 
groundbreaking suggestions, and the first chapter concluded by demonstrating how some 
Spanish intellectuals responded aversly to the introduction of the new philosophies nearly 
coterminously with the novatores. 
The disillusioning and antisuperstious campaign of Benito Jerónimo Feijóo, the most 
popular figure of the Spanish enlightenment, was the focus of the second chapter.  In it, this 
dissertation argued that Feijóo’s work on miracles, paradoxes, demonic possession, and instances 
of the supernatural serve as a case in point of the way in which the theoretical debates over 
epistemology and metaphysics were resolved and realized in concrete ways and examples.  
Feijóo, like many other Spanish ilustrados, saw in the occurences of the supernatural the perfect 
case study for discussing the proper normative relationships between religion and science.  This 
chapter highlighted in his discourses four methodological changes that undergirded the 
epistemological debates: quantification, methodological naturalism and skepticism, medical 
fideism, and changes to the valuation of epistemic authorities. 
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The controversy surrounding the teatrista polemics was then explored in the subsequent 
chapter, which examined the views of conservative counter-Enlighteners writing against Feijóo.  
This third chapter examined the works of Mañer, Armesto y Ossorio, and of Cigala, distilling the 
central points of the counter-enlightenment platform as an epistemological cautiousness which 
distrusted the ability of the mechanical philosophy to sufficiently explain both physics and 
metaphysics.  This was a reaffirmation of the value of Scholasticism and of traditional modes of 
perception, and an insistence on the unity of knowledge would not allow for the epistemological 
demarcation demanded by ilustrados.  Moreover, the case study of Cigala demonstrated that the 
epistemological conversations of the Spanish enlightenment was occurring on both sides of the 
Atlantic and throughout the early modern Hispanic world. 
Chapter four focused on the negotiation between the progressive and conservative 
enlightenment positions, shifting temporally to examine the writings of Vicente Fernández 
Valcárcel at the end of the century (1787-1797).  Here, it presented Valcárcel’s work to arbitrate 
between the new philosophies advocated by Martínez, Feijóo, and other ilustrados and the 
counter-enlightenment philosophy espoused by Lessaca, Araujo, and other scholastics.  It 
particularly assessed Valcárcel’s contributions to developing an epistemological framework for 
relating the fields of science and religion, revisiting the epistemic demarcation originally 
proposed sixty years earlier by Martínez.  The study ended in the fifth and final chapter, in which 
the epistemological debates of the enlightenment became politicized by Caroline society, the 
French Revolution, and the French invasion of the Iberian Peninsula.  Using the nebuluous 
reformist and ilustrado movement of Spanish Jansensim, this chapter demonstrated how the 
focus of the Spanish Enlightenment became poltiticized at the end of the eighteenth century.  
Counter-enlighteners became associated with the reactionary, xenophobic backwardness which 
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would dominate the intellectual historiography of Spain until the end of the twentieth century.  
Meanwhile, the progressive ilustrados of Spain were labeled as mere afrancesados and enemies 
of the throne and altar.703  The rich, theoretical, and abstract epistemological discussions of the 
previous century were buried beneath the political rhetoric of the Revolution. 
The epistemological debates of the Spanish enlightenment demonstrate how religious 
intellectuals and natural philosophers within Spain encountered, challenged, adapted, and in 
some cases, rejected the modern philosophies and new sciences of the seventeenth and early-
eighteenth centuries.  These include conversations about causality in the natural and supernatural 
realms, the role of divine action, the value of different modes of perception and ways of 
knowing, and the establishment of distinct disciplines of knowledge with particular 
methodologies for ascertaining the truth.  More broadly considered, these debates help historians 
to understand the history of the philosophy of science and the nature of the relationship between 
science and religion in Spain and in Europe, Spain’s place among the wider Catholic and 
European enlightenments, and how the Spanish enlightenment compared to other religious 
enlightenment experiences. 
 
The Negotiation of Science and Religion in the Spanish Enlightenments 
The history of the relationship between science and religion has recently received 
increased scholarly attention, particularly as a means of better understanding the ways that these 
two fields continue to interact on a regular basis in the modern era.  Recent theories which study 
the “deep concord” of theistic belief and scientific practice or that describe science and religion 
as “non-overlapping magisteria” are not simply normative philosophies, but take into account the 
                                                 
703 See, for example, Pey, Compendio de la obra intitulada: La Autoridad de las dos Potestades, Tomo Primero 
(Bayona: la Imprenta de M. Cluzeau, 1822). 
271 
reality and testimony of the historical record.  The history of the philosophies of science and 
religion during the eighteenth century, in particular, offers a dialogue between these two 
disciplines that ranges from theories of compatibility to mutual exclusivity and irreconcilable 
antagonism.  The Spanish enlightenment, while providing different perspectives on how science 
and religion could operate harmoniously, consistently asserted that the two fields were 
compatible and bound by the doctrine of the unity of truth.  This position sets the history of the 
philosophy of science in Spain apart from contemporaries in France and Britain.  It was, in many 
ways, a unique balance of traditional Scholasticism and modern philosophy which included 
discussions on the separation of science and religion as two distinct disciplines, how each related 
to faith and reason as modes of perception, the role of final causes in the natural sciences, and 
debates over divine action in the natural world.  These discussions, if and when they occurred 
elsewhere in the continent, did not have the distinctly mediated position and epistemological 
cautiousness which marked the Spanish mindset.  The arguments debated by Spanish thinkers 
during the eighteenth-century and the ultimate position articulated by individuals like Valcárcel 
are quite similar to modern-day discussions about the normative nature of religion and science. 
 
Relation to the Broader Catholic Enlightenment 
The epistemological debates of eighteenth-century Spain can also be understood as part 
of the broader Catholic Enlightenment – that is, the enlightenment as it occurred in Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, and portions of France and Germany.  Ulrich Lehner writes that Catholic Enlighteners 
had two common goals: “(a) to use the newest achievements of philosophy and science to defend 
the essential dogmas of Catholic Christianity by explaining them in new language, and (b) to 
reconcile Catholicism with modern culture.”704  Even in this subset of the enlightenment, Spain 
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stands apart.  It is true that Spanish ilustrados sought to strengthen Catholicism with the new 
sciences – for example, Feijóo’s use of experimentalism to expose faked miracles – and that 
others sought to reconcile Catholicism with modernity, such as Valcárcel.  At the same time, 
Spanish intellectuals retained a distinct “conservatism” that marked their approach to these two 
aims and did not hesitate to reject the modern in favor of the traditional.  This is particularly 
clear in the case of Scholastic reasoning.  Lehner also notes that a common factor of the Catholic 
Enlightenment was that “all agreed that Aristotelian scholasticism could no longer serve as the 
universal foundation for theology.”705  In Spain, such Scholasticism had a longstanding and 
lingering influence, especially over theology.  Still, as has been demonstrated by the chapter on 
Spanish Jansensism, the Spanish church was participating in enlightening and reformist 
movements coterminously with the global Catholic Church in the eighteenth century. 
 
Relation to Other Religious Enlightenment Experiences 
This research also helps to elucidate the way in which religious traditions outside of 
Catholicism encountered the new philosophies of the Enlightenment during the late-seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries.  In his recent work, The Religious Enlightenment, David Sorkin 
demonstrates how many forms of religion in the eighteenth century, such as varieties of 
Protestantism and Jewish Haskalah, in addition to reformist Catholicism, were key figures in the 
generation, dissemination, and adaptation of enlightenment thought.706  This is not only true with 
the way these religions similarly encountered the new philosophy of science, but also the way 
they addressed other “enlightenment ideas” such as religious tolerance, the importance of 
vernacular publications and the democratization of knowledge, the relationship between Church 
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and State, and the primacy of experience and reason as epistemological modes of perception.  
Likewise, Jean-Pierre Martin, studying Protestant experiences in the North American 
Enlightenment, argues that Jonathan Edwards reacted similarly to the Counter-Enlighteners of 
the Hispanic world, responding to materialist and reductionist philosophies with a reassertion of 
the metaphysical grounding of all knowledge and emphasizing “intuitive knowledge of God, 
tradition, common sense, and language” as legitimate ways of knowing.707 
Moreover, the historian Stephen Barnett has helped to clarify what he labels “the myth of 
deism” that has dominated the secular interpretation of the enlightenment in France and England.  
According to Barnett, “the bogeyman of deism” was actually often the historical creation of 
religious individuals involved in politico-religious debates of the eighteenth-century – a straw-
man sect of intellectuals that historians have believed to be far more pervasive than actually 
existed.708  The method proposed in Barnett’s work for understanding religious and political 
debates helps to nuance many of the religious debates of the eighteenth century.  Rather than 
flatly labeling examples such as the Methodist movement of the Anglican John Wesley or the 
Jansenist Catholics of France and Spain as unenlightened contretemps, these topics become a 




 This dissertation has sought to show how eighteenth-century Spanish intellectuals 
thought about knowledge in the eighteenth-century, amid the influx of new philosophies and 
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scientific advancements which marked enlightenment thought.  By examining key scientific, 
philosophical, and theological works of the period, this dissertation has demonstrated that 
eighteenth-century Spanish thought was marked by a fundamental concern over clearly defining 
and establishing an epistemological and metaphysical platform which governed their 
investigations of theology, philosophy, and the natural sciences. From these discussions, Spain 
participated in and encountered the enlightenment in a uniquely conservative way which shaped 
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